

The AMERICAN HISTORICAL REVIEW

Vol. LII, No. 1

October, 1946

The British Road to Yorktown: A Study in Divided Command

WILLIAM B. WILLCOX*

FEW episodes in military history have received more one-sided attention than the Yorktown campaign. The Franco-American design has been studied in all its ramifications, but the strategy of the British has been largely neglected. What they did has long been known in detail; why they did it is a question which needs further exploration.¹ They had the strategic initiative

* The author is associate professor of history in the University of Michigan.

¹ The standard treatment of British strategy in this period is in J. W. Fortescue, *History of the British Army* (13 vols. in 20, London, 1899-1930), III, chaps. xvi-xx. This work is invaluable for reference, but its judgments are few and not always sound. Much of the source material for a study of British plans is in Benjamin F. Stevens, ed., *The Campaign in Virginia, 1781: An Exact Reprint of Six Rare Pamphlets on the Clinton-Cornwallis Controversy*, etc. (2 vols., London, 1888). The most valuable part of these volumes is the correspondence between Clinton, Cornwallis, and Germain, from May of 1780 to December of 1781. Despite the editor's diligence, the correspondence is incomplete. A number of important letters are still in manuscript among the Sir Henry Clinton Papers in the Clements Library of the University of Michigan (cited hereafter as CP). A study of the Yorktown campaign, based on these papers, appeared in 1931: Randolph G. Adams, "A View of Cornwallis's Surrender at Yorktown," *American Historical Review*, XXXVII (October, 1931), 25-49. The article is an excellent survey of British planning in the final months; it was written before the Clinton Papers were fully catalogued, however, and contains a number of misstatements and misinterpretations.

at the beginning of the southern campaign, and they lost it in great part because of a series of faulty decisions. Those decisions paved the way to their final disaster, which was as much the work of their own high command as of Washington or de Grasse.

British strategy in America, in the seventeen crucial months from the fall of Charleston to the fall of Yorktown, is too complicated a story for a single article. But through the period runs one constant theme, the Chesapeake, which grows in importance until it eclipses all others. The theme is no accident. The great bay was a focus for the British from the moment they opened a major theater of war in the Carolinas; that theater committed them also to Virginia, and within a year they had shifted their center of operations from Charleston to the James. Five months later they had lost the war.

The Yorktown campaign, in short, was not an isolated episode. It was the last in a chain of events extending over a period of almost three years, from the time when the British first moved in force into Georgia in the closing days of 1778. Success there encouraged them to extend their operations a year later to South Carolina, where their campaign opened brilliantly with the siege and capture of Charleston, in May of 1780, and with Cornwallis' victory over Gates at Camden in the following August. In July, however, the French had established a naval base at Rhode Island, from which their small fleet was a constant menace to British communications. In October, despite this danger, the British began a series of expeditions to the Chesapeake, where the forces were continually increased until, by May of 1781, their size encouraged Cornwallis to join them. He did so, and in August he moved the combined army to Yorktown; there he was bottled up at the end of the month by the French West Indian squadron. The British fleet failed in an attempt to rescue him, returned to New York, and stayed there until he surrendered.

This outline of events raises a number of questions. Why did the British commit themselves increasingly to the Chesapeake? Since their position there was obviously exposed, why did they fail to protect it against the threat of the French fleet? Did their naval commanders make good or bad strategic use of their own fleet? Once the army was caught at Yorktown and the attempt at rescue had failed, why were six weeks allowed to pass with no second attempt, and no effort by Cornwallis to escape the closing trap? These questions are not completely answerable, but they deserve more attention than they have had. They can best be considered first in terms of two factors, independent of the enemy's designs, which determined British strategy, and second in terms of the situation as it developed.

The first strategic determinant was personal, the relationships between the admirals and generals. War often depends on such accidents, especially when

the two sides are nearly equal in force. Co-operation and adaptability in a high command are then major assets, while quarrelsomeness and divided counsels are corresponding deficits. The tragedy of Great Britain in America was not that her military leaders were fools, but that they lacked the qualities required for effective teamwork. Although they had individual virtues, they could not pool them to solve their common problem.

Cornwallis is an example in point. He was an excellent tactician in the heat of battle, and he planned more boldly than most of his fellow officers; but he was often bold at the wrong times. His qualities might have been virtues in a field officer under a cautious superior; they were dangerous defects when he was acting independently, as he virtually was during this period. He was headstrong, impatient of the ideas of others and uncritical of his own, and largely unaware of the cardinal fact that the army depended on the navy. To turn him loose in the Carolinas was to invite disaster.

His commander in chief, Sir Henry Clinton, was wholly different. He could strike hard after sufficient preparation, as he showed at Charleston. But in general his failing was caution. While he might wait as patiently as Washington, he lacked his enemy's gift for a quick change from waiting to attack; inaction seems to have dulled his awareness of the pressure of time. He also lacked Washington's breadth of view and inclined to emphasize dangers in proportion to their nearness. Within these limits he was a competent defensive strategist, at a time when only an audacious and skillful offensive could have won the war. He deputed the offensive to Cornwallis, partly from choice and partly because he could not help himself, and his deputy was more audacious than skillful.

Some of the blame for Clinton's position rests with the home government, and in particular with Lord George Germain. The character and failings of Germain are so familiar that he is in danger of becoming the whipping-boy for all the British errors in the Revolution. The shortage of troops in America cannot be laid wholly at his door, as Clinton was tempted to do. But his incredible optimism led him to minimize the need of reinforcement, and his interference with Clinton's plans kept that harassed general on the verge of resigning throughout the four years of his command.

The naval chief during most of the period was Vice-Admiral Marriot Arbuthnot. He was nearing seventy and was in failing health; these are the two excuses to be made for him. He was vacillating, irascible, and timid; his strategic sense was usually meager, and his tactical ideas, to judge by his one engagement, were in the worst tradition of the period.

Arbuthnot was succeeded in July of 1781 by Rear Admiral Sir Thomas Graves, his superior in everything but rank. Graves was conscientious, polite,

easy to work with, fitted to command a squadron which was comfortably superior to the enemy. But he was not the man for a crisis, and he was plunged without warning into the worst naval crisis of the war. He tried to meet it bluntly, by a battle in which he displayed more courage than skill. He failed, and failure seems to have left him with no further resources in himself.

These were the principal British actors in the final campaign. None of them showed genius, but their average capacity was probably as high as that of the commanders opposed to them. With the possible exception of Arbuthnot, the British suffered less from individual incompetence than from mutual friction. Germain's attitude toward Clinton was at best equivocal, and Clinton despised him. Sir Henry's relations with Cornwallis were slightly strained at the beginning of the Carolina campaign, and rapidly deteriorated. Clinton and Arbuthnot were at loggerheads for almost a year before the cabinet yielded to Sir Henry's demand for the admiral's removal.² By then—July of 1781—the harm had been done. Strategy implies teamwork, but the team had disintegrated.

The second strategic determinant was the conditions which geography imposed upon the British from the beginning of the southern campaign. That campaign was not in itself the direct concern of the commanders in chief, except as it absorbed reinforcements. Clinton never fell into Germain's error of trying to direct operations from too great a distance but left them to Cornwallis. The navy was even less concerned; no hostile fleet could remain for long off the southern coast, because the enemy had no base within operating range. Yet the war in the Carolinas dominated British strategy for a year after the fall of Charleston, because it focused the attention of the high command upon the Chesapeake.

The reason was one of logistics. Washington's communications between the southern and northern colonies were by land, and they were most vulnerable to sea power where the land route was narrowest, between the Alleghanies and the great bay. Here the Royal Navy might operate, both in the Chesapeake and in its western tributaries from the Potomac to the James. A naval base in the bay would be better located, especially for winter, than at any other point on the American coast. The first step would be to secure it with troops landed from the fleet; the second would be an advance westward, at best to the mountains, so as to cripple the American army to the south. At least the British might capture stores and impede reinforcement of the enemy to the point where part of the forces opposed to Cornwallis would be with-

² The breach between the two grew out of their failure to destroy the French forces at Rhode Island in 1780; see my article, "Rhode Island in British Strategy, 1780-1781," *Journal of Modern History*, XVII (December, 1945), 306-307, 309-13, 316-17.

drawn for the defense of Virginia; the way would thereby be opened for the earl's advance northward. The Chesapeake, in short, was the place to clamp a tourniquet on the artery of American supplies.

This was apparent as soon as Charleston had fallen. The victory brought a glow of optimism to the British command: the long miles from South Carolina to New York seemed to be open to conquest, and the end of the war to be in sight. "A few works, if properly reinforced, will give us all between this and Hudson River," Clinton wrote from Charleston. "I leave Lord Cornwallis here in sufficient force to keep it against the world, without a superior fleet shows itself—in which case I shall despair of ever seeing peace restored to this miserable country."³ From the start, in other words, the success of the army depended on naval predominance.

Success also depended on Cornwallis. Here, too, Clinton felt uneasy. He had been threatening to resign the command since he had received it in 1778, and for the past year the earl had been recognized as his most probable successor.⁴ Cornwallis had therefore been consulted in the early stages of the Charleston operations, until he had somehow realized that his promotion was not imminent. He then abruptly withdrew to his tent and improved upon Achilles by trying to turn the officers against their commander in chief. "I do not think his conduct has been military," Clinton complained; "I am sure it was not friendly, though his professions are still so."⁵ Sir Henry was about to leave him in virtually independent command, and may well have wondered what would come of it.

Clinton left for New York in early June. His departure was hastened by the impending arrival of a French fleet and army, a threat which postponed a British landing in the Chesapeake until New York had been made secure. Admiral Arbuthnot bewailed this turn of fortune, which destroyed his hope for the prompt conquest of Virginia. Clinton also was disappointed, but he was determined to risk nothing until he knew the enemy's strength and destination.⁶ He feared that they might make for the Chesapeake, in which they had already shown a disconcerting interest. After d'Estaing had failed before Savannah in 1779, he had sent some ships to Virginia on their way back

³ Clinton [to William Eden], May 30, 1780, CP. I have modernized spelling and punctuation throughout.

⁴ Fortescue, III, 253, 290.

⁵ Uncatalogued and undated Clinton memorandum, written before he left Charleston, CP. See also Clinton [to Eden], May 30, 1780, CP.

⁶ Historical Manuscripts Commission, *Report on the Manuscripts of Mrs. Stopford-Sackville, of Drayton House, Northamptonshire* (2 vols., London, 1904-10), II, 162, 165; Arbuthnot to Germain, Aug. 27, 1780, Germain Papers (Clements Library), XIII; Benjamin F. Stevens, ed., *Facsimiles of Manuscripts in European Archives Relating to America, 1773-1783* (25 vols., London, 1889-98), VII, no. 726. The *Stopford-Sackville MSS* is the calendar of the Germain Papers, and I cite it wherever the relevant part of a document has been printed verbatim. The original papers are arranged chronologically, in numbered but unpaginated volumes.

to the West Indies. They had been dispersed by a storm, but one ship of the line and two frigates had made the York River and wintered there. Fortifications had been erected at Yorktown to cover them and were still standing as a reminder that the French might return.⁷

Clinton had already outlined to Cornwallis the strategy which he wished to follow. The safety of Charleston was the earl's primary objective, and an offensive must be subordinate to it; the only line of advance suggested was by boat up the Cape Fear River. Operations in the Chesapeake would start as soon as the season and the naval situation permitted, and Cornwallis might be asked to contribute a detachment to them. Their purpose would be first to establish a naval station in the vicinity of Norfolk, then to strike north toward Baltimore.⁸ This remained the outline of Clinton's design for the next twelve months.

It had much to be said for it. Charleston was a primary consideration; its harbor and land defenses made it an ideal base for an army dependent on the sea. As long as Cornwallis remained in touch with that base and was supported by a superior fleet, his position was secure. He could assume the offensive by sea, could harass enemy communications while his own remained invulnerable, and could test the temper of the coastal regions without imperiling himself if loyalist recruits failed to materialize. Such methods might not win the war, but they could scarcely lose it.

Clinton's plan for the Chesapeake shows the same solid caution. He had no grandiose design for a pincers movement, southward from Virginia and northward from Charleston; between the two lay the bulk of North Carolina, the most difficult of terrain for an army with sea-borne communications.⁹ Instead he envisaged a smaller pincers movement against Pennsylvania, for which British resources were more nearly adequate. He would thereby have utilized the large garrison at New York, which was largely wasted as the campaign actually developed. He would also have been able to adjust operations according to the number of men available—a matter in perpetual doubt because it depended on the home government. If the force was small, it might establish a naval post in the Chesapeake, sound out the loyalty of the inhabi-

⁷ The French works initially drew Clinton's attention to Yorktown: Stevens, *Controversy*, II, 114; Clinton to Germain, Mar. 1-16, 1781, CP. For d'Estaing's detachment, see Georges Lacour-Gayet, *La marine militaire de la France sous le règne de Louis XVI* (Paris, 1905), pp. 224-25; William M. James, *The British Navy in Adversity: A Study of the War of American Independence* (New York, 1926), p. 162.

⁸ Stevens, *Controversy*, I, 213-14; Clinton to Cornwallis, June 8, 1780, CP. See also Clinton's three-volume manuscript history, among his papers: "An Historical Detail of Seven Years Campaigns in North America from 1775 to 1782," etc., II, 11-12; Gov. Josiah Martin to Germain, June 10, 1780, Germain Papers, XII.

⁹ Stevens, *Controversy*, I, 399, 417; Sydney G. Fisher, *The Struggle for American Independence* (2 vols., Philadelphia and London, 1908), II, 337-38.

tants, and hinder the enemy from sending supplies or men southward. If the force was stronger, it might seize the peninsula between the Chesapeake and the Delaware, from which it could still impede enemy communications, and where it could be supported by sea and yet weather a temporary French naval superiority.¹⁰ The plan took into account the principal strategic factors: the uncertainty of reinforcements and of retaining command of the sea, and above all the use of that command while it existed. Clinton had the priceless asset of mobility by water, from which he intended to profit.

Cornwallis thought differently. He was convinced from the beginning that Charleston could not be permanently held without the conquest of the hinterland. His conviction led him to operate in areas remote from the sea, where his problem of supply was so great that minor defeats became major ones, and victories were rendered fruitless. Although he relied throughout on diversions in the Chesapeake to distract the enemy, he never seems to have understood what Clinton intended to do if and when a major campaign was opened there.

The difference in thinking between the two men appeared in the initial plan of operation against North Carolina. Cornwallis dismissed Clinton's suggestion of an advance up the Cape Fear, and decided instead to invade the back country as soon as the season permitted.¹¹ He thus renounced at the start co-operation with the navy. His reason was that sickness rendered the tide-water areas prohibitively dangerous. "The bringing the troops down towards the coast before the month of November would be leading them to certain destruction."¹² This factor constantly affected British strategy, and it may in this instance have determined Cornwallis' choice. But the choice also implied a casualness about the value of naval assistance.

Clinton, once he reached New York, grew less optimistic than he had been. He was worried by the threat from the French fleet, and he was slowly realizing that he did not have the army for a major operation in Virginia. Germain was writing him lightheartedly that one more campaign would reduce all the southern provinces.¹³ But Germain was doing nothing to provide the military wherewithal. Clinton wrote him that a diversion in the Chesapeake would necessitate a defensive at New York. Even if Sir Henry achieved his aims in Virginia, which were to test the spirit of the loyalists, to distract the enemy from Cornwallis, and to prevent the French from establishing a naval base,

¹⁰ Stevens, *Controversy*, I, 433-35; "Historical Detail," II, 146-48; Clinton to Germain, no. 1 of Aug. 25, 1780, CP. Arnold urged the same scheme on Germain in Oct., 1780: Fortescue, III, 339.

¹¹ Stevens, *Controversy*, I, 225 and n. 3. Lieut. Col. Tarleton, Cornwallis' subordinate, favored a direct move to Cross Creek (Fayetteville) on the Cape Fear, to open water communications with Wilmington. Banastre Tarleton, *A History of the Campaigns of 1780 and 1781, in the Southern Provinces of North America* (Dublin, 1787), p. 171.

¹² Stevens, *Controversy*, I, 234.

¹³ Germain to Clinton, July 4, 1780, Germain letter book, Germain Papers.

"there would yet remain a task which the army I now command is absolutely unequal to."¹⁴

The French landed in July at Newport, Rhode Island, and a second enemy expedition was reported bound for the Chesapeake.¹⁵ Clinton was anxious to forestall it. He wrote Cornwallis for reinforcements, but the next day he realized that the men could not be spared. He promised, nevertheless, to establish a post on the Elizabeth River, which might become a place of rendezvous once North Carolina had been conquered.¹⁶

At the moment Cornwallis was busy in South Carolina. News of the French arrival had stirred the hornet's nest of rebellion, and his hands were full. But he persevered in his idea that the only defense was to attack North Carolina. A diversion in Virginia would aid the attack, and he earnestly requested one in August.¹⁷ Clinton was more than willing. By this time he dreamed of occupying either the peninsula between the Delaware and the Chesapeake or that between the Chesapeake and Albemarle Sound.¹⁸

Admiral Arbuthnot recommended reinforcing Cornwallis via Charleston, and leaving the Chesapeake alone until spring. Clinton was scornful—"does the good man recollect that 'tis time this war finishes?" Troops sent by South Carolina might take twelve weeks to join the army, while operations along the James would relieve pressure on Cornwallis within a few days. The seizure of Petersburg would force the Americans back behind the Blue Ridge, and the James would then become the northern boundary of the British conquest.¹⁹ In this happy hope Clinton dispatched some 2,500 men to the Chesapeake on October 10, under command of Major General Alexander Leslie. The objectives suggested to him were Petersburg, Richmond, and a post on the Elizabeth, but he was put specifically under Cornwallis' orders.²⁰

Three days before Leslie sailed, his purpose was frustrated by the Battle of King's Mountain. This defeat led Cornwallis to give up the invasion and fall back on South Carolina. There he first heard of the Chesapeake expedition; he did not know, however, whether it was under his orders or Clinton's, and considerable time was lost before he urged Leslie to join him by the Cape Fear River. Leslie obeyed promptly, but he had scarcely reached the Cape Fear

¹⁴ Clinton to Germain, July 4, 1780, CP.

¹⁵ Germain to Clinton, no. 2 of May 5, received on June 26, 1780, CP. Unless it appears elsewhere, the date of receipt of any letter to Clinton is from the original in the CP.

¹⁶ Clinton to Cornwallis, July 14, 15, 1780, CP.

¹⁷ Stevens, *Controversy*, I, 238; Cornwallis to Clinton, Aug. 8, 1780, CP. Tarleton (p. 173) mistakes both the cause and purpose of this expedition.

¹⁸ Clinton to Germain, Aug. 12, and to Arbuthnot, Sept. 5, 1780, CP; "Historical Detail," II, 33-36.

¹⁹ Stevens, *Facsimiles*, VII, no. 741.

²⁰ Stevens, *Controversy*, I, 270-71.

before the earl ordered him south to Charleston, for a junction by the longer but safer route.²¹ The first diversion had failed.

Cornwallis had received his reinforcements, after all, by the route Arbuthnot had suggested. Clinton acquiesced perforce, but he was deeply disappointed. "I will do all I can to recover this blow and forget, if possible, it has happened. But this is an end of all golden dreams in Chesapeake."²² Leslie had accomplished nothing there. He had not raided Petersburg or established a post, and he had encouraged the local loyalists to reveal themselves only to desert them.²³ Clinton's objectives in Virginia were further than ever from realization.

Sir Henry determined to try again, little as he could spare the troops. In December he sent two thousand men to Portsmouth under Brigadier General Benedict Arnold. This time Cornwallis was strongly urged not to absorb the detachment but when possible to reinforce it. He was also authorized, if necessary, to replace its commander by one of his own officers.²⁴ Arnold, the deserter, was an unknown quantity to the British.

At this critical moment, when Arnold was about to land and Cornwallis to launch a new offensive, a breach began to appear between the earl and Clinton. They had not always seen eye to eye, but their relationship had hitherto been cordial enough. Now, when cordiality was particularly important, Cornwallis' tone changed. The change coincided with the return from England of his aide, Captain Alexander Ross, whom he had sent to London in late August with an account of the victory at Camden and who rejoined him on December 21.²⁵ From the very next day, according to Clinton, the earl adopted a new and critical tone toward his chief. Sir Henry blamed the alteration on hints, brought back by Ross, that the cabinet would be glad to see Cornwallis succeed to the command. "Ross, . . . I take it for granted, informed him that he must disapprove of all I had done and intimate my want of economy."²⁶

The attitude of the cabinet is understandable. Clinton had also sent an emissary to London, Major General William Dalrymple, who had arrived in October with reports of the British failure at Rhode Island and with the terms on which Sir Henry insisted if he were to remain in command.²⁷ Then came Ross, with the news of the Battle of Camden—tangible victory, as contrasted

²¹ *Ibid.*, I, 271-76, 277-80, 284-86, 289, 298-301, 308, 317-18; Lord Rawdon to Leslie, Oct. 31, and Clinton to Cornwallis, Nov. 5, 1780, CP.

²² Clinton to unknown, Nov. 12, 1780, CP.

²³ Extract from unknown to Anthony Stewart, Nov. 19, and Clinton to unknown, Nov. 26, 1780, CP; "Historical Detail," II, 54-55.

²⁴ Stevens, *Controversy*, I, 310-11.

²⁵ *Ibid.*, I, 255-56, 312 n. 2.

²⁶ Clinton's endorsement on Cornwallis to Clinton, Dec. 22, 1780, CP; see also Stevens, *Controversy*, I, 312-13 and notes.

²⁷ Willcox, in *Jour. of Mod. Hist.*, XVII, 316.

with Dalrymple's bad tidings and demands. The government naturally, if unwisely, paid more attention to the bringer of good news than of bad. "I have but too much reason to complain," Dalrymple reported, "of the sad effects attending on the state of affairs given by the sanguine people from America."²⁸ Clinton's star seemed to be setting, and in all probability Ross took back strong enough hints from ministers to turn Cornwallis' head.

Cornwallis' generalship, as well as his attitude toward Clinton, changed soon after Ross rejoined him. After King's Mountain he had abandoned an offensive for a defensive war. But in early January, 1781, he received word of Arnold's expedition at just the moment that Leslie's force came within reach, and decided to renew the offensive in North Carolina. He was now pitted against Nathaniel Greene, not the incompetent Gates, and the first fruit of the British advance was the Battle of Cowpens. There Cornwallis lost the bulk of his light troops, but this time he was undeterred by defeat. His previous caution had deserted him, and for some reason he felt that his only salvation was in advancing.²⁹ He accordingly began the long march which took him to Yorktown.

In this decision Clinton had no part. On January 18 Cornwallis wrote him that he might go forward despite the setback at Cowpens.³⁰ The earl apparently sent him no word thereafter until April 10, from Wilmington, and received no dispatch from him until May, when Cornwallis reached the Chesapeake. From January until May the earl was lost to Clinton in the wilderness, and Sir Henry had the impossible task of integrating his plans with an unknown quantity. The result was that the British were fighting two wars independently, one in the Carolinas and one in Virginia.

Developments in the Chesapeake soon engaged all Clinton's attention. Arnold had established his post at Portsmouth, after some hesitation, and was soon in great danger of being trapped there by a combined operation of American troops under Lafayette and the French squadron from Newport. The danger was averted in March by a naval battle which left the British in command of the bay. The first enemy thrust at the Chesapeake had been parried, but it had had considerable effect on British strategy. It had kept Arnold largely inactive, and consequently of little use to Cornwallis. More important, it had induced Clinton to send reinforcements to Virginia and thereby to increase the British commitment there.³¹

²⁸ Dalrymple to Clinton, no. 2 of Dec. 7, 1780, CP.

²⁹ Stevens, *Controversy*, I, 356. Fortescue attributes this decision to Germain's influence (III, 370); Cornwallis, however, had abundant rashness of his own.

³⁰ Stevens, *Controversy*, I, 356.

³¹ For a fuller description of the campaign against Arnold, see Louis R. Gottschalk, *Lafayette and the Close of the American Revolution* (Chicago, 1942), chap. ix; Willcox, in *Jour. of Mod. Hist.*, XVII, 318-21.

The reinforcements arrived in late March under Major General William Phillips. As Arnold's superior, Phillips succeeded him in command; his instructions were the usual ones, to secure a base, to raid along the James, and to co-operate with Cornwallis.³² What form this co-operation would take neither he nor Clinton knew. Cornwallis' latest letter was still the inconclusive one of January 18, and there was still no assurance that he was on the offensive. If he was, Phillips must remain to assist him. If he was not, the post was so exposed that it would probably be withdrawn before summer.³³

By April, Clinton expected that Cornwallis would destroy Greene's army in North Carolina and push the British conquest to the James. "As you know," Sir Henry wrote to Phillips, "it is my intention to leave the conduct of the war as it approaches northward to Lord Cornwallis, whose able management justifies me in so doing. I think the sooner his lordship joins you in Chesapeake the better, after he has made his arrangements in the Carolinas."³⁴ The last phrase was a major qualification. Clinton had no expectation of a meeting on the Chesapeake unless all to the south of it had been pacified, and for obvious reasons. If Cornwallis came north, leaving an enemy army behind him, he would have little chance to retreat southward again in case Virginia became untenable. Regardless of his success or failure in the north, furthermore, South Carolina would be at the mercy of the enemy.

No one knew where Cornwallis was. Phillips heard from American sources that there had been a battle at Guilford on March 15, and that the earl's army was entrenching itself nearby. Another American account, reaching New York, persuaded Clinton that the British had won a considerable victory. He wrote to Cornwallis on the thirteenth in the belief that the battle had forced Greene back across the Roanoke and that the earl would soon have pacified the Carolinas to the point where he could come to the Chesapeake for consultation. Two days earlier, however, Sir Henry had written Phillips that Cornwallis' situation might be critical.³⁵ The truth is that the commander in chief did not know what to expect. Cornwallis might appear on the James as master of all to the south of it, or he might be forced back onto the defensive in the Carolinas. Until Clinton knew which would happen, he could not begin to plan a campaign.

He was consequently unwilling to commit himself further to the Chesapeake. Phillips had promised, before sailing, not to request more men except for purposes of which Sir Henry would unquestionably approve, and the latter

³² Stevens, *Controversy*, I, 347-50.

³³ Undated and uncatalogued Clinton memorandum, written in February or early March, 1781, CP.

³⁴ Clinton to Phillips, Apr. —, filed at the end of Apr., 1781, CP.

³⁵ Stevens, *Controversy*, I, 377-78, 384, 405-406, 401.

had told him in April that he must operate solely with what he had.³⁶ Soon, however, Phillips and Arnold submitted plans which were all contingent upon a reinforcement of between eighteen hundred and two thousand men. Phillips pointed out that he already had too many troops for desultory operations and too few for solid ones. But before this letter was finished, he received at long last news of Cornwallis.³⁷

The news was the earl's dispatch to Clinton of April 10, sent from Wilmington by the man-of-war *Amphitrite*. She called at the Chesapeake, and Phillips read the dispatch. It told a curious story. The campaign had been "uniformly successful," but Cornwallis' effective army had shrunk from something under four thousand to one thousand exhausted men.³⁸ He had retired to Hillsborough, then by a meandering route to Cross Creek (Fayetteville) on the Cape Fear. The river proved unnavigable, and he had the alternatives of continuing down its bank to the sea or of falling back on South Carolina. He elected the former, in the hope that reinforcement might reach him by sea at Wilmington and enable him to return to the higher country before the sickly season began. But the dispatch ended with a plea to Clinton to transfer the seat of war to the Chesapeake, if necessary at the price of abandoning New York.³⁹ Clinton's private comment on this suggestion was that "it certainly would have been the speediest way of finishing the war—for the whole army could probably have been annihilated in one campaign, commencing in July."⁴⁰

Cornwallis had failed to destroy Greene's army, and by retreating to Wilmington he had opened South Carolina to it. On April 22 he heard that Greene was marching against Lord Rawdon, who had been left in command in Cornwallis' absence. The threat was of the earl's own making: he had violated his original instructions to safeguard Charleston at all costs. He could repair his error only by returning in one of two ways, directly by sea or overland to the Waccamaw and thence by water. He rejected the first possibility on the ground that it would take too long and would be disgraceful; he ignored the second, along with his own earlier design of returning to the back country. Instead he decided to go to Virginia. He realized this was a desperate gamble, but he wrote Clinton on April 23 that he was driven to start at once, without waiting for orders, by the fear Greene would return northward and cut him off from

³⁶ Phillips to Clinton, Mar. 15, and the letter cited in n. 34, CP.

³⁷ Stevens, *Controversy*, I, 410-13. Fisher (II, 457-59) exaggerates Clinton's and Phillips' earlier optimism about Cornwallis, and Phillips' despair at sight of the dispatch from Wilmington.

³⁸ Estimates of his initial force vary between two and four thousand; he gave his numbers after Guilford as 1,560, of whom a third were sick. Fortescue, III, 365 and n. 3; Stevens, *Controversy*, I, 396-97 and notes.

³⁹ *Ibid.*, I, 395-99. For well-founded criticisms of Cornwallis' strategy, see Tarleton, p. 288; "Historical Detail," II, 139-40.

⁴⁰ Clinton's endorsement on Cornwallis to Clinton, Apr. 10, 1781, CP.

Virginia. To Phillips he wrote in the same tenor, on the twenty-fourth, and warned him not to imperil his own force by coming to meet him.⁴¹

This was the decision of a man beyond the point of clear thinking. None of his reasons makes sense. Charleston was in danger, and he could have returned in time to protect at least the city and at most the outlying garrisons. Such a move would also have mitigated the two greatest dangers to which he exposed himself by going to the Chesapeake, sickness and the main enemy force. The Carolina hills, as he well knew, were not so fever-ridden as the Virginia coast. They were also out of reach of Washington's army and of French sea power. The latter was likely to be in terms of something more than the small Rhode Island squadron. Every summer since 1778 a major French fleet had either appeared or been expected on the American coast, and there was no reason to assume that the coming months would be free of the danger.

Cornwallis' final error was in leaving without orders. The *Amphitrite*, which brought his dispatch north, had sailed initially from Charleston. Lieutenant Colonel Balfour, commanding there, had three dispatches from Clinton to Cornwallis, written in early March, and had promised to forward them at the earliest opportunity; instead he merely sent the earl a brief note of their contents.⁴² Cornwallis had been out of touch with his chief for four months, and was about to embark on what he knew was a perilous and unexpected move. A dispatch boat took less than two days from Charleston to Wilmington.⁴³ Everything pointed to the rudimentary precaution of seeing those dispatches before he committed himself.

Whether they would have dissuaded him is another matter. The first dispatch was little more than official gossip. The second, however, informed him that Arnold had been bottled up in the Chesapeake by a French naval detachment, that the main French squadron was at large with Arbuthnot in pursuit, and that Phillips and his reinforcements would be held at New York until the coast was clear. The earl knew Clinton's opinion of Arbuthnot and might have read between the lines what is there for the reading—Sir Henry's doubt that the coast would be clear.

The third dispatch was a copy of Clinton's instructions to Phillips. They made apparent that the purpose of the expedition was to establish a post and to co-operate with Cornwallis, not to enter on major operations; Clinton twice mentioned a return to New York in the near future.⁴⁴ Not even a casuist

⁴¹ Stevens, *Controversy*, I, 420-22, 424-25, 426, 428-29; see also Tarleton, pp. 290-92; "Historical Detail," II, 168-70.

⁴² Stevens, *Controversy*, I, 392, 395 notes, 420 and notes, 424 n. 2.

⁴³ Clinton estimated the sailing time as twelve hours: "Historical Detail," II, 171. Balfour's message to Cornwallis was apparently sent on Apr. 20 and received on Apr. 22. Stevens, *Controversy*, I, 418-19, 420-21.

⁴⁴ *Ibid.*, I, 331-35, 341-45 and notes, 347-50; Fisher, II, 455.

could have deduced that Sir Henry intended to make the Chesapeake the principal theater of war. Cornwallis had the power to do so, by adding his army to that already there, but the decision would be entirely his.

It was. He had been in independent command for almost a year, while he was being warped in one way by the applause of the cabinet and in another by the hard realities of the campaign. His mind seems to have been numbed by defeat, but his spirit was as confident as ever. Rather than return to being a subordinate, he would force his own design on his superiors. His mood was like that of another self-willed general a century later—"I will carry things with a high hand to the last." But Cornwallis, unlike Gordon, was playing for vast stakes in a game which he did not fully understand.

For some time after the earl's decision was made, Phillips and Clinton were waiting on word from him. Phillips was nearer and heard first. Cornwallis' desperate letter of April 24 reached him on May 6, just after he had finished a raid on Petersburg. He answered at once that he would return to Petersburg and hope to establish contact from there; if there was no threat more serious than Lafayette's small force, a junction might be made without difficulty.⁴⁵ At this point Phillips was smitten with a fever and was soon desperately ill. The command devolved again upon Arnold, to the disgruntlement of a number of his subordinates.⁴⁶ Arnold wrote Clinton that he was eagerly expecting Cornwallis, and would advance toward him as soon as he knew the earl's whereabouts; once the junction was made, "we shall be in force to operate as we please in Virginia or Maryland."⁴⁷

Clinton, meanwhile, was in the dark. His last word from Cornwallis had been the dispatch of April 10, which he had received on the twenty-second by the *Amphitrite*.⁴⁸ He answered that he could make no plans until he knew more of the earl's intentions and the state of his army. It was not until May 22 that he received the final letters from Wilmington with their news of the impending march to the Chesapeake, and six days later came Cornwallis' dispatch of May 20 from Petersburg. This month of waiting was an anxious one for Sir Henry. On May 13 he was confident that Phillips' raid on Petersburg would stop Greene's march southward, and presumably hoped—as Cornwallis feared—that Greene's return would cut off the earl from Virginia. By the eighteenth he had received Cornwallis' letter to Phillips of April 23, but still clung to the possibility that the march might be abandoned.⁴⁹ Two days later, however, the

⁴⁵ Phillips to Cornwallis, May 6, 1781, CP.

⁴⁶ Lieut. Col. Thomas Dundas to Clinton, May 12, 1781, CP. Sir Henry planned to supersede Arnold with Maj. Gen. James Robertson. Clinton to Capt. Cumming, R.N., May 17, 1781, CP.

⁴⁷ Arnold to Clinton, May 12, 1781, CP.

⁴⁸ Cornwallis' letter of Apr. 10, as published, was a duplicate received on May 22, just a month after the original. Stevens, *Controversy*, I, 395, 441.

⁴⁹ *Ibid.*, I, 395-99, 424-25, 426, 441-45, 476-77; Clinton to Germain, May 13, 18, 1781, CP.

chance seemed so faint that he opened the barrage of criticism which he continued for the rest of his life. "His lordship's principal reason for this last extraordinary move is to avoid the disgrace, as he calls it, of going by sea to Charleston. . . . To avoid what he calls a disgrace to one corps (which certainly is none), he risks the Carolinas, his own corps, Lord Rawdon and General Phillips. . . ." ⁵⁰

Sir Henry was convinced that everything possible had been done for Cornwallis in the Chesapeake, and that it had been effective. Greene had been forced to retreat because Arnold's raid on Richmond had cut enemy communications (an idea for which there is no apparent substantiation); Arnold would have repeated the raid after the Battle of Guilford if he had not at that moment been trapped by the French fleet. Cornwallis had failed because of his own shortcomings, not for lack of support. He had been annoyed by the defeat at Cowpens into changing his plan from a regular invasion to a rapid march without baggage or supplies. "His lordship may have gained honour, but he has lost an army, lost the object for which he moved it, and buried himself on the sea coast of North Carolina." If he then joined Phillips, all between Virginia and Charleston would be lost. "There is a motto in Latin which has often struck me, *non bis peccatur in bello*. I do not often quote Latin, but this same motto troubles me." ⁵¹ Well it might.

On May 28 Sir Henry heard from Cornwallis at Petersburg; Phillips had died there some days before. "My wonder at this move of Lord Cornwallis will never cease. But he has made it, and we shall say no more but make the best of it." ⁵² The best, to Clinton's mind, would be either for Cornwallis to cripple Greene's communications in Virginia and so force him out of the Carolinas, or preferably for the earl to move to the head of the Chesapeake and co-operate with Sir Henry against Pennsylvania, where alone the temper of the loyalists had not yet been tested. If Cornwallis rejected both alternatives, Clinton hoped that he would confine himself to a few posts and return the bulk of the army to New York. ⁵³ The commander in chief conjectured and hoped, he did not order. He now treated Cornwallis more as an equal than a subordinate.

Sir Henry later gave reasons for his conduct. He was still on the verge of resigning unless Arbuthnot was replaced, and he concluded that Cornwallis had come to Virginia in order to be on hand to receive the command. ⁵⁴ Since

⁵⁰ Stevens, *Facsimiles*, VII, no. 748; see also *id.*, *Controversy*, II, 110-12; "Historical Detail," II, 165-67, 176.

⁵¹ Clinton to Maj. Gen. Edward Mathew, May 18-21, 1781, CP. I have italicized the Latin.

⁵² Stevens, *Facsimiles*, VII, no. 748.

⁵³ Clinton to Germain, June 9-12, 1781, CP; "Historical Detail," II, 179, 182. These ideas did not reach Cornwallis until July. Stevens, *Controversy*, I, 493-98.

⁵⁴ Fisher, II, 455-57 and notes.

Clinton expected to turn it over to him at any moment, he did not feel free to criticize or direct him in any way.⁵⁵ The Clinton-Arbuthnot feud, and the cabinet's delay in settling it, had brought British strategy to the verge of disintegration.

Whatever may be thought of Clinton's scruples, his plan against Pennsylvania had much to recommend it. Cornwallis' troops would be taken from the pestilential summer climate of Virginia. Both British armies might be carried by sea for part of their route, to a large extent supplied by sea, and if necessary evacuated by sea; at the same time both would merely be inconvenienced by a temporary French naval superiority. Most important, the British would be working toward a junction while their enemies were dispersed—Rochambeau at Newport, Washington on the Hudson, Lafayette and Steuben in Virginia, Greene in South Carolina. Clinton was for once proposing a strategy of concentration.

Cornwallis had no such idea. He seems, in fact, to have had no active idea at all. With the help of an additional detachment, sent from New York, he proposed to hold Portsmouth, chase Lafayette out of Richmond, and then settle down at Williamsburg until Clinton told him what to do. He brushed aside the Pennsylvania scheme, reiterated that Virginia was the key to the war and must be reduced by a large army, and enunciated the maxim that the British should hold the fewest possible positions in the greatest possible strength. "Why then," was Clinton's comment, "force new operation in Virginia?"⁵⁶

By June Sir Henry wished to decrease his commitment to the Chesapeake. He knew that the enemy conference at Wethersfield, Connecticut, had resulted in alternative plans for an attack on Cornwallis or himself, and he believed that New York was the more likely objective. It was therefore of first importance that the British armies should be strategically co-ordinated, either to defend each other or to forestall attack by a joint offensive. Clinton, unlike Cornwallis, was determined to hold New York at all costs, and he therefore envisaged defensive co-ordination in one of two ways: Cornwallis must either use his present force actively enough to divert the enemy from New York, or confine himself to a post and return the bulk of his troops. Offensive co-operation meant a pincers movement against Pennsylvania. For the next three months Sir Henry was attempting to get Cornwallis' acquiescence in one or another of these plans.

The earl was patently uninterested in Pennsylvania, and he gave no sign of offensive intentions anywhere else. Throughout most of June, therefore,

⁵⁵ "Historical Detail," II, 196-97, 202.

⁵⁶ Stevens, *Controversy*, I, 487-89 and n. 17.

Clinton bombarded him with requests either to do something active or to take a post—at Williamsburg, Yorktown, or whatever he preferred to Portsmouth—and return his surplus troops.⁵⁷

Why was a post so important? Leslie, Arnold, and Phillips had in turn been absorbed with the problem of finding one, and Cornwallis was even more immediately interested. The reason was naval. An army in Virginia had waterborne communications, and it would be exposed to destruction if the navy lost control of the bay. Control meant a base in the area, which was desirable for other reasons as well. After the British had evacuated Rhode Island in 1779, their only good harbor for ships of the line was Halifax, Nova Scotia; New York was never satisfactory because of its dangerous bar. After the French seized Rhode Island in 1780, the British were exposed to naval attack whenever the enemy eluded the blockade of Narragansett Bay. Rodney, in December of 1780, had pointed out the importance of a base in the Chesapeake as an aid to land operations; Graves later urged it on Clinton and Cornwallis.⁵⁸ Such a post would not only secure the army; it would improve the whole naval position.

It was easier for the high command to decide that such a base was needed than for the field commander to decide where it should be. The ideal base provides a defensible anchorage for a fleet without being dependent on the fleet for its own defense. This meant, in the conditions confronting the British, an anchorage for ships of the line commanded by a site strong enough to be held by a small garrison—Hampton Roads dominated by a Rock of Gibraltar. Since the ideal did not exist, the practical alternatives were either a base for ships of the line secured by a large force, perhaps at Portsmouth, or a minor post for frigates.

Cornwallis had his predecessors' experience to guide him, but it was inconclusive. Leslie had not had time to make a fair trial of Portsmouth. Arnold had settled there against his will; he believed that many other positions were more defensible with half the men, although he did not say what they were. Phillips had been instructed to occupy Yorktown or Old Point Comfort, if it could be done without undue risk and if Arbuthnot preferred either to Portsmouth. Phillips was soon convinced that Portsmouth would not do, and he suggested a number of other possibilities.⁵⁹ But he did not commit himself to one, let alone fortify it. The decision was left to Cornwallis, and it led him to Yorktown.

⁵⁷ *Ibid.*, II, 14–17, 19–23, 24–25, 26–28, 29–31.

⁵⁸ *Stopford-Sackville MSS*, II, 193–94; Stevens, *Controversy*, II, 67–68; G. R. Barnes and J. H. Owen, eds., *The Private Papers of John, Earl of Sandwich, First Lord of the Admiralty, 1771–1782* (4 vols. [London], 1932–38: publications of the Navy Records Society, LXIX, LXXI, LXXV, LXXVIII), IV, 176.

⁵⁹ Stevens, *Controversy*, I, 322–23, 348, 378–79; II, 53; "Historical Detail," II, 152. On the disadvantages of Portsmouth as a base, see John G. Simcoe, *Simcoe's Military Journal: A History*

The earl had concluded, soon after his arrival, that Portsmouth was out of the question as the main base. It could be held only by an army, could not protect ships of the line, and was most unhealthy in warm weather. He sent Leslie to occupy it with a small force, and proposed, after raiding Richmond, to move the main army toward Yorktown, where he hoped to find a suitable site.⁶⁰ His raid involved him in a month of inconclusive campaigning against Lafayette, and he did not reach Williamsburg until June 25. The next morning he received Clinton's request for reinforcements. Meeting it, he decided, took precedence over establishing a base, and he was convinced that he lacked the force to do both. Clinton had asked only for such troops as could be spared from a sound defensive, but this qualification Cornwallis chose to ignore.

He answered Sir Henry on June 30, in high dudgeon. He argued against retaining a post with his depleted force anywhere in the Chesapeake area, and asked leave to return to Charleston. Worse than that, he announced that he was retiring to Portsmouth to embark the troops for New York.⁶¹ A few days later he began the march. On the way he had the opportunity for a decisive blow against Lafayette, but he let the chance slip on the ground that Clinton's order took precedence over the destruction of the enemy.⁶² This excuse has the ring of novelty.

When Sir Henry heard of the move to Portsmouth, he was aghast. Establishing a base, to his mind, took precedence over everything else, and he had never dreamed of abandoning that aim. But he also had never dreamed that it would require Cornwallis' whole army. His ignoring of this possibility had produced the confusion. Convinced that a large fraction of the army was being wasted, he had used a more peremptory tone than he would otherwise have done. But the actual wording of his letters had been almost as clear as he claimed it was. "His lordship . . . was at liberty to keep the whole if he could not spare them. For my instructions have all been, 'first keep for yourself a respectable defensive, etc., and send me the rest.'"⁶³

of the Operations of a Partisan Corps, Called the Queen's Rangers . . . during the War of the American Revolution (New York, 1844), pp. 178-79, 180; Howard H. Peckham, ed., "Sir Henry Clinton's Review of Simcoe's *Journal*," *William and Mary Quarterly*, 2d ser., XXI (1941), 364-65. On the advantages of Portsmouth as compared with Yorktown, see Thomas White, *Naval Researches; or a Candid Inquiry into the Conduct of Admirals Byron, Graves, Hood, and Rodney in the Actions off Grenada, Chesapeak, St. Christopher's, and of the Ninth and Twelfth of April, 1782* (London, 1830), pp. 56-58, 68-69. White's account is valuable from the naval side, but grossly erroneous about the land campaign.

⁶⁰ Stevens, *Controversy*, I, 488.

⁶¹ *Ibid.*, II, 31-39. Arbuthnot had been removed, but Clinton now expected to resign because of Germain's letter of May 2; for that reason he declined the earl's offer to return to Charleston. "Historical Detail," II, 229-33.

⁶² *Ibid.*, II, 237-38; Tarleton, pp. 362-68; Gottschalk, pp. 264-67, where the role of Clinton's orders in Cornwallis' "retreat" is overestimated.

⁶³ Clinton to unknown, July 24, 1781, CP. Sir Henry felt that Cornwallis' misunderstanding had been willful. "Historical Detail," II, 215-16.

As soon as he learned of the move, Clinton countermanded it and explained what he had meant. He had been convinced from the consensus of his field commanders that Portsmouth was not practicable and that Yorktown might be; he therefore ordered Cornwallis to return to the latter before Lafayette seized it. Three days later, on July 11, Sir Henry conferred with Graves (who had just taken over the naval command from Arbuthnot), and the two agreed that the best site was Old Point Comfort. The earl was consequently instructed to examine and fortify it, and to occupy Yorktown as well if it was needed for an outer defense. He was again asked for reinforcements but was authorized if necessary to keep his whole force.⁶⁴ Clinton for once could not have been clearer.

He later claimed that orders from Germain, received at this point, destroyed his plan of campaign by forcing him to leave Cornwallis' army intact. This extraordinary claim has been widely accepted.⁶⁵ It was based on a dispatch of May 2, received on June 27, in which Germain's tone was insulting but his words were vague. Clinton was ordered to push British conquests from south to north, yet was specifically permitted to postpone operations in Virginia until a more clement season. Sir Henry, in a subsequent comment on this letter, referred to another from Germain "forbidding me from taking a man from Virginia till that province was conquered."⁶⁶ This second letter he never produced, and it has not survived among his papers.

Clinton, at the time, gave no sign that Germain had interfered. On July 13 he sent the minister a long explanation of why he preferred his own design against Pennsylvania to Cornwallis' against Virginia—with a strong implication that he would try the former as soon as the season permitted.⁶⁷ For the next month he continued to ask Cornwallis for reinforcements. All this suggests a commander who was unconscious that his strategy had been altered by his government. Well he might have been, because Germain had altered nothing. If the missing letter was ever received, Clinton ignored it. The letter

⁶⁴ Stevens, *Controversy*, II, 49–56, 61, 62–65 and notes, 73–78. Gottschalk misinterprets these letters (pp. 277–78); they did not reverse "all previous plans and instructions," but restated what Clinton had been trying to say all along.

⁶⁵ George O. Trevelyan, *George the Third and Charles James Fox, the Concluding Part of the American Revolution* (2 vols., New York and London, 1914–15), II, 360; Dudley W. Knox, *The Naval Genius of George Washington* (Boston, 1942 reprint), pp. 88–89; Charles L. Lewis, *Admiral de Grasse and American Independence* (Annapolis, 1945), p. 136; Fortescue, III, 396–97; James, p. 282. Adams (in *Am. Hist. Rev.*, XXXVII, 29–30), aware of the disparity between Clinton's claim and his conduct, explains it by assuming that Sir Henry failed to read Germain's dispatch.

⁶⁶ Stevens, *Controversy*, I, 467 and n. 17. Clinton's reference seems to be to a second letter from Germain, of June 6, in the printed version of which Sir Henry interpolated a sentence in his manuscript note, in such a way that it appears to have been part of the original. *Ibid.*, II, 13 and n. 5. It was not in the original, and the letter in any case was received on August 4, too late to have affected Clinton's plans.

⁶⁷ Clinton to Germain, July 13, 1781, CP; see also Stevens, *Controversy*, II, 82–87.

of May 2 ordered only what Sir Henry had long had in mind. He expected the Chesapeake to be the scene of a major offensive later and never intended to abandon it entirely. His strategic design was consistent. It was made to appear changeable not because of Germain's interference but because of Cornwallis' misunderstanding.

The earl received Clinton's new orders on July 20, and now had no alternative to establishing a base. The site, however, was still to be determined. The earl ruled out Old Point Comfort, which appeared unsuitable to him, to his engineer, and to the available naval officers; it could neither command the entrance to the James nor protect a fleet in Hampton Roads. He therefore announced that he was evacuating Portsmouth and moving to Yorktown and Gloucester, which he believed covered the only anchorage where ships of the line could be given effective protection.⁶⁸

The price for protection was high. Old Point Comfort, from the navy's point of view, scarcely lived up to its name.⁶⁹ But its anchorage at least gave space for maneuver, a major consideration in a day when an inferior fleet might escape through accidents of wind, tide, or darkness. Cornwallis might have had the same advantage for his army if he had occupied Williamsburg Neck, as suggested, from Yorktown to Old Point; in an emergency he could then have regrouped his force for escape by water in one of several directions. Instead he took an inland position where he could be easily surrounded, where the York River cut his army in two without being a route of escape, and where an outnumbered British fleet would have the greatest difficulty in reaching him and getting out again. The last consideration was particularly important by the time he moved to Yorktown. The growing danger that the fleet would be outnumbered was one which a cautious commander would have taken into account.⁷⁰

Clinton had been haunted for months by this threat. In March Admiral de Grasse had sailed from France with a large fleet for the West Indies. In May Sir Henry had heard a rumor that this fleet might come to North America during the summer, and he had immediately decided that in that case he would abandon everything in the Chesapeake except a small defensible post; otherwise loss of command of the bay for even forty-eight hours might be disas-

⁶⁸ *Ibid.*, II, 95-97, 102, 104-109 and n. 19. Fisher (p. 470) says that Cornwallis reversed himself in deciding to return to Yorktown. The earl's contention throughout was that he could defend the site only with his full force, and he returned when Clinton had assured him of that force.

⁶⁹ On the possibility of fortifying Old Point, see A. H. Miles, "Sea Power and the Yorktown Campaign," *United States Naval Institute Proceedings*, LIII (1927), 1173.

⁷⁰ Cornwallis had received a warning of this danger from Clinton on July 12. Stevens, *Controversy*, II, 26-27.

trous.⁷¹ Sir Henry's caution was defeated by Cornwallis' inordinate idea of the number of men needed for a post.

Germain had long known the enemy purpose. He had sent Clinton a casual warning in early April, but he had added the assurance that Admiral Rodney would follow the French with the British West Indian squadron.⁷² In late June the minister learned that de Grasse would reach North America in August.⁷³ This vital detail he neglected to send to Clinton. Instead he repeated his vague warning, coupled with a positive guarantee that Rodney would follow; he added that Rear Admiral Digby, Arbuthnot's successor, was coming from England with three ships of the line as reinforcement.⁷⁴

Meanwhile, in America, indications were mounting that de Grasse would come in force. Prisoners taken in Virginia talked frankly of it; the French at Rhode Island were jubilant about it; a frigate was reported to have left Newport for the Caribbean with pilots for the American coast.⁷⁵ By the end of July Clinton knew from intercepted letters that de Grasse had left Martinique weeks before, and it was thought that he might arrive on the scene within a few days.⁷⁶ All now hinged on what Rodney, in the West Indies, did to meet the threat.

Developments there were setting the stage for Yorktown. De Grasse actually sailed from Haiti for the Chesapeake on August 5, a month after leaving Martinique. The fate of the war depended on whether the British followed in equivalent strength, and this in turn depended on knowing what proportion of the enemy fleet was northward bound. If Rodney sent too many ships in pursuit, he would expose the British West Indies to the remaining enemy; if he sent too few, he would expose the British position in North America. The keys to his problem were prompt and accurate intelligence and the ability to interpret it.

On July 7 he had written Graves that the French were likely to come north, and that the British fleet would then make for New York via the Virginia capes. On July 31 Rodney heard that the frigate from Newport had reached the French fleet off Haiti, bringing thirty pilots for the Chesapeake and Delaware. This convinced him that the Chesapeake was the objective,

⁷¹ Clinton to Germain, May 18, to Robertson, May 27, and to Arbuthnot, May 29, 1781, CP.

⁷² Stevens, *Controversy*, I, 381. A month later Germain believed that the French would attack Halifax or Penobscot. Germain to Clinton, no. 2 of May 2, 1781, CP. The idea that they would divert their strength to such objectives is a commentary on the minister's strategic sense.

⁷³ Germain to Gen. Sir Frederick Haldimand, June 26, 1781, Germain letter book.

⁷⁴ The letter was not received until Oct. 10. Stevens, *Controversy*, II, 42-43.

⁷⁵ Tarleton, p. 305; D. B. to Capt. Beckwith, June 19, and intelligence report filed under June 23, 1781, CP. Lewis asserts (p. 119 and n. 7) that this frigate sailed from Boston, not Newport, but the British agent reported that the pilots had been taken on at Newport.

⁷⁶ Clinton to Germain, July 28, 1781, CP. See also Clinton to the duke of Gloucester, same date, in the Clinton-Gloucester correspondence, a volume of photostats in the CP.

but he missed the implication in the number of pilots—that de Grasse was sailing with his entire line of battle, leaving the French West Indies virtually defenseless. All Rodney's dispositions were made on the false premise that the enemy were dividing their force, not sending the whole of it.

The admiral was in wretched health, which may have impaired his judgment. On August 1 he turned over the fleet to his second in command, Rear Admiral Sir Samuel Hood, with instructions to go north as soon as possible. Rodney himself sailed to England with a convoy escorted by three ships of the line and two frigates. He sent another convoy to Jamaica under escort of the *Torbay*, 74, and *Prince William*, 64, and he requested Vice-Admiral Sir Peter Parker, commanding at Kingston, to send on the escort at once to North America with whatever ships of his own he could spare. Rodney was confident that Parker would send his whole line, one 90 and three 74's, and that this squadron and Hood's would give Graves an ample margin of superiority at New York.⁷⁷ His confidence was misplaced.

Hood, after Rodney's departure, gathered every ship available. He notified Graves on the sixth that he was coming, and sailed on the tenth with fourteen of the line. Parker did nothing to help. He detained the *Torbay* and *Prince William* so long that they arrived at New York too late, and he sent none of his own line. This was a contribution to the subsequent disaster, but it was less than that of Parker's superior.

Rodney had assured the government that he would watch the enemy like a lynx.⁷⁸ Instead he made irreparable errors. He can scarcely be blamed for doubting that de Grasse would take his whole fleet; the decision to do so was unusually bold for the period. But he can be blamed for not providing the maximum defense against that possibility. He took home three sail of the line, one of them a ship which he called the finest of her rank in the navy.⁷⁹ He sent Parker a request for reinforcement, which was not sufficiently peremptory to get action.⁸⁰ Lastly, he failed to use well his knowledge of de Grasse's destination. This knowledge he may or may not have passed on to Hood; the latter did not mention it in writing Graves, although it should obviously have been known in New York at the earliest possible moment.⁸¹ Rodney himself did

⁷⁷ Godfrey B. Mundy, *The Life and Correspondence of the Late Admiral Lord Rodney* (2 vols., London, 1830), II, 151, 152; *Sandwich Papers*, IV, 136.

⁷⁸ Mundy, II, 119.

⁷⁹ *Ibid.*, II, 154. The ship was the *Gibraltar*, 80.

⁸⁰ The request grew more peremptory in Rodney's memory as it receded into the past. *Ibid.*, II, 152, 166. Clinton's subsequent comments were equally inaccurate. Stevens, *Controversy*, II, 70 n. 20, 71 n. 21, 141 n. 1, 149 ns. 2, 5, 6.

⁸¹ Rodney's implication that he forwarded the news is untrustworthy, because his memory often served his interests; see *Letters from Sir George Brydges now Lord Rodney, to His Majesty's Ministers, &c. &c. Relative to the Capture of St. Eustatius, . . . Together with a Continuation of His Lordship's Correspondence with the Governors and Admirals in the West-Indies and America, during the Year 1781, until the Time of His Leaving the Command and Sailing for*

not remember to forward it until August 13, when he dispatched to Graves a frigate, the *Pegasus*.⁸² She and her news arrived too late to be of use.

These sins of omission suggest that for a fortnight Rodney was too ill to think. The final pages of his *Letters* imply that he may have had a guilty conscience, and Clinton testified to the same effect. The two erstwhile friends discussed the campaign years later. Rodney tried to lay the blame on Parker, for keeping the Jamaica squadron idle. When the question arose of why he himself had squandered three ships of the line on convoy duty, he "had no apology to make . . . but *hums* and *haws*. In short, the noble lord feels his share of the blame [in] that campaign."⁸³

Wherever the blame may have been, the upshot was that Hood was coming north with fourteen sail of the line and de Grasse with twenty-eight. Graves, Clinton, and Cornwallis were living in happy ignorance. Rodney's dispatch to Graves of July 7 had not reached him until August 16; Hood's message that he was leaving was intercepted, and its gist was not known in New York until the day before he arrived. Meanwhile, on the fourteenth, word of de Grasse's approach reached American headquarters and was promptly reported to Clinton. On the nineteenth the Franco-American army began its move from the Hudson to Virginia. On the twenty-second a British agent reported that its destination might be the Chesapeake; "yet for God's sake," he added fatuously, "be prepared at all points!"⁸⁴

Clinton was paying scant attention to the flurry of intelligence reports, partly because his mind was on other things. He was trying to concert with Graves an attack on the French squadron at Newport, was wrangling in stately fashion with Cornwallis about the earl's past conduct, and was still attempting to get reinforcements from him—fruitlessly, because Cornwallis had decided that he needed every man if the work of fortification was to be completed before the beginning of October.⁸⁵ The last chance of reducing the British commitment in the Chesapeake had faded.

A great deal of energy has been spent in explaining Clinton's inaction at

England (London, 1789), p. 166. Hood received some last-minute intelligence, which is referred to but not printed in his letters. David Hannay, ed., *Letters Written by Sir Samuel Hood (Viscount Hood) in 1781-2-3* ([London], 1895: publications of the Navy Records Society, III), pp. 39-40. One naval historian assumes that Rodney withheld the information from his subordinate. French E. Chadwick, ed., *The Graves Papers and Other Documents Relating to the Naval Operations of the Yorktown Campaign, July to October, 1781* (New York, 1916: publications of the Naval History Society, III), pp. 60-61. Adams (in *Am. Hist. Rev.*, XXXVII, 37) assumes that Rodney sent the news to Hood, but is wrong in implying that Hood then forwarded it to Graves. In any case it had virtually no effect on British naval dispositions.

⁸² *Graves Papers*, pp. 59-60.

⁸³ Clinton to unknown, undated and uncatalogued, CP. See also *Letters from Rodney*, p. 173.

⁸⁴ Intelligence report, Aug. 22, 1781, CP. See also Adams, in *Am. Hist. Rev.*, XXXVII, 38-40.

⁸⁵ Willcox, in *Jour. of Mod. Hist.*, XVII, 328-30; Stevens, *Controversy*, II, 109-19, 123-24, 127-28, 130-36.

this crucial period. He remained idle while the enemy were marching around New York toward Virginia, while de Grasse was approaching, while the French squadron was preparing to quit Rhode Island. Such idleness was puzzling, and soon after the end of the campaign the rumor spread that Washington had deceived Clinton into thinking, until too late, that New York was the objective. Sir Henry protested hotly but in vain; the rumor has persisted ever since.⁸⁶ A more startling explanation appeared for the hundred and fiftieth anniversary of Yorktown, that Clinton in these weeks was intermittently blind.⁸⁷ Both solutions of the puzzle are wide of the mark. Sir Henry could see, figuratively and physically, but the situation as he saw it restrained him from action. His conduct is intelligible in terms of his premises.

The basic premise was that de Grasse would not come without a covering British fleet. Such a fleet had been promised by Germain and by Rodney. Washington and Rochambeau might in that case maneuver until doomsday without seriously endangering either New York or Yorktown. The axiom had long been accepted by both sides that New York, when fully garrisoned, could be successfully attacked only if the French had naval superiority; Clinton assumed that they would not have it with de Grasse, and they certainly did not have it without him.⁸⁸ As long as they lacked it, Yorktown was equally safe. Part of the reason was a secondary premise, that an army in Virginia could be fed and supplied only by water, which meant command of the bay. Even if a siege of Cornwallis could somehow be maintained, Clinton could always relieve him by sea from New York.

But relief would be impossible if Sir Henry left New York. That is the point which his critics ignored. He had to keep his army concentrated at a port of embarkation. If he followed Washington, he would sacrifice the greatest British asset, the ability to move by sea—either against Rhode Island or to the Chesapeake, as circumstances might dictate. He had reasons for staying where he was. The fact that he did not know Washington's destination is irrelevant, because he would not have moved if he had.

Whether Graves could have moved is another question. The naval danger

⁸⁶ For Clinton's protests see *ibid.*, I, 16–18 and notes; II, 162 n. 2, 248 n. 44; "Historical Detail," II, 249–51. For a modern acceptance of the rumor see Trevelyan, II, 372.

⁸⁷ Adams, in *Am. Hist. Rev.*, XXXVII, 36, 38. The argument is based on copies in the Shelburne Papers (Clements Library) of two letters from Clinton, of July 28 and Aug. 20, 1781 (LXVII, 159–60, 163). "Almost blind," Sir Henry remarks in the first letter, "I employ a friend's hand." "I am blind," he says in the second, "and so will you be . . . before you decipher this." Such hyperbole proves nothing except that he was suffering from eyestrain at some moment in those two days. At another moment in each he wrote legibly, as shown by his autograph letter to the duke of Gloucester, July 28–Aug. 20, 1781, Clinton-Gloucester correspondence, CP.

⁸⁸ The French had at Newport one 80, two 74's, four 64's, and one 44. Graves had, excluding two ships under repair, one 98, two 74's, and two 64's. The enemy's margin of superiority, therefore, was less than it had been in 1778, when they had not even tried to pass the bar.

was his responsibility, and by now he had numerous indications that de Grasse was coming in force.⁸⁹ If he had believed this evidence instead of dismissing it, he would have had one countermove—a dangerous gamble, but no more dangerous than inaction. He did not know that a British fleet was on its way, since Hood's dispatch had not been received. Rodney's earlier one had been, however, and it promised that if the French moved, help would be sent to New York by way of the Chesapeake. In that case the British forces would have to join quickly—if possible before de Grasse arrived on the coast, and at all costs before he joined the Rhode Island squadron. The obvious meeting place was where Graves knew that his reinforcement would first make a land-fall, the capes of Virginia. If he had had the boldness to sail for them at any time within a week of his hearing from Rodney on the sixteenth, the course of the war might have been altered. He would presumably have fallen in with Hood on the twenty-fifth, when the latter made the Chesapeake.⁹⁰ The British, in full force, would then have been in possession of the bay when de Grasse arrived, and it is questionable whether he had the strength to dispossess them. He might have blockaded them, but a blockade would not have given him that command of the bay which was prerequisite for the concentration against Cornwallis. Graves would have taken a great risk for a commensurate gain, the gain of disrupting enemy strategy.⁹¹ Instead he did nothing.

On the twenty-eighth Hood arrived. He had reconnoitered the Chesapeake and found no sign of the enemy, but he realized that they might come at any moment. He stirred Graves to action, and the combined squadron sailed on the thirty-first. Graves knew that the French had left Newport, and hoped to intercept either that squadron or de Grasse before the two joined. But he did not know how important such interception was; he seems to have underestimated de Grasse's strength as much as Hood, who thought that it was probably no more than twelve of the line.⁹² In that case the British, with

⁸⁹ Willcox, in *Jour. of Mod. Hist.*, XVII, 329.

⁹⁰ Graves's brother later asserted that Hood had never touched at the Chesapeake, but Sir Samuel insisted that he had reconnoitered it. W. Graves, *Two Letters from W. Graves, Esq; Respecting the Conduct of Rear Admiral Thomas Graves, in North America, during His Accidental Command There for Four Months in 1781* [4th issue, London, 1783], pp. 15 and note, 37; *Letters by Hood*, p. 26. Hood certainly passed near enough the mouth of the bay so that the two squadrons would have made contact by frigates.

⁹¹ The move would have exposed New York to the Rhode Island squadron: *Two Letters from W. Graves*, pp. 34-35. But the admiral did so on the 31st, when the whereabouts of that squadron were still unknown; the defenses of New York were too strong to be endangered by a sudden naval raid.

⁹² John K. Laughton, ed., *Letters and Papers of Charles, Lord Barham, . . . 1758-1813* (3 vols. [London], 1907-11: publications of the Navy Records Society, XXXII, XXXVIII, XXXIX), I, 122-23. Lewis criticizes Hood for "overeagerness" in going on to New York from the Chesapeake, and Adams criticizes him for losing track of de Grasse. Lewis, p. 155; Adams, in *Am. Hist. Rev.*, XXXVII, 38, 40. Hood's objective, dictated by his orders and by sound strategy, was neither the Chesapeake nor de Grasse, but the earliest possible junction with Graves.

nineteen, would be equal to the combined French fleet and greatly superior to either division of it.

Clinton remained unperturbed until September 2, when he began to see the situation as it was. The *Pegasus* had arrived from Rodney with word of de Grasse's destination, and this apparently convinced Sir Henry that Washington was moving to Virginia. He wrote to warn Cornwallis, but, before the letter left, a note came from the earl that thirty to forty ships had been seen at the mouth of the bay.⁹³ The crisis was at hand.

Clinton at last recognized it as serious, but he was far from panic. He believed that Cornwallis had almost eight thousand men, and ought to be able to hold off even a greatly superior force in a position as strong as Yorktown was said to be.⁹⁴ "Things appear to be coming fast to a crisis. We are therefore no longer to compare forces with the enemy, but to endeavour to act in the best manner we can against them. . . . With what I have, inadequate as it is, I will exert myself to the utmost to save Lord Cornwallis."⁹⁵ Four thousand troops were embarked, to sail as soon as the way was clear.⁹⁶

The earl was hurrying on his fortifications but doing nothing else. He repeatedly ignored chances to strike the enemy while their forces were still divided, and in the event he thereby lost his last hope. His reason was that he did not feel justified in a desperate gamble when Clinton had promised to come to his rescue.⁹⁷ The odds were certainly much against him even before the arrival of the main enemy army: he was outnumbered almost two to one by Lafayette's corps and the marines, under the marquis de St. Simon, landed from de Grasse's fleet.⁹⁸ But the earl could have attacked either of these before they joined, and good luck and good generalship might have enabled him to escape with most of his army. The alternative was certain disaster if Clinton did not come. Any risk was preferable to inaction, therefore, unless there was a real chance of rescue.

Graves had virtually eliminated that chance by September 13. On the fifth he had encountered de Grasse, and the two fleets had engaged off the mouth of the Chesapeake. The battle was tactically indecisive, but after it Graves allowed his opponent to inveigle him into almost a week of maneuvering at sea, during which the Rhode Island squadron slipped unmolested into the

⁹³ Stevens, *Controversy*, II, 149-50, 146.

⁹⁴ Clinton to Germain, Sept. 12, 1781, CP.

⁹⁵ Same to same, Sept. 7, 1781, CP.

⁹⁶ Clinton to Graves, Sept. 2, 1781, CP.

⁹⁷ Stevens, *Controversy*, II, 157; I, 76-77.

⁹⁸ The French were agreeably surprised that Cornwallis did nothing: Karl G. Tornquist, *The Naval Campaigns of Count de Grasse during the American Revolution, 1781-1783*, tr. by Amandus Johnson (Philadelphia, 1942), p. 57. Clinton's later criticism shows that he underestimated enemy strength by almost fifty per cent. Stevens, *Controversy*, I, 76 n. 1, 77 n. 3; II, 151 n. 1, 157 ns. 1-2; "Historical Detail," II, 259-61. For the actual situation see Gottschalk, pp. 300-301.

Chesapeake. De Grasse's strategic objective was accomplished, and the British had lost their last faint opportunity to enter the bay.⁹⁹ They returned to it to find the French again in possession, and Graves decided on the thirteenth to return to New York.

The navy had shot its bolt. This was the time, if ever, for Cornwallis to gamble on escape. The facts were before him. By the seventeenth he knew the strength of the combined enemy fleet, long before it was known in New York; he also knew Graves's strength, and hence the naval odds. He had been told that Admiral Digby was momentarily expected with a supporting squadron from England, but not how many ships he would bring.¹⁰⁰ Whatever that force, it was most unlikely to redress the balance, particularly when the French were in possession of the bay. Cornwallis' data strongly suggested that rescue was impossible, and that he should therefore attempt escape at any cost.

Instead he did nothing. He later explained that Clinton had left him no discretion in holding his post and had promised him help.¹⁰¹ Both points are weak. Cornwallis had repeatedly used his discretion before, and even in their recent misunderstanding Clinton had not tightened the rein. As for rescue, it depended not on the army but on the navy, and the core of the earl's responsibility was his knowledge of the naval situation. He knew it far more accurately, by September 17, than Clinton or Graves, both of whom underestimated the odds against them: they believed that the admiral had engaged on the fifth not the French West Indian squadron alone, as he had, but the combined enemy fleet.¹⁰² If ever a subordinate had an obligation to think and act independently, Cornwallis had it when he learned the full strength of the enemy line. Instead he sat idle and laid the responsibility at Clinton's door. This is a far cry from the independence of five months before, when the earl left Wilmington without waiting for his commander in chief's dispatches.

Cornwallis' passivity transferred the focus of British planning to New York. Everything now hinged on whether Clinton and Graves could concert and carry through a rescue expedition in time. They might conceivably have done so if they had seen the emergency in its true light. But they both had a greater sense of leisure and of caution than the realities warranted.

Clinton first heard from Graves on the fourteenth: "the enemy have so

⁹⁹ On the feasibility of entering the bay after the battle of the fifth, see *Letters by Hood*, pp. xxxix-xl, 29-30, 33-34, 38, 39; *Two Letters from W. Graves*, p. 20; White, pp. 52, 67; *Sandwich Papers*, IV, 143. None of these references brings out that the move would have paralyzed Washington's strategy; on this point see Knox, pp. 98-99, 155.

¹⁰⁰ Stevens, *Controversy*, II, 149-50, 153, 157-58. I have found no indication that the size of Digby's squadron was known in America before September 4, when Clinton heard that it would be three sail of the line; he had apparently hoped before that it would be larger. Commodore Affleck to Clinton, Sept. 4, and Clinton memorandum, Sept. 23, 1781, CP.

¹⁰¹ Stevens, *Controversy*, I, 75 and ns. 5, 8-10. The notes are unintelligible in places, because Stevens could not always decipher Clinton's incredible hand.

¹⁰² "Historical Detail," II, 262-63.

great a naval force in the Chesapeake that they are absolute masters of its navigation."¹⁰³ Sir Henry's answer was undismayed. Since Cornwallis had assured him on the eighth that he had provisions for another six weeks, should not rescue be postponed until Digby's arrival?¹⁰⁴ Clinton apparently did not imagine that the length of the siege might be determined by factors other than food, and his own experience at Charleston had given him an exaggerated view of the besiegers' difficulties.¹⁰⁵

His miscalculations were shared by most of his general officers. The first of a series of councils of war was held on September 13; only one man present seems to have felt the need for desperate measures, and he was the last person to convince a council. Major General James Robertson, the military governor of New York, was a flabby, easy-going man, without the will to back his opinion.¹⁰⁶ But in the crisis he showed more strategic insight than his fellow officers.

Robertson's first proposal was that five thousand men should sail on the only ship of the line available at New York, in the hope that she could slip through the enemy fleet. He was opposed by Clinton and lightly abandoned his idea, but the next morning he restated it in writing. His argument was that inaction would lead to the loss of Cornwallis, and thus of the whole British cause in America. Any dangers were preferable to this ultimate disaster; dangers were at worst probabilities, disaster was certain. The choice was between taking the only chance and giving up the game.¹⁰⁷

He could not have put more lucidly the case for action at all costs. But he did not press his point in a council held on the fourteenth, on receipt of the first news from Graves. Officers recently returned from Yorktown were interviewed, and agreed that the post could hold out for at least three weeks against an army of twenty thousand. The board thereupon decided that nothing should be done until Digby arrived. Robertson concurred; his flash of insight had gone.¹⁰⁸

The case for delay was plausible, given the situation as seen from New York. The problem of logistics could be solved only by the navy; Clinton was

¹⁰³ Graves to Clinton, Sept. 9, 1781, CP.

¹⁰⁴ Clinton to Graves, Sept. 14, 1781, CP.

¹⁰⁵ Undated and uncatalogued Clinton memorandum, CP. The clearest explanation of why his theories did not apply is an eyewitness account of the siege, such as that in J. K. Laughton and J. Y. F. Sullivan, eds., *The Journal of Rear-Admiral Bartholomew James, 1752-1828* ([London], 1896: publications of the Navy Records Society, VI), pp. 111-28.

¹⁰⁶ Washington accused him of indolence, and Chief Justice Smith of frivolity. John C. Fitzpatrick, ed., *The Writings of George Washington from the Original Manuscript Sources, 1745-1799* (39 vols., Washington, 1931-44), XXII (1937), 140; Adams, in *Am. Hist. Rev.*, XXXVII, 46. Clinton disliked Robertson and blamed him for much of Germain's misinformation about the war. Stevens, *Facsimiles*, VII, no. 748.

¹⁰⁷ Minutes of the council of war of Sept. 13, filed at the end of September, and Robertson to Clinton, no. 1 of Sept. 14, 1781, CP.

¹⁰⁸ Minutes of the council of war of Sept. 14, filed at the end of September, 1781, CP.

convinced, as Washington was, that no army in Virginia could live without water-borne communications.¹⁰⁹ On this point Sir Henry asked the opinion of a Virginia loyalist in New York; the answer was that an army of ten thousand, not supplied by water, could exist only if the population starved.¹¹⁰ Since mass starvation was at that time beyond the military mind, the only feasible course was to wait until the navy could regain command of the bay. Hence the exaggerated importance of Digby's squadron, now known to be three sail of the line. The high command did not know the actual naval odds, and naturally imagined that the addition of three ships might make the difference between failure and success.¹¹¹

A third council was called on the seventeenth, on receipt of a letter from Cornwallis. The earl believed that his provisions would hold out for six weeks, and the board consequently decided that the end of October was the last possible time for relief. Nothing would be attempted, however, unless the navy could open and maintain communications.¹¹² On the same day Clinton received from Graves a letter which augured ill for the navy: the shattered fleet was returning to New York, and the admiral was convinced that nothing could reach Cornwallis by sea.¹¹³

Clinton answered, with serene confidence, that the fleet must force a way into the York or James, cover a landing, and then remain in support. Graves merely replied that he would do what he could; once Digby's squadron had joined, the enemy might be unable to block the York and James simultaneously.¹¹⁴ Sir Henry's confidence was not contagious.

On the twenty-third came Cornwallis' letter of the sixteenth-seventeenth, with the first definite news of the combined French strength, and the first hint of possible surrender: "If you cannot relieve me very soon, you must be prepared to hear the worst."¹¹⁵ The high command had the truth at last, that rescue must come at once, despite appalling odds, or not at all. An army council of war met immediately. Its decision was put before the recently returned admirals the next day, approved by them, and embodied in a dispatch to Cornwallis--the first definite promise, on the part of both services, "to

¹⁰⁹ Clinton to the duke of Gloucester, Sept. 20, 1781, Clinton-Gloucester correspondence, CP; Stevens, *Controversy*, II, 165-66.

¹¹⁰ Hardin Burnley to Clinton, Sept. 15, 1781, CP.

¹¹¹ The fact that the CP are silent about the ships from Jamaica suggests that Hood did not know of Rodney's request to Parker, and had not thought to mention the *Torbay* and *Prince William* during his three days off New York in August. Graves, when he returned in September, referred to Rodney's two ships but not to Parker's four. Clinton to unknown, Sept. 24, 1781, CP.

¹¹² Minutes of the council of war of Sept. 17, filed at the end of September, 1781, CP; Cornwallis' letter is printed in Stevens, *Controversy*, II, 154-55.

¹¹³ Graves to Clinton, Sept. 15, 1781, CP.

¹¹⁴ Clinton to Graves, Sept. 17, and Graves to Clinton, Sept. 21, 1781, CP.

¹¹⁵ Stevens, *Controversy*, II, 158.

relieve you and afterwards co-operate with you." The sailing date, it was hoped, would be October 5.¹¹⁶

Between the councils of the twenty-third and twenty-fourth Clinton had put his thoughts into writing. His mind went over and over the possibilities, like a squirrel running in a cage. Would Cornwallis try to break out? He knew the naval odds, knew that Graves had retired to New York, and might conclude that refitting would take at least from one spring tide to another. This reasoning might induce him to try to escape—to fight his way across the Chickahominy, on to Richmond, and so into North Carolina. "If his lordship determines before the arrival of Washington, he may be saved although the Chesapeake is lost. . . ."Tis better to lose it and save Lord Cornwallis than lose both."¹¹⁷ The reasoning was probably sound, but the earl had no such intention.

Clinton had convinced himself by the twenty-sixth that Cornwallis would make the attempt. Another council was called, but it did not support this view. The other officers insisted that the earl, in warning them to be prepared for the worst, had meant "something more serious than a retreat." Clinton then suggested a diversion against Philadelphia. The board decided unanimously that the move was inadmissible, because the fleet would in all likelihood be ready to embark the army for the Chesapeake by October 3.¹¹⁸

How was the navy expected to get the troops into the bay? Certainly not by mere strength. Graves's squadron was successively increased, first by the return of two ships which had been under repair at the time of the battle, then by the arrival of Digby's three on September 21, and lastly by the appearance of the *Torbay* and *Prince William* on October 11. But even with these additions the British line was greatly inferior to the French in numbers and weight of metal, and de Grasse had the advantage of position.

It was just this advantage which the British hoped to turn against him. He was thought to have taken an anchorage where the violence of the tide would hinder the maneuvering of his anchored ships and give the British, if they chose their time well, a chance to slip by. They could then anchor inshore near the mouth of the York, where the tide-run was weaker and the French pursuit would be cramped for space and impeded by sandbanks. Once Graves was in position, he might be able to land the army from the men-of-war without serious molestation.¹¹⁹

This plan rested on a number of dangerous suppositions, and their danger

¹¹⁶ *Ibid.*, II, 160; minutes of the councils of war of Sept. 23 and 24, filed at the end of September, 1781, CP.

¹¹⁷ Clinton memorandum, Sept. 23, 1781, CP.

¹¹⁸ Minutes of the council of war of Sept. 26, filed at the end of September, 1781, CP.

¹¹⁹ Undated and uncatalogued Clinton memorandum, CP; "Historical Detail," II, 269; Stevens, *Controversy*, II, 173 n. 1 (where "sides way" should presumably read "udesway"). On the feasibility of the plan see White, p. 51; Knox, p. 115.

may have been a reason why it was not tried. If de Grasse was foolish enough to ignore the tides after several weeks in the bay; if the British ships, encumbered by troops, passed the enemy line without crippling losses; if Graves found an anchorage safe from shore batteries and from de Grasse—if all this happened, the army might be landed and might even join Cornwallis. But after that? Clinton professed to believe that Washington would then obligingly give up and that de Grasse would sail back to the West Indies.¹²⁰ If not, British troubles would only be beginning. Graves could scarcely command the bay in the face of the enemy fleet, let alone keep open communications with New York. Clinton's and Cornwallis' troops would therefore have to re-embark in the face of Washington's whole force, and the ships—already damaged and now packed to bursting with soldiers—would have to fight their way out past an enemy alert and eager for revenge. How could all this be done?

The obvious answer was that it could not be. Good luck and good seamanship might bring Graves to his anchorage, particularly if he had the advantage of surprise, but nothing short of a miracle could get him out again. If the French and Americans held their positions, the British fleet would be as neatly trapped as Cornwallis was. Danger to the ships was a different matter from danger to the troops. Risking the whole army was justifiable, since North America would in any case be lost with Cornwallis. But risking the fleet meant risking the West Indies as well: the islands could be lost with Graves in the Chesapeake.

This line of reasoning was quite within the capacity of the admirals at New York. The more they pondered the idea of rescue, the more difficulties they saw. Clinton called a joint council of war on the twenty-eighth, to find out how far the navy was willing to co-operate; what he found was a mare's nest of doubts. The admirals boggled at entering the Chesapeake at all, and Digby suggested that the most which could be asked of them was to put the troops ashore. Clinton answered that the army would be lost unless they remained, and insisted that this point had been settled on the twenty-fourth. Digby then asked what the army intended to do, and was told that that would depend on circumstances; if a withdrawal were necessary, Sir Henry "supposed, of course, that there would be no more difficulty in getting off than in going in—of which, however, the admiral's countenance seemed to express some doubt." Clinton, who presumably read Digby's face only too well, dropped the question there. He proposed, and the board agreed, that Cornwallis should be informed if the date of sailing had to be postponed, and should be told to weigh the chances and act as he thought best.¹²¹

¹²⁰ [Clinton to the duke of Newcastle] Oct. 3-16, filed under Oct. 3, 1781, CP.

¹²¹ Incomplete minutes of the council of war of Sept. 28, filed at the end of September,

Another anxiety loomed larger as the days wore on. If the ships got into the Chesapeake to find that Cornwallis had surrendered, the expedition might be uselessly squandered. Clinton tried to get assurance from the admirals that they could get into the bay and out again "without risking an action that may probably be decisive against them."¹²² They naturally could promise nothing, and his anxiety grew. It accounts for his repeated efforts to arrange a method of getting word from Cornwallis to the fleet, so that at worst the rescue force might be saved from the earl's disaster.¹²³

By the end of September the navy seems to have been largely reconciled to the gamble. The remaining question was the date of departure, which depended on the New York dockyards. They did not live up to expectations; the date was postponed from October 5 to the eighth, then to the twelfth.¹²⁴ Clinton had only praise for the zeal and exertions of the navy, but quick results were not forthcoming; by September 30 he admitted to himself that catastrophe was imminent. "I see this in so serious a light, so horrible, that I dare not look [at] it."¹²⁵

As September lengthened into October with no sign of immediate action, despair must have been growing in New York. Each letter from Cornwallis was more gloomy than the last.¹²⁶ Councils of war met to concert elaborate plans, which the planners must have realized had less and less chance of being tried.¹²⁷ On October 17 the fleet at last began to leave the harbor, with a great show of signal flags "to push forward the lazy and supine," Graves reported. "And I am sorry to find that difficulties go on increasing, and that nothing can turn the tide but being actually at sea."¹²⁸ The admiral does not seem to have shared Clinton's admiration for the zeal of the navy.

The wind turned fair on the nineteenth, and the fleet put to sea. Clinton was buoyed by hope, though it may have been born of despair. He believed that Cornwallis' works were in order and his position strong. "He must be

1781, CP. Digby, who would normally have assumed the command, insisted that Graves retain it. James Ralfe, *The Naval Biography of Great Britain: Consisting of Historical Memoirs of Those Officers of the British Navy Who Distinguished Themselves during the Reign of His Majesty George III* (4 vols., London, 1828), I, 182. Graves was at least as pessimistic about the venture as Digby. *Graves Papers*, pp. 117-18, 121; Charles Ross, ed., *Correspondence of Charles, First Marquis Cornwallis*, (3 vols., London, 1859), I, 121-22.

¹²² Undated and uncatalogued Clinton memorandum of matters to be submitted to a council of war, presumably written in late September or early October, 1781, CP.

¹²³ Stevens, *Controversy*, II, 160, 163-64, 170, 175, 187; Clinton's instructions to Maj. Charles Cochrane, filed at the end of September, 1781, CP.

¹²⁴ Graves to Clinton, Sept. 28, 1781, CP; Stevens, *Controversy*, II, 172.

¹²⁵ Clinton memorandum [Sept. 30, 1781], CP. Sir Henry's admiration for the navy was shared by others. Ralfe, I, 182-83.

¹²⁶ Stevens, *Controversy*, II, 169-70, 174-75, 176-77, 188. Of these four letters the first three were received respectively on Oct. 8, 12, and 16, and the fourth apparently on Oct. 19.

¹²⁷ Minutes of councils of war of Oct. 8 and 10, 1781, CP. See also Stevens, *Controversy*, II, 184-87.

¹²⁸ Graves to Clinton, Oct. 17, 1781, CP.

saved or— . . . I understand nothing of sea matters, you know, but my oracle, S[ir] S[amuel] Hood, seems to think that if they meet us at sea, we have everything to hope from our better sailing—and, I could add, from the superior abilities of all our naval chiefs. The stake is great. . . . The two services start in perfect good humour with each other, and determined to do their best.”¹²⁹

Their best would no longer serve. Cornwallis had asked for terms on the seventeenth, when the ships were leaving the harbor; on the nineteenth, when they sailed, he had signed the articles of surrender. In the early morning of the twenty-fourth a schooner came alongside Graves’s flagship at sea, carrying three men who had left Yorktown on the eighteenth and were convinced that the post had since surrendered; their news was confirmed on the twenty-sixth by refugees taken off from the coast.¹³⁰ Nothing remained but for Clinton to return to New York and Hood to the West Indies. British strategy in the American theater was virtually at an end; Sir Henry had nothing left with which or for which to plan. The disaster was final.

Could the last-minute attempt to avert it have been made? Hood believed so, and laid the blame on Graves; in a letter of condolence to Clinton on the twenty-fifth, he expressed his undying regret “that we were not in the Chesapeake ten days ago, which I very much flatter myself we should have been.”¹³¹ Whether they could have been depends on facts which cannot be established, such as the condition of the dockyards and of the damaged ships, the efforts put into refitting and revictualing, the spirit of the admirals in pushing on the work. Only on the last point is there ground for conjecture. Both Digby and Graves were skeptical about the expedition, and skepticism does not generate the utmost effort. Twice during his brief command Graves was charged with refitting a squadron for a purpose about which he was doubtful, once to attack Newport and once to relieve Yorktown; both times the refitting was finished too late. This may be mere coincidence, but it is suggestive.

Whatever Graves’s responsibility for the final delay, he certainly bears his share of blame for the failure of the campaign. He wasted an opportunity to attack Newport and thereby to impede if not destroy the enemy *de ign* before it could be executed. He did not believe in the danger from the West Indies, or prepare to meet it if it materialized. He apparently ignored the possibility of interposing his fleet between Cornwallis and the enemy before *de Grasse* arrived, and after the battle of September 5 he sacrificed the last faint hope by allowing himself to be led on a wild-goose chase out to sea. His sole idea was

¹²⁹ Clinton to unknown, Oct. 19, 1781, Shelburne Papers, LXVII, 168–70. This letter was presumably written before the receipt of Cornwallis’ desperate note of the fifteenth.

¹³⁰ *Graves Papers*, pp. 137–38, 141–42.

¹³¹ Hood to Clinton, Oct. 25, 1781, CP. Sir Henry agreed that the delay had been fatal. But he never blamed Graves, which is remarkable; no other major figure in the campaign, except Hood, escaped his censure.

to attack regardless of odds—the strategy of the charging bull. Once the attack failed, he was a commander without a plan.

The worst which can be said of Graves is that he failed to make good use of an inferior fleet. Its inferiority, the greatest single element in the British debacle, was the fault of Rodney. Until August the key to the campaign was in the West Indies, and Rodney was responsible for it. His duty was to find out, if humanly possible, how many ships de Grasse was taking and to provide the maximum protection against them. He failed on both counts. His reconnaissance was poor, and when he did receive intelligence at the last minute, he understood only part of it and misused that part. He and Parker immobilized six ships of the line at a crucial period, and he himself took home three. These dispositions show little strategic insight; they bear out Mahan's verdict that Rodney was a tactician rather than a great admiral.¹³²

Neither Rodney nor Graves, however, was responsible for the military situation out of which the campaign grew. That situation was created by the army and was of great potential danger. When the danger materialized, the navy tried and failed to meet it. But the initial responsibility rests with the generals, not the admirals; it was the strategy of Clinton and Cornwallis which created the crisis.

Clinton has been the scapegoat for the whole disaster. He made the original error of giving Cornwallis too much latitude, thereby establishing what was in effect a dual command. The error was to some extent imposed by distance and slow communications, but it was accentuated by the fact that Clinton's orders were more polite than explicit. As time went on, the importance of his command decreased in relation to that of his subordinate. More and more men were drawn from New York to the Chesapeake, where they came under Cornwallis' control as he moved northward. These detachments forced Clinton, at least in his own opinion, into a defensive at New York throughout most of the period. He planned incessantly for an attack, on Newport or Philadelphia, but never made it; his army was not used even to harass the enemy. This inaction, whether it resulted from logic or laziness or a mixture of the two, is the worst charge which can be laid against the commander in chief. He was far from a bold or brilliant strategist, but he was not one to court disaster.

Cornwallis was. On him, if on anyone, rested responsibility for the exposed British position in the summer of 1781. His conduct is at first glance hard to understand, particularly in the light of his record ten years later in India; he seems like a different man from the victor of Bangalore and Seringapatam.

¹³² Alfred T. Mahan, *The Influence of Sea Power upon History, 1660–1783* (24th ed., Boston, 1914), p. 397.

But the later campaign differed in its essence from the earlier: the army in India did not depend directly upon the navy. Hence the war with Tippoo did not bring out the earl's greatest shortcoming—his inability to understand sea power. In America, on the contrary, this characteristic appeared in almost every major step of his road from Charleston to disaster.

Cornwallis began by choosing the back country of South Carolina in preference to the Cape Fear River. His campaign, punctuated by real defeats and Pyrrhic victories, led him to Wilmington. From there he refused to return to Charleston by sea; instead, on his own responsibility, he transferred the seat of war to Virginia. This was not only a breach of instructions but an act of recklessness, because it placed his army in complete dependence on the navy; British naval predominance had been intermittently threatened since 1778, and might be again. He could subsequently have mitigated the danger either by operating with Clinton against Pennsylvania or by immediately fortifying a naval base. Instead he wasted three months before moving to Yorktown; he apparently did not understand the requirements of a base or the need for finding it quickly. He was then caught in the trap which he had helped to make for himself, and in September he threw away his last chance of escape because he could not or would not grasp the purport of his information about the French fleet. This was the conduct of a thoroughgoing landsman. His mind did not project itself to sea, and out of the sea came the force which destroyed him.

The nucleus of this phase of the war, for both sides, was the interaction of sea and land power. "In any operation and under all circumstances," as Washington put it, "a decisive naval superiority is . . . the basis upon which every hope of success must ultimately depend."¹³³ This was equally obvious to Clinton by the autumn of 1780. "I have served a long apprenticeship to the sea service; the success of the next campaign, if we are enabled to make it, will depend in great measure on naval manoeuvres and arrangement."¹³⁴ They were enabled to make it because Cornwallis forced it—forced it in such a way that it was utterly dependent on naval maneuvers. The lesson of Arnold's predicament at Portsmouth was forgotten. The safety of the army again rested with the admirals, and this time the admirals blundered irretrievably. *Non bis peccatur in bello*.

¹³³ Fitzpatrick, XIX (1937), 174.

¹³⁴ Clinton to unknown, Nov. 26, 1780, CP.

Odoacer: German or Hun?

ROBERT L. REYNOLDS AND ROBERT S. LOPEZ*

THE history of the migrations which marked the downfall of both the Roman Empire in the West and the Han Empire in China is still very obscure. "Nowhere, since the time of Alexander the Great, do we feel so strongly that the meagreness of the sources flouts the magnitude of the events."¹

Unfortunately, the starting point, hence the guiding thread of all these migrations, lies in Central Asia, whose political, economic, and cultural history will in most of its details remain to us a blank page. For even such remote and belated repercussions of Central-Asiatic events as took place within the view of the classic world are but dimly shown to us in cursory, contradictory, and often unreliable sources.

To be sure, new archaeological and philological material has been piling up in the last two or three scores of years, which has been used in a number of valuable studies. But little of such evidence is specific enough to contribute to the revision of the histories of individual tribes. It is clear, nevertheless, that non-Germanic steppe peoples and cultures must have had a deep influence on many groups which were denominated German by a bygone generation of historians and philologists.²

Two chief difficulties are encountered by anyone attempting to use the Asiatic materials which throw light upon the history of the great migrations. In the first place, despite the archaeological and philological discovery of Asia, no one has yet appeared to draw together from the one hand the learning of Ural-Altaic philology and archaeology and from the other the written documents and monuments, the epics, sagas, and even the modern folklore, of the West. Moreover, the affinities of the varied Asiatic peoples are still uncertain. It is still unclear whether the earliest Turks were ethnically more akin to the "Mongoloid" or to the "Caucasic" stocks (although the Turkish speech has always been Altaic), and whether the leading tribe of the Hunnic conglomerate was Turkic or Mongolic. Even the identifications of the Hunni with the

*Dr. Reynolds is professor of history in the University of Wisconsin and Dr. Lopez is assistant professor of history in Yale University.

¹ J. B. Bury, *History of the Later Roman Empire* (2d ed., London, 1923), preface.

² Cf. Bernhard Salin, *Die altgermanische Thierornamentik* (Stockholm, 1904); Ellis H. Minns, *Scythians and Greeks* (Cambridge, 1913); M. I. Rostovtzeff, *Iranians and Greeks in South Russia* (Oxford, 1922); J. M. de Groot, *Die Westlande Chinas* (Berlin, 1926); A. A. Vasiliev, *The Goths in the Crimea* (Cambridge, Mass., 1936); Frederick J. Teggart, *Rome and China* (Berkeley, 1939), with bibliography.

Hung-nu and of the Avars with the Yuan-yuan are not definitely proved. We do perceive that all these tribes were so thoroughly commingled by inter-marriage, migration, and conquest that we can scarcely speak of clear-cut ethnic border lines. At the most, we can speak of linguistic groups, as far as the Asiatic evidence goes.

When we turn to the Western source materials, we find that a rich secondary literature has already been created from such evidence alone.³ But it is a noticeable characteristic of most of it that the history of every group of invaders of the Western Empire—except for the Huns, the Avars, the Alans, and a few such tribes—is reconstructed on the assumption that each such group was Germanic. This assumption is maintained not only when the weight of philology and contemporary statement support it but when neither does, a phenomenon which is apparently a consequence of the fact that when the pioneering research in the field was undertaken—to organize and to bridge the great gaps in the surviving Western sources—it was almost exclusively promoted by Germans. The eager nationalism of the rising German Reich turned their attention to the task in the first place; the picture of the migrations which emerged from their studies quite justified the zeal of their retrospective patriotism.

Whatever may have been the state of information two generations ago to support their assumption that the solution for doubts should be sought in a "Germanic" direction, consideration of the import of the new materials from Asia suggests that a wider horizon should now surround the interpretation of even the well-picked-over Western sources. Perhaps on re-examination these sources can be better fitted into those from South Russia and Central Asia and can even provide clues to steppe history itself.

With such ideas in mind, may we try some modest "chunk of history," giving it revisionist treatment, in a sort of experiment designed to test the possibilities of a "Hunnish" rather than a "Germanic" approach? Despite our weakness in Ural-Altaic and Scytho-Sarmatian materials, it does seem to us worth essaying, in connection with King Odoacer and the whirlpool of peoples in which he made his career.⁴

³ The basic general works are those of Eduard Wietersheim, *Geschichte der Völkerwanderung* (2d ed., Felix Dahn, Leipzig, 1880-81) and Ludwig Schmidt, *Allgemeine Geschichte der germanischen Völker* (München-Berlin, 1909) and *Geschichte der deutschen Stämme bis zum Ausgange der Völkerwanderung* (Berlin, 1910-18); also Alfons Dopsch, *Wirtschaftliche und soziale Grundlagen der europäischen Kulturentwicklung* (2d ed., Wien, 1923-24); Torsten E. Karsten, *Les anciens Germains* (Paris, 1931); N. Aberg, *Nordische Ornamentik in vorgeschichtlicher Zeit* (Leipzig, 1931), with bibliography.

⁴ We are particularly indebted to Professors Sidney Fish, Ernst Herzfeld, Karl Menges, and Martin Sprengling, and to Dr. Orkhan Yirmibesh for their valuable suggestions, without which this paper could not have been written. It goes without saying that they cannot be responsible for the judgments expressed in it.

For the purpose we find in the Western sources the names of a number of key persons: Odoacer; his father, Edicon; his son, Thelan or Oklan; his brother, Hunoulphus. Bits of the careers of each are revealed. With their names were associated the tribes or groups of the Torcilingi, Sciri, Heruli, and Rogians, or Rugians, concerning whose histories there are also fragments of information. For philological work there are these and some other names.⁵

The Torcilingi (some manuscripts carry the spelling "Turcilingi") are to us little more than a name. They appear in the extant sources only twice.⁶ In the *Historia Miscella* of Landulphus Sagax they are listed with those nations which under Attila's command took part in the battle of Châlons. The statement is unconfirmed by other sources. While the *Historia* is itself a late and unreliable chronicle, it includes some materials from earlier and better sources which have not come down to us. In the list of Landulphus, the Torcilingi appear jointly with the Sciri.⁷

The Torcilingi are mentioned the other time in the account of Jordanes—once more, jointly with the Sciri—as forming the core of the tribes or mercenary bands of which Odoacer was the leader when he deposed Romulus Augustulus. Jordanes refers to the Torcilingi three times, but only and always in connection with a single event: Odoacer's seizing of power over Italy. After that, we hear no more of the Torcilingi, not even in connection with Odoacer's later career.⁸ Furthermore, Jordanes is the only firsthand source calling Odoacer king of the Torcilingi; most often Odoacer is called king of the Sciri or a Scirian.⁹ Neither Landulphus nor Jordanes supplies a scrap of information as to the race, language, mode of life, origins, or earlier whereabouts of the Torcilingi.

Nevertheless, the German scholars of the nineteenth century built up a pedigree and a *Lebensraum* for these obscure "ancestors." Since the Torcilingi were mentioned (in the fifth century) in company with the Sciri, it was deduced that the two peoples had been neighbors and kinsmen in the first cen-

⁵ Jordanes, *M.G.H., Auct. Ant.*, V, *Get.*, 70, IX. See appendix to this essay, p. 51 below.

⁶ Kaspar Zeuss, *Die Deutschen und die Nachbarstämme* (München, 1837), pp. 155, 189, suggested that the *Πουτίλλιοι* mentioned by Ptolemy, II, 11, 7, were the Torcilingi. This was accepted by Karl V. Müllenhoff, *Deutsche Altertumskunde* (Berlin, 1870-1900), III, 319, and IV, 494. But most scholars have rejected this identification, which entails an amazing number of metatheses in order to build a Germanic etymology. Even the acceptance of this dubious proposal would not affect the thesis of this paper.

⁷ On the passage of the *Historia Miscella*, cf. Wietersheim, II, 245. See also Sidonius Apollinaris, *Carmina*, VII, 321.

⁸ Jordanes, *Get.*, 120, XLVI; 133, LVII, and *Rom.*, 44. In Paul Diac., *M.G.H., Auct. Ant.*, II, *Hist. Rom.*, XV, 8, and elsewhere, the name of the Torcilingi appears, but the source in such later references is evidently Jordanes.

⁹ See A. Nagl, "Odoacar," *Pauly-Wissowa, Real-Enzykl.* (1888 ff.); Moritz Schoenfeld, *Wörterbuch der altgermanischen Personen- und Völkernamen* (Heidelberg, 1911), s. v. One Byzantine writer, Theophanes (ed. de Boor, 1883), I, 119, 122, says that Odoacer was a Goth, but the source is late and is contradicted by all the earlier writers.

tury. Or they were supposed to have been the royal clan of the Sciri, which is not far from our own conjecture, as will be shown below. Some scholars, leaving behind the caution of those who first worked over the sources, found for the Torcilingi an early home on both sides of the Oder, with the Sciri on the east, the Vandals on the left, and the Rugians on the north.¹⁰ So surrounded, the Sciri and Torcilingi then became lesser twigs of the great Gothonic tree.¹¹ As a last step, historical dictionaries of Germanic names came to list *Torcilingi* among the rest, even though a question mark had to be put in place of the etymology which no efforts had been able to produce.

As far as etymologies go, however, it is not difficult at all to suggest them, if the starting assumption be that the Torcilingi were some sort of Turks. An early Turkish form *Türk-lük*, "Turkdom," might be postulated. Or the root *Türk*, designating Turks both in early and in modern times, might have been "bedeutsched" in barbarian circles, by process of analogy, through the addition of the suffix *-ing* or *-ling*, as in Karling, Merowing, Sikling, Knythling, for descendants of Karl, Merovech, Sigehere, and Knut. Or the same suffix might have been added to the Turkish personal name *Ṭoghril*, *Ṭoghrul*, or *Ṭogrul*, of which we have samples from the eleventh century on, and which was borne, *inter alios*, by the founder of the Seljuk empire.¹²

These have been simply offered as possibilities; there may be better. The first to suggest that the Torcilingi were Turks was Cesare Balbo. The Italian historian knew no Turkish but had no particular urge—as had the Dahns and Grimms—to aggrandize the German peoples; he wrote, "Of the Torcilingi one would say, judging from their name, that they were Turks." The French orientalist, Edouard Blochet, holds for *Türk-lük*, in remarks buried in an essay where a medievalist would hardly look for them. Besides, the essay for good reasons enjoys little credit among orientalists.¹³

¹⁰ Besides Schoenfeld, *s.v.* "Thorcilingi" and p. 289, see Schmidt, *Allgem. Gesch.*, p. 135, and *id.*, *Gesch.*, I, 349–50; Gudmund Schütte, *Our Forefathers, the Gothonic Nations* (Cambridge, 1929), II, 29; G. Romano, *Le dominazioni barbariche in Italia* (Milan, 1909), p. 46, etc. R. Much, *s.v.* "Turcilingi," Pauly-Wissowa, *Real-Enzykl.*, and *Deutsche Stammeskunde* (Berlin-Leipzig, 1920), pp. 125–26, gets rid of all problems by assuming that the term is just another name for Sciri. Especially, *cf.* Müllenhoff, as cited in note 6 above.

¹¹ The end product of a century of scholarship with a "Germanic bent" is perhaps this quotation from Schütte, II, 29, "No ancient historian or law codex states that there existed a special (Gothonic) branch embracing Rugians, Sciri, and Torcilingi. These tribes may be called supernumerary members of the East Gothonic sub-group. . . . Owing to occasional co-operation at certain times, they may most conveniently be considered under a common heading." There is, however, nothing to criticize in the conscientious scientific work which goes with these assumptions.

¹² *Kar-luk* is probably a farfetched analogy; its etymology is not established; *Ṭogrul* seems a fairly plausible root, with a little metathesis. There is the Petcheneg princely name, *Turak*, *cf.* Gyula Németh, *Inscripfen des Schatzes von Nagy-Szent-Miklós* (Budapest-Leipzig, 1932), pp. 30–31.

¹³ C. Balbo, *Sommario della storia d'Italia*, IV, chap. v; E. Blochet, "Les noms des Turks dans le chapitre x de la Génèse," *Revue de l'Orient Chrétien*, XXVIII (1931–32), 412 ff.

The Sciri are more frequently heard of than the Torcilingi, although notices are cursory and indefinite. Pliny the Elder, in a passage which is outstandingly unspecific, even for that vague section of his dealing with the misty Baltic regions, mentions an *Aeningia*, off somewhere north or east. Perhaps giving notice of Aeningia's inhabitants, or perhaps just mentioning something else he had heard about the general region, he then writes of Sarmatians, Venedae, Sciri (or maybe the original text of Pliny carried Ciri or Cyri), and Hirri. The latter two, for all the text reveals, may have been subgroups of the Venedae, or the memory of some rhyme scheme.

After having finished this vague section, Pliny turns with manifestly increased confidence to a discussion of the Germans; he does *not* include the Sciri, nor any group with a similar name, in his catalogue of Germans. Neither Caesar nor Tacitus had heard of Sciri.

At some time after 300 B.C. (or after 200 B.C., or even a good deal later than that again, for all the certainty we have), "Galatae and Sciri" tried unsuccessfully to capture Olbia, a Greek city on the northwestern coast of the Black Sea. That is all the *Protogenes Inscription* has to say about the Sciri.¹⁴ Since Greek was vague in its use of the term *Galatae*, the latter may have been true Kelts, in which case all we know is that the Olbians excluded the Sciri from that category; or the term may have covered both Germans and Kelts, in which case we conclude that some Greeks thought that the Sciri were neither.

Following the time of Pliny there is silence concerning the Sciri for three hundred years. About 381 and again in 408 A.D., they were combined with Carpi, Sarmatians, and Huns in affrays along the lower Danube. First they tried, with Carpi, to push across the river; the second time they tried with Huns. Indeed, the second time the Hunnic khagan, Uldes or Uldin, was apparently their sovereign. On each occasion they met with military disaster, and many Sciri were sold or settled as peasants in eastern Roman territory.

Those Sciri who remained north of the river apparently fell under the rule of Attila the Hun; as we have seen, they were reported to have been with him at Châlons. After the death of the Great Hun, the Sciri appear as the bitterest foes of the Ostrogoths, who had led in the coalition against the heirs of Attila. The Scirian leaders, Edica or Edicon, and his son, Hunoulphus, began an all-out war against the Ostrogoths. In the opening clashes the Ostrogothic king, Valamir, father of Theodoric the Great, lost his life; but shortly after, the Sciri met with crushing defeat near the Bolia river (468 A.D.), and Edicon

¹⁴ Minns prints the text in his appendixes. Rostovtzeff holds for an early date (say, early third century, B.C.). But for other comments, with basic edition of the text: *Corpus Inscriptionum Graecarum*, 2058.

himself apparently found death in the battle. Hunoulphus escaped with a following to Constantinople, where he rebuilt his power as a *condottiere* in the imperial service.

Soon after the Scirian disaster, Odoacer, another son of Edicon, began a career quite parallel to that of Hunoulphus, but under Ricimer, in Italy. The latter used him in the struggle against Emperor Anthemius (472). Four years later, the uprising of the barbarian mercenaries against Orestes and his son, Romulus Augustulus, gave Odoacer and his Sciri and Torcilingi and their associates, the rule of Italy. It is very likely that Odoacer set in motion his plotting in agreement with Hunoulphus, who was just at that moment at the height of his influence at the eastern court. Some years later, Hunoulphus, fallen into disgrace with Emperor Zeno, joined Odoacer in Italy, with a small bodyguard. Thus both remnants of the Scirian group, scattered after the battle of the Bolia, were joined again, about 486.

But in 488 the last days of the Sciri began: Theodoric the Great, followed by the Ostrogothic people and a train of lesser groups, and backed in the enterprise by Zeno, descended upon Italy. After long and bloody fighting, Odoacer was defeated and then treacherously murdered (March 15, 493).¹⁵ The nearest relatives of Odoacer were killed at once upon Theodoric's orders; many of his followers were killed by mobs. After that, like the Torcilingi, the Sciri disappear, save a few simple peasants of the name, left in the Balkans and known to Jordanes.¹⁶

One possibility remains, though the evidence is insecure, that some sort of Sciri yet survived. Jordanes' list of the peoples who remained faithful to Attila's son, Dengesich, includes Ultzinzures, Bittugures, Bardores, and Angisciri, who—according to the writer in Pauly-Wissowa, *s.v.* "Hunni"—"evidently bear Turkish-Hunnic names."¹⁷

Now, as sketched above, the Sciri were found, in the nineteenth century, to be an old Gothonic group, indeed, the first of them all to have raided the classic peoples in Gothonic style (on the strength of the Olbia inscription). But there is absolutely nothing that hints that any contemporary author thought of them as Germanic.¹⁸ German philologists have found significance in the name, however, by adding an *r* to the root *ski*, "to shine" or "to glow." One scholar, endorsing this etymology, wonders whether the Sciri were

¹⁵ *Anon. Vales*. On the epos which pictured Odoacer as the betrayer, not the betrayed, cf. Schmidt, *Gesch.*, I, 163; Schütte, II, 35.

¹⁶ Sources and bibliography on the Sciri are listed in Schmidt, *Gesch.*, I, 350 ff.; Schütte, II, 30 ff.; K. Kretschmer, "Sciri," Pauly-Wissowa, *Real-Enzykl.*

¹⁷ Jordanes, *Get.*, 128, LIII. The words in quotation marks are from Kicssling, "Hunni," Pauly-Wissowa, *Real-Enzykl.*

¹⁸ Save for Procopius, who once calls them Goths (*De Bello Goth.*, book I, 1). But the ethnological inaccuracy of that particular passage makes it worthless; he lumps together as Gothic the Alans (who certainly were not Germans, but Iranians), and the Sciri.

"shining" because of their illustriousness (as in the Latin *clari, splendidi*), or because of their innocence (as in *candidi, sinceri*), or because of racial purity (*reinen, unvermischten*). A Danish scholar has no doubt: the Sciri were "the pure ones."¹⁹

By way of suggestion, it can be mentioned that a very common word in modern Persian and in Pahlavī, *shīr*, might be considered. The word has two quite different meanings: "milk" and "lion." Steppe peoples rely and have relied upon milk; but "lion" has always been an attractive name to peoples. In old Persian, *shīr* in the sense of "lion" would have been *shagr*, and the fall of the *g* may have taken place quite early;²⁰ it can be conjectured that the name among the Scytho-Sarmatians was similar. But if there was any substance under Pliny's text, his Sciri lived in lands now postulated to have been the ancestral homes of Baltic or Slavic tribes, or even of Finns. Perhaps etymologizing with those languages should be attempted.

Sciri and Torcilingi are said to have formed the main element among the mercenaries who revolted against Romulus Augustulus and hailed Odoacer as *rex gentium*. Long before Odoacer reached this position, his father and brother had been leaders of the Sciri. However, most of the sources also mention that Heruls and Rugians, or Rogians, were included in the following of Odoacer in 476. There is no need for the Heruls to have been related by blood or speech to the others; Sarmatic Alans joined up with Germanic Vandals, Germanic Lombards made common cause with Mongolic (?) Avars against Germanic (?) Gepids, and so on.

It may be granted that the Heruls apparently were Germanic despite the fact that most of the personal names of their leaders baffle German philologists.²¹ In any case, only a fraction of the Heruli could have been included in the mixed bands which followed the fleeting fortune of Odoacer. An independent kingdom of the Heruls, back in Europe's interior, is often mentioned long after Odoacer's fall, and various leaders of Herul troops fought over Europe and the Near East and Africa, for their own accounts or in Byzantine

¹⁹ R. Much, "Skiren," *Real-Lexikon der germanischen Altertumskunde*. Schütte, II, 29, adds, "The Sciri belong to a series of (Gothonic) tribes with names of the short type." Incidentally—and this accounts for so unusual a classification—he works out a theory which is developed in various ways in his studies, to the effect that short names were the original Germanic type but that longer compound names spread from Ostrogothic beginnings starting about the time when the Huns came to dominate. He does not connect the two phenomena. One might suggest that the longer compound names follow polysyllabic Iranian patterns as well as resembling the "word-built" pattern of Turkic names. Cf. especially Schütte, I, 187 ff.

²⁰ Cf., for instance, E. S. D. Bharucha, *Pahlavī-Pārsend-English Glossary*, p. 245.

²¹ We find among the Heruls an Ochus, which appears Iranian; an Aordus which appears to be based on the name of the Sarmatian Aorsi; and even a Verus, which is quite Roman. Names which "sound" perhaps Dacian were Andonnoballus, Datus, Faras, Alvith, for which neither Förstemann nor Schoenfeld offers a Germanic etymology or can offer one only on the supposition that Greek sources misspelled the name. Only Halaricus, Rodvulf, and Fulcaris yield results to Germanic etymology.

service. The Heruls are variously depicted by Greek and Roman observers as daring seamen, as excellent cavalrymen, or as fierce, naked warriors fighting exclusively afoot! They remind one of the Northmen-Danes-Varangians-Rōs-Normans of the eighth to the twelfth centuries. They apparently migrate through other peoples, they adapt themselves and their fighting techniques to the most various circumstances, they pick up outlandish names—and maybe womenfolk and speech?—they serve bravely for pay, and they found kingdoms which vanish again.²²

The Rugians, or Rogians, counted by Jordanes among the peoples of Odoacer, were probably Germanic, *if* they were the same Rugians whose king Odoacer killed and whose kingdom he destroyed. Two branches of one folk often fought; there were the bitter struggles between the Ostrogoths of Theodoric Strabo and the Ostrogoths of Theodoric the Great; there were the Frankish civil wars of the Merovingians and Carolingians; the Norse leaders fought each other, and so on. But it really is strange—and has puzzled all scholars who have touched the problem—why no source hinted that a king hailed by at least some Rugians as their leader should throughout his reign have been the Rugians' enemy.²³ The sources carefully mention that when Theodoric marched against Odoacer, one of the former's roles was to pose as avenger of the Rugian king Odoacer had executed. Earlier, when Odoacer destroyed the Rugian kingdom, he resettled in Italy a number of Romans from those lands above the Brenner Pass, but he was content simply to wreck the power of the Rugians, without trying to become their king. In no case, in other words, did Odoacer behave as we should expect a Rugian princeling to have behaved, nor is there contemporary comment on such conduct of his.

It is necessary to note that our source which connects Odoacer with some sort of Rugian (?) following does *not*—precisely in that passage—spell the tribal name as any other author spells it, or as he (this is Jordanes) himself spells the name when writing about the enemy Rugians whom Odoacer destroyed. In the latter case he spells with a *u*; Odoacer's enemies were Rugians. In the former case he uses an *o*; Odoacer was a Rogian or had Rogians in his train.

Jordanes had occasion in three different passages to refer to the events which brought Odoacer to power. Once he does not mention any "Rogian"

²² Sources and bibliography in Schmidt, *Gesch.*, I, 333 ff; Karsten, pp. 75–76; Rappaport, "Heruli," Pauly-Wissowa, *Real-Enzykl.* Several classic and postclassic writers mention the Heruls as "Scythians," but save that it implied the author thought they lived the nomad life, the term, of course, had no classificatory significance.

²³ Paul. Diac., *Hist. Lang.*, I, 19, tried in a curious way to explain why Odoacer, whom Jordanes had called *Rogus* or king of the *Rogians*, should have waged war against the Rugians. The Lombard historian built up the assumption that while Odoacer ruled part of the people, the rest were his enemies. Cf. Schmidt, *Gesch.*, I, 325 ff.

follower: "*Torcilingorum rex habens secum Sciros, Herulos.*" In another passage he says: "*Odoacer, genere Rogus, Thorcilingorum Scirorum Herulorum turbas munitus . . .*" In this second case, it appears that Rogus is not a tribal name, but a family name, showing descent from some real or mythic Rogus. The third passage might go to show that the name did refer to a tribe: "*sub regis Thorcilingorum Rogorumque tyrannide . . .*" Here, however, the Sciri and the Heruls are forgotten, as though they were secondary in describing Odoacer's real status. Putting these statements in at least one logical sequence, it appears that Odoacer was the Torcilingi-king, of the stock of Rogus, with Sciri and Herul followers.²⁴

The evidence strongly hints that Odoacer's Rogian connection did not tie him with the tribe of Rugians, but that instead it linked him with the family of some Rogus. Among the Huns only do we find this name, and when we find it, it belongs to a man well worthy to give it to his line. One of the three brothers who ruled the Huns before Attila was Rogas or Ruga or Rugila (as the different sources, including Jordanes, variously call him). The other brothers were Octar or Otcар, and Mundiukh or Mundzuch—the latter Attila's father.

German tribes and families often sprang, or thought they sprang, from some noted leader, but among the Turks and Mongols the same thing was true. We have the Ottoman Turks, the Seljuk Turks, the Chagatai Mongols, and the Nogai Tatars, to mention only a few.²⁵ It is quite possible that Odoacer's Torcilingi, or at least their royal clan, were thought of as derived from Attila's uncle, Rogas the Hun-king.²⁶

What was the nation of the leader of those Torcilingi, Sciri, and Rogians? "*Genere Rogus,*" says Jordanes, and as we have seen, a Rogas was one of Attila's uncles. Octar or Otcар are names given the other, and there is no paleographic reason to prefer either of those forms, unless further evidence should tip the balance. As a matter of fact, such evidence is available.

There is a fragment of a Greek chronicler, quoted by a later grammarian, which presents us with a Hunnic name more or less halfway between an Otcар and an Odoacer: "Odigar, the supreme ruler of the Huns, died." These are the only extant words from that source. We have no means to locate the quo-

²⁴ Jordanes, *Rom.*, 44; *Get.*, 133, LVII.

²⁵ Some of these eponymic heroes were probably legendary; the existence of a Seljuk is doubted (cf. E. Rossi, "Turchi," *Encicl. Ital.*, with bibliography). But Othman, Chagathai, and Nogai were historical.

²⁶ This is also the opinion of Blochet, *loc. cit.* Jordanes, *Get.*, 88, XXIII, mentions "Rogas" beside the Finns, Aestii, Slavs, and Eruli, subjugated by the Ostrogothic king, Ermanaric, about 350 A.D. Nobody has been able, so far, to explain this passage; neither can we, unless it reflects some tradition that Rogas and his kin had been forced for some time to accept some sort of overlordship by Ermanaric. This would be our only evidence for such a fact. Cf. *Get.*, 105, XXXV.

tation as to time or place. Whether the personage in question was Attila's uncle, or still another Hun-king, his name certainly approaches that of Odoacer.²⁷ Odoacer's own name evidently could not be pronounced by Roman mouths without some kind of alteration.²⁸

Like *Torcilingi*, *Odoacer* is one of the names included in the onomastic dictionaries of the German tongues and like the former, it appears with a question mark in place of an etymology. But Turkish offers at least two promising choices: If we regard this name as an adaptation of *Ot-toghar*, it may mean either "grass-born" or "fire-born." And a shorter name, *Ot-ghar*, which is closer to *Otcar*, might be translated by "herder."²⁹ If Ratchis could become Radagaisus, why could *Ot-toghar* or *Ot-ghar* not have become Odoacer or Odovacer?³⁰

In addition to *Otcar* and *Odigar* and Odoacer, there was still "another" of like name, who had a career as an unlucky free lance around Angers in the 450's and 460's.³¹ In our unique source for this leader, written a century after the events by Gregory of Tours, we find this Adovacrius or Odovacrius heading a "Saxon" band. He and his men took part in a chaotic struggle for control of the Loire region, between the battle of Châlons (451) and the consolidation of Visigothic authority in the region, by Euric (466-484).

Since Gregory is the only chronicler who mentions this "Saxon" (?) it is worth while to analyze his story, unfortunately very confused.³² According to the historian of the Merovingians, "Adovacrius" went to Angers "*cum Saxonibus*," sometime after the battle of Châlons.³³ Childeric I, king of the Salian Franks (and father of Clovis; hence Gregory's interest in this business), intervened in the same area. Paul, a Roman count who had first beaten off the Visigoths in the district with the help of the Franks, was killed in a new

²⁷ Menander Protector (*Fragm. Hist. Graec.*, IV), p. 269.

²⁸ Cf. Ratchis-Radagaisus, Karl-Carolus, etc. In Latin the name Odoacer is often spelled Odoracer, with a *v* which is never indicated in Greek.

²⁹ al-Kāshgharī, *A Dictionary of the Turco-Tataric Languages* (Constantinople, 1915-17), s. v. There is also the Kalmuk word *oduaki* ("the present one"; Ramstedt, *Kalmückisches Wörterbuch*, Helsinki, 1935), if the addition of an *r* could be explained in some way. The form ODOVAC is found on Odoacer's coins.

³⁰ Curiously enough, the name of Odoacer has its historical revival in non-German groups, though its use by them has been taken to indicate that they were thereby manifesting surrender to German influence. The Přemysl Ottakar, crowned king of Bohemia in 1198, may have been showing in his name the vestiges of old Avar or Magyar relations with the Czechish nobility. It is closer to *Ot-toghar* than to Odoacer itself.

³¹ While in the following section of our paper we develop the thesis that the "Adovacrius" of the Loire region in the 450's was the same as Italy's Odoacer, it should be noted that the major thesis of this study—that the latter was a royal Hun—does not depend upon this subsidiary point.

³² Greg. Turon., *Hist. Franc.*, M.G.H., SS. Rer. Merov., I, 83, 18, and 19.

³³ The phrase "*cum Saxonibus*" is reminiscent of the one Jordanes used when describing Odoacer's seizure of power: "*habens secum Sciros . . .*" In both passages the authors appear to be indicating that while the leader was of one breed, the troops were of another, as a modern historian would imply if he wrote, "Lawrence, with his desert Arabs."

affray—apparently in a joint onslaught of Childeric and “Adovacrius” against him. The winners seem to have quarreled immediately after the death of Paul. Many of the “Saxons” had been killed in the battle with Paul’s Romans; then “their islands” (whose?) were captured by the Franks. Finally, in his last sentence in this account, Gregory made an astonishing leap, certainly through space and likely through time: “Odovacrius” (no longer “Adovacrius”) came to an agreement of *foedus* with Childeric, concerning matters far off on the other side of Gaul. They jointly “subjugated those Alamans who had invaded part of Italy.” Here Odovacrius is no longer connected with a “Saxon” band.

It seems well established that Gregory of Tours took this detailed information about Angers from a municipal compilation which has not come down to us, the *Annales Angevini*.³⁴ His condensed and unclear account is apparently an extract or a direct copy of those lost *Annales*, except for the agreement of “Odovacrius” in the last sentence. This combination of Childeric and “Odovacrius” for joint business touching Italy hardly grows out of their squabbles at Angers. For his last fact Gregory could have drawn on the text or the extract of the text of some *foedus* between Childeric and the Italian Odoacer, after the latter had risen to power.

This last supposition jibes with other material we have on the basic foreign policy of the successor of Romulus Augustulus; this policy apparently aimed at securing the flanks of Italy by a chain of treaties with the barbarian rulers of Gaul and Africa, and at securing wherever possible direct control over all territories included in the Italian prefecture. We know that in this last connection, he reconquered Dalmatia from the murderers of Julius Nepos, and that he destroyed the Rugian kingdom in Noricum. When he could not retain lands above the Alps, he aided their Roman inhabitants to withdraw into Italy proper. As to his western neighbors, we have long had evidence of treaties made early in his reign with Visigoths, Burgundians, and Vandals. Gregory of Tours appears in this muddled passage to complete the chain by revealing a pact made around the same time (Childeric died about 480) by which the Franks of Childeric helped him restrain the Alamanni in the Rhaetian parts of the Italian Prefecture.³⁵ (No other source reveals evidence of Alamannic invasion of Italy proper, south of the Alps, at this time.)

Beyond the fact that Gregory apparently had reason to fuse “Adovacrius”

³⁴ Cf. Wilhelm Junghans, *Histoire critique des règnes de Childeric et de Chlodovech* (Paris, 1879), pp. 12 ff.; Godefroid Kurth, *Etudes franques* (Paris-Bruxelles, 1919), II, 214 ff.

³⁵ On the foreign policy of Odoacer, cf. especially Ferdinando Gabotto, *Storia dell' Italia occidentale* (Pinerolo, 1911), I; Ludwig M. Hartmann, *Geschichte Italiens im Mittelalter* (Stuttgart-Gotha, 1923), I; Luigi Salvatorelli, *L'Italia dalle invasioni barbariche al secolo XI* (Milano, 1939), pp. 70 ff.; G. B. Picotti, “Sulle relazioni fra re Odoacre e il Senato e la Chiesa di Roma,” *Rivista Storica Italiana*, ser. 5, IV, 363 ff., with bibliography.

with "Odovacrius" and our deduction that the latter was Italy's Odoacer, there are general reasons for identifying "Adovacrius" of Angers with the same ruler. Just before the Angers incidents began, Sciri and, probably, "Torcilingi" had been in Gaul with Attila; after the latter's withdrawal, northern and central Gaul were in confusion and there was no reason why petty leaders of all sorts should not try there to make their fortunes. If Sciri were there under Odoacer, that explains why he is not mentioned in connection with the war his father and brother waged against the Ostrogoths; it also explains why, about four years after his kinsmen had met crushing defeat in central Europe, he had sufficient followers to cause Ricimer to enlist him for Italian enterprises.

But Gregory calls Adovacrius' followers "Saxons," not Sciri.³⁶ The fact that this is the unique reference to Saxons in the region, for a long time after, bears no weight; scraps of peoples strayed far in those days and it cannot be held that Sciri wandered but denied that Saxons could. Besides, the Saxons then were great pirates and the region was open to penetration from seas they roamed. However it can be pointed out that palaeographically the confusion of *Sciri* and *Saxones*, either by Gregory in reading his own source or by a copyist working on an early text of Gregory's history, is quite reasonable. The Saxons lasted on; long before the time of Gregory himself the Scirian name had disappeared. And Gregory was not a particularly erudite man.³⁷

Pretty good cases can be made out then, for theories that in the period of the migrations two or at most three Odoacers flourished: Otcár, uncle of Attila the Hun; Odigar, "the supreme ruler of the Huns," who was probably the same man; and Odoacer, leader of Torcilingi and Sciri, who tried first in Gaul and then succeeded in Italy.

Of Edicon, Odoacer's father, we do not hear before the death of Attila; by that time, however, he would have been at least in middle age, for his son Hunoulphus shared leadership with him (and, if the suggestions in the preceding section be accepted, his other son was a leader at the same time in Gaul).³⁸

Only a few years before (448), we read of an Edica or Edicon who was a very high official under Attila. The Hunnic ruler sent this man to Constantinople as ambassador to Theodosius II, along with a noble Roman, Orestes, who probably acted as interpreter and liaison officer. Priscus, the Greek who tells of this legation, first calls this Edicon a "Scythian," which was the archaistic name often used in that day for steppe nomads of Southeastern Europe and

³⁶ While Sciri were at Châlons, these passages in Gregory are the only notice we have of Saxons in those parts where this "Adovacrius" operated, for centuries before and after Gregory's day.

³⁷ Confusions of the *CI* letter group with an *A*, and of *R* with *X*, are far from impossible in the script of the time, while *IR* could also be confused with *IBUS*.

³⁸ Odoacer was about sixty in 493 (*cf.* Nagl, *loc. cit.*).

Central Asia.³⁹ However, Priscus goes on to relate that the emperor invited Edicon to a state banquet but did not extend the invitation to Orestes. When the latter complained, courtiers told him that he could not expect the same treatment as Edicon, "a Hun by race, excellent in fight." Now, though Priscus would have meant "Scythian" to be taken as a literary term, he would not have used "Hun" for anyone not a Hun; in his day "Hun" meant Hun (only later did it extend to mean peoples like Avars and Magyars, when it became in its turn an archaistic term), and Priscus, of all Greeks in his day, knew the Huns.

A bit later, Orestes seems to have persuaded his noble Hun to plot the poisoning of Attila. Edicon, however, made no move to effect that project; indeed, he revealed the plot to Attila, who forgave him. Orestes abandoned the Hunnic court.

We need scarcely recall that many years later, Orestes made his own son Emperor of the West, through a new betrayal of his new lord, Julius Nepos. Then Odoacer, son of an Edicon, put Orestes to death and sent into retirement the son of Orestes, Romulus Augustulus.

As for Edicon, the "Hun by race" who was so high in Attila's service, we do not hear of him after the return of his mission to Constantinople. But within a few years we find Edicon the "Scirian," father of Odoacer and Hunoulphus, leading a bitter attack upon the Ostrogoths who had betrayed their allegiance to the heirs of Attila. While there is no positive proof that the two Edicons are identical, nothing seems more probable. It is more or less taken for granted by all who have touched the problem. If so, Odoacer was the son of a "Hun by race, excellent in fight."⁴⁰

The name Edicon is not found among early Germanic peoples; Germanic philologists have been unable to find an etymology for it. But there was a Mongolic Edgü among the chieftains of the Golden Horde, as late as the thirteenth century.⁴¹ There is a "good" etymology in the Ural-Altaic linguistic group; in fact, *ädgü* in Turkish means "good."⁴²

Odoacer's son is called by two different names in our sources: Thelan and

³⁹ Priscus, fragments 7 and 8; see especially pp. 76-83 and 95.

⁴⁰ Approving the identification of the Edicons are, among others, Wietersheim-Dahn, Förstemann, Hodgkin, Bury, Nagl. Only A. Juris, "Über das Reich des Odovakar," *Gymnasium Program* (Kreuznach, 1883) is definitely against the identification because of Priscus' statement that Edicon was a Scythian. He gives no other reason. The French historiographer of the seventeenth century, Henri de Valois (Valesius), recognized Edicon, who was a Hun (Priscus), as Odovacar's father; and in the eighteenth century Tillemont agreed with this opinion. Le Nain de Tillemont, *Histoire des empereurs et des autres princes qui ont régné durant les six premiers siècles* (Brussels, 1740), VI, 178-79.

⁴¹ Edgü-Timur was a lieutenant of Ogotai in 1239, cf. B. Spuler, *Die Mongolen in Iran* (Leipzig, 1939), pp. 39, 383, with sources.

⁴² Etymology suggested by Blochet.

Oklan.⁴³ This would seem to hint that one or the other was a title or a nickname; neither has a satisfactory Germanic etymology.

Thelan resembles the name borne by the khagan of the eastern Turks, Tulan, who reigned from 587 to 600 A.D.

Oklan resembles closely the Turkish-Tatar word *oghlan*, "youth," which in modern times came through into German as *uhlan*, the name for lancers of "tartar" type. If this etymology be accepted, then the young man was named Thelan and he was also called familiarly or even by title, "The Youth."

The name of Odoacer's brother, Hunoulphus, is formed of two elements which often recur in the names of early Germans: *hun* and *wulf*. The latter word is self-translating, but the meaning of *hun* has not been agreed upon by philologists. However, the best and most generally accepted of all guesses so far offered is just "Hun." The early barbarians, impressed by the might of the Huns, seem to have begun giving the name to their offspring well before Attila's glory won him the highest seat in their Valhalla.⁴⁴ Thus the son of the famous Vandal-Alan king, Gaiseric, was named Hunneric: "king of the Huns" or "Hun-king." And the son of the renowned Ostrogoth, Ermanaric, was named or nicknamed Hunimund: "under the *mund* (or suzerainty) of the Huns"; actually he did reign under the suzerainty of the Huns, if we may believe Jordanes respecting this period of Ostrogothic history.⁴⁵

Hunoulphus, then, was the "Hunnish wolf" or "wolf of the Huns." Why wolf? With the Germans, the frequent recurrence of the suffix *wulf* in personal names is an unexplained, although a noticeable phenomenon. The wolf has no favorable place (in fact, the wolf-god, Loki, has the most despised of all) in saga and folklore, and the man-wolf or werewolf is one of the most abhorred figures invented by the folk imagination. But the animal holds a most distinguished place among the Turks and Huns. The legends of the Hiung-nu, as related by the ancient Chinese historians, made the whole people stem from a princess Hiung-nu and a wolf. Likewise, the early Turks—not unlike the Romans—maintained that their khagan was the offspring of a she-wolf. Here is what a Chinese historian writes about the T'u-kiüe (Turks), as early as 581 A.D.: "On top of the staff of their flag, they put the golden head of a she-

⁴³ On the spellings of Thelan-Oklan, cf. Schoenfeld, *s. v.* The best source, Joh. Antioch., fragment 214a, spells 'Οξλάν. One is reminded of the words *Infanta* and *Juncker*, grown into titles.

⁴⁴ Ernst Förstemann, *Altd deutsches Namenbuch* (2d ed., Bonn, 1900-16), I, *s. v.*

⁴⁵ According to the vague story of Jordanes, Hunimund was succeeded, after a long interregnum, by Valamir, Theodoric's father, who was to die fighting the Sciri. But Ammianus gives different names. He speaks of a king, Withimer, after whom the Ostrogoths were ruled in the name of the minor Witheric, by Alatheus and Safrac, two lieutenants of the Huns. The first name, probably Grecized by Ammianus, is difficult to etymologize; the other seems Sarmatic(?)—at any rate, non-Germanic—like Candac, Suktak, and other names of the sort which were common in the period.

wolf. The barons of their rulers call themselves *wolves*. As they descend from wolves, they do not want to forget their origin."

The Turkish equivalent for "wolf" is *büri*, *böri*, or *börü*. This word could have been an element in the name of Attila's grandfather—the father of Otcar, Rogas, and Mundzikh—whom Jordanes calls Balamber. *Hun-wulf* could have been a translation of such a name, or even the translation of a title the son of Edicon, one of the noblest Huns, could rightfully bear: "baron (*börü*) of the Huns." No satisfying etymology has been found for the feudal word *baro* or *baron*, in the sense of noble warrior.⁴⁶

A recapitulation of the evidence brings out these points:

While in all the secondary literature generally followed it has simply been assumed that Odoacer and his peoples were Germans, there is no scrap of source material to support such an assumption in the case of his immediate following and some evidence which goes far to indicate that they were *not* Germans.

Next, while we have Jordanes' testimony that Goths often took Hunnic names, it would seem strange for any Gothonic family to use them exclusively. Here, however, we have leaders—Odoacer, and his father and his son—who bear names no Germanic philology has been able to explain but which appear to make sense in some sort of Ural-Altaic speech. There is a brother with a "Germanic" name, but half of that is *Hun*.⁴⁷

More than this, there are the coincidences (but a whole group of coincidences) which link the names of this group to those of Attila's own kindred and to Hunnic officials at Attila's court.

The careers of Odoacer, of his father, and of his brother—even of his ill-fated son—were entirely consistent with those which could have been achieved by noble Huns in the generation after Attila's death: "*Torcilingorum rex*,

⁴⁶ For *baro*, cf. Du Cange, *Glossarium Med. et Inf. Lat.*, s. v.; René Grousset, *L'empire des steppes* (Paris, 1938), p. 125; G. B. Picotti, "Unni," *Encicl. Ital.*, with bibliography. A hundred years later the sovereign of the Western T'u-kiüe (Turks) was named Istami, yet the Greeks called him by his title, *Sir-yabghu*, which they rendered as Sizabul. A Hephthalite king defeated the Sassanian ruler, Peroz, in 484; the Arabo-Persian writers took the victor's title, *khshevan*, "king," to be his name, rendering it Akhshunwaz.

⁴⁷ There is one exception, Odoacer's wife, whose name is given as Sunigilda by Joh. Antioch. (fragment 214a). But the wife was not necessarily of the same stock as the husband. The sagas, although they often mention the name of Odoacer under different transliterations, are unfortunately of little help, because of their unhistorical commingling of quite distinct personages and peoples; there are the many ways in which Actius the Roman and Attila the Hun were first conceived to be German heroes and then blended into one saga personality. The connection is at best tenuous, and is here pointed out with diffidence, yet we may have a like curious echo of real history in the case of Odoacer and his family. For instance, an Ottarr is said by saga genealogy to have been the grandson of Alf and the great-grandson of Ulf: a vague recall of some Hun-wulf? In Beowulf, Ohthere (Odoacer?) is the son of Ongentheow ("servant of the Huns"?—Edicon?), and the brother of Onela (Hunoulph?). On the other hand, Onela is said by a modern philologist to be the same as Anala, mythic ancestor of the Ostrogothic royal clan.

habens secum Sciri, Herulos . . .”; “a king of the Turks, having with him Sciri, Heruls . . .”

If any should question why for just this one time the name Turk should appear in our sources for the period, it can be pointed out that here clearly Jordanes was drawing upon Cassiodorus, who delighted in showing off just that kind of knowledge, and who was in a position to possess it with respect to the family of Odoacer.

Having deliberately chosen a “Hunnic” rather than the traditional “Germanic” point of view, then, here is how one can reconstruct the main developments in the “chunk of history” which was picked for the experiment:

The Sciri (originally a Baltic [?] or Sarmatic [?])—but hardly a Germanic—people) were drawn into the Hunnic political constellation around the middle of the fourth century. Their ties to the master Hunnic people were drawn tighter and tighter in the reigns of Uldin, Rogas, and Attila. Under the latter, one of his relatives of the royal clan of Rogas was leader of the Sciri, supported by a band of Torcilingi, his Turkish tribesmen. The plot of this leader, Edicon, with Orestes, was forgiven; still, Attila left at home his once-tainted kinsman when marching against Aetius, the Roman who had the best connections among the Huns and who might have tried to tamper with some of the shakiest vassals of his adversary.

Young Odoacer was with the Scirian contingent at Châlons; he remained in Gaul to profit from the disorder which followed that battle. Then Attila died, and his sons and relatives divided among themselves the empire—or rather, the tribes—over which the Hun-king had held sway. Edicon retained control of that part of the Sciri which was not in Gaul with Odoacer; he carried on Attila’s drive to rule over the peoples but his forces proved inadequate. Only a handful of his Sciri survived the defeat on the Bolia and accompanied Hunoulphus to Constantinople. Odoacer, squeezed out of Gaul between the Visigoths and the Franks, accepted service with Ricimer.⁴⁸

APPENDIX: A NOTE UPON THE ETYMOLOGIZING OF NAMES FROM OUR WESTERN SOURCES FOR THE PERIOD OF THE GREAT MIGRATIONS

In our essay we have suggested a number of Ural-Altaic etymologies for names mentioned in the sources for this epoch. If there had not been accumu-

⁴⁸ Two other things may be mentioned, although they are not of great apparent significance. In his coins Odoacer is represented with a thick mustache, which may be a Turkish as well as a German adornment, and with heavy eyelids, which seems to be rather a Turkish than a German characteristic: Roman moneyers of the fifth century were usually skilled and realistic. Then, according to one chronicler Odoacer favored the Arians; but for an orthodox Catholic writer of that century impartiality already amounted to a bias in favor of the heretics. On top of this, there is a tradition that Theodoric had Odoacer buried in a Jewish synagogue; and since the Ostrogothic king showed on another occasion his respect for the synagogue, we have no reason to think that

lated in the last hundred years a great mass of Germanic etymologizing on all such names, we should have taken this step more lightheartedly, for two good reasons:

1. Whatever names may earlier predominate in a human group, when it falls under the religious, political, moral, social, or cultural leadership of some other group, the personal names or the naming principles of the latter will tend to be taken up by the former, though not, of course, to the exclusion of all older names. On several of these counts Hunnic dominance of the Germanic world endured throughout the period of the migrations. One should therefore expect that "German" names, especially those in leading families which had cause to mingle with the masters in campaigns, in court life, and in nuptials, should have been both adopted and adapted from Hunnic names. Names of leaders, in turn, are just the sort our sources have preserved.

2. We do not have to rely upon deduction alone to conclude that in the epoch studied the process took place exactly in the manner stated. Jordanes writes, ". . . let no one who is ignorant cavil at the fact that the tribes of men make use of many names, even as the Romans borrow from the Macedonians, the Greeks from the Romans, the Sarmatians from the Germans, and the Goths frequently from the Huns." (Jordanes, *M.G.H., Auct. Antiq., Get.*, 70, IX; Mierow's trans.)

To us it would seem that these two reasons are above challenge regarding this particular field of study. However, they are not challenged—they are simply passed over—in the whole mass of dictionaries and philological studies touching the subject. In these the approach is overwhelmingly according to Germanic preconceptions. All name elements, clear or doubtful, are fed automatically into a complex apparatus of roots, analogies, hypothetical forms, similar terms known to have been later in use by some Germanic people somewhere, and the answer nearly always comes out at the other end: This is what the name meant—in German. The rest of the time, when the machine fails to work: A question mark!

We feel that in questioning this whole approach we are doing more than tilt at windmills. Of course, the Germanic predilection of the history of the period as constructed in the nineteenth century gives great support to these assumptions of Germanic philology; the reverse is quite as true. We nurse, as is apparent, deep reservations about at least some of the "history" but we face the "facts" of the philology and have no tools with which to dig into them except those furnished by the philology itself. Still, we are bothered by it.

he meant by this decision to inflict a last outrage upon the body of his enemy. If Odoacer was a heathen, burying him in a synagogue might seem the only solution, for his body would have been out of place both in a Catholic and in an Arian church.

As an example of the sort of thing that is met with, take the name *Attila*. All we have of common sense and the witness of Jordanes demand that that man's name be considered a Hun name. Turning to the historico-philological literature, though, we find the following over-all presentation: "Since *ila* is a Gothic diminutive, the name is Gothonic, and its bestowal upon the baby Hun prince illustrates the rapid permeation of Gothonic culture to the highest ranks in Hunnic society. The first element in the name is 'not so certain,' though Gothic *ata* ('lord' or 'father') is probably involved." (Gothic use of *ata* for "lord" or "father" looks a whole lot like the universal Turkic use of *ata* to mean "lord" or "father"—and as early as Ulfilas, let alone Attila.)

Then when the suffix *ila* turns up all through the sources as a component of names, no eye takes note that man after man who bore such a name was demonstrably a Hun, probably a Hun, or of a group which had strongly felt Hunnic power. No, the *ila* just goes to show the Gothonic character of those names, "since *ila* is a commonly used Gothonic diminutive, appearing often as an element in Gothonic names, even in those of Attila and many of his closest relatives."

Maybe so.

Starting with hunches like ours about *ila* (that somewhere in it lurks a Turk term), and going through the *Namenbücher*, we feel that scholars familiar with the more ancient Ural-Altaic tongues might find much that would profit them and help place more exactly the Huns and their language among the Ural-Altaic groups. Old-Persian and non-Persian Iranic philologists should also examine the possibilities. Important additions to our understanding of German language history might derive from such research. At least until such studies have been made, and through them the original Germanic assumptions have been sustained, the general evidence indicates that much of the current secondary material floats upon doubts which impair its usefulness.

A few Germanic words which are considered to show traces of Asiatic influence are listed in Karsten, pages 194-97 (see footnote 3 above). There is practically no bibliography upon the subject.

The Failure of an Attempted Franco-German Liberal Rapprochement 1830-1840

OSCAR J. HAMMEN*

ALMOST all hope for the auspicious continuation of a trend which had seemed very promising in Franco-German popular relations died in the critical year of 1840. During the preceding decade, numerous writers and intellectuals had confidently promoted a rapprochement between France and Germany, an alliance based on the collaboration of liberal forces in both lands. Cordial relations seemed desirable, if not necessary, both to the French liberals and above all to a group of zealous young Germans who rebelled against the reactionary institutions prevalent east of the Rhine.

Though successful in the Revolution of 1830, French liberalism felt insecure and isolated as against the solid reactionary front then prevailing in the rest of Europe. Franco-German friendship and collaboration hence seemed necessary in order to establish a more favorable balance of power for liberalism against the recurring threat of an incursion by the Cossacks of Nicholas I.

In Germany the very growth of liberalism long had been retarded because continental Europe generally associated liberalism and the rights of man with France and the great Revolution, a revolution which for Germany ultimately had signified national humiliation and domination by France. Hence, liberalism in Germany had labored constantly under the charge of being a French ideology, thus inferring ties with the archenemy. Only liberalism of a pronounced nationalist and anti-French bias could, therefore, have hoped to find popular acceptance among the Germans, conscious as they were of the fact that in the past princes and factions had allied themselves all too often with France in a manner prejudicial to the ultimate interests of Germany. Therefore, while a national liberalism might have been acceptable, its triumph in Germany, and especially in Prussia, appeared destined to be short-lived. A liberal regime in Prussia, with a pronounced nationalist tone, would have alienated France; it could scarcely have left the western frontiers unguarded in order to concentrate adequate forces to discourage or counter the anticipated intervention of autocratic Russia and reactionary Austria.

The sole escape from the above dilemma seemed to lie in the espousal of a liberalism, cosmopolitan in its emphasis, which would seek to overcome ancient

*The author is a member of the department of history in Westminster College, Utah.

animosities between France and Germany through the cultivation of a friendship based on common political views. Then, liberalism, freed from the stigma of being an enemy ideology, could gain adherents rapidly and rise to power in Germany. Thereafter, secure in the friendship of France, or even assured of French aid, a liberal Prussia and Germany could survive the challenge of the eastern conservative powers. Thus alone, so it appeared to many young German liberals, could liberalism expand and ultimately gain ascendancy in Germany.

The decade following the July Revolution provided some favorable conditions for the development of close ties between liberalism in France and Germany. By 1830 in Germany, a new generation, which had not been infected directly with the anti-Gallic virus bred by the War of Liberation against the oppressive rule of Napoleonic France, had matured. Young Germans were less disposed to judge, *a priori*, that all things issuing from France must be baneful to Germany.

It is not, of course, entirely accurate to speak of the liberals of the decade subsequent to the July Revolution as being separate products of a younger and of an older generation. Since the above designations, however, have the sanction of history and tradition, they will generally be retained as a matter of convenience in this article. In a more basic sense the "younger generation" was the offspring of eighteenth century rationalism and cosmopolitanism, of the philosophical school which stressed the common humanity of all peoples but contended against and underestimated the existence of national disparities and of the emerging force of nineteenth century national feeling. The "older generation," product of the historical school and of romanticism, while giving due stress to the rights and dignity of mankind, tended to emphasize history and tradition, pointed to the diverse national institutions and characteristics as bars to the rationalist application of a common pattern of living and government for all nations. To them, the English constitutional developments served as a model and guide. To the younger generation, on the other hand, an abrupt and revolutionary break, *à la* 1789, with the irrational past seemed a desirable procedure. The latter, therefore, were inclined to look to France for inspiration and even aid.

German youth, in consequence, hailed the events in the Paris of July, 1830, as harbingers of a better age, as merely the first fiery eruptions of long-suppressed energies through the solid conservative shell which so long had encased the soul of Europe. Numerous German university students flocked to Paris to see the "great nation" at close hand.¹ This "second crowing of the

¹ Prince William to Frederick William III, Sept. 15, 1830, in Paul A. Merbach, ed., *Wilhelms I. Briefe an seinen Vater König Friedrich Wilhelm III* (Berlin, 1922), pp. 95-96.

Gallic cock," so Heinrich Heine exulted, was even bringing daylight to Germany, where aristocrats and priests sought to intimidate the people with visions of the Terror while the liberals and humanists, in contrast, promised scenes similar to those of the "big week" in Paris, culminating in a peaceful triumph of liberal forces.² As a self-styled "son of the revolution," Heine predicted that the great deeds of the French were addressed to all peoples; they would not fail to see the significance of the July days.³

Ludwig Börne responded in a similar vein. To him, upon entering France in September, 1830, the first sight of the French cockade, seen on the hat of an Alsatian peasant, seemed like a "small rainbow" after the deluge of the preceding years. The Revolutionary tricolor filled him with hope and fear; he yearned to fight, if only for a day, under those colors.⁴ Börne, in that rosy dawn, anticipated a revolution in Germany⁵ which he hoped would result in the creation of a German republic.

This excess of enthusiasm for the July Revolution among the young German liberals caused a number of French observers to see therein a bid for liberal intervention by France in Germany. Edgar Quinet, French writer, politician, and advocate of Franco-German collaboration, hopefully assumed that the Prussian Rhine Province, at least, only awaited the word to effect a reunion with France.⁶ Quinet, and others, however, misjudged the nature of German enthusiasm. Liberal Germany, out of opposition to domestic absolutism, applauded events in France as a dramatic preview of developments which must follow in Germany. Liberals, too, looked to France for encouragement and perhaps aid in establishing constitutional government in Germany. But even in the Rhineland none, or at best an inconsequential minority, desired a political union with France.⁷

Moreover, sympathy for French Revolutionary achievements was confined, in general, to the youth of Germany. The older liberals, tempered as they were in the fires of the War of Liberation, remained hostile and suspicious.⁸ To them, this sympathy for the triumphs of a revolution in France

² Heinrich Heine, Einleitung zu "Kahldorf über den Adel in Briefen an den Grafen M. von Moltke," March, 1831, in Ernst Elster, ed., *Heinrich Heines Sämliche Werke* (7 vols., Leipzig and Vienna, 1890), VII, 280-82. Subsequent references to the Elster edition will be referred to as *Werke*.

³ Heine, "Ludwig Börne. Eine Denkschrift," *Werke*, VII, 59, 64.

⁴ Ludwig Börne, "Briefe aus Paris," Sept. 7, 1830, *Gesammelte Schriften von Ludwig Börne* (12 vols., Vienna, 1868), VIII, 4-5.

⁵ Heine, "Börne," *Werke*, VII, 68.

⁶ Philippe Sagnac, "La Crise de l'Occident et la question du Rhin. Essai sur l'esprit public en France et en Allemagne (1832-1840)," *Revue des études napoléoniennes*, XVI (1919), 284-85.

⁷ *Ibid.*, XVI, 286-87.

⁸ The outspoken distrust and hostility toward France evinced by most of the older generation of liberals is best seen in the historian Niebuhr, the patriot Arndt, and in Görres, a Catholic, anti-Prussian liberal and former editor of the *Rheinischer Merkur*, which first appeared during the War of Liberation and which Napoleon dubbed the "fifth power" fighting against him. See

appeared dangerous. The historian Niebuhr saw this enthusiasm as a disintegrating force which would make futile any real resistance to the attack by France which he anticipated.⁹ Even David Hansemann, noted Rhineland liberal and usually a judicious observer, professed that, if French troops invaded Germany bearing proclamations which renounced all conquests and indemnities but promised to establish the national independence of Germany under a free constitution, a favorable response from a portion of the population was likely. Such a Gallic offer would appear attractive as long as Germany in comparison had nothing but the despised Confederation and reactionary institutions. The memory of former French domination, so Hansemann asserted, had lost its force.¹⁰

A degree of caution must be exercised, however, in accepting the statements of liberals which indicated the existence of ideological sympathies amounting to treasonable collaboration with an invading French army. The presence of an expansionist, aggressive France, was often used as an argument to convince Prussia of the need for introducing progressive and popular institutions, on the generally accepted thesis (by liberals) that only free citizens of a free Germany would possess the unity and moral strength required to repulse French *élan*.¹¹ Thus Hansemann, while speaking of the French threat and of possible German sympathies for the invading hosts of a "free" nation, was loyally addressing himself to the Prussian king to induce the latter to assume popular leadership in Germany through the granting of a liberal constitution. Only a free Prussia, so Hansemann stated, could resist a France which inscribed "liberty, fraternity, and equality" on her banners. In fact, conservative states, through their evident weaknesses, invited aggressive attacks from free nations and inevitable defeat at the hands of an army of citizen soldiers.¹²

While the older generation had viewed the Revolution of 1830 with misgivings, youth in Germany at first had demonstrated an unbounded hope and

Niebuhr to Hensler, Dec. 19, 1830, in Friedrich Perthes, ed., *Lebensnachrichten über Barthold Georg Niebuhr aus Briefen desselben und aus Erinnerungen einiger seiner nächsten Freunde* (3 vols., Hamburg, 1838-39), III, 280; Arndt to Schleiermacher, Dec. 7, 1830, "Aus Arndts Briefen," ed. by Friedrich Jonas, *Preussische Jahrbücher*, XXXIV (1874), 589-620; Joseph von Görres, "Krieg oder Frieden? An die Kriegspartei in Frankreich. 1831," in Marie Görres, ed., *Joseph von Görres, Gesammelte Schriften* (9 vols., Munich, 1854), V, 420-23. See also Herman Bloesch, *Das junge Deutschland in seinen Beziehungen zu Frankreich* (Bern, 1903), p. 65.

⁹ Niebuhr to Hensler, Dec. 19, 1830, *Niebuhr*, III, 280.

¹⁰ David Hansemann, "Denkschrift von D. Hansemann über Preussens Lage und Politik," Dec. 31, 1830, in Johannes Hansen, ed., *Rheinische Briefe und Akten zur Geschichte der politischen Bewegung 1830-1850* (2 vols., Essen, 1919), I, 68.

¹¹ See Sägemann to Varnhagen, Nov. 17, 1819, in Karl August Varnhagen von Ense, ed., *Briefe von Sägemann, Metternich, Heine und Bettina von Arnim* (Leipzig, 1865), p. 100; Joseph zu Salm-Dyck, "Denkschrift über die Verfassungsfrage," Jan. 28, 1831, in Hansen, I, 86; Hansemann, "Denkschrift von D. Hansemann, 1840," in *ibid.*, I, 216-17.

¹² Hansemann, "Denkschrift . . . 1830," in Hansen, I, 39, 62-66, 69, 78.

sympathy for events in France. Ultimately, however, the judgment of even the younger generation would be decided by the question of whether revolution in France meant foreign wars and expansion at the expense of Germany. The question of war or peace, indeed, hung in the balance for a number of years.

At first a legitimist crusade against revolution in France appeared most imminent. Nicholas I of Russia prepared for immediate offensive action and sent Marshall Diebitsch to Berlin to provide for concerted Russo-Prussian action.¹³ Frederick William III of Prussia, though he, in the judgment of the youthful Moltke, possessed the only army in Europe which was really fit for offensive action¹⁴ opposed an intervention in which his state would necessarily play the major role and, in case of failure, be forced to pay the piper through the sacrifice of territory on the Rhine.¹⁵ Metternich hesitated because of Austria's unreadiness. Prussian caution, Austrian unpreparedness, and Russian preoccupation with the Polish rebellion, and other factors thereafter made intervention impossible. The threat of war initiated by France, however, remained. Liberals and Republicans hated the "*maladie de 1815*" as an affliction which could be cured only through a reconquest of the left bank.¹⁶

Such nationalist outbursts in Paris and French demands for the "natural frontiers" inevitably evoked an unfavorable reaction in Germany. Doubts and fears began to assail the German youth which had hailed the July events with unreserved enthusiasm. This led to a greater emphasis on the need for national resistance and unity against France. By 1831, Quinet, reversing his views of the previous year, believed that Germans no longer looked to France but instead were rallying around Prussia.¹⁷ Quinet began to doubt the very existence of any liberalism in Germany, and especially in Prussia. Between the latter state and its people there was a secret *entente* for postponing liberty in favor of the pursuit of the fortunes of Frederick the Great. Quinet discovered the German hearts still bled over the wounds inflicted by the Treaty of Westphalia and the loss of Alsace-Lorraine much as the French were affected by the decisions of 1815.¹⁸ Although Quinet, as in 1830, undoubtedly exaggerated a trend which became increasingly apparent, his views were substantiated, to a

¹³ Kurt M. Hoffmann, *Preussen und die Julimonarchie, 1830-1834* (Berlin, 1936), p. 15.

¹⁴ Helmuth von Moltke to his mother, Dec. 25, 1830, in *Schriften des General Feldmarschalls Grafen Helmuth von Moltke* (Berlin, 1900), I, 122.

¹⁵ Clausewitz to Gneisenau, Aug. 20, 1830, in Hans Delbrück, ed., *Das Leben des Feldmarschalls Grafen Neithardt von Gneisenau* (5 vols., Berlin, 1880), V, 606-607; Stägemann to Friedr. Cramer, Sept. 20, 1830, in K. A. Varnhagen von Ense, ed., *Briefe von Chamisso, Gneisenau . . .* (2 vols., Leipzig, 1867), II, 198; Hoffmann, pp. 20-23, 66; Vicomte de Guichen, *La Révolution de Juillet 1830 et l'Europe* (Paris, 1916), pp. 120-39.

¹⁶ Guichen, p. 139.

¹⁷ Paul Gautier, ed., *Un prophète. Edgar Quinet. Édition nouvelle de ses articles sur l'Allemagne d'après les textes originaux avec commentaire* (Paris, 1917), p. 6.

¹⁸ Quinet, "De l'Allemagne et de la Révolution en 1831," in *ibid.*, pp. 104, 120.

degree, from other sources. Heine found himself astounded at Prussia's ability to use all sorts of people, even the "most raging demagogues," to preach that all Germany should become Prussian.¹⁹ Even at the Hambach Festival of 1832, despite the presence of a number of Poles and "*amis du peuple*" from Strassburg in an atmosphere of cosmopolitan liberalism, expressions of marked German national feeling prevailed.

The Hambach Festival, which has been characterized as the first German political meeting on a grand scale,²⁰ did indeed reflect fully both the aspirations and the misgivings of the liberal young Germans in 1832. On the one hand, Heine saw it as the occasion where French liberalism delivered its most intoxicated sermon on the mount; there the modern age "caroled its morning song," and toasts were drunk to the fraternity of all mankind.²¹ A European confederation of states, a league of republican nations, centering about a free Germany, France, and a resurrected Poland, beckoned as the ultimate ideal.²²

Despite the cosmopolitan aura, which to Heine and others seemed dominant at Hambach, the national hopes and fears of the assembled multitude of German liberals preponderated in the majority of scenes, symbols, and speeches. The realization of a great, free, and united German fatherland, which would assume an honored and respected rank in the society of European states, was the common goal to which the Germans subscribed, diverse though their programs otherwise might be. The popular German national colors, the black-red-gold, appeared everywhere in banners and cockades.²³

The question of welcoming French aid for the realization of German freedom interjected a note of disharmony. J. G. A. Wirth, the hero of the festival, gave expression to the misgivings of the great majority on this issue. The welfare and liberty of most European nations, even of France, depended on a free Germany, Wirth declared. Hence, many German patriots looked to France for aid in the belief that French self-interest would dictate such a policy. Wirth warned against this delusion. French propaganda might well promise aid to the friends of freedom everywhere, but as far as Germany was concerned, it would be at the price of the left bank of the Rhine. Wirth declared that Germany would not buy liberty at the cost of new dishonors and territorial losses. If France sought to conquer but one furrow of German soil, all opposi-

¹⁹ Heine, "Vorrede," "Französische Zustände," *Werke*, V, 17-18.

²⁰ Veit Valentin, *Das Hambacher Nationalfest* (Berlin, 1932), p. 81.

²¹ Heine, "Börne," *Werke*, VI, 94.

²² Valentin, pp. 10, 22, 41-44; Johannes Bühler, *Das Hambacher Fest. Deutsche Sehnsucht vor hundert Jahren* (Ludwigshafen a. Rh., 1932), pp. 9-10, 18-19, 108; Joh. Georg Aug. Wirth, "Bei dem Hambacher Fest am 27. Mai 1832," in Theodor Flathe, ed., *Deutsche Reden. Denkmäler zur vaterländischen Geschichte des neunzehnten Jahrhunderts* (2 vols., Leipzig, 1893-94), I, 147, 153.

²³ Valentin, pp. 33, 37, 59; Bühler, pp. 51, 135-38.

tion and divisions in Germany should and would cease at once; a united Germany would arise against France.²⁴

Inevitably, too, the wound to Germany resulting from the past loss of Alsace-Lorraine made itself felt at Hambach. Wirth asserted that freedom for Germany would probably result in a reunion of the lost provinces with Germany.²⁵ How, he did not state. Karl Heinrich Brüggemann, a student who later became a noted liberal Rhineland editor, somewhat more specifically demanded the return of Alsace-Lorraine.²⁶

The French and Alsatian guests at Hambach were pained by such distrust of French motives, especially by the injection of the question of Alsace-Lorraine. Lucien Rey of Strassburg issued a declaration that France was being misjudged; the July Monarchy had no desires for the Rhine frontier; it sought only an honest tie with Germany without which the freedom of Europe would be impossible. The barriers which princes had erected between both peoples must be destroyed, Rey asserted.²⁷

In spite of the efforts of a minority group at Hambach, which wished to use French, and also Polish, aid in achieving German freedom, the dominant sentiment remained one of distrust of French motives. French aid, and the help of other peoples, would be welcome only if it were entirely clear that such assistance would not lead to demands for German territory. German freedom must be achieved primarily through the efforts of the Germans themselves—not through foreign aid.²⁸ Thus German nationalism, a distrust of France, nourished in part by an increasing awareness of French expansionist views, overshadowed the cosmopolitan view at Hambach in 1832.

Ultimately, however, the pacific policy of Louis Philippe, coupled with the renewal of reaction and repression in Germany, led to a lessened emphasis on nationalist aims in favor of cosmopolitan liberalism. After a period of uncertainty, German youth had been assured that revolution in France did not necessarily mean territorial losses and humiliation for the fatherland.²⁹ Furthermore, when Louis Philippe announced a policy of nonintervention in opposition to the contrary principle of the reactionary powers, France seemed to emerge as the champion of liberalism everywhere.³⁰ The younger generation of German liberals thereafter pursued the goal of an ideological tie with France. Little by little the dream of national unification seemed to recede in favor of a program advancing the cause of universal liberty.³¹ Convinced that

²⁴ Wirth, in Flathe, I, 144, 146–49. ²⁵ *Ibid.*, I, 149. ²⁶ Valentin, p. 49; Bühler, p. 113.

²⁷ Bühler, p. 109. ²⁸ Wirth, in Flathe, I, 152; Valentin, p. 124; Bühler, pp. 108, 113–14.

²⁹ V. DeMars, "Revue-Chronique," *Revue des deux mondes*, 4th series, XXIII (1840), 806.

³⁰ Hoffmann, p. 26.

³¹ E. De Cazales, "Sur l'Allemagne," *Revue des deux mondes*, 4th series, XXVII (1841), 641; Otto Wiltberger, "Die deutschen politischen Flüchtlinge in Strassburg von 1830–1839," *Abhandlungen zur Mittleren und Neueren Geschichte*, XVII (Berlin and Leipzig, 1910), 3, 141.

the continued hostility between France and Germany irrevocably forced Prussia to seek support in the east at the price of maintaining reaction in the saddle at home, a general Franco-German rapprochement, in the eyes of young liberals, became the very prerequisite for the liberalization of Prussia and Germany as a whole. Political doctrines would thenceforth govern foreign relations, with the constitutional states aligned against the hated Holy Alliance.³² Young Germany revived the cosmopolitanism of the eighteenth century which knew no national frontiers between kindred spirits.³³ Heine, Börne, Jacob Venedey, and others proposed the creation of a new Holy Alliance of peoples and of humanity. In such a reconstructed Europe, France and Germany would constitute the central pillars of a structure dedicated to justice and equality for all nations.³⁴

Heine devoted himself to the task of overcoming the national hatreds and suspicions existing between Germany and France. France, so he insisted, no longer constituted a threat to Germany. In place of the old lighthearted desire for conquest, the French now nourished an earnest desire to fraternize with the Germans in the realm of the spirit.³⁵ Heine sought to acquaint peoples with the "realities of the age," so nations no longer would be incited to hatred and war. Thereafter, the great league of nations, the holy alliance of peoples would make it possible to convert swords into plows. Peace, prosperity, and freedom would prevail.³⁶ Börne saw hope in the fact that Poles, Italians, and others, were coming to realize that only a free Germany could preserve the liberty of western Europe against attacks from the east.³⁷ Liberty, he asserted, was impossible as long as nations existed. Once princes, who persisted in stirring up hatred, were dethroned, then Germans and Frenchmen would find a fatherland everywhere.³⁸ Heine and Börne both stressed the need of closer cultural and intellectual ties between Germany and France. Thus, in 1836 Börne wrote that, if the Germans, deceived by the lies of princes, the puerilities of her poets, and the ignorance of her *savants*, should again succumb to a suicidal hatred for France, the reading of the French poet Béranger would have an enlightening and calming effect on them. Whereas, should France again be prompted by national vanity into an attack on Germany, the reading of the German poet Uhland would inform them that Germans could never be sub-

³² *Ibid.*

³³ Sagnac, *loc. cit.*, XVI, 293.

³⁴ Bloesch, pp. 87-89; Hanna Kobylinski, *Die französische Revolution als Problem in Deutschland 1840 bis 1848. Historische Studien* 237 (Berlin, 1933), pp. 28-29; Alfred Biese, *Deutsche Literaturgeschichte* (3 vols., Munich, 1930), II, 566.

³⁵ Heine, "Vorwort," to "Florentinische Nächte," *Werke*, IV, 318; *id.*, "Lebensabrisz," *ibid.*, VII, 299.

³⁶ *Id.*, "Vorrede" to "Französische Zustände," *ibid.*, V, 11-12.

³⁷ Börne, "Briefe aus Paris," Feb. 26, 1832, *Schriften*, XI, 14.

³⁸ *Id.*, "Briefe aus Paris," Feb. 2, 1833, *ibid.*, XII, 21.

jugated, that German friendship would be a greater prize than even victory.³⁹

As a whole, there was a general increase in German interest in France after 1830. The circulation of French newspapers and periodicals multiplied.⁴⁰ Evidence is lacking, however, to prove that many liberals from the commercial, industrial, or professional world became avowed converts to the proposed Franco-German rapprochement, even though they read the *Revue des deux mondes* and applauded the literary products of the Young Germany with its raillery of the *status quo*. While reactionary circles denounced the movement as Jewish, because of the prominent roles played by Heine and Börne,⁴¹ moderate liberals reserved their judgment or confided their dissent to entries in their diaries.⁴² It appears that many liberals took no public notice of the whole program of the Young Germans, and their silence more often signified disapprobation than acquiescence.

The Young Germans, however, deluded by the very popularity of their literary works, displayed an unwonted confidence in the immediate realization of plans for a Franco-German rapprochement. In 1835, Börne exulted that only some few historic hours separated the Germans and the French from that happy day when strife between them would cease forever. In that hour, as Börne visioned it, nationals from both lands would confidently approach each other, mutually proffering their "ink-stained hands."⁴³ Börne's judgment, however, appears to have been clouded too greatly by the quantity of ink expended in the cause. No positive confirmation of his views existed at the time.

French liberals responded readily to the Young German bid for co-operation. The time was most opportune. An enthusiasm for German thought had already been kindled by Madame de Staël and perpetuated by Victor Cousin. French romanticism found inspiration and guidance in the German world—a rare phenomenon representing the first instance in history when the Gallic spirit harkened to the Teutonic.⁴⁴ The triumph of romantic thought and art in France after 1830 naturally predisposed the intellectual and artistic world

³⁹ *Id.*, "Bérenger et Uhland," *ibid.*, VII, 178.

⁴⁰ Ludwig Salomon, *Geschichte des Deutschen Zeitungswesens* (3 vols., Oldenburg and Leipzig, 1906), III, 325.

⁴¹ Bloesch, p. 79.

⁴² Thus, August Reichensperger, liberal Catholic politician from the Rhineland, denounced the leftist ideals of France as intolerant and unworthy of imitation. Ludwig Pastor, *August Reichensperger* (2 vols., Freiburg im Breisgau, 1899), I, 33, 65, 67. Perhaps Varnhagen von Ense expressed the views of many moderate liberals. To him, the time seemed inopportune. The excesses, crudeness, and narrowness evident among the Young Germans discredited all liberalism. Karl August Varnhagen von Ense, *Tagebücher von K. A. Varnhagen von Ense* (6 vols., Leipzig, 1861-62), I, 255. Varnhagen von Ense, writer and editor, probably is most famous for his diary and his voluminous correspondence with the noted persons of his age. See also Stägemann to F. Cramer, June 8, 1835, *Briefe von Chamisso, Gneisenau . . .*, II, 217.

⁴³ Börne, *Schriften*, VII, 145.

⁴⁴ Gautier, pp. 12-15.

toward closer ties with Germany. Political considerations, the menace of autocratic Russia and of eastern reactionary forces in general, was another factor which made imperative a closer understanding with Germany. French liberals hoped to find in Germany an ally, a buffer state, against that reactionary intervention which caused Frenchmen to fear for their newly established liberal government.

Saint-Marc Girardin, a great admirer of Teutonic virtues, was a strong advocate of friendship with Germany. To him, Germany represented the balancing power between despotic Russia and liberal France. Foreseeing the emergence of a strong and unified national German state, he urged the necessity of making timely provisions in order to guarantee that Germany would exert her power in a direction favorable to France. An alliance between France, Germany, and England appeared as Girardin's final goal.⁴⁵

Most French liberals, however, refused to consent to a rapprochement with Germany on the basis of the existing territorial *status quo*. A nationalist insistence on the "natural frontiers" for France was as much a part of the creed of French liberals as were the natural rights of man. There was a tendency, nevertheless, to gloss over this divisive issue when urging the creation of a common front with Germany. Alarmed by this seeming forgetfulness of their natural frontiers, Quinet, who at all times was an ardent apostle of Franco-German friendship, composed a poem ("Les Bords du Rhin") in which he glorified the Rhine as a part of France and exhorted all Frenchmen not to forget that historic stream of Gallic glory. The poem appeared in the *Revue des deux mondes* in 1836.⁴⁶ Quinet's exhortation seems somewhat superfluous. As a matter of fact, among all the French collaborationists, Saint-Marc Girardin alone appeared ready to renounce the "natural frontiers" in order to make possible a Franco-German alliance against the eastern Slavic "threat to liberty and civilization in all of Europe."⁴⁷

It was this frontier issue which finally made impossible a Franco-German rapprochement. French liberals, though they stressed the need for an understanding in order to save the cause of liberty and Western civilization, were not disposed to surrender their national demand for the Rhine frontier. On the other hand, with the exception, perhaps, of Heine and a few others who appeared undisturbed by the French demand for the left bank of the Rhine, German liberals were not ready to yield national territory in order to hasten the hoped-for triumph of liberalism in Germany. But on the whole, Germans were too inured to the perpetual French claims to the Rhine frontier to be

⁴⁵ Saint-Marc Girardin, *Notices politique et littéraires sur l'Allemagne* (Brussels, 1835), pp. xii-iv (preface).

⁴⁶ Gautier, p. 55.

⁴⁷ Sagnac, *loc. cit.*, XVI, 294-99.

greatly agitated over the issue. Quinet's Rhine poem remained unanswered in 1836; in 1840, when the reality of a Gallic offensive to the Rhine seemed at hand, that poem inspired a multivoiced reply from Germany.

The Near Eastern crisis of 1840 brought an abrupt end to whatever chances there may have been for a Franco-German liberal rapprochement. Rebuffed, humiliated, and excluded from the councils of the great powers in the crisis of 1840, French anger exceeded all bounds. Thiers and the liberals in general called for a march to the Rhine.⁴⁸

The German response to the Gallic threat was unexpectedly violent. Universal denunciations of French ambitions and aggressiveness provided one outlet for the fervid display of an aroused feeling of national hostility toward France. Germans spoke of naught save rushing to arms in defense of the Rhine and of the fatherland.⁴⁹ Civil dissensions ceased; the religious acrimony arising from the first *Kulturkampf* in Prussia, lost force.⁵⁰

German nationalist defiance of France in 1840, however, found its most characteristic expression in an outpouring of patriotic verse which excited the French into a reply in kind. The result was a poetic war. The literary world, which had been foremost in promoting cordial relations between the two nations until 1840, took the lead that year in disrupting the work already accomplished. When a French army, charged with orders for an invasion of the Palatinate, took up its position at Metz in September, 1840, an otherwise inconspicuous poetaster from the Rhineland, Nicholas Becker, released the first defiant blast in the form of a militant poetic reply to Quinet's Rhine poem of 1836. Becker's poem,⁵¹ set to music one hundred and thirty times, affirmed the German character of the river and challenged the French to attempt to take the "free German Rhine."⁵² The poem was on everybody's lips, evoking or giving evidence of mass enthusiasm and national feeling in opposition to France. Bismarck at a later date asserted that the effect of this poem was equal to that of the presence of several additional army corps on the Rhine.⁵³

⁴⁸ France's response was not entirely the spontaneous and blind recoil of a nation to the humiliations of 1840. Even before then a number of French notables had seen in the Near Eastern imbroglio an occasion for altering the treaties of 1815 in France's favor. See Armand Lefebvre, "De la politique de la France dans les affaires d'Orient," *Revue des deux mondes*, 4th series, XV (1838), 313-17; Duc d'Orléans to Prince de Joinville, July 26, 1839, *Revue retrospective ou archives secrètes du dernier gouvernement, 1830-1848* (Paris, 1848), p. 307; Armand Lefebvre, "Mahmoud et Mehemet Ali," *Revue des deux mondes*, 4th series, XVIII (1839), 507. The association between Mehemet Ali and natural frontiers had been established already; 1840 then supplied the popular and emotional impetus.

⁴⁹ Sagnac, *loc. cit.*, XVII, 74-75; Heinrich Ritter von Srbik, *Deutsche Einheit. Idee und Wirklichkeit vom Heiligen Reich bis Königgrätz* (2 vols., Munich, 1935), I, 304.

⁵⁰ Eduard Gachot, *La dispute du Rhin de Jules César à Foch* (Paris, 1936), p. 328.

⁵¹ The poem is generally identified by its opening line, "*Sie sollen ihn nicht haben, den freien deutschen Rhein.*"

⁵² Gautier, p. 287. ⁵³ Karl Schorn, *Lebenserinnerungen* (2 vols., Bonn, 1898), I, 109-10.

Becker had dedicated his verse to Alphonse de Lamartine, the noted French lyric poet, a liberal, and later foreign minister under the Republic of 1848. Lamartine's poetic response, often called the "Marseillaise de la Paix,"⁵⁴ because of its moderate and conciliatory spirit, was published in the *Revue des deux mondes*.⁵⁵ This feeble response aroused indignation among French army circles, and a certain Captain de Bayet dropped his sword for a pen to create a highly nationalistic and belligerent reply, which asserted that France would again take the "free Rhine" and bade the Germans to weep over their dead fathers and to tremble for their children.⁵⁶ Liberal French writers such as Gautier, Balzac, and Musset, likewise believed that Lamartine had treated Becker all too indulgently. Hence, at a gathering, Alfred de Musset took up the challenge, asked for two cigars, withdrew for fifteen minutes, and forthwith composed a provocative reply, pregnant with Gallic verve and pride in past French glories in the struggle for the Rhine.⁵⁷

The Germans, however, had the quantitative advantage in the poetic war of 1840. Most German poets, in accord with the mood of the period, contributed some verses. Max Schneckenburger then produced "Die Wacht am Rhein," which, after a delay of thirty years, achieved national popularity in 1870-1871. Hoffmann von Fallersleben's "Deutschland über Alles," expressive of the sentiment of the time which placed national interests above all other considerations, provided the empire after 1871 with a popular national song, which, under the Weimar Republic was officially proclaimed the German national anthem. Together with such poetic effusions, fiery affirmations of German unity and strength became a major preoccupation of the people and the princes.

Denunciations of the lenient treatment accorded to France in 1815 in the matter of Alsace-Lorraine were everyday grist for journalists and writers.⁵⁸ The mood of the hour was best summarized in the reactions of that violently anti-Prussian expatriate, Jacob Venedey. In the past Venedey had cheered the July Revolution, had agitated for a Franco-German alliance, and even as late as 1839 had written a book excoriating all things Prussian.⁵⁹ In 1840, however, Venedey asserted that, if it became necessary to choose between freedom and nationality, his choice would be for the fatherland at the cost of liberty.⁶⁰

⁵⁴ Gautier, p. 287.

⁵⁵ *Revue des deux mondes*, 4th series, XXVI (1841), 932-36.

⁵⁶ Cited in Gachot, pp. 280-81.

⁵⁷ Sagnac, *loc. cit.*, XVII, 101; Gachot, p. 28.

⁵⁸ De Cazales, "Sur l'Allemagne," *loc. cit.*, XXIX (1842), 74-76; Moltke, *Gesammelte Schriften*, II, 220-25. Even Friedrich Engels demanded the return of Alsace-Lorraine, with considerable warmth—though under certain reservations. Hermann Oncken, "Friedrich Engels und die Anfänge des deutschen Kommunismus," *Historische Zeitschrift*, CXXIII (1921), 254.

⁵⁹ In his *Preussen und Preussenthum* (Mannheim, 1839).

⁶⁰ Sagnac, *loc. cit.*, XVII, 112-13.

It was not in poetry alone that the spirit of 1840 found expression; it was also closely associated with a noted architectural achievement. Romantic lovers of the Gothic long had called attention to the unfinished cathedral at Cologne. In 1840, August Reichensperger published a pamphlet in which he exhorted all Germans to show their patriotism by honoring, preserving, and completing the work begun by their forefathers at Cologne. Such a language, Reichensperger stated, would be comprehensible to all, even in France.⁶¹ The appeal was timely. Societies were formed throughout Germany to promote the undertaking. Catholics and Protestants alike contributed funds for the completion of the cathedral. When the construction was resumed in 1842 after a lapse of four centuries, the opening festival was characterized by an excess of Pan-Germanic enthusiasm. Frederick William IV of Prussia identified the spirit which undertook to complete the cathedral as being the same as that which had defeated France in 1813. The portals of the cathedral, the king asserted, would become triumphal arches leading to a great future for Germany—a warning to the world.⁶² The French patriot, Quinet, wrote at the time that Frederick William IV therewith converted the cathedral into a blockhouse against France, inscribing a declaration of war under its portals.⁶³ Archduke John of Austria also spoke of a unity, embracing all lands where the German tongue was spoken, a unity which would make the position of the German world as unshakable as the mountains.⁶⁴

It must be noted, however, that romanticists such as Frederick William IV and Archduke John, in speaking of a united Germany, by no means had a unitary state in mind, or even a federal state as created in 1871. Both wished to see the spirit of unity and brotherhood weld the diverse creeds, classes, and states of Germany into an effective force against the outside world. Both, however, in varying degrees, respected the “historic rights” of princes, classes, and states as they then existed in the German world. To the German people, such reservations remained, as a whole, unnoticed and unknown. Both the Prussian king and the Austrian archduke hence appeared as popular national heroes, a factor which made itself felt in 1848.

The crisis of 1840 had the effect of solidifying, accentuating, and hastening the development of German nationalism. The threat to the Rhine had produced an animosity toward France which nullified, for all practical purposes, previous attempts to create a Franco-German rapprochement. The ideal, however, was perpetuated in the *Deutsch-Französische Jahrbücher*, to which

⁶¹ Pastor, I, 165–66.

⁶² Kölner Domrede König Friedrich Wilhelms IV. 4. Sept. 1842, O. Jäger and F. Moldenhauer, eds., *Auswahl wichtiger Aktenstücke zur Geschichte des neunzehnten Jahrhunderts* (Berlin, 1893), pp. 183–84.

⁶³ Quinet, “De la Teutomanie,” in Gautier, p. 300.

⁶⁴ Franz Schnabel, *Deutsche Geschichte im neunzehnten Jahrhundert* (4 vols., Freiburg im Breisgau, 1937), IV, 157–58. See also Varnhagen von Ense, *Tagebücher*, II, 103, Sept. 22, 1842.

Arnold Ruge, Marx, Engels, Heine, and others contributed, as well as in the Paris *Vorwärts* of Heinrich Börnstein.⁶⁵ Increasingly, the program became the property of the left where it made a modified appearance in the "workers-of-the-world-unite" slogan of the Communist Manifesto.⁶⁶

The attempted rapprochement between France and Germany in the years from 1830 to 1840 is an interesting essay on the part of writers and intellectuals to overcome traditional hostilities through the promotion of a common ideological front. After 1840, however, Heine, Hugo, and others pleaded a hopeless cause. The songs of 1840 had extolled the virtues of the fatherland and of national unity; the cause of universal freedom could not hurdle the disputed Rhine. It became apparent, both in France and in Germany, that where national interests conflicted, only a liberalism which supported the national cause would flourish. The spirit of cosmopolitan liberalism could not obliterate disputed frontiers.

Unfortunately for all liberalism in Germany, the conservatives, the princes, and Prussia profited from the developments of 1840. The latter events had demonstrated, contrary to the assertions and hopes of liberals, that in a struggle for national security or interests against a liberal France all Germans would unite, even though reaction prevailed on the home front. That fact may not have been lost on the princes of Germany—or perhaps on a Bismarck.

⁶⁵ Kobylinski, pp. 28–30; G. Adler, *Die Geschichte der ersten sozialpolitischen Arbeiterbewegung in Deutschland* (Breslau, 1885), pp. 96–98.

⁶⁶ Though Heine continued his efforts to allay Franco-German hostilities, his influence in Germany became negligible. Distrusted even by liberals and expatriates, repudiated by the Germans for his mocking remarks on the national fervor of 1840, Heine's loyalties were more and more directed toward the France to which he had always been partial. It is and will remain a controversy as to how far Heine's sentiments may have been influenced by pecuniary considerations; he was the recipient of regular sums drawn from the secret funds of the French Foreign Office. To a few German republicans, notably Karl Heinzen, the French menace appeared wholesome in that it served as an object lesson which demonstrated that an unfree, hence weak, people such as the Germans would always be threatened with wars and spoiliations. Heinzen candidly affirmed that he would fight for German independence only if German institutions were freer than those of the aggressor state; a reactionary Germany he would readily betray to France. Karl Heinzen, *Teutsche Revolution. Gesammelte Flugschriften* (Berne, 1847), pp. 324, 336. As France came to realize that action against an inspired Germany would be costly, a number of French writers sought to intimidate the Germans with the threat of a Franco-Russian alliance under which Russia would be given a free hand in the Balkans in return for French expansion on the Rhine. The considerations which later in the century brought into existence the tie with Russia prevailed even before 1840 and were again emphasized after year of crisis. Lefebvre, "De la politique de la France dans les affaires d'Orient," *loc. cit.*, XV 313–16; Guichen, p. 14; Julien Rovère, *Survivances françaises dans l'Allemagne napoléonienne. 1814–1914* (Paris, 1918), pp. 30–31; Gautier, p. 317; Sagnac, *loc. cit.*, XVII, 110. A number of liberal French writers, however, persisted in the attempt to obtain a peaceful cession of the coveted Rhine territory. Their appeals, in contrast to the preceding decade, were less directed toward the German people as such; instead, more immediate dealings with the Prussian state were advocated. Quinet and Victor Hugo especially proposed the peaceful surrender of the Rhineland by Prussia to France. Prussia would receive compensation at the expense of Hanover and other German regions, while the Germanic world as a whole would make good the loss through expansion down the valley of the Danube. Quinet, "1815 et 1840," in Gautier, pp. 275–77; Victor Hugo, *Le Rhin* (3 vols., Paris, 1842), III, 211. To Hugo, the salvation of Europe and world peace depended on friendly relations between France and Germany with a Franco-Prussian alliance directed against Russia and England. *Ibid.*, III, 199–203.

* * * Notes and Suggestions * * *

State or Continental Privateers?

SIDNEY G. MORSE*

ONE aspect of Revolutionary privateering has yet to be fully clarified: under what legal authority did the bulk of the American private armed vessels operate? In their generally admirable works, the principal authorities on American conduct of the war at sea during the Revolution have stated or implied that both the Continental Congress and the states commissioned privateers throughout the war, and that the latter commissioned a large proportion of the whole number. And reference to other writers shows that this idea is firmly established in the literature on American naval activity in the Revolution.¹

The truth seems to be that virtually all the privateers fitted out by the Americans during the Revolutionary War were "Continental privateers" in the sense that they were commissioned by the Continental Congress. Although several states did indeed "establish state privateering," and might conceivably have issued their own commissions throughout the war, in actual practice they did not. Investigation has demonstrated this fact clearly enough for the New England states, and there can be little doubt that it applies to the other states as well. The point is of importance to students in the field, and evidence uncovered in connection with it throws interesting light upon administrative relations between the states and the Continental Congress.

To make this matter clear, some description of the records upon which identification of Revolutionary privateers rests is necessary. When the owners of a vessel wished to have her commissioned as a privateer or obtain a letter of

* The author is assistant professor of history in Norwich University, Northfield, Vermont.

¹ Thus Charles O. Paullin, *The Navy of the American Revolution: Its Administration, Its Policy, and Its Achievements* (Cleveland, 1906), especially pp. 320-21, and also pages where he discusses the vessels sent out by the various states (e.g., pp. 148 and 340 on Massachusetts). Dr. Paullin did point out that "after the first half of 1776 all the states used Continental commissions and bonds" (p. 321), but he did not develop the significance of this fact with regard to the commissioning of the privateers. Also Gardner W. Allen, *A Naval History of the Revolution* (2 vols., Boston, 1913); especially I, 45-46; also pp. 178-79, and other places where he discusses the number of privateers commissioned each year; and finally, Appendix 7: "Continental Privateers," II, 715-16. In his *Massachusetts Privateers of the Revolution* (Boston, 1927), Dr. Allen did not bring out the distinction quite so plainly; but it is still clearly implied (pp. 33, 38-39). Among more recent writers (who for this period depend to a considerable degree on Paullin and Allen), see Dudley W. Knox, *A History of the United States Navy* (New York, 1936), pp. 5-6. Carroll S. Alden and Allan Westcott (*The United States Navy: A History*, Philadelphia, 1943) at least suggest that most of the privateers were under Continental commission (p. 12).

marque, they presented to the state authorities a petition, in which the essential information concerning the vessel and the purposes of the owners was stated. If the commission was granted, the owners posted a bond guaranteeing in general terms that their privateer would conduct herself in accordance with the legal regulations established for such vessels. When these formalities had been completed, the authorities handed to the commander his commission. Of these documents, the original commissions have been dispersed and largely lost, because each was given to the designated commander and thereafter suffered the fate of most private papers. Important files of petitions and bonds have, however, been preserved; and it is from the bonds particularly that most lists of Revolutionary privateers have been compiled.

However, in the use of the bonds for this purpose, false assumptions have been made. In the first place, it has evidently been understood that in general the bonds filed in state archives are state bonds, while those preserved among the records of the Continental Congress are Continental bonds.² Actually the present location of these bonds does not possess such significance; their character is, of course, determined not by their whereabouts but by their content. It is true that all the bonds in the Continental archives are Continental bonds; but it is not true that all the bonds in state archives are state bonds: most of them are Continental bonds also.³ In receiving them from the privateers, the state authorities, acting merely as agents of the Continental Congress, were supposed to forward them to Congress; at times they did so, while at other times they did not. This irregularity is not explained, but it could well be due simply to carelessness.

In the second place, it seems to have been assumed in making generalizations about state privateers as opposed to Continental privateers that so-called "privateer bonds" were all of the same character, and that each represented a separate commission.⁴ In reality there are two kinds of bonds. The first and most important is that already described above, which provided surety that the commander would obey the laws and regulations governing privateers. This may be called, for purposes of this discussion, a "general conduct" bond; and it is clear that each one of these does indeed represent a separate privateer commission. The second kind of bond is, however, quite different. It comprises bonds which the privateers were on occasion required to post as surety that

² See, in addition to the references previously cited, Allen, *Naval History of the Revolution*, I, 20.

³ Therefore the idea (implied by Knox, pp. 5-6) that the bonds filed in the archives of the Continental Congress (calendared in Charles H. Lincoln, ed., *Naval Records of the American Revolution, 1775-1788*, Washington, 1906) constitute the sum total of all Continental bonds extant is incorrect.

⁴ Allen, *Naval History of the Revolution*, I, 20, 46.

they would perform certain acts desirable for the public good, and refrain from doing other undesirable acts—acts outside the scope of the ordinary privateering regulations, and hence not covered by the general bond. This second type represents merely an exercise of police power and has nothing to do with the commissioning of privateers. These might be called “special conduct” bonds.

Examination of the bonds in the archives of the New England states shows that regularly, after the adoption of the Continental privateering resolves, the “general conduct” bonds are Continental bonds, whereas the “special conduct” bonds, which do not necessarily indicate the commissioning authority, are state bonds.⁵ There are frequently (and apparently should regularly be) two bonds, one of each type, for the same vessel.

Massachusetts, of course, did commission privateers under her famous act of November 1, 1775, until the Continental privateering resolves went into effect in April, 1776. But thereafter the general conduct bonds for Massachusetts privateers (that is, vessels fitted out and principally owned in Massachusetts) were regularly Continental bonds, although many of them were kept on file in the Massachusetts archives.⁶ Rhode Island too “established state privateering” in an act which preceded the Continental resolves by only a few days, but she did not, with certain exceptions to be noted, commission privateers under it.⁷ New Hampshire also enacted an elaborate act modeled on that of Massachusetts, but all bonds extant for her privateers are Continental bonds.⁸ Although Connecticut is supposed not to have established state pri-

⁵ Examples of Continental “general conduct” bonds may be seen reproduced in Allen, *Massachusetts Privateers of the Revolution*, facing pp. 244 and 304; the first is preserved in the Papers of the Continental Congress (Library of Congress), the second in the Massachusetts Archives (Boston). The first of these (p. 244) is in the form adopted only in 1781; most of the Continental bonds resemble the second, which is in the form originally prescribed by the resolves of April 3, 1776. Examples of state “special conduct” bonds may also be seen in the same work, facing pp. 44 and 164.

⁶ Allen, *Massachusetts Privateers of the Revolution*, pp. 25–31 (the privateering act). Allen’s list contains perhaps a dozen vessels commissioned under this act, beginning with the *Boston Revenge*, December 7, 1775 (*ibid.*, p. 87). The last Massachusetts state general conduct bond was given by the *Washington*, March 20, 1776 (Revolutionary Rolls, Massachusetts Archives, VII, 298). Beginning with the schooner *Lady Washington*, May 7, 1776 (*ibid.*, VII, 291), Massachusetts privateers gave Continental bonds, of which about half are filed in the state archives, while the rest are to be found in the Papers of the Continental Congress (see Lincoln, *passim*). State special conduct bonds were first required of vessels leaving Massachusetts ports in the spring of 1777, on the occasion of the lifting of a shipping embargo designed to facilitate army recruiting. Thenceforth they were more or less regularly required.

⁷ *Records of the Colony of Rhode Island and Providence Plantations in New England*, ed. by John R. Bartlett (Providence, 1856–65), VII, 481–88 (privateering act). Most of the general conduct bonds for Rhode Island privateers are in the state archives, Maritime Papers—Bonds—Masters of Vessels, II–IX. A few were sent in to Congress and are calendared in *Naval Records*. Rhode Island also used state special conduct bonds, filed in the volumes indicated above together with the general conduct bonds.

⁸ Paullin, pp. 466–67. Some of the bonds for New Hampshire vessels are in the state archives (in Provincial and Revolutionary Papers, manuscripts in the New Hampshire Historical Society, Concord), others in the Papers of the Continental Congress.

vateering, she did issue special commissions of her own to armed whale boats operating in Long Island Sound. But the Connecticut privateers which cruised the high seas were evidently under Continental commission.⁹

During the emergency created by the approach of British invading forces late in 1776, Rhode Island did issue her own commissions to a few privateers—as a temporary expedient only. The supply of blank Continental commissions was exhausted, and it was deemed important to get out as many vessels as possible before the enemy could close Narragansett Bay to American shipping. Similar action was taken on another occasion in 1778.¹⁰ Yet in emergencies of lesser magnitude the states apparently refused to deviate from the normal procedure. Ordinarily, when they ran short of Continental commissions and privateer owners were clamoring for them, they either borrowed them from each other, or simply let the applicants find them where they could.¹¹

That there was a clear realization on the part of both Congress and the states that the privateers were under Continental authority appears from the documents to which a case in 1779 involving a Rhode Island privateer gave rise. Captain Isaac Tyler in the sloop *Dolphin* captured a schooner in a Nova Scotian harbor, went ashore and plundered some houses, and carried off his booty to Providence. When he presented his case to the prize court, the Assembly intervened to stay proceedings and force him to restore the captured schooner and goods to their owners. The captain, in addition to being somewhat piratically inclined, was a notable sea lawyer. He now appealed to the Continental Congress to protect him from the state's action, declaring that Rhode Island was exceeding her authority in attempting to obstruct the exercise of a Continental commission. Upon hearing Tyler's version of the incident, Congress took a serious view of the matter, and Rhode Island was informed that the members were "a good deal alarmed at the interference of any of the states, in cases when the extent of their commissions [of Congress] are questioned."

In reply to this Governor Greene did not deny that Tyler was acting under Continental commission. On the contrary, he admitted it by implication in asserting, as one of the principal reasons for the intervention of the Rhode Island Assembly, that the privateer commander had exceeded the authority of

⁹ Trumbull Papers (Connecticut State Library, Hartford), VII, 128; VIII, 132; *Public Records of the State of Connecticut*, III (Hartford, 1922), 341-42, 448; Louis F. Middlebrook, *Maritime Connecticut during the American Revolution* (2 vols., Salem, Mass., 1925), II, *passim*.

¹⁰ Bonds—Masters of Vessels, Rhode Island Archives (Providence), II, 64-73; Letters, 2d ser., II, 66; Council of War Records, 1778-1779, p. 94.

¹¹ This is brought out in the correspondence of the privateer owners. For example, *Essex Institute Historical Collections*, LXXI (January, 1935), 11-12; and Ernest E. Rogers, ed., *Connecticut's Naval Office at New London during the American Revolution* (New London, 1933), p. 58.

that commission, especially by making captures ashore above the high-water mark.¹² In other words, Rhode Island acknowledged the jurisdiction and authority of Congress in this field; but she also apparently believed that, in case of a violation of the terms of the Continental commission, the state had the right to take independent remedial action.

When Congress learned the true circumstances (which were quite different from the story told in Tyler's petition) and perceived the sordidness of the privateersman's proceedings, it evidently was not inclined to raise profound constitutional issues on the basis of such an affair. Tyler's petition was dismissed.¹³ But the refusal of Congress to act in this particular case did not mean that it was unaware of its authority in the matter, had it wished to exercise it.

Thus it seems clear that Revolutionary privateering, like the Revolutionary military and regular naval organization, was meant to be a "Continental"—that is, a *national*—enterprise. Privateering, however, was hampered in this respect not only by the particularism which weakened all the activities of the Continental authorities, limiting the unity and efficiency of the regular armed forces, but also by two other factors peculiar to it. First, privateers were owned, fitted out, and operated by private individuals in the various states; hence they were not readily amenable to centralized control. Second, American prize courts—whose general conduct and approach to their work could exercise an important influence on the general conduct of the privateersmen—were state courts, which not seldom resisted rather than co-operated with efforts of the central authorities to exercise general supervision over the condemnation of prizes, as well as over the commissioning of privateers. Yet even in the business of prize court administration there was sometimes a disposition to support the Continental authorities, in order that unity and harmony might prevail. In one case where Congress reversed the decision of the Rhode Island Court of Admiralty, the state authorities acquiesced not only promptly but enthusiastically. The state judge was directed to issue the writs necessary to comply with the reversal, and at the same time admonished that "the Resolves and Decrees of the Honorable Continental Congress, the Supreme Legislative Authority of the United States, should be strictly observed and carried into execution."¹⁴ This incident, it must be admitted, should be regarded as exceptional rather than typical. Generally speaking, there was not, in Revolutionary

¹² Petitions to the General Assembly, Rhode Island Archives, XVII, 72-75; Letters, 2d ser., *ibid.*, III, 130; Papers of the Continental Congress, 42, 7, 356-94, and 19, 6, 105; *Journals of the Continental Congress, 1774-1789* (Washington, 1904-37), XV, 1341.

¹³ *Ibid.*

¹⁴ Case of the Phoenix, tried Nov. 25, 1776, Admiralty Papers, Rhode Island Archives, IX, 154-58; Court of Admiralty Minute Books, II, 35-41; Council of War Records, II, 119.

America, a widespread or firm determination to regard the Congress as “the Supreme Legislative Authority of the United States.” Still, the declaration is important as an indication of the urge toward effective union which did exist, although it was naturally strongest during the early days of the great crusade—particularly in the days of '76, when, indeed, this episode occurred.

On the Question of the Hellenization of Sicily and Southern Italy during the Middle Ages

PETER CHARANIS*

IN the Middle Ages, at least to the end of the eleventh century, important regions of Sicily and southern Italy, notably the eastern portions of the former and the territories known as Calabria and *terra d'Otranto* of the latter, were Greek in language. In southern Italy, indeed, Greek survived the Middle Ages, and there are even now, both in Calabria and the *terra d'Otranto*, a number of communities where Greek is the language of the population.¹

When and under what circumstances did Sicily and southern Italy become Greek in language? The earliest answer given to this question was that the prevalence of Greek in Sicily and southern Italy during the Middle Ages was a linguistic survival of *Magna Grecia*. This view prevailed down to and beyond the middle of the last century when it was challenged by the Italian philologist G. Morosi. Morosi was the first to study systematically and scientifically the Greek in southern Italy in the nineteenth century. He studied both the Greek spoken in *terra d'Otranto* and that spoken in Calabria. With regard to the former he came to the conclusion that it was the popular idiom of the tenth century, and, accordingly, he placed the origin of the Greek colonies in the *terra d'Otranto* at the end of the ninth century, during the reign of Basil I or that of Leo VI.² The origin of the Calabrian colonies, however, he placed later than the ninth century, in the period between the middle of the eleventh century and the end of the twelfth. The reason for this was that in the Greek dialect spoken in Calabria he thought he had found many Arabic and Turkish influences.³ Morosi, therefore, rejected the earlier view which considered the prevalence of Greek in Sicily and southern Italy during the Middle Ages as a linguistic survival of *Magna Grecia*.

The ideas developed by Morosi became generally accepted and remained unchallenged for a considerable time.⁴ In the meantime, however, the accumulation of archaeological and epigraphical evidence tended to show that the ancient Greek element in Sicily and southern Italy had not been completely

*The author is associate professor of history in Rutgers University.

¹ M. A. Triantaphyllides, *Νεοελληνική Γραμματική*, I (Athens, 1938), 296.

² G. Morosi, *Studi sui dialetti greci della Terra d'Otranto* (Lecce, 1870), p. 189.

³ "Il dialetto romaico di Bova di Calabria," *Archivio Glottologico Italiano*, IV (Torino, 1878), 72 ff.

⁴ See, for instance, H. F. Tozer, "The Greek-speaking Population of Southern Italy," *Journal of Hellenic Studies*, X (London, 1889), 11-42.

Latinized by the long Roman domination. This evidence was finally sifted and studied systematically by G. Rohlfs, who offered his results in a doctoral dissertation, which he later revised and enlarged.⁵ Rohlfs' book marks a reaction to the ideas which had been developed by Morosi, for Rohlfs returned to the view which had prevailed before the publication of Morosi's works. The conclusion which he reached was that the basic element of the population of eastern Sicily was not Latinized but remained Greek-speaking throughout the Roman domination; there was, therefore, no break in the Greek tradition in Sicily and southern Italy.⁶ Rohlfs' opinions have found favor among many scholars.⁷

Rohlfs himself, however, was careful to point out that the position of Greek in Sicily had greatly deteriorated under the Roman Empire and had it not been stimulated by an outside influence it would have died out.⁸ Thus the difference between the ideas of Morosi and Rohlfs is a difference in degree. Morosi held that the Greek of *Magna Grecia* had completely disappeared; according to Rohlfs it had not disappeared, but its position had greatly deteriorated. In either case its revival in the Middle Ages needed an outside stimulus. The problem, therefore, of determining the nature of this influence still remains.

In the meantime, between the publication of the works by Morosi and that of Rohlfs, when Morosi's idea that the Greek of *Magna Grecia* had completely died out during the Roman domination was generally accepted, several attempts were made to determine the factors which were responsible for the revival of Greek in Sicily and southern Italy during the early Middle Ages. The explanation generally accepted was that this revival was the result of an influx into Sicily and southern Italy of a considerable Greek-speaking element, but the real problem was to determine the date and the place of origin of this migration and the circumstances under which it was brought about. Morosi's opinion that the earliest Greek colonies in southern Italy were established toward the end of the ninth century was not found satisfactory. For besides the fact that the evidence for the establishment of Greek colonies in southern Italy at the end of the ninth century is very slight,⁹ it was well known that

⁵ G. Rohlfs, *Scavi linguistici nella Magna Grecia* (Rome, 1933).

⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 129-131.

⁷ J. Vendryes' review of Rohlfs' book in *Revue des études grecques*, XLVIII (Paris, 1935), 185 ff.

⁸ Rohlfs, pp. 134 ff.

⁹ There are two references in the Byzantine writers concerning the establishment of Greek colonies in Italy toward the end of the ninth century. According to a note found in the manuscript C of the chronicle of Cedrenus (Bonn, 2:225C) the city of Gallipoli was reconstructed and settled during the reign of Basil I with colonies brought from Heraclea Pontica. The second reference comes from Theophanes Continuatus (Bonn, 321) who says that Basil settled in the theme of Longobardia three thousand former slaves from the Peloponnesus.

Sicily and southern Italy had become Hellenized long before the reign of Basil I.

Not long after the appearance of Morosi's work, François Lenormant published his history of *Magna Grecia* in which he offered another explanation of the Hellenization of Sicily and southern Italy. This explanation had already been suggested by others, but Lenormant gave it force and expression and made it his own. Lenormant's explanation consisted of this, that in the eighth century, during the iconoclastic controversy, many Greek-speaking monks fled to Sicily and Italy in order to escape the persecutions of the iconoclastic emperors and that these monks were responsible for the Hellenization of these regions.¹⁰ This explanation sounded plausible and won some acceptance,¹¹ but further investigation showed that it was open to serious objections. The document upon which Lenormant had based his contention that the number of monks who fled to Italy was large was shown to be a forgery of the eighteenth century.¹² This was a serious objection, but still more serious was the fact that by the beginning of the iconoclastic controversy the Hellenization of Sicily was complete. Lynn White has shown that whereas about 600 A.D. Sicily "contained a considerable Latin element," by 650 it "had become completely Greek in language, rite and culture."¹³ Besides, as Batiffol remarked, "a country could not be peopled by monks, *gens aeterna in qua nemo nascitur*."¹⁴ Lenormant's explanation is no longer seriously held.

Those who have studied the history of Rome and of Italy in the seventh and eighth centuries have been struck by the fact that out of the thirteen popes who from 678 to 752 occupied the pontifical throne eleven were orientals, *i.e.*, Greek speaking. This fact called for an explanation. Several explanations have been offered and they are all related to the question of the growth of Hellenism in Italy.

Charles Diehl in his remarkable study on the exarchate of Ravenna attributed the predominance of oriental popes in the period from 678 to 752 to the policy of the imperial government. His contention is that during and after the reign of Justinian the imperial government made it a point to fill the important administrative positions in Italy with orientals because it was believed that they would more faithfully carry out its policies. Hence it promoted them to important positions, particularly in the church, and by applying pressure succeeded in vesting them with the papal dignity itself. These oriental admin-

¹⁰ F. Lenormant, *La Grande-Grèce* (Paris, 1881), II, 380 ff.

¹¹ For example, Tozer, *loc. cit.*, X, 38.

¹² P. Batiffol, *L'abbaye de Rossano* (Paris, 1891), p. v.

¹³ Lynn White, *Latin Monasticism in Norman Sicily* (Cambridge, Mass., 1938), p. 17. The third chapter of this book, which is entitled "The Byzantinization of Sicily," appeared in a more extensive form under the same title in the *American Historical Review*, XLII (1936), 1-21.

¹⁴ Batiffol, p. v.

istrative officials and ecclesiastics, aided by oriental merchants who were in Italy, became the agents for the Hellenization of Italy, which was one of the objectives of the imperial government.¹⁵

The influence of the oriental merchants in the Hellenization of Italy, which was only touched upon by Diehl, was developed and elaborated upon by Louis Bréhier.¹⁶ Bréhier was also struck by the predominance of orientals among the popes of the seventh and eighth centuries. He agreed with Diehl that there was a political reason for the elevation of so many orientals to the papal see, but he felt that this explanation was not enough. Bréhier argues that the election of so many orientals to the pontifical see could have been made possible only if there existed among the Roman clergy an "elite of orientals capable of accepting the burden of the pontifical power" and the "fact that it was made possible is proof of the existence of such an elite of oriental clergy."¹⁷ The existence of this elite of oriental clergy "is one of the principal indications of the social influence that the Greeks and the orientals exercised" in Rome. These Greeks and Syrians came to Italy as pilgrims and exiles, but primarily as merchants. That there were many oriental merchants in Italy throughout the sixth century was shown by Bréhier to be a fact.¹⁸

Thus both Diehl and Bréhier place the beginnings of the spread of Hellenism in Italy in the sixth century and attribute it to the influence of the orientals who settled in Italy as administrative officials, both lay and ecclesiastic, and as merchants.¹⁹ Diehl, however, is careful to warn against any exaggeration.²⁰ "Despite the large place," he writes, "that the oriental element held in the Roman society, and although Rome may have been in the seventh century, according to a statement of M. di Rossi, a city half Byzantine, the Latin tradition and language kept so great a force that many among the newly arrived foreigners became fused with the indigenous population." This statement of caution casts doubts upon the entire theory that the spread of Hellenism in Italy was the work of administrative officials and merchants. For if in Rome where these officials and merchants were strong and doubtless constituted the upper stratum of Roman society, their influence, as a Hellenizing agent, remained superficial and hardly touched the core of Roman society, in the provinces where they were much less strong their influence must have been considerably less, no doubt without the power to change the language and cultural tradition of a whole region. But, as the language and cultural tradition

¹⁵ Ch. Diehl, *Etudes sur l'administration byzantine dans l'exarchat de Ravenne (568-751)* (Paris, 1888), pp. 241-88.

¹⁶ Louis Bréhier, "Les colonies d'orientaux au commencement du Moyen-Age," *Byzantinische Zeitschrift*, XII (Leipzig, 1903), 1-39.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, XII, 4. ¹⁸ *Ibid.*, XII, 5 ff.

¹⁹ But see also Paolo Orsi, "Byzantina Siciliae," *ibid.*, XIX (1910), 475.

²⁰ Diehl, p. 283.

of Sicily and parts of southern Italy were seriously affected, the agent that did this must have been other than the influence of the oriental officials and merchants. But besides this general observation, it must be noted that Diehl really did not produce any concrete evidence in support of his thesis. His contention that the oriental popes of the seventh and eighth centuries were elevated to the pontifical throne through pressure exerted by the imperial government is by no means well founded. Gay has found no evidences of such pressure, and has further pointed out that these popes were not particularly subservient to the imperial wishes. Gay himself accounts for the predominance of the orientals among the popes of the seventh and eighth centuries on the ground that they were essential, in view of the Monotheletic controversy and the troubles caused by the Arabic invasions, because they were well versed in the traditions of the East.²¹ Besides, the most important regions under the jurisdiction of the papacy in the seventh century and the first part of the eighth—southern Italy, Sicily, Greece, including Thessalonica and Crete—were Greek speaking. Gay, therefore, rejected the view that the Hellenization of Sicily and southern Italy was brought about by the increasing influence of the Byzantine administration and of the Greek element that was already there. In his opinion what brought about the Hellenization of Sicily and southern Italy was the influx of a considerable number of Greek-speaking elements from the East as a result of the Arabic conquests.²²

The explanation offered by Gay is now generally accepted. It did not, of course, originate with him, nor was it developed by him at length. Batiffol,²³ writing in 1891, offered the same explanation, and twelve years later K. Lake²⁴ expressed the same view. In recent years Lynn White has become its outspoken exponent.

But the evidence in support of this explanation is very meager. Already before the publication of White's study Rohlf's rejected this explanation on the ground of insufficient evidence.²⁵ White himself is very much aware of this insufficiency. "The documentation of these westward movements," he writes, "is as yet most inadequate and the chances of error regarding them are great."²⁶

²¹ J. Gay, "Quelques remarques sur les papes grecs et syriens avant la querelle des Iconoclastes," *Mélanges offerts à M. Gustave Schlumberger* (Paris, 1924), I, 40–54.

²² Gay, "Notes sur la crise du monde chrétien après les Conquêtes Arabes," *Ecole française de Rome: Mélanges d'archéologie et d'histoire*, XLV (Paris, 1928), 2.

²³ Batiffol, pp. vi ff.

²⁴ K. Lake, "The Greek Monasteries in South Italy," *Journal of Theological Studies*, IV (1903), 350. Lake attributes the Hellenization of Sicily to two causes: (1) "to the expedition of Constans II and the occupation by Greek soldiers and settlers to which it gave rise, and (2) to the immigration of Greeks, lay and monastic alike, who fled from the troubles which were depopulating the Levant generally." See also A. Vaccari, "La Grecia nell'Italia meridionale," *Orientalia Christiana*, III (Rome, 1925), 274–75. To the expedition of Constans II was attributed by Lancia di Brolo the introduction of the Greek rite in Sicily. Lancia di Brolo, *Storia della chiesa in Sicilia nei primi dieci secoli del Cristianesimo*, II (Palermo, 1884), 21 f.

²⁵ Rohlf's, pp. 146–47.

²⁶ White, in *Am. Hist. Rev.*, XLII, 7.

Indeed, as Rohlf's remarked, this documentation reduces itself to a few isolated instances of persons of oriental origin finding themselves in North Africa and Sicily during the period of the Persian and Arabic invasions. Of the alleged immigration of orientals to the Occident during the Persian invasion of Syria, Palestine, and Egypt only one person, the monk John Moschus, is cited as having reached Rome.²⁷ This belief of a mass emigration from the Orient during the Persian invasions is really based on a deduction. Wherever the Persians went they favored the Jacobites and persecuted the Chalcedonians who were composed chiefly of Greek-speaking elements and were vastly in the minority. Therefore, considerable elements of the Greek minority must have emigrated.²⁸ But the fact is that no definite evidence has been produced to show that, as a result of the Persian persecutions, emigrants from the Orient reached Italy in any appreciable numbers.

A piece of evidence offered as proof of the existence in Italy of a considerable number of oriental elements toward the end of the first half of the seventh century is the composition of the Roman synod of 649 which condemned Monotheletism. It was observed that this synod was controlled by oriental monks, and from this it was deduced that these monks must have come from the Orient because of the Monotheletic policy of Heraclius. The contention is that Heraclius' policy split the Chalcedonians, many among whom chose to abandon their home rather than accept the religious policy of the emperor.²⁹ But the fact that some monks fled to Rome in order to fight the religious policy of Constantinople offers no proof of a substantial movement of Greeks from the Orient to the Occident. The arrival of ecclesiastics in Rome in order to combat some particular policy of the emperors of Constantinople was a common occurrence in the early history of the church. In the final analysis, therefore, the argument of the establishment of Greek emigrants from the Orient in Italy as a result of the Persian invasions of the oriental provinces of the empire is based on the instability of conditions in the East, both political and religious. Concrete evidence of such an emigration does not exist.

There remains now to be considered the argument adduced in favor of an emigration of Greeks from the Orient and their establishment in Italy as a result of the Arabic invasions of the seventh century. When Alexandria capitulated to the Arabs in 642, a considerable part of the Greek population departed with their goods. This fact was seized upon by White as evidence in support of his thesis. He writes, "It seems probable that some of them reached

²⁷ *Ibid.*, XLII, 8.

²⁸ "All this [the persecution of the Chalcedonians by the Persians]," writes White, "would doubtless stimulate emigration by the Greek minority." *Ibid.*, XLII, 9. But the point is to show that a great many of these emigrants went to Sicily or Italy.

²⁹ *Ibid.*, XLII, 9 f.

the west," but he hastens to add that "there is no clear evidence on the point."⁸⁰ Indeed the evidence to which White refers is not only obscure but virtually nonexistent. White cites two references: the frescoes in Santa Maria Antiqua in Rome; and the oldest MS of the Alexandrian Liturgy of St. Mark, which comes from Messina. In the church of Santa Maria Antiqua there are five layers of frescoes, the second of which is Hellenistic in style and was painted sometime before 650. Myrtila Avery, who studied this layer, came to the conclusion that its iconography is Alexandrian and this, plus the fact that its style is Hellenistic, led her to the further conclusion that it must have been painted by Alexandrian artists.⁸¹ White seized upon Miss Avery's opinion as constituting an "admirable evidence of the arrival in Rome before 650 of eastern immigrants," although, because of the chronology, he does not think it probable that they came as a result of the Arabic invasions.⁸² Now both these references in reality yield no evidence of an eastern immigration to Italy. The MS of the Alexandrian Liturgy, like other manuscripts, may have been brought to Sicily, as Vaccari suggests, by oriental monks,⁸³ but the fact that oriental monks brought books to Sicily does not prove that there was a mass immigration there of Greeks coming from the Orient. The same objection applies to the inference drawn from the frescoes of Santa Maria Antiqua. Besides the point that it is by no means certain that the iconography of these frescoes is Alexandrian—there is indeed considerable doubt whether there was such a thing as a specific Alexandrian iconography or a specific Alexandrian style⁸⁴—the mere presence of Alexandrian painters in Rome is no indication of a mass movement of population from Alexandria to Italy.

It is known from Greek and Mohammedan sources relating to the conquest of Syria and Palestine by the Arabs that many Greeks abandoned their homes and sought shelter elsewhere. This, too, was seized upon as possible evidence that there was a Greek migration to Sicily during this time. The fact is, however, that nowhere in these sources is it said that those who abandoned their homes went to Sicily or Italy.⁸⁵ Most likely they all went to Asia Minor. The

⁸⁰ *Ibid.*, XLII, 10.

⁸¹ Myrtila Avery, "The Alexandrian Style at Santa Maria Antiqua, Rome," *Art Bulletin of the College Art Association of America*, VII (New York, 1925), 131-49.

⁸² White, in *Am. Hist. Rev.*, XLII, 10, n. 48.

⁸³ "I monaci greci, che popolarono la Sicilia e poi le Calabrie nell' alto medio evo, ci venivano dalla Palestina e dall' Egitto; portavano seco, qual sacro tesoro, le divine Scritture, e allo studio di esse continuarono sempre a consacrarsi con ardore, non solo per la santificazione delle anime loro, ma anche per istruzione e utilità dei posteri." Vaccari, *loc. cit.*, III, 303.

⁸⁴ Ernst Kitzinger, *Römische Malerei vom Beginn des 7. bis zur Mitte des 8. Jahrhunderts* (Munich, 1934), p. 12. See in addition M. Schapiro's review of C. R. Morey's, *Early Christian Art*, in *Review of Religion*, January, 1944, pp. 170, 181.

⁸⁵ White (*Am. Hist. Rev.*, XLII, 11, n. 49) refers to Philip Khuri Hitti, *Origins of the Islamic State* (New York, 1916). I have checked the references and here is what I have found. "In the year 49 the Greeks left for the sea-coast" (p. 180). They (the Greeks of Tripoli) "wrote to the king of the Greeks asking for relief through reinforcement or ships on which they might

social and military transformation of Asia Minor during the seventh century is usually explained by the settlement of refugees from the oriental provinces and barbarians, chiefly Slavs, from the Balkan peninsula.³⁶

Some emigrants from Syria, Palestine, and Egypt are known to have lived in North Africa about 641, and a few among them crossed over into Sicily two years later.³⁷ But, to repeat Rohlf's statement, this is an isolated instance of no great importance, for these orientals were few in number and practically all monks. And what was said by Batiffol in his criticism of Lenormant's thesis, that monks fleeing from the persecutions of the iconoclast, were responsible for the Hellenization of Sicily and southern Italy, applies equally well to this case: "A country could not be peopled by monks, *gens aeterna in qua nemo nascitur*."

These are all the pieces of evidence offered in support of the thesis that an emigration from the oriental provinces of the Byzantine Empire of considerable proportion took place during the Persian and Arabic invasions and that the Greek-speaking people involved settled in Sicily and southern Italy, a settlement which had the effect of bringing about a metamorphosis in the language, rite, and culture of these regions. It must be admitted that this evidence is meager and in no way does it justify the thesis that has been built upon it. Indeed this thesis seems to have been arrived at by some such reasoning as this: By the middle of the seventh century Sicily had gone through a linguistic and cultural transformation; this transformation was brought about by an immigration of considerable importance; about the time this transformation took place the East was in the midst of a political and cultural convulsion, the result of the Persian and Arabic conquests; therefore, the people involved in this immigration must have come from the East. "From 614 onward," writes

escape and flee to him. Accordingly, the king sent them many ships which they boarded in the night-time and fled away" (p. 194). "He [a certain Greek patrician] made his way together with his followers to the land of the Greeks" (p. 195). "The fact is that when Damascus was taken possession of, a great number of its inhabitants fled to Heraclius who was then at Antioch, leaving many vacant dwellings behind that were later occupied by the Moslems" (p. 189). "At last they [the people and soldiers of Antioch] capitulated, agreeing to pay poll tax or evacuate the place. Some of them did leave; but others remained, and to the latter abu-Ubaidah guaranteed safety, assessing one *dinār* and one *jarīb* (of wheat) on every adult" (p. 227). "When the Moslem armies reached these towns [Greek towns in Syria], their inhabitants capitulated, agreeing to pay poll-tax or evacuate the places. Most of them left for the Byzantine empire" (p. 232). Alexandria: "Some of its Greek inhabitants left to join the Greeks somewhere else" (p. 348). It must be said, however, in fairness to White, that he does not claim that his source actually says that the Greeks who left the Orient went to Italy. The implication of his statement is, however, that he believes that some of these refugees went to Sicily. That some of these refugees may have gone to Sicily is, of course, possible, but the mere possibility that this may have happened does not justify the belief that it did happen.

³⁶ George Ostrogorsky, "Agrarian Conditions in the Byzantine Empire in the Middle Ages," *Cambridge Economic History*, I (London, 1941), 197: see also my article, "On the Social Structure of the Later Roman Empire," *Byzantion*, XVII.

³⁷ White, in *Am. Hist. Rev.*, XLII, 11 f.

White, "the Levant suffered a series of fearful convulsions any one of which would have forced thousands of refugees across the sea."³⁸ The same thought forms the basis of Gay's article, "Notes sur la crise du monde chrétien après les conquêtes Arabes."³⁹

The series of convulsions which the Levant suffered during the first half of the seventh century were indeed fearful, and doubtless thousands of refugees were forced across the seas, some of whom may have possibly reached Sicily. But these convulsions were not restricted to the oriental provinces of the empire. The agony that the Balkan peninsula suffered was perhaps more dreadful than anything that happened in the East. Bulgars, Cotrigurs, Avars, Slavs—all these people rivaled each other in their destructiveness. Particularly severe and devastating was the great invasion of the Avars and Slavs during the early years of the reign of Maurice (582–602). Following is a description of this invasion by a contemporary.

That same year, being the third after the death of king Justin, was famous also for the invasion of an accursed people, called Slavonians, who overran the whole of Greece, and the country of the Thessalonians, and all Thrace, and captured the cities, and took numerous forts, and devastated and burnt, and reduced the people to slavery, and made themselves masters of the whole country, and settled in it by main force, and dwelt in it as though it had been their own without fear. And four years have now elapsed, and still, because the king is engaged in the war with the Persians, and has sent all his forces to the East, they live at their ease in the land, and dwell in it, and spread themselves far and wide as far as God permits them, and ravage and burn and take captives. And to such an extent do they carry their ravages, that they have even ridden up to the outer wall of the city, and driven away all the king's herds of horses, many thousands in number, and whatever else they could find. And even to this day, being the year 895 [A.D. 584], they still encamp and dwell there, and live in peace in the Roman territories, free from anxiety and fear, and lead captives and slay and burn.⁴⁰

This invasion was only one of a series of invasions which left the Balkan peninsula prostrated and changed its ethnic composition, giving rise to problems the solution of which still defies the ability of the world statesmen. These invasions began before the death of Justinian, grew in intensity in the fourth quarter of the sixth century, and continued well into the seventh century. And what was said of the Levant may also be said of the Balkan peninsula, that from 558 onward it "suffered a series of fearful convulsions any one of which would have forced thousands of refugees across the sea." Yet it has occurred to no one among those who have dealt with the question of the Hellenization of

³⁸ *Ibid.*, XLII, 7. ³⁹ See note 22 above.

⁴⁰ John, Bishop of Ephesus, *The Third Part of the Ecclesiastical History of John, Bishop of Ephesus*, tr. from the Syriac by R. Payne Smith (Oxford, 1860), p. 432. The other contemporary sources are: Evagrius, *Ecclesiastical History*, ed. by Bidez and Parmentier (London, 1898), p. 228; Menander in C. Müller, *Fragmenta Historicorum Graecorum*, IV (Paris, 1851), 252; John of Biclár in *Mon. Germ. Hist., Chronica Minora* (1893), V.II, ed. by Mommsen.

Sicily and southern Italy that the immigrants responsible for this Hellenization might have come from the Balkan peninsula, particularly Greece.

As a matter of fact the impulse, in the form of an immigration, which strengthened the Greek element in Sicily and southern Italy, thereby bringing about the linguistic and cultural transformation of these regions, came from Greece in the eighties of the sixth century and as a result of the devastating invasion of the Avars and Slavs a contemporary description of which was given above. The information about this immigration has been available since 1749, but no one among those who have dealt with the question of the Hellenization of Sicily and southern Italy appears to have known it, while those who have referred to it in connection with the question of the Slavonic settlements in Greece in the sixth century usually discarded it. This was because this information is given by an anonymous chronicle, known as the *Chronicle of Monemvasia* and thought to have been written in the sixteenth century, hence about a thousand years later than the events which it describes.⁴¹ But recent studies have shown that this chronicle was actually written toward the end of the tenth century or the beginning of the eleventh, and that its author drew his information from a first-rate historical source, now lost, which was written before 932.⁴² This conclusion was made possible by the publication in 1912 of a scholium of Arethas of Caesarea, an outstanding Byzantine scholar of the late ninth and early tenth centuries, a pupil of the great Photios, written in 932, which confirms, as far as it goes, almost word for word what the chronicle has to say.⁴³ Since the publication of Arethas' scholium there remains virtually nothing in the chronicle that cannot be confirmed by other sources. Therefore, it can now be affirmed in unmistakable and unambiguous terms that the *Chronicle of Monemvasia* is absolutely trustworthy and constitutes one of the most precious sources of the Avar and Slav penetration of Greece and the dispersion of the Greeks during the early years of the reign of Maurice (582-602).

Here is what the *Chronicle of Monemvasia* says about the great Avar

⁴¹ This chronicle was first published in 1749 by Joseph Pasinus and his collaborators in their catalogue of the manuscripts of the royal library of Turin from a manuscript written in the sixteenth century: *Codices manuscriptorum bibliothecae regiae Taurinensis Athenaei*, I (Turin, 1749), 417 f. Pasinus' edition was the only edition available until 1884 when S. P. Lampros reissued it, together with two other versions which he found in two manuscripts, the one belonging to the monastery of Koutloumousion, the other to that of the Iberikon, both monasteries of Mount Athos. According to Lampros the manuscript of the Iberikon was written in the sixteenth century, that of Koutloumousion probably in the sixteenth, although there are some indications which point to the seventeenth. S. P. Lampros, *Ἱστορικά Μελετήματα* (Athens, 1884), pp. 97-128. In 1909 these three versions were reprinted by N. A. Bees with some corrections: "Τὸ περὶ τῆς πτύσεως Μονεμβασίας, χρονικόν," *Βυζαντινὰ*, I (Athens, 1909), 37-105.

⁴² S. Kougeas, "Ἐπὶ τοῦ καλουμένου χρονικοῦ «Περὶ τῆς πτύσεως τῆς Μονεμβασίας»,," *Νέος Ἑλληνομνήμων*, IX (Athens, 1912), 473-80. I have studied the *Chronicle of Monemvasia* in detail and my results will be published in the fifth volume of the *Dumbarton Oaks Papers*.

⁴³ Kougeas, *loc. cit.*, IX, 474-75.

invasion of the eighties of the sixth century, the same invasion that is described by the contemporary passage quoted above:

In another invasion they [the Avars] subjugated all of Thessaly and Greece, Old Epirus, Attica and Euboea. They made also an incursion into the Peloponnesus, conquered it by war, and, destroying and driving out the noble and Hellenic nations, they settled in it themselves. Those among the former [the Greeks] who succeeded in escaping from their blood-stained hands dispersed themselves here and there. The city of Patras emigrated to the territory of Rhegium in Calabria; the Argives to the island called Orobe; and the Corinthians to the island called Aegina. The Lacones too abandoned their native soil at that time. Some sailed to the island of Sicily and they are still there in a place called Demena, call themselves Dementitae instead of Lacedaemonitae and preserve their own Laconian dialect.

This passage offers unmistakable evidence of an immigration to Sicily and southern Italy toward the end of the sixth century, but the immigrants involved came not from the oriental provinces of the Byzantine Empire but from Greece itself. And this immigration was of considerable proportion. The entire city of Patras moved to Calabria and the Lacedaemonians who went to Sicily were numerous enough to found a city to which apparently they gave their name.⁴⁴ And although documentation is lacking, it is not improbable that, in view of the general situation, other Greeks besides the people of Patras and the Lacedaemonians, Greeks from Epirus, central Greece, and the western parts of the Peloponnesus in general, went to Sicily or Italy at that time. As the Slavs occupied virtually all the western part of the Peloponnesus, the Peloponnesians who managed to flee could find no nearer haven than Sicily or Italy.

Therefore, it must now be admitted that the outside impulse needed to strengthen the Hellenic element in Sicily and southern Italy and to enable it to regain its predominant position came from Greece, particularly from the Peloponnesus, during, and as a result of, the great Avar and Slav invasions of the late sixth century. It is, of course, entirely possible that this element was further strengthened by refugees from the Orient during the Persian and Arabic invasions, but of these refugees nothing definite can be affirmed because documentation is lacking. It is not impossible either that Greek-speaking

⁴⁴ On Demena see Michele Amari, *Storia dei Musulmani di Sicilia* (2d ed.; Catania, 1933), I, 609 ff. Also, Sac. Luigi Vasi, "Notizie Storiche e Geografiche della città e valle di Demona," *Archivio Storico Siciliano*, nuova serie, anno X (Palermo, 1885), 1-15. The etymology of Demena is not certain. Amari (I, 609 f.) thinks that it was named after the inhabitants. If this opinion is correct then the name Demena may have been derived from Dementitae, the name by which, according to the *Chronicle of Monemvasia*, the Lacedaemonians who settled in Sicily came to be known. And the term Dementitae is a corruption of Lacedaemonitae as the *Chronicle of Monemvasia* calls the Lacedaemonians. What probably happened was the dropping of the first two syllables from Lacedaemonitae and the simplification of the spelling of what remained—Dementitae instead of Daemonitae. The form Demona instead of Demena occurs several times in the sources.

refugees from central Italy settled in Calabria, after the conquest of the exarchate of Ravenna by the Lombards, but for this, too, there is no definite documentation.⁴⁵ The movement of population from Greece to Sicily and southern Italy toward the end of the sixth century is the only movement for which definite documentation exists. It is to this movement, therefore, that the ultimate Hellenization of Sicily and southern Italy must be attributed.

Related to this Greek emigration is the question of the establishment of Slavonic settlements in Greece. That Slavs settled in Greece during the Middle Ages no scholar has ever denied,⁴⁶ but it has been denied, especially by modern Greek scholars, that they settled there as early as the end of the sixth century. This was because the *Chronicle of Monemvasia* was ignored, while the contemporary accounts of Menander, Evagrius, and John of Ephesus were given an interpretation of such a broadness as to make them inapplicable to Greece.⁴⁷ But with the *Chronicle of Monemvasia* confirmed by the scholium of Arethas there can no longer be any doubt that Slavs settled in the Peloponnesus in the sixth century, during the reign of Maurice, and that, in settling there, they exterminated part of the ancient population and forced another part to disperse and emigrate. But it by no means follows that the Greek element completely disappeared from the Peloponnesus and that the modern Greeks are Christians of Slavonic descent in whose veins there is "not a single drop of real pure Hellenic blood."⁴⁸ For the eastern part of the Peloponnesus from Corinth to Malea remained in Greek hands, and when, beginning with the ninth century, the Slavs of the Peloponnesus were subdued, parts of the country were settled with new Greek-speaking elements, some of which were pure Greek, others not so pure, but doubtless Hellenized.⁴⁹ Slavonic tribes

⁴⁵ C. Cecchelli, "Squardo Generale all' Architettura Bizantina in Italia," *Studi Bizantini e Neoellenici*, IV (Rome, 1935), 21.

⁴⁶ On the Slavs in Greece see A. A. Vasiliev, "The Slavs in Greece" (in Russian), *Vizantiiskij Vremennik*, V (St. Petersburg, 1898), 404-38, 626-70. Vasiliev's work, although written forty-eight years ago, is still fundamental. I read it with the aid of Mrs. Nathalie Scheffer. The German Max Vasmer, a scholar of Slavic philology, published during the war (1941), in the *Proceedings* of the Prussian Academy, a long work (350 pages), based principally on the study of place names in Greece, on the question of the Slavic settlements in Greece. This work was not available to me, but I had access to the long review by C. Amantos, "Οἱ Σλάβοι εἰς τὴν Ἑλλάδα," *Byzantinisch-Neugriechische Jahrbücher*, XVII (Athens, 1944), 210-21. The question has been more recently treated in an excellent monograph by D. Zakythinos, *Οἱ Σλάβοι ἐν Ἑλλάδι* (Athens, 1945). About this book see the *post scriptum* to my article "Nicephorus I, the Savior of Greece from the Slavs," *Byzantina-Metabyzantina*, I (New York, 1946).

⁴⁷ As late as 1939 the Greek scholar Amantos wrote, "By Hellas the archaist Menander means the Byzantine regions up to the Danube, including modern Bulgaria." In the same way he explained the passage of Evagrius. Constantine I. Amantos, *Ἱστορία τοῦ Βυζαντινοῦ Κράτους* (Athens, 1939), I, 281 ff. See also my review of this book in *Byzantion*, XV, 472.

⁴⁸ Fallmerayer, *Geschichte der Halbinsel Morea während des Mittelalters* (Stuttgart, 1830), I, iii-xiv, as quoted by A. Vasiliev, *History of the Byzantine Empire* (Madison, 1928), I, 213-14.

⁴⁹ *The Chronicle of Monemvasia*, Bees's edition, pp. 68-69; the scholium of Arethas, in Kougeas, *loc. cit.*, IX, 474-75. See also C. Hopf, *Geschichte Griechenlands vom Beginn des Mittelalters bis auf unsere Zeit*, in Ersch and Gruber, *Allgemeine Encyclopädie der Wissenschaften und Künste*, LXXXV (Leipzig, 1867), 98-99.

continued to exist; some of them were still there in the fourteenth century, but their strength had declined at the beginning of the ninth century when they were defeated at Patras and that city was again resettled with Greeks, descendants of those who had emigrated to Calabria in the sixth century.⁵⁰ The Slavs indeed continued to resist, but their long domination of the western Peloponnesus was over; eventually they succumbed and became completely absorbed by the Greek race. They left behind them some Slavonic place names, but their long domination failed to affect materially the Greek language.

⁵⁰ *The Chronicle of Monemvasia*, p. 69; the scholium of Arethas, Kougeas, *loc. cit.*, IX, 474.

Duer and the “Conway Cabal”

LOUIS GOTTSCHALK AND JOSEPHINE FENNEL*

THE winter of 1777-1778, glorious in American Revolutionary history because of the heroism and suffering of Valley Forge, has also been considered most inglorious by some historians who believe in the existence of a concerted effort—perhaps a conspiracy—to remove George Washington from his command of the Continental armies. The suspected conspiracy has been called “the Conway Cabal,” since it has long been generally believed that the plot centered around General Thomas Conway, an Irishman who had served in the French army before joining the Americans in their struggle for independence. The list of participants, as prepared by contemporaries and historians, includes Horatio Gates, victor at Saratoga, Charles Lee, second only to Washington in the army, Thomas Mifflin, quartermaster general, and Benjamin Rush, physician general. The list of intriguers has sometimes been extended to include several members of the Continental Congress—notably, Richard Henry Lee and Francis Lightfoot Lee of Virginia, John Adams, Samuel Adams, James Lovell, Elbridge Gerry, and Timothy Pickering of New England, and William Duer of New York.

Specific evidence, however, of the existence of an intrigue against Washington is limited. To be convincing, such evidence ought to reveal definite attempts to thwart the commander in chief or statements indicating a desire for his removal. Mere criticism of his ability would hardly be enough, for his friends were sometimes no less guilty in that regard than his enemies. For example, Conway’s reputedly calling the commander in chief a “weak general”¹ is matched by disparaging remarks of Baron de Kalb, whose ultimate loyalty to Washington has not been questioned. De Kalb spoke of Washington as a general who did not know “how to profit from the clumsiest errors of his enemy.”² There were very few who specifically stated their desire for Washington’s removal.³ More of those listed as caballers made no such declarations.

*Dr. Gottschalk is professor of history in the University of Chicago. Miss Fennell is a fellow of the American Association of University Women.

¹ Washington to Conway, Nov. 9, 1777, in John C. Fitzpatrick, ed., *The Writings of George Washington from the Original Manuscript Sources* (Washington, 1932), IX, 29.

² De Kalb to Broglie, Sept. 24, 1777, in Henri Doniol, *Histoire de la participation de la France à l'établissement des Etats-Unis d'Amérique* (Paris, 1888), III, 226-27.

³ Anon. (probably Benjamin Rush) to Patrick Henry, Jan. 12, 1778, in Jared Sparks, ed., *The Writings of George Washington* (Boston, 1834), V, 496; anon. to Congress, Jan. 17, 1778, *ibid.*, V, 497-99; and possibly also James Lovell to Horatio Gates, Nov. 27, 1777, in Edmund C. Burnett, ed., *Letters of Members of the Continental Congress* (Washington, 1921-26), II, 570.

That they did not openly avow such a desire does not mean, of course, that they did not feel it; and some who were trusted by Washington are now accused of having been caballers. Their silence does mean, however, that the evidence against them is only circumstantial. We have convincing evidence of anti-Washington feeling only from the outspoken few, and it is not enough to prove a "cabal."

The circumstantial evidence is also unsatisfactory. The only definite attempt to hinder the commander in chief seems to have been the reorganization by Congress of the Board of War in October, 1777. But if it was the purpose of Congress that the board become an instrument of opposition, the work of the altered board seems not to have been carried on with that in view. The great current of rumors is another indication that there must have been considerable anti-Washington feeling. Yet the extent to which that feeling was entertained is not at all clear. Thus, almost the only undebatable conclusion that emerges from the available evidence is that Washington and his friends were certain that a "cabal" did exist, whether it existed in fact or not.

The following letter is an example of the current criticism that made contemporaries—particularly the younger men on Washington's staff—think that there was a cabal against the commander in chief. Its author, William Duer, better known for his post-Revolutionary speculations in western lands,⁴ is supposed, according to legend, to have thwarted the anti-Washington plans of Congress by insisting on attending that body, when New York was otherwise unrepresented, in order that he might vote against the anti-Washington faction.⁵ This legend of his loyalty to Washington is more than counterbalanced, however, by the belief of the marquis de Lafayette that Duer was not Washington's friend.⁶ Moreover, Lafayette's suspicion is perhaps indirectly confirmed by Charles Lee. Shortly after the battle of Monmouth, where Lee had been publicly rebuked by Washington, Lee suggested that Duer would be interested in seeing a letter in which Lee had made some uncomplimentary remarks about Washington.⁷ Lee apparently counted on the sympathy of Duer.

If it is true that Duer belonged to a cabal, the question of whom he wished to see as commander in chief is not easily answered. The most generally held idea of the purpose of the Conway Cabal is that Washington was to be re-

⁴ Joseph Stancliffe Davis, "William Duer, Entrepreneur, 1747-99," *Essays in the Earlier History of American Corporations* ("Harvard Economic Studies," XVI, Cambridge, 1917), pp. 111-338; Archer Butler Hulbert, "The Methods and Operations of the Scioto Group of Speculators," *Mississippi Valley Historical Review*, I (1915), 502-15, II (1915), 56-73.

⁵ William Dunlap, *History of the New Netherlands, Province of New York, and State of New York, to the Adoption of the Federal Constitution* (New York, 1840), II, 133-34.

⁶ Lafayette to Henry Laurens, received Jan. 28, 1778, *South Carolina Historical and Genealogical Magazine*, VII (1906), 182.

⁷ Lee to Robert Morris, July 3, 1778, *The Lee Papers* (Vols. IV-VII of *Collections of the New-York Historical Society, 1871-74* [New York, 1872-75]), II, 459.

moved from his command, which was to be given to Horatio Gates, popular because of his recent victory at Saratoga. That Duer favored any such choice, however, is unlikely, since he not only disliked the victor of Saratoga but was also a close friend of Gates's special rival, General Philip Schuyler, as the following letter shows. It is entirely possible, of course, that Duer had his own aspirant for the position.

At any rate, it is clear from the document below that Duer was critical of Washington's leadership. It is also possible, but not equally clear, that he may even have feared for the further existence of the Continental Army if the command were not changed. It must be pointed out, however, that the major part of this letter from Duer to Francis Lightfoot Lee is taken up with criticism of the mismanagement of the quartermaster and commissary departments, for which Washington could hardly be blamed. It seems natural that a businessman should lament inefficiency in arming, equipping, and financing the army and should want to centralize buying and disbursement in a few capable businessmen's hands. Thus, inasmuch as Washington was not a "businessman," Duer's comments on the inefficiency of the army may have been an indirect criticism of the commander in chief. This is not necessarily true, however, since Schuyler, for whom Duer expressed great respect, was no more of a businessman than Washington, who kept his private accounts methodically and was a rich man in his day. Likewise, although Duer wrote that he feared the dissolution of the army, considering "the character" of the existing "Councils" and of the "Principal Leaders" in the army, he was not necessarily indicating a desire for the removal of Washington. He may have meant to rebuke some other unspecified generals and some congressmen as well.

This letter thus shows only Duer's general despair over the conduct of the war. It is not sufficient to prove his participation in a cabal against Washington, still less that such a cabal existed. But it is easy to understand how from dissatisfaction such as Duer expressed—which was apparently no secret—might have arisen the apprehension on the part of Washington and his friends that an intrigue against the commander in chief did exist and that Duer was involved in it.

The letter given below is in the Lee Collection of the Alderman Library, University of Virginia. It was written from Reading, Pennsylvania, where Duer had stopped, perhaps on his way to Albany, New York, to join Lafayette for an expedition into Canada. As the letter reveals, Duer had volunteered to accompany the army into Canada, but he never reached Albany; the reason is shown in the letter. The date 1777 is obviously an error for 1778, since the Canadian fiasco took place in 1778.

Words which are illegible or uncertain are indicated by [?]. Otherwise the document is printed literally with all its vagaries in spelling.

READING Feby. 14th* 1777 [1778]

MY DEAR SIR,

You will be much surprised to hear of me from Reading, where I have been detain'd three or four Days, in Expectation of receiving a Letter from York Town,⁸ the Substance of which, is (I am told) a very Extraordinary Conversation betwixt the Marquis de la Fayette, and Genl. Conway, of which I had the Honor of being the Topic—⁹ In the Course of a Discussion betwixt these Officers of the Expedition against Canada, the Marquis Express his Astonishment, that I should be trusted to go on it, as he had been inform'd that my political Character was that of a *Tory*.¹⁰ *Risum teneatis, Amici?* if you can, your risible Muscles are not so flexible, as I take them to be—I think it is no difficult Matter to guess at the Quarter, whence this Insinuation comes, or the Purpose for which it is design'd—I am happy, however, to learn it in Time, for, however I despise the Insinuation it will furnish me with this Useful Lesson not to risque my own Reputation, and Ease of Mind by troubling the Young *Telemachus* with the Presence of a Person, whom he cannot consider as a *Mentor*. Before I was inform'd of this Matter my Imagination suggested to me that the Pleasure, which the Marquis Express of my going with him as a Volunteer appear'd more the Result of French *Politesse* than of Inclination; yet, as I was of Opinion my Presence might be useful to the Public, I was willing to sacrifice my own feelings to a more important Consideration—To persist in this Resolution at present would be a Breach of Self Duty, as I must in such Case sacrifice my own Ease, and (possibly) my Reputation, without the Hope of possessing with the Marquis that Influence, which might be necessary for Effecting Purposes beneficial to the public Weal—I have thought it my Duty to communicate this Matter to you in order that you may mention it to the Board of War and to Congress, who probably depend on my going into Canada, and may thereby be prevented from taking such Measures with respect to that Expedition as Policy may suggest—¹¹ I think a Committee of Congress ought without Delay to be sent into Canada should our Troops oblige the the Enemy to retire to Quebec; and though, I owe too much to my own Feelings to Volunteer it, where I am look'd upon in a Suspicious Point of View, I will, if Congress think proper, act as one of such a Committee, provided M^r Law of Connecticut¹²—whose Probity, and good Sense must be well known in Congress be appointed to act with me. Should Con-

* Here, as in succeeding abbreviations (M^r, Acct^s, etc.), the lack of appropriate characters has compelled the printer to omit a dot or double dot directly under the superior letters. [Editor's note.]

⁸ York, Pennsylvania, seat of the Continental Congress, Sept. 30, 1777–June 27, 1778.

⁹ The question arises whether such a conversation did in fact ever take place, since Conway left York the day before Lafayette arrived there (Louis Gottschalk, *Lafayette Joins the American Army* [Chicago, 1937], p. 118). And who could have written a letter describing a conversation between Lafayette and Conway about Duer, if not Conway himself? And how could Duer have learned about such a letter if he had not yet received it? Could Mifflin have told him?

¹⁰ Lafayette wrote to Laurens that Duer had "the reputation in the country to be a *Tory*." Jan. 27, 1778, *South Carolina Hist. and Geneal. Mag.*, VII (1906), 182.

¹¹ This probably explains why Duer did not meet Lafayette in Albany. If the Board of War took, or failed to take, any measures with regard to the Canada expedition because of the change in Duer's plans, there is no evidence to prove or disprove it. The expedition received remarkably little support but that was probably not because of deliberate intention.

¹² Richard Law, lawyer, judge, and delegate to the Continental Congress.

gress think proper to take any Measures on this Subject, they will be pleased to communicate it to me as early as possible, directing their Letter to the Care of Genl. Schuyler—I shall now proceed from myself to the Public—

In my last Letter I inform'd you that I should endeavor to prevail on Genl. Mifflin to join the Board of War without Delay—¹³ I accordingly explain'd to him the Manner in which the Resolution respecting his Settlement of the public Acc^t had past,¹⁴ and gave my Opinion, that it ought not to be consider'd in the rigorous Sense, which at first View it appears to Convey—All my Endeavors, I am sorry to say have proved fruitless, his Feelings appear to me greatly wounded, and what has tended to aggravate them is the Return of M^r Butler from York Town without a Farthing of Cash;¹⁵ although the Department is in a most Miserable Condition for Want of that Article—I have taken much Pain to make myself acquainted with the State of the Department, and am fully convinced, that unless active, and Experienced Officers are immediately appointed to conduct the different Branches of it, and be properly Supplied with Cash, in order to enter into the immediate Execution of the Business, that we shall not be able to take the Field 'till very late next Year, for Want of Waggon, Camp Equipage &^{ca} nay, I doubt whether this will be the Worse—The Supply of the Army depending upon an Active and judicious Discharge of this Office, a Defect in this Point, added to other Causes, will I fear occasion the Dissolution of the Fragments of a once Powerful Army—¹⁶

Your Zeal, my dear Sir, for the Cause we are engaged in, will I trust engage you to rouse Congress from their Languour, and not to cease urging them on this Point, 'till Matters are put in a proper Train—So much Time has elapsed without any thing being done with respect to this Matter, that I doubt whether the Exertions of any Person whom Congress can at present appoint will atone for what has past: but should they appoint Persons of Ordinary Talents, or even Persons of Ability, but living at a distance, (whence great Delays must necessarily accrue in their Entering into the Execution of their Office) the most fatal Consequences must Enue. Some of the Principal Misfortunes in the Commissary's Department were derived last Year from this Source. Considering the present Critical Situation of Affairs the Persons to conduct this Business ought in my Opinion to be appointed either out of the Army, or amongst Persons in this State and that of Jersey, who have had some Experience in the Depart^t—There are two persons in Pen^a who in

¹³ Major General Thomas Mifflin of Pennsylvania, quartermaster general of the Continental Army, 1775–78, had been appointed to the reorganized Board of War in November, 1777. He had been present at a meeting of the board on January 28, 1778. Worthington C. Ford, ed., *Journals of the Continental Congress, 1774–1789* (Washington, 1905), X, 102.

¹⁴ Duer is probably referring to the resolution of January 30: "On motion, *Ordered*, That the quarter master general immediately prepare and render an account to Congress of all his public expenditures." *Ibid.*, X, 103.

¹⁵ Probably Anthony Butler, agent of the quartermaster general (Thomas Lynch Montgomery, ed., *Pennsylvania Archives*, 5th Series [Harrisburg, 1906], V, 4). He did receive a warrant for money, however, for one was ordered, on February 5, 1778, to be drawn on the treasurer in his favor "for 12,000 dollars, for the use of three brigades of waggons about to be despatched to North Carolina for cloathing." *Journals of the Continental Congress*, X, 123–24.

¹⁶ Mifflin's resignation as quartermaster general was accepted by Congress on November 7, 1777 (*ibid.*, IX, 874), but on the following day it was resolved that he should be asked "to continue in the exercise of that office, and that he be invested with full powers" until another quartermaster general could be appointed (*ibid.*, IX, 882). The Board of War, after a meeting at which Mifflin was present, made a long report urging that the quartermaster department "should immediately be organized, and put in full vigour and motion" (*ibid.*, X, 102). The suggestions of the board had been adopted by Congress on February 5 (*ibid.*, X, 126), but Duer may not have expected any results from such action.

my Opinion are well calculated to conduct to conduct two of the [?] Branches respecting the furnishing Waggons, and Forage. I mean M^r Mark Bird, and Colo. R: L: Hooper—¹⁷ The former is a Man of great Influence, and Property, and brought up from his Youth in a Business, which from its Nature, is capable of furnishing good Quartermasters, namely the Iron Factory—; the second, you know from the Accounts, and repeated Testimonies we have received is undoubtedly a Man of Business—To this it may be added that they have already been Employ'd in that Business, which must necessarily give them an Advantage over Persons, whatever their Talents may be, who have not yet applied them in this Channel—

From Principles of Public Duty, I am induced to mention these Persons; but I must observe that in my Opinion nothing can Effect a radical Cure to the Mischiefs, which prevail in that System, and introduce Vigor, and OEconomy, not only in that, but in the other military Departments, but the ordering Genl. Schuyler to the Army, and prevailing on him to accept of the Qu: Ma: Department; and in Conjunction with the Com^{rs}¹⁸ of the War Office to model it, as they shall deem Expedient—I trust you know me too well to think I have so often urged this from any Considerations of personal Friendship. Were I to consult his Peace of Mind, I should be against his Accepting it; because I know the Opposition he would meet with from many who make their Harvest, by destroying all Order in the Administration of public Affairs—My mind is impress with the Strongest Conviction of the Necessity of calling forth his Talents for the public Service; and Congress will I am afraid be obliged to acknowledge it when it may be too late to remedy the Evils which accrue from the Cruel, and unjust State of Suspense he is at present kept in—¹⁹

Shall I beg your Attention whilst I enter into some Minutiae with Respect to this Department, which have come to my Knowledge—

- 1st There is not at present at Camp Sufficient Strength of Teams and Horses to remove the Artillery and Baggage of the Army, should the Movements of the Enemy render a Retreat necessary—
2. Were more Horses and Teams Supplied at this Time for Want of a proper Supply of Forage, a judicious Mode of Feeding, and a proper Dicipline in the Arrangement and Care of the Teams, they would before the Month of April is past be in as Miserable a Condition as they are at present—
- 3^d Upwards of two thousand horses have been Expended in the Course of the last Campaign in the Q: M: Department; and from what I can learn few (if any) of the Harniss belonging to these Horses have been preserved—
4. Through Want of proper Management and Care of the Tents, few if any of them can be made Serviceable for the next Campaign.
5. No Magazines of Forage from what I can learn is as yet laid up for the Spring Service—

This is a faint [?] Sketch of the State of this Department:²⁰ I leave it to yourself

¹⁷ A colonel in the militia of Berks County, Pennsylvania, Bird owned, in addition to considerable land and Negroes, several mills and forges. Robert Lettis Hooper of New Jersey was deputy quartermaster general and owner of considerable land in Pennsylvania. He appears, however, not to have been so popular as Duer suggested, for two days after Duer wrote this letter, the council of Pennsylvania presented complaints against Hooper as a result of which he was suspended from office. *Journals of the Continental Congress*, X, 172, 176, 177.

¹⁸ Commissioners.

¹⁹ Schuyler's request for a court martial to investigate his conduct of the war in the northern department was not met until October, 1778.

²⁰ For similar statements of conditions see Washington to Col. Henry E. Lutterloh, Dec. 27,

to draw the Inferences—I shall only observe that it is lamentable to consider that we whose Resources in this and the Com^{ys} Department²¹ are in many Respects much preferable to those of the Enemy, should be in danger of having our Army disbanded from a Want of these Branches bei[n]g conducted with Spirit and Skill, at a time when the Enemy, are making every Preparation for opening the Campaign early, and profiting by our Want of Attention, and the Exercise of a false humanity (it deserves the name of Treason!) which induces us to leave in their Power so much Forage, and as many horses, as are necessary for enabling them to act with Vigor in carrying on this wicked, and Cruel War—

Another Object, which demands your immediate Attention and in which a Delay must be fatal, is the Supplying the Com^{es}²² with Cash for forming the Magazines—I have conferred with Colo. Hooper, and the other Gentⁿ in this Quarter on the Subject,²³ and am convinced, that if they are immediately Supplied, notwithstanding the Time which has been lost they will answer the Expectation of Congress; if not, all Prospect of forming Magazines in Time on this Side the Susquehanna must be given up—I trust therefore that they will be Supplied immediately with Money—I believe the Treasury Board are alarmed at the large Sums daily demanded for the public Service, but, when they consider that almost all the Articles in the Com^{ys} Quarter Masters, and Cloathing Department exceed on an Average four Times the Price at which they were purchased not twelve-months Since, and that this is Season, in all Wars, when the largest Expenditures are necessary, their Wonder on this Point must cease—However painful the Reflection, more Money (and that a very large Sum must be immediately emitted) but this is like giving Water to a dropsical Man; a ruinous Expedient!—It will give Ease for a short Time—but unless our Finances are better managed, than they have been, (or indeed ever can be by a Committee of Congress)²⁴—the Sinews of War must fail—and Congress lose Entirely the Opinion the public once formd of their Wisdom—Less than a Year must, I am confident, exhaust our narrow System of temporary Expedients, and Contracted Measures. The State of the public Debt, and the critical Situation of Affairs call loudly for the Care of Men of Superior Abilities, of Capacity to form some great comprehensive Plans for our Relief—Men, who will not be biassed by a Consideration to particular States, much less Individuals; or content themselves with a languid Official Execution of their Duty; but apply to the important Business of our Finances with a Steadiness arising from a Conviction of their own Talents, and Integrity, and with the zeal of Men, who are passionate for their Purpose—Such Men it is the Duty of Congress in my Opinion to find out as quick as possible, to entrust the Super Intendence of the Treasury to them, and to Support them in the Execution of their Office, and in the Plans they may Suggest for introducing public OEconomy, and supplying our Funds—I know it has been a Doctrine pretty generally received as Orthodox in Congress that the Treasury should only be entrusted to the Management of Mem-

1777, in Fitzpatrick, X, 213–14 (need for tents); *id.* to R. L. Hooper, Nathaniel Falconer, and Jonathan Mifflin, Feb. 15, 1778, *ibid.*, X, 464 (need for forage); *id.* to president of Congress, Jan. 1, 1778, *ibid.*, X, 244 (lack of preparation for next campaign); *id.* to the Committee of Congress with the Army, Jan. 29, 1778, *ibid.*, X, 388–90 (need for tents, horses, saddles, and forage). Washington was hardly less critical of the quartermaster department than Duer.

²¹ Commissary Department.

²² Commissaries.

²³ Duer seems to have confused the functions of the commissary and the quartermaster departments; at any rate, he did not always make clear which department he was discussing.

²⁴ The Treasury Board, which was created by Congress on February 17, 1776, as a "standing committee . . . for superintending the treasury." *Journals of the Continental Congress*, IV, 156.

bers of Congress, and my Colleague Mr Duane²⁵ (who to do him justice attended faithfully to it, and managed it with Reputation) is a Sanguine Partisan for this Opinion; yet, whoever considers how few members of Congress could ever pretend to the Character of Financiers, the Evils, which flow from a constant Fluctuation of Members of the Treasury, the Partiality in public Advances too often shewn to particular States, and individuals, from a political Complaisance which Members are inclined to shew to each other, and the Impossibility there is of Members of Congress giving up Sufficient Time to the Board, to make themselves Masters of the Business, and to enable them to conduct it with Advantage to the Public, and with Satisfaction to Individuals, whoever, I say, considers these Points, must be of Opinion that the Evils arising from the present mode of Conducting the Treasury infinitely overbalance any Advantages, which can result from its being under the Management of Members of Congress—The only Advantage, which I ever heard mentiond as attending the present Mode, was its being a powerful check against Frauds, and improper Application for public Money—But, Surely, there is no magical Influence in the Name of a Committee of Congress, which can itself produce these valuable Ends—These must be effected by Strict Integrity, Knowledge of Business, and close Attention in the Committee who Super Intend the Treasury—and the same Qualities may be found in Commissioners to be appointed by Congress for this Purpose, at least in an equal, and so far as it respects Attention, and Skill, in a Superior Degree—I wish therefore that the Treasury Department, as well as every other Executive Department of Congress was thrown under Commissioners—Every possible Precaution ought certainly to be taken that these Persons should not only be well qualified by their Abilities, but, by an unsuspected Integrity of Character, for the exercise of a Trust of such high Moment—but if no one was to be appointed to it but after being a certain Space of Time in Nomination, and by the Voice of nine States, the public would have every Security for a faithful Discharge of this trust which could be expected—An additional one (if deem'd necessary) might still be added; and that is a Committee of Congress to be appointed by the Ballot of nine States, whose Business it should be to inspect monthly the Proceedings of the Comm^{rs} and to report to Congress their Opinion of the Modes in which the Treasury Business has been conducted—Should you agree with me in this Opinion (which I trust you will in a great Measure) you will ask perhaps where are the Men to be procur'd who are fit for this Business, and who are willing to execute it?—I must confess that I do not think there are many Men in America, who can be considered as Financiers, our contracted dependent System of Government not affording Scope for Abilities of this Species—yet some undoubtedly might be found whose Genius fits them in a peculiar Manner for such a Line of Business—Two occur to me at present Mr R: Morris of this State, and my Colleague Gov^r Morris—With respect to the former, you know him so well, that it is unnecessary to enlarge upon his Character—the latter, tho' Young, has turnd his thoughts and Course of Reading much to the Subject of Money as a Science, and from his Genius would I am convinced make an Useful, and Shining Member in such a Department—Some others in the different States might be fix'd on, with whom I am not acquainted—Whether or no if Congress thought proper to make such an Establishment these Persons would accept, I cannot tell; but this I am certain of—that they ought to do it, as the Situation of public Affairs calls for the Talents of every Person in that Line, where he can be most Useful to his Country—My Mind is so strongly oppressed with

²⁵ James Duane of New York, chairman of the Treasury Board since its creation in 1776.

these and Several other Matters relating to our public Matters, that I cannot find ease 'till I unbosom myself, and I know no one, to whom I can do it with greater Frankness than yourself—A long Experience of you in the Course of last Year²⁶ ha[s] convinced me of your Abillities to judge, and of your Determination to pursue what is Right—I am interrupted from proceeding further by a Messenger who brings an account from the Army, which I have daily expected.—I have obtained a Copy of the Letter concerning the Situation of our Army, which I transmit to you—if Congress has not received the Acct., make such use of it as your Prudence may Suggest—²⁷ For my own Part, when I consider the Character of our present Councils, and that of the principal Leaders in our Army, I am induced to prepare my Mind for an Event (which unless a Miracle interposes) will certainly happen, the Dessolution of the Army—Whether or no this may prove Eventually for the worse, I am at a Loss to determine. Some great public Calamity may call forth the Spirit of Enquiry into the Causes of our Misfortunes, rouse all our public Bodies from their Languor, compell the Prejudices of States and Individuals to bend to the public Good, and call forth those Spirited and determined Whigs²⁸ both in our Councils, and in our Armies, by whose means only this Revolution (like all others which have ever happend) will be brought to an Issue—You may perhaps, think me too Sanguine in harbouring such an Idea, but when you Consider the Justice of this War, and take a retrospective View of the Extraordinary Events which have happen'd in it, and the Instruments with which we have labour'd, you will be induced to cry out as a good Catholic, *Non nobis Domine*—

Dr Potts²⁹ is kind enough to take Charge of this Letter, I flatter myself from the necessary Changes which will be made in our Medical System and from the Harmony which (I trust) will subsist betwixt himself, and Dr Shippen³⁰ the most beneficial Consequences will be derived in the Management of our Hospitals—

I beg you to tender my Respects to M^{rs} Lee; and to remember me to the Members of the Board, particularly our Fellow Labourer in the Vineyard Dick Peters—³¹ Tell him I meditate writing him a Folio, the next Attack I have of the Cacoethes Scrib:

You will oblige me in making my Compliments to M^r Arnet, and M^r Penn and M^r Langwothy, and M^r Wood, my old Messmates³²—

As I have some Matters which I purpose communicating to you from this Place

²⁶ Francis Lightfoot Lee joined the Board of War on September 11, 1776, and Duer became a member on July 2, 1777. *Journals of the Continental Congress*, V, 751; VIII, 525.

²⁷ When an extract from a letter from Duer to Lee (it may have been this one or the one mentioned below) was read in Congress (Feb. 21, 1778, *ibid.*, X, 189), there was no mention of an accompanying letter. Duer may have been referring, however, to the letter from Washington to the Committee of Congress with the Army, January 29, 1778, in which the commander in chief discussed in great detail the state of the army. See Fitzpatrick, X, 362–403.

²⁸ The reading of this phrase is not certain. Gottschalk quoted it as "their spirited and determined whys" (*Journal of Modern History*, XIII [1941], 98). A re-examination of the document shows the present reading to be the more likely.

²⁹ Dr. Jonathan Potts of Pennsylvania. In the reorganization of the medical department in 1778, he was appointed "deputy director general in the middle district." Feb. 6, 1778, *Journals of the Continental Congress*, X, 131.

³⁰ Dr. William Shippen, jr., "director general of all the military hospitals for the armies of the United States." Apr. 11, 1777, *ibid.*, VII, 253.

³¹ Richard Peters of Pennsylvania, who became secretary of the Board of War in 1776 (June 13, *ibid.*, V, 438) and a full-fledged member of the reorganized board in November, 1777 (Nov. 27, *ibid.*, IX, 971).

³² Cornelius Harnett(?) and John Penn, delegates to Congress from North Carolina; Edward Langwothy and Joseph Wood, delegates from Georgia.

I shall stay here till I have finish'd another letter to you—Since I have been out of the Vortex of Confusion in York Town Two Matters [?] have Suggested themselves to me, the one an Expeditious, and Cheap Mode, of procuring a Body of Horse for the next Campaign, the other, in my Opinion, as certain Mode of recovering the Navigation of the Delaware, and thereby obliging the Enemy either to Surrender, or to hazard a Retreat through the Jerseys with the Loss of their Shipping—Twenty five thousand Men with good Generals to conduct the different Divisions of the Army will I think be Sufficient—

However you, and the Board of War will judge of both when I communicate the matter fully—

God bless you, and Yours!

W^m DUER

Honb^{le} Francis Lightfoot Lee Esq^r—

PS: I have particular Reasons for wishing that Congress was immediately furn^d. with an Exact Muster of the Con^l Army, particularly the Main Army—It is high Time we should know the Worst of Matters—and prepare against it as Wise, or brave Men ought—

* * * * *Reviews of Books* * * * *

General History

NOWHERE WAS SOMEWHERE: HOW HISTORY MAKES UTOPIAS AND HOW UTOPIAS MAKE HISTORY. By *Arthur E. Morgan*. (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press. 1946. Pp. 234. \$2.50.)

Mr. Morgan here continues investigations begun or hinted at in his *Edward Bellamy*. His present work contains concepts and exhibits over which the reader can long pause. Mr. Morgan's general thesis is that utopias are part of the pattern of social change and development, and necessary to it. Utopias, he maintains, are not drawn from thin air; they reflect actual conditions of life of which their creators have somehow become aware. In turn, they provide experimental blueprints without which the future cannot be built, since nature is extremely parsimonious with new ideas.

The author's major case in point is sufficiently impressive. After reading his discussion of More's *Utopia*, one rereads it as though one had never seen it before. For Mr. Morgan, on the basis of original analysis of pre-Columbian and post-Columbian voyages to South America, makes novel claims. More's celebrated work he declares to be no figment of the imagination, but more nearly a transcript of life as it was known in Peru before the coming of Pizarro. How did More acquire the information? *Utopia* states plainly that Raphael Hythloday, the book's narrator, visited South America with Vespucci, left the ship, and, in company with others journeyed overland to Utopia (Peru?). It has hitherto been assumed that More's "romance" was published before he could have had any knowledge of the Peruvian system. Clements R. Markham's *History of Peru* (1892) noted that "in many respects Peru under the Incas resembled the Utopia of Sir Thomas More," but made no effort to account for the fact. The parallels must be examined to be appreciated. Mr. Morgan's careful reasoning and research deserve the thoughtful attention of historians.

Mr. Morgan proceeds to roam throughout the field of utopian writing, to Biblical times and beyond, encompassing the world. He advances the theory, but does not pretend to establish it beyond all criticism, that the Golden Age may have obtained as a condition of primitive societies, and that the peace and security they knew are echoed in utopias which have come down to us. Mr. Morgan treats the subject objectively and with reservations, as in his chapter "Why Utopias Fail," but feels that we learn from them, willingly or unwillingly, and require better equipped "social engineers" to extract the best from them. There is thus no question of advocating a return to outmoded civilizations or of partisan argument in behalf of any particular "utopian" system. If, as Mr. Morgan submits, literary utopias have a basis in fact, to one degree or another, and if they exert

an influence on governments (as Harrington's *Oceana*, for example, very definitely did), then Mr. Morgan seems justified in believing that we are well advised to keep an open mind respecting the limitations of human nature, and to see to it that the influence of utopians is for better rather than worse.

Antioch College

LOUIS FILLER

THEORY AND PRACTICE IN HISTORICAL STUDY: A REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON HISTORIOGRAPHY. [Social Science Research Council, Bulletin 54.] (New York: Social Science Research Council. 1946. Pp. xi, 177. \$1.75.)

THE purpose of the committee in presenting its *Report* is stated by Professor Curti in his foreword as one of helping to clarify thought about history and of aiding historians in the teaching and writing of it. The members of the committee on historiography—Charles A. Beard, Shepard B. Clough, Thomas B. Cochran, Louis Gottschalk, Jeannette P. Nichols, Richard H. Shryock, Alfred Vagts, and Merle Curti, chairman—attempted to fulfill its purpose by arriving at a number of propositions which they assumed would be generally acceptable to historians as asserting basic premises of inquiry, methodological precautions, desirable techniques and principles, and relations with neighboring disciplines. The final, revised list of twenty-one "Propositions" preceded by definitions of key terms used in them—*cf.* history, historical method, historiography, and scientific spirit in history—makes up chapter v. An earlier version of these propositions was submitted to seventy historians. Of the thirty-five who replied, only fifteen were in substantial agreement with the ideas expressed and eight were in general disagreement. How the propositions as they now stand, and the preceding four chapters which may be said to explore their main implications, will be received can be conjectured by the canceling out of historians' criticisms as reported by Professor Curti and from recollections of controversy occasioned by Mr. Beard's arguments in "That Noble Dream." A considerable number of historians will not find this a dish to their liking.

Yet even though they say that it is spinach and to hell with it, one may also conjecture that there is a good deal in the *Report* that needs to be stomachied. Attention is called principally to the following:

1. To Beard's argument in chapter 1, "Grounds for a Reconsideration of Historiography," that the current contradiction in thought exhibited in the ignoring of historians by men of affairs who nevertheless continually appeal to what history "shows" is extremely serious in view of the time dependency of history as actuality and history as written. Unless the blame is all on one side, there is justification for Beard's assertion of an obligation of historians "to examine their assumptions, procedures, and results" in the business of selecting, representing, and interpreting continuations and changes in the time processes of history.

2. To the argument in chapter II, "Controlling Assumptions in the Practice of American Historians," by John Herman Randall, jr., and George Haines, IV, that the very historians "who claimed to make no assumptions and to have no principles of selection" in keeping with a professional, institutionalized, "scientific" study of history were men subject to controlling assumptions in their work. The authors emphasize the selective nature of histories and contend that knowledge is "objective" in history only for some determinate context of inquiry.

3. To the corroboration of the objective relativism just cited presented in Howard K. Beale's study, chapter III, "What Historians Have Said about the Causes of the Civil War." In concluding generalizations drawn from his extensive survey of literature in the limited field selected, Professor Beale states that historians' explanations "depend upon the background and training of the writers, upon the time and place in which they lived and wrote, and upon their philosophies of history and life or their lack of conscious philosophies." His conclusions bear out a main thesis of the *Report* as a whole, namely, that historical practice cannot do without theory and that overt, critical cognizance of theory is better for practice than unconscious or unacknowledged assumption, selection, and interpretation.

The beginnings of a valuable and much needed task are presented in chapter IV, "Problems of Terminology in Historical Writing," introduced by Beard with illustrations by Sidney Hook. The original plan was to collect and collate historians' usages of fifty key terms and from these usages to have Professor Hook formulate definitions. This was given up when it was found that usages would not yield self-consistent definitions. The chapter contributes short, critical essays ranging from a few sentences on "Force" and "Generalization" to six pages on "Cause."

Chapter VI consists of a "Selective Reading List on Historiography and Philosophy of History" prepared by Ronald Thompson. The contents are arranged under five main headings: (1) "The Profession of Historian," (2) "The Philosophical Approach," (3) "Contending Schools," (4) "National Developments," and (5) "New Interpretations." This reading list in itself would commend the *Report* to anyone having an interest in theory and practice in historical study.

University of California

EDWARD W. STRONG

THE CATHOLIC APOSTOLIC CHURCH, SOMETIMES CALLED IRVINGITE: A HISTORICAL STUDY. By P. E. Shaw. (New York: King's Crown Press. 1946. Pp. viii, 264. \$3.25.)

THE so-called "Catholic Apostolic Church" is one of the curiosities of religious history. Founded in 1832 by certain admirers and followers of Edward Irving, it was popularly called "Irvingite"—a misnomer, for Irving though he lent the movement prestige took a subordinate part from the first, and the real leader was

John Bate Cardale. The sensational feature of the church was that it encouraged prophesying and "speaking with tongues," ecstatic utterances in other words, which Thomas Carlyle described as "to me the most doleful of all phenomena." More serious in its results was the church's eschatology. Robert Baxter originally announced the second coming of the Lord for July 14, 1835. Though disagreement arose about this prophecy, the second advent was in any case expected in no long time, and a permanent organization seemed unnecessary. Control of the church was vested in twelve "apostles," who could not be replaced and who alone had power to ordain the ministry. The last of the "apostles" died in 1901, no ministers have been ordained since, the present clergy are advanced in age and dying off, and the "Catholic Apostolic Church" despite its considerable wealth and large spiritual claims is rapidly becoming extinct. Its present membership is probably only a few thousands including those in the United States and Canada, and it lies under a period of silence imposed in 1901 which makes it difficult to find out anything about it.

Few accounts of the movement exist, most of them out of date. Mr. Shaw's careful monograph fills a gap and has the greater value because he has used pamphlet material now almost unobtainable and has thus preserved information that it would have been a pity to lose. Though bizarre, the "Catholic Apostolic Church" has historical importance as a symptom of the changing conditions and religious unrest in the era of its foundation. Neither its eschatology nor its ecstatic utterances was peculiar to itself—there were numerous other instances. The leaders were almost all men of wealth and position: the "apostles" included Henry Drummond, one of the richest men in England, and Spencer Perceval, son of the prime minister. Irving's spiritual quest commanded respect from his contemporaries, for example from Thomas Carlyle who loved him though bewailing his lapse into "incredible notions." The movement drew its ideas and views from Scottish Presbyterianism, from the tradition of Hooker (whose work greatly influenced Irving), and from high-church Anglicanism, and it has relations with all of these. In some respects it runs parallel to Tractarianism; it formed a very different but still comparable reaction to some of the same conditions. For the student who wishes to understand the meaning of Victorian religious history this movement will offer suggestive clues.

Princeton University

WILLIAM O. AYDELOTTE

A SHORT HISTORY OF ERITREA. By *Stephen H. Longrigg*, Chief Administrator of Eritrea, 1942-4. (New York: Oxford University Press. 1945. Pp. vi, 188. \$3.50.)

WE are indebted to Brigadier Longrigg for the only treatment of this subject in English. After serving as administrator in Cyrenaica during the two brief periods of British occupation in 1941 and 1942, he was transferred to Eritrea,

where he evidently decided to improve his time by reading up on the history of the region. His book is thus the work of an inspired amateur who has enjoyed firsthand opportunities for seeing the country and getting acquainted with its mosaic of peoples. He has relied almost entirely, where personal observation has not sufficed, on secondary works. Among these the numerous Italian writers are, quite properly, well represented if one is to judge from his rather spotty bibliography.

Though the name Eritrea was not officially adopted until 1890, the author begins his sketchy account with the dawn of known history in Ethiopia prior to the Axum kingdom. Inevitably he finds that the history of Eritrea, especially its plateau section, is part and parcel of the history of Ethiopia. Much of his book is thus Ethiopian political history, though it cannot be described as a history of Ethiopia. The effect of all this is to cast doubt on the point he is trying to make—that Eritrea, during its long history, has seldom been effectively occupied and governed by the Ethiopian state, and that therefore it should not, as Haile Selassie insists, be “returned” to Ethiopia. It is only fair to say that Longrigg is, in fact, aware that his narrative provides a continuous array of evidence showing the indissoluble ties of geography, religion, language, and history which unite highland Eritrea with northern Ethiopia. In his concluding section on “the future of Eritrea” he has therefore proposed (1) that the lowlands of western and northern Eritrea, inhabited largely by nomadic Moslems, be transferred to the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan, and (2) that the highland zone, together with the Red Sea coast around Massawa, be added to the province of Tigray to form an autonomous “unit or State” to be “placed under the sovereignty of the Emperor and be administered in his name and on his behalf by a European power.” Naturally, the friends of Ethiopia have been outraged by this suggestion that Haile Selassie’s empire be partitioned (see *International Affairs*, January, 1946, pp. 157 ff.).

In several instances the spelling of names and places is inconsistent in following Italian rather than English phonology, while here and there errors have crept in—e.g., the battle in which Emperor John IV was killed (1889) was fought at Metemma, not Gallabat (p. 118).

University of Denver

ROBERT GALE WOOLBERT

AUTOGRAPHS: A KEY TO COLLECTING. By *Mary A. Benjamin*. (New York: R. R. Bowker Company. 1946. Pp. xviii, 305, plates. \$6.00.)

Most books dealing with autographs are either mildly nauseating memoirs (*How I Bought My Fourth Folio*) or highly specialized studies of limited appeal (*French Paraphs, 1720-1730*). Miss Benjamin is to be congratulated, therefore, on having written a badly needed book, one which is precisely what the subtitle indicates: an introduction to autograph collecting for the benefit and guidance of the amateur. It falls into two very unequal parts. The first section, filling nearly

two hundred and forty pages, opens with a concise historical summary and then takes up such varied matters as autograph terminology, what to collect and where to buy it, forgery and legitimate reproduction, hidden signatures and confused identities. Part Two is made up of about thirty pages devoted to the care, preservation, and arrangement of materials and is followed by several useful tables—famous dates in bibliography, a comparison of the Gregorian calendar with that of the French Republic, and lists of Napoleon's marshals and relatives.

One need not read very far before discovering that the author's chief interest is American history, and hence it is not surprising to find that most of her illustrative material is drawn from that field. If she occasionally tends to digress too elaborately, she is none the less interesting and readable. But it is to be regretted that the book's emphasis is so exclusively historical. True, much interest attaches to the signers of the Declaration of Independence, but the average collector will probably agree that they need not be mentioned on nearly every other page and that the famous Button Gwinett hardly deserves a chapter and four plates to himself. It is only fair to indicate, however, that the author does point out that there are others who rival Gwinett in rarity; the case of Thomas Lynch, jr., the rarest of the signers, is especially relevant since it serves to remind us of the fact that there is a direct relationship between the availability of autograph material, on the one hand, and its commercial and publicity value, on the other. Only one of Lynch's letters and a few signatures have survived; hence there have been practically no recent transactions in these items. Though Gwinett documents are almost as rare, they have been offered occasionally. The result is that Button Gwinett is a well-known figure but Thomas Lynch, jr., is remembered only by specialists.

The various processes for reproducing letters and documents have done much to preserve important manuscript and autograph materials and thereby to encourage and facilitate research in various fields. But while the perfection of the technique for producing facsimiles that can be distinguished from the originals only by experts has proved an aid of inestimable value to the scholar, it has greatly complicated the life of the collector. This, of course, is nothing new, for ever since the days of Chatterton and Ireland forgeries have been frequent and ingenious, to say nothing of their having been both costly and disillusioning when finally discovered—as they inevitably are, even though decades may pass before the moment of detection arrives. Fortunately, though modern science has enabled the forger to accomplish his dishonest objective temporarily, it has also been his undoing; a knowledge of papers and inks, chemical tests, the use of infrared and ultraviolet rays, etc., make exposure practically certain, though the inexperienced collector may be badly duped either through natural gullibility or as a result of his not owning or having access to the necessary apparatus and materials.

If any one chapter is to be singled out for its particular value, the eighteenth (dealing with the care and preservation of autograph materials) is particularly worthy of attention. Not only does it synthesize much practical information on

such matters as silking, lamination, and the removal of stains but, equally important, it emphasizes the necessity of not doing certain things. The book's most serious weakness is its lack of a bibliography. Since it is obviously written for the benefit of the tyro, it should certainly have indicated further sources of information on the many topics discussed; the few footnote references are a highly inadequate substitute. The thirty-five plates provide much pertinent illustration (though the description of Plate V is misleading because of typographical error).

All in all, the general reader will find much of genuine interest here; the beginning scholar—and many mature ones—may secure much sound guidance on the use of documentary and autograph materials; the average collector will discover that the volume is a practically indispensable handbook.

Louisiana State University

THOMAS A. KIRBY

SUITORS AND SUPPLIANTS: THE LITTLE NATIONS AT VERSAILLES.

By *Stephen Bonsal*. Introduction by Arthur Krock. (New York: Prentice-Hall. 1946. Pp. xiii, 301. \$3.50.)

IN *Suitors and Suppliants*, Stephen Bonsal has brought together materials from his diary relating to the maneuvers of the small nations at the Versailles Peace Conference just over a quarter of a century ago. This volume thus complements his *Unfinished Business*, published two years ago, in which the author recounted those aspects of his work which had to do with the formation of the League of Nations.

As assistant to Colonel House in his task of keeping in touch with the many statesmen who desired to win American support for their various causes, Mr. Bonsal assembled a wealth of information regarding the many national, minority, and frontier problems which beset the conference. His diary takes the form of a series of interviews with such "suitors" as Masaryk and Beneš, Paderewski and Dmowski, and Brătianu and Goga, and with such "suppliants" as Kerensky and Savinkov, Feisal and Lawrence, and Nubar and Aharonian. A separate chapter is devoted to each "little nation," and the reader is guarded against the special pleading of the various national representatives by the author's well-informed comments and parenthetical historical notes. In addition, several chapters are devoted to more general issues such as the conclusion of the armistice with Germany, the difficulties of Wilson's personal position, and the final peace treaty.

Readers acquainted with the history of the peace conference will find little that is new in this volume apart from the author's own opinions and anecdotes. The Bonsal diary nevertheless makes an important and oft-neglected point when it stresses the fundamental significance of Wilson's decision to press for the establishment of the League of Nations at the expense of the full application of the principle of national self-determination. As Wilson himself described his intentions in a message to Brătianu, "the frontiers we are tracing are temporary, cer-

tainly not final, and . . . later on, in a calmer moment and informed by longer study, the League of Nations will intervene to adjust provisional settlements which may be found to be imperfect" (p. 169).

It has long been customary to criticize Wilson for sacrificing so many of his other objectives in the hope that the League would ultimately redress the errors of Versailles. In reviewing Wilson's policy at the peace conference through Bonsal's eyes, however, and with the knowledge afforded by hindsight, one is inclined rather to marvel at the President's prophetic wisdom in insisting that the problem of international organization be given precedence over the national issues which loomed so large at the end of the last war.

Today few would question the soundness of Wilson's decision, and at the end of the second World War the establishment of the United Nations organization was regarded as a necessary prerequisite to the discussion of peace terms. Whether the "little nations" will fare any better today, however, than they did a quarter of a century ago remains to be determined.

Princeton University

C. E. BLACK

LANDING OPERATIONS: STRATEGY, PSYCHOLOGY, TACTICS, POLITICS, FROM ANTIQUITY TO 1945. By *Alfred Vagts*. (Harrisburg, Pa.: Military Service Publishing Company. 1946. Pp. 831. \$5.00.)

It is astonishing that we should have to wait until 1946 for a scholarly and reasonably thorough work on landing operations. In Part One, Dr. Vagts considers the "overall picture" of landing operations in history, and in the other three parts summarizes the military landings of ancient and medieval times, of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, and of the age of steam. There is a brief conclusion.

The historical sections of the book are in fair balance and bring the sequence of landing operations up to the end of World War II. Sixty pages are given to the few landings of World War I and over two hundred to the many of World War II. From the author's notes he appears to have relied largely on magazine articles and newspaper dispatches for World War II background. Even within a year of the end of the war (which must have roughly coincided with the completion of the book by the author) a number of valuable official reports and early historical narratives have appeared which would have broadened the author's reference material. The book lacks a bibliography, which, let us hope, may be charged to wartime limitations of paper rather than to deliberate omission by author or publisher; for certainly a book as valuable as this should have one.

The author considers landing operations to be "shockers" among military enterprises. "They are apt to upset," he writes, "not only a military *status quo*, but a psycho-political one as well. Even if military practice and theory have neglected landings for long periods, the memory of peoples along sea shores never forgets them. . . . The shock strategy and tactics of landings can force war out

of its ruts, its 'halts in the mud,' by providing new openings, new fronts." Dr. Vagts also finds that the reason why there were so few decisive landing operations for two and a half centuries before World War II was simply that the admirals and the generals "shunned cooperation and the inevitable subordination of one service to the other." World War I, for example, could have been far more amphibious. In the end, total war overcame such inhibitions.

Wars may be classed geographically, says the author—according to the tendency to wage them on land, sea, or both—as continental, naval, or littoral. But there can be no war solely of the sea or of the air. "All war is land based and war inherently demonstrates the strongest possible tendency toward landing operations." Douhet and Mahan were both wrong.

Landings are the most significant, important, and complicated aspects of littoral war, writes Dr. Vagts, and "therefore the most elaborate. They vary with the invaders' intentions, from commando raids to full-strength attacks. They are limited, in both their sea and airborne aspects, by weather and climate. Landings are actually a combination of sea, air, and ground operations."

Dr. Vagts has pointed general chapters on supreme command in combined operations, on the strategy and tactics of such operations, on preparation and planning, and logistics and statistics. His treatment of the logistics of landings is too brief, giving only a suggestion of the actual problem and the tonnages involved in such operations as the Normandy landings and the following campaign. The author's chapters on the political-psychological aspect, and on insularity and invasion draw valid conclusions. The "island-dream" of the perfect fortress continues. The Japanese leaders thought of the chance of invasion of their mainland as one in a million as late as 1944. The shock of the atomic bomb was as much (perhaps more) "a shock of a terrific, destructive *manless invasion*," shattering the island confidence of the nation, as a shock of pure destruction. "Isolationism in America," says Dr. Vagts, "is by no means dead, but rather waits for technological justification. Russia is building up her own isolation. . . . England must realize that her own isolation is gone." If isolation is possible at all, it can be achieved only on the continental scale. In his conclusion, the author says that manless invasion is now the great problem of warfare and of the world, and discusses briefly certain possible controls and unification of the services in the United States which the atomic bomb makes utterly necessary.

I should like to see far more American books of this kind, for they are needed. At present, there is hardly comparable work on any of the other special aspects of warfare.

Infantry Journal

JOSEPH I. GREENE

TOP SECRET. By *Ralph Ingersoll*. (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company. 1946. Pp. viii, 373. \$3.00.)

WORLD WAR II: A CONCISE HISTORY. By Roger W. Shugg and Major H. A. DeWeerd. (Washington: Infantry Journal. 1946. Pp. 538. \$3.00.)

Top Secret is not an impartial and accurate account of the high politics and strategy in the European theater of operations. The author was attached to General Bradley's headquarters, and he appears to have had no appreciation of the functions and problems of higher headquarters. He has a staff officer's jealousy of his commander's prestige, and this leads him to make unjustified criticisms of Bradley's equals and superiors and to gloss over Bradley's shortcomings.

Montgomery may have had the "slows," but he also had the bulk of the German armor facing him at Caen and at the Rhine crossing. As Supreme Commander, it was not General Eisenhower's task to lead an army in the field. His job was to co-ordinate the Anglo-American armies under his direction so as to secure the unconditional surrender of Germany. It is a matter of record that this mission was fulfilled in less than a year after the landing was made in Normandy. This task was accomplished in spite of the divergent war aims of the Anglo-American allies and called for statesmanship of a high order.

Mr. Ingersoll is grievously unfair in his appreciation of General Marshall. He thinks that General Marshall was unalert and naïve, and says that "there is no record that Marshall was anything but mildly confused and irritated as the succession of events through 1942 and 1943 continued to end periodically with the main effort of the Allied forces in Europe directed towards the Mediterranean again, and always shortly after Roosevelt had secured an agreement that the main effort should be expended across the Channel" (p. 75). On the contrary, the records show the exact opposite. General Marshall, more than any other individual, was responsible for the adoption of the "Overlord" plan. He pushed it from the beginning and at Teheran secured its adoption as a firm commitment. In further justice to General Marshall, it should be pointed out that his responsibilities were world-wide and were not confined to the European theater.

It seems to have been a source of irritation to the author that the war aims, and therefore the strategic concepts, of the Anglo-American allies did not coincide. The British, he says, fought the war for political ends. Does he really believe that the United States fought the Germans for other than political ends? He is highly critical of British attempts to substitute for political reasons a Balkan approach for the western European strategic concept, yet he admits that "the war was won more or less on our terms" (p. 350).

The main faults of this book are those inherent in a subjective analysis of events by a participant whose viewpoint was necessarily limited and prejudiced. The accounts of the landing in Normandy and of the concentration camps, however, are done with considerable reportorial skill.

Mr. Shugg and Major DeWeerd do not pretend that their account of World War II is based on anything other than "public sources," which would seem to mean official communiqués, statements, reports, and propaganda. Obviously, now

that the war is over, additional information from friendly, neutral, and enemy sources will add to our knowledge of what occurred, and the perspective of time will modify judgments formed in the heat of battle. For example, today one would hesitate to say that General Weygand was a "defeatist." Darlan reached an agreement with General Clark, not with General Eisenhower. The preliminary "Overlord" plan for the landing in France was drawn up in the summer of 1943 by a combined staff under the British general F. E. Morgan, not by the Combined Chiefs of Staff in the spring of 1943. The variable time fuse was the most effective weapon used against the V-1 bomb. The book is chiefly useful as a handy chronology of World War II.

University of Minnesota

RODNEY C. LOEHR

THE SECRET HISTORY OF THE WAR. Volume III, CASABLANCA TO KATYN. By *Waverley Root*. (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons. 1946. Pp. 484. \$5.00.)

MR. Root describes the theme of his third volume as "the diminution in 1943 of the significance of the military war as compared with the political, economic and ideological wars." It is an approach whose validity is open to argument, at least when it is developed in so highly selective a fashion as it is in this book. There are only the barest incidental references to the progress of military operations. The big strategic decisions which marked the year, including those on the vital question of the relations between the Pacific and the European theaters, are almost wholly ignored. On the political and economic side there is an interesting if depressing study of the deterioration in Russo-Polish relations, culminating in the Katyn incident, and brief chapters on certain selected developments in Italy and Argentina and the Baltic states. But two main topics dominate the book: the methods adopted by the Nazi regime in the face of approaching defeat, and—far outweighing every other section of the volume—the political struggle between Giraud and de Gaulle for control in North Africa.

In his treatment of German policies and internal conditions, Mr. Root develops the thesis that the Nazis, knowing after Stalingrad that the present war was lost, set out to prepare for the next one by laying the foundation for a revival of German militarism after the period of defeat. The thesis is not new, and some parts of his argument need qualification. The statement that German production reached its peak in 1941 is to a certain extent misleading, and I think he underrates Allied awareness of the long-term dangers inherent in Nazi political tactics. None the less, Mr. Root's first chapters bring together a useful body of evidence on the Nazi plans for winning the peace and emphasize the difficulties which the Allies found in translating their knowledge into a coherent and effective policy for the destruction of German militarism.

It is however the North African imbroglio which comes in for the most

exhaustive examination. Mr. Root describes it in the utmost detail and subjects it to lengthy analyses in a determined and generally successful effort to establish the ineffectiveness of Giraud and the disingenuous methods by which the State Department tried to uphold him against de Gaulle. It should be said that he brings little "secret" information to this task. On such questions as why Roosevelt was so set against de Gaulle, or what went on at Casablanca, he is frankly reduced to speculation, some of it highly imaginative. On the whole, however, both his narrative and his criticisms are likely to stand up even when fuller information becomes available. One may question, however, whether this topic was worth treating in such a prolonged and argumentative fashion. There is a case for a full descriptive narrative, but the moral could be adequately pointed without phrase-by-phrase analyses of Giraud's pronouncements or the releases of the State Department. One may be thoroughly sympathetic with the author's approach, and yet wish that he had devoted some of his space to other matters instead of spending it on such protracted flogging of a long-dead horse.

University of Toronto

EDGAR McINNIS

Ancient and Medieval History

BIBLIOGRAPHY OF ENGLISH TRANSLATIONS FROM MEDIEVAL SOURCES. By *Clarissa P. Farrar* and *Austin P. Evans*, Professor of History, Columbia University. [Records of Civilization, Sources and Studies, Number XXXIX.] (New York: Columbia University Press. 1946. Pp. xiii, 534. \$7.50.)

HIGH in the heaven of scholars there must be a quiet, restful corner set apart for bibliographers. Possibly there, and only there, can they find repose and the ultimate reward for their daring, tireless industry and the hope of attaining the full perfection their worldly efforts seem never to bring. Let it be said at once—this bibliography fills a critical need at a critical time, it reflects scholarship of the highest sort, and on every page shows the industry, patience, and skill of all who aided in its production. Miss Farrar and Professor Evans, and Miss Judith Bernstein who contributed so much during the early stages of work on the volume, can take personal and professional pride in this tangible evidence of their scholarship. Students and scholars can rejoice in the possession of a work on which they will all lean heavily, and librarians should consider themselves thrice blest to have such an aid at hand.

No bibliography designed for practical use can be exhaustive and here the authors have tried to be discriminating as well as helpful. The guiding principle was to include or exclude a title in direct proportion to its interest for students of European culture during the Middle Ages. The documents given are primarily literary sources and usually not official papers. These cover all phases of medieval

civilization and represent works translated from Latin and Greek sources as well as from most of the vernacular languages, including the Arabic. Selections of only a few pages are not usually listed, but importance rather than length was the basis for the selection of titles. When there exists an abundance of translations for a medieval source, as is the case for the works of Dante, a highly selective list of translations is given and sufficient guidance furnished to lead one quickly to translations not in this book.

The authors are aware that any distinction between official papers and literary sources is an arbitrary one and they even query their own decision to include translations of commentaries and glosses on the *Corpus* while excluding translations of portions of the *Corpus juris civilis*. There are 3,839 titles for English translations of important literary sources produced during the period from Constantine the Great to the year 1500 in Europe, northern Africa, and western Asia. The index of seventy-three pages is made with care, and the alphabetical listing of sources seems to be the logical solution of a complex and difficult problem. The full riches of the volume, however, are not always indicated directly by these guides. The neophyte will miss titles actually at hand; those versed in the literature of the age will need to look about. One seeking translations for sources dealing with the crusades, for example, will find only meager substance if he follows only the topical listing; he will be more amply rewarded if he consults the index under crusades; unless he has further guidance or wide knowledge of the subject, he will overlook many translations that are noted elsewhere in the volume—in this instance, to cite only one example, the *De expugnatione Lyxbonensi* (No. 2465). If the uninformed and unimaginative cannot always find at once what they seek here, it is no indication that the authors have failed in their task.

It is significant that this book appears at this time. Doubtless there are many who will sigh wistfully and lament the obvious fact that it forcefully indicates the passing of the happy time when translations were spurned and sources were read in the language of the author. But the most unlettered historian knows that a golden age rarely stands too close inspection, and the assertion that our forebears were all linguistic giants is not sustained by fact. The Middle Ages themselves certainly did not spurn translations and why should we? If medievalists are to attract proper attention to the rich sources of their subject and are to make the study of medieval civilization meaningful in a modern age, they will need to urge and to further the making of translations of those many works still waiting a translator and now conspicuous by their absence from this list. If a smug pride and an unrealistic attitude prevent medievalists from doing this, they may well deserve to find themselves lost on an arid and desolate isle in the great sea of contemporary times. The fate of their fellows in classical studies might serve as a timely warning.

Northwestern University

GRAY C. BOYCE

L'EGLISE ET LA ROYAUTE EN ANGLETERRE SOUS HENRI II PLANTAGENET (1154-1189). Par *Raymonde Foreville*, Docteur ès lettres, Chargée de Cours à la Faculté des Lettres de Lille. (Paris: Bloud & Gay. 1943. Pp. xxxv, 611.)

THIS is a comprehensive study of the subject based on a fresh critical interpretation of the original sources. Preliminary chapters contain an estimate of the worth of these sources and a brief survey of the pertinent aspects of the relations between the church and royalty previous to the reign of Henry II. A short chapter on the relations of Henry II with the papacy and the English church to 1162 is followed by an account of the conflict with Becket which constitutes the heart of the story. It adds much that is new both in fact and in interpretation. Two examples may suffice for illustration. The analysis of Becket's thought with regard to the principles at issue in the controversy and of the sources of his thought (pp. 213-75) is most enlightening. By a critical study of the bull by which Alexander III authorized the archbishop of York to crown Henry's oldest son a strong presumption is established that it should be dated 1161 instead of 1167 or 1170 (pp. 280-83), and thereby the attitude both of the pope and of Thomas toward the coronation is rendered more consistent than previous accounts have made it appear to be. One general result of the treatment is to display the support given to Becket by Alexander III as stronger than it has usually been considered. Another is to provide a balance for accounts which have been influenced by too much sympathy for the cause of Henry II.

The remainder of the volume, which is as long as the portion dealing with the conflict, is concerned largely with the settlement made at Avranches in 1172 and its supplementation by negotiations with a papal legate and by the gradual establishment of royal and papal practice during the remainder of the reign of Henry II. The general conclusions reached with regard to the retention or loss by Henry II of the practices embodied in the judicial clauses of the constitutions of Clarendon and with regard to the increase of papal authority in England during these years do not differ materially from those of Maitland and Brooke. These and other aspects of the settlement, such as the practice with regard to the election of bishops, and other developments not related to the constitutions are treated with a wealth of detail which makes this portion of the book an extensive addition to our knowledge.

The author steers a careful course through the evidence, of which much is difficult of interpretation, and he supplies the reader with ample references to the sources. His interpretations sometimes agree with and sometimes differ from those commonly accepted previously. On the vexed problem of *Laudabiliter* he concludes: "Whatever may be the degree of credence which is accorded the bull *Laudabiliter* of which the authenticity remains doubtful, the facts themselves to which it makes allusion cannot be rejected" (p. 491). For this assumption concerning the facts he relies on a statement of John of Salisbury (pp. 83, 84). Yet

he accepts as true the demand of Peter's pence from Ireland by Adrian IV which is mentioned only in *Laudabiliter*. He argues that Peter's pence did not connote papal lordship, but notes that Paul Fabre in his *Etude sur le Liber Censuum* holds the opposite view (pp. 85-87, 497). If the reader turns to Fabre's carefully documented exposition, he may find reason to doubt Foreville's argument. On the question of the trial of criminous clerks the author follows Maitland's interpretation of the third chapter of the constitutions of Clarendon but denies his contention that the canon law did not support Becket's claim that the state could not punish a clerk for a crime for which an ecclesiastical court had already degraded him. The denial is based on a different interpretation of some of the canons and statements of canonists which Maitland cites to support his view (pp. 137, 138, 144-51). Foreville's interpretation of the significance of some letters of Alexander III concerned with the census of exempt monasteries (pp. 530, 531) is erroneous, but this is not characteristic. A student of the subject may agree or disagree with the views of Foreville, but they are based upon too extensive and thorough research to be ignored.

Haverford College

W. E. LUNT

Modern European History

THE ART OF THE RENAISSANCE IN NORTHERN EUROPE: ITS RELATION TO THE CONTEMPORARY SPIRITUAL AND INTELLECTUAL MOVEMENTS. By *Otto Benesch*. (Cambridge: Harvard University Press. 1945. Pp. xiv, 174, plates. \$7.50.)

ALTHOUGH few will deny that art offers to the historian important evidence about past ideals and attitudes, the problem for the historian is to see and understand art in such a way that it can be related to other developments. One solution is to be found in the *Geisteswissenschaft* movement started by Wilhelm Dilthey. Dilthey maintained that because mental life is an organic whole, to understand it is to grasp its unity through an intuitive process of relating parts to whole and whole to parts in ever progressive intimacy and precision. This method was applied to the study of art by the Austrian Max Dvořák, who emphasized the imaginative and emotional implications of art forms and their derivation from basic attitudes, thus bringing art, as it were, into the realm of historical ideals and interests.

It is in the spirit and method of this tradition that Dr. Otto Benesch has conceived an interpretative survey of sixteenth century art in northern Europe emphasizing its relation to contemporary intellectual and spiritual developments. Into the making of his book, which is a revision of lectures originally presented at the Lowell Institute in Boston, many different elements have entered: Dvořák's teaching, the author's highly specialized knowledge, a Germanic approach to conception,

and an English mode of expression—all have been welded into a rich and complex unity. The product is a suggestive interpretation which at the same time devotes much attention to detailed analysis of single art works, eighty of which are illustrated by reproductions in black and white on unglazed paper. Dürer, Grünewald, Altdorfer, Holbein, and Bruegel are key subjects of separate chapters; two other chapters are devoted to the influences underlying Mannerism in the Netherlands and France; and a final chapter discusses the spread of mathematical and mechanical ways of conceiving space. The aim of the author's analysis of art forms is to disclose the patterns of emotion and conception to be found in art. Recognition of these inevitably suggests comparison with developments in other fields. For information about the latter, Dr. Benesch relies heavily upon the works of Troeltsch, Burdach, and others, but his basic interest in relating art to other movements is to make its spiritual meaning more precise and vivid by frequent use of analogies. Not generalizations about art and other movements, then, but art history from a point of view which implies such relations is the subject of the book.

The author has much to say about attitudes toward religion and nature. "The Gothic craving for expression is indelible in Northern art." In Dürer, he finds a religious idealism akin to Luther's; in Grünewald, an ecstatic religiosity like that of St. Brigitta's *Revelations*; in Dutch painting, the mysticism of the Brothers of the Common Life; and in later French art, the "serious, contemplative, mournful mood of the Western world in the era of Counter Reformation." Interwoven with these influences was a new view of nature. For Dürer, empiricism meant an intuitive union of general and particular as it did for Nicholas of Cusa; the pantheism of Paracelsus was anticipated in Austrian landscape painting, and the mechanistic and vitalistic outlook of Giordano Bruno, in Bruegel. Finally, a conception of space and form like Kepler's mathematical views emerged in Tintoretto and El Greco. Humanism, too, had its influence in the portrait painting of Cranach and Holbein. But these bald statements do not do justice to Dr. Benesch's discussion, for his aim is not to present abstractions but to see the characteristics of single works of art in terms of intellectual and spiritual influences. Because these are the essential forces behind stylistic change, he opposes the view that the grandeur and monumentality of Italian forms gradually weaned the North away from the "restless, creeping, curling, flickering lines" and "lean, brittle" forms of the Late Gothic. Instead, he finds that a new combination of empiricism and religious feeling produced within the Late Gothic tradition at the beginning of the century in Germany a short-lived but native Renaissance, while elsewhere, after a short interlude of Romanism in the Netherlands, an intermingling of Gothic feeling, empirical conception and Italian art forms gave rise between 1520 and 1600 to numerous varieties of Mannerism which were, to a large extent, "a resuscitation of Gothic transcendence and expressiveness." At the end of the century, whatever the spiritual or formal characteristics of various types of Mannerism, thinking in terms of mathematical space triumphed everywhere.

Between the expressed aims and the real achievement of Dr. Benesch's book, there is inevitably something of a contrast. The apparent intention is to arrive at insight into the structure of basic attitudes, and the author's style carries deep overtones of intuition and perception. When he declares that "the time in which Dürer lived was full of anxieties, marked with that tension which accompanies the tides of great eras of human thought," one takes a deep breath and prepares for tremendous insights. Where, in discussing Dürer and Austrian landscape painting, the author is at his best, there one indeed has a feeling of contact with the spirit of the time. But use of metaphors does not necessarily mean insight. In connection with Grünewald's drawing of St. Peter, the author remarks, "The storm of holy light which roars over him is not greater than the storm of emotion which shakes his soul. We face an excess of religious fervor, as it grasped the minds of the ecstasies and enthusiasts, as it roared through the movements of the Spiritualists." Here, the accompanying illustration does not seem to substantiate the implied insight. The real achievement of Dr. Benesch's book seems to me to be that it makes available an amazing variety of material out of which insight into basic attitudes can be built. The book is a beautiful integration of previous investigations and full of stimulating suggestions and fresh nuances of thought and expression. For the historian, it will have special value not only because it deals with art so that it can be understood in relation to contemporary developments but also because it makes available the conceptions of a school of German thought all too little known in this country.

Stanford University

DAYTON PHILLIPS

LA VENALITE DES OFFICES SOUS HENRI IV ET LOUIS XIII. By *Roland*

Mousnier, Agrégé de l'Université, Docteur-ès-Lettres, Professeur d'Histoire et de Géographie au Lycée Louis-le-Grand, Maître de Conférences auxiliaire en Sorbonne. (Rouen: Editions Maugard. 1946? Pp. xxix, 629.)

WE have in this study of the system of officeholding in France, primarily in the first half of the seventeenth century, a monograph that is both significant and tedious. The author has read exhaustively, has studied manuscript and archive material, and is familiar with the work of some of the greatest French scholars in the field such as the late Henri Hauser and the late François Simiand. Yet he has produced a book of Gargantuan size without a trace of wit or imagination. The reader is spared no name or detail that the author has been able to discover, yet when he is about to succumb to exhaustion he comes suddenly upon an excellent description of the stinginess of Henry IV or the extravagance of his widow. M. Mousnier is inclined to overestimate the importance of his subject in French history, but he has read skillfully the characters of Henry IV, Sully, and Richelieu. He shows clearly that he understands the significance of the growth of absolutism in France and the need for it, yet he would like us to believe that the increasing

venality and heredity of officeholding was the chief instrument used by both Henry IV and Richelieu to achieve that end.

M. Mousnier threads his way through seemingly interminable mazes of political and financial intrigues. He brings out the importance of conflicting interests of the three estates that made it impossible for them to wring from the crown any important bureaucratic reforms. He knows how these conflicts arose. He shows the reader that the feudal system was perhaps the most fundamental cause of the system of officeholding and he sees clearly how it created the almost universal confusion between public and private property which made nearly all officials patently dishonest according to our standards. The author goes on to give us valuable information on the inadequacy of nearly all salaries and the further fact that they were seldom paid regularly and sometimes not at all. In addition, the bourgeoisie, which occupied nearly all except the highest offices, was moved chiefly by social and financial ambition, the individual buying a minor office in the hope that he, or his heirs, would in time be able to buy a more important one, thus securing a larger income and a greater degree of exemption from taxes such as the *taille*, and, ultimately, would enter the ranks of the nobility. Finally we are shown that government accounts were almost never audited with care because double-entry book-keeping, while well known to businessmen, was not used by officials, most of whom had not been properly trained for their work. Mousnier describes clearly also the narrowness and jealousy existing in every rank of the bureaucracy which, as in the case of the estates, enabled the government to play off one group against another and which makes the historian wonder whether any of the numerous demands for reform of venality were sincere.

The evidence brought forward in this book on economic and social conditions in France in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries is exceedingly valuable to the historian and has clearly been obtained by thorough and intelligent research. It is a pity that most of this valuable information is buried under such a mass of details that it is to be feared that many historians will not have the patience to dig it out.

University of Michigan

ARTHUR L. DUNHAM

L'ALSACE FRANÇAISE DE LOUIS XIV A NOS JOURS. By *Gaston Zeller*, Professeur à la Faculté des Lettres de Strasbourg. (Paris: Librairie Armand Colin. 1945. Pp. vii, 147. 65 fr.)

THE historical literature dealing with the subject of Alsace is extensive. Most of it has been written to prove that the province should belong either to Germany or France. The advocates of the Teutonic point of view include such famous historians as Heinrich von Sybel and Heinrich von Treitschke. Some authors who have written on the subject of Alsace have even been decorated for their unconcealed partisanship. A very few, like Miss Putnam, have made a serious effort to be objective.

It is, consequently, with a certain skepticism that one takes up a work on *L'Alsace française de Louis XIV à nos jours*, written by a French professor and claiming to have been written for the sole purpose of giving information on the subject. Yet a careful reading of the little work under review reveals that the claim has been justly made. It throws much light upon the history of the province of Alsace and its author, a professor at the University of Strassburg, has striven with a large measure of success to be impartial.

The book begins with the conquest of Strassburg in 1681. In the first chapter, which deals with the reign of Louis XIV, the author points out that the province obtained for the first time something approaching political unity, that the people of Alsace were reluctant to accept the new master, that the religious policy of Louis XIV made the task of winning the allegiance of the province more difficult, and that the country suffered greatly from the wars of the grand monarch. In the eighteenth century the author finds that Alsace benefited from the growing tolerance, that it enjoyed a period of prosperity, that it was well governed, and that it fell more and more under the influence of French culture. During the French Revolution, in the opinion of Professor Zeller, the revolutionary spirit brought about the final fusion of Alsace and France but took away its distinctive institutions and encountered many conditions in the province which did not characterize the rest of France. In the period from 1799 to 1870 the author finds that the political life of Alsace ceases to be of interest, that the former political ties with Germany are broken, that the Alsatians become increasingly a literary and artistic province of France, and that Alsace participated fully in the Industrial Revolution without arousing the social unrest which usually accompanied it. During the years that Germany dominated the province, Professor Zeller concludes, the Alsatians proved in many ways their unshakable loyalty to France. Finally, he defends the refusal of France to hold a plebiscite in Alsace and explains the recent movement in the province for autonomy as a product of clericalism rather than disloyalty to France.

This work should be read by everyone interested in the history of Alsace. It is the product of ripe scholarship. It contains much information not otherwise available. And it is written by a patriotic Frenchman who has striven with success to be objective.

University of Wisconsin

C. P. HIGBY

SECRETARY OF EUROPE: THE LIFE OF FRIEDRICH GENTZ, ENEMY OF NAPOLEON. By *Golo Mann*. Translated by *William H. Woglom*. (New Haven: Yale University Press. 1946. Pp. xvi, 323. \$4.00.)

A BRILLIANT summation of the diplomatic scene from the French Revolution to the death of Goethe as seen through the eyes of an aristocratic intellectual. About three fifths of the book is comprised of extracts from Gentz's innumerable letters and memorandums; one fifth is a skillful condensation of European history; and

another fifth the author's philosophic and interpretative comments. The book is particularly welcome, because Gentz has never had an adequate biography, though the thousands of letters and political writings which survive afford abundant material. But Gentz was not a popular figure in the age of nineteenth century nationalism and liberalism, to both of which he was violently opposed in his later years. Though born in Silesia, a pupil of Kant, and an intimate of Rahel Lewin's Berlin salon, he left Berlin because of debts and politics, went to Vienna, and came to dislike Prussia and the "Teutomaniacs" who wanted German unity, student freedom, and liberty of the press.

One usually thinks of Gentz in connection with the Congress of Vienna, where his skill in conciliation, knowledge of history, and sense of the practical contributed so much to secure a just equilibrium in Europe. But Mr. Golo Mann, the youngest son of Thomas Mann and a Ph.D. from pre-Nazi Heidelberg, sets forth very interestingly the important role which Gentz played in the long struggle against the hated Napoleonic dictatorship, as well as his statecraft in salvaging conservatism and the peace of Europe from 1815 until his death in 1832. Nor does he neglect the curious aspects of his personal life: divorce, illegitimate children, hatreds and friendships, gambling and perpetual debts in spite of frequent donations from foreign powers and the Rothschilds, his depression of mind and bursts of tears, and finally the beautiful and successful love of the 67-year-old "Secretary of Europe" for the lovely 19-year-old Viennese ballerina, Fanny Elssler. Herr Mann is no apologist. He writes with fairness, sympathy, and insight, explaining but not unduly extenuating or condemning. Except for some use of modern phrases like "way of life," "scrap of paper," "warmonger," and "*Lebensraum*," he does not press the uncanny parallels between Gentz's age and our own: overthrow of dictators, balance of power, and conflict of ideologies. He wisely leaves the reader to draw for himself the apt analogies.

It is impossible to characterize in brief Gentz's views, partly because they shifted during a quarter of a century from early radicalism and Kantian idealism to rigid conservatism and Metternichean realism; and partly because he possessed so fully the art of "veiling actual contradictions with the trickery of words," that in one and the same letter he often seems to say both Yes and No. To really understand him one must read this book.

Herr Mann gives no footnotes, no indication of where his quotations are taken from, and almost no dates. This suggests that his book is designed not for the professional historian but for the literary public. The former presumably knows the chronology and can find the sources if he wants to take the trouble; and the latter perhaps doesn't care. The index seems to be complete and accurate but a little bizarre in method—one must look for Stein under V, for Mallet du Pan under D, and for Aachen under C.

Harvard University

SIDNEY B. FAY

PRUSSIAN MILITARY REFORMS, 1786-1813. By *William O. Shanahan*, Assistant Professor of History at the University of Notre Dame. [Studies in History, Economics, and Public Law, edited by the Faculty of Political Science of Columbia University, Number 520.] (New York: Columbia University Press. 1945. Pp. 270. \$3.25.)

In the preface to his very scholarly study the author states that the usefulness of the historian's craft "lies in the understanding that only an historical perspective seems to provide," and he voices the hope that "a profound lesson can be learned from Napoleon's failure to prevent Prussia's military recovery" after Jena. In contrast he recalls the misconception which played a part at the Paris Peace Conference when the legend of the *Krümper* system was used as a weapon against Foch's proposal of a short-term German army. It is to the author's credit that he once more kills this legend. It may be noted, however, that Lloyd George was not only fearful of Germany's amassing of reserves but of the very principle of conscription. Once a long-serving professional army was forced upon Germany, conscription, he hoped, would disappear in France too. As a matter of fact, Mr. Shanahan proves that it was the conscripted *Landwehr* of 1813 rather than the *Krümper* that permitted Prussia's survival. But it is certainly not by way of criticizing the principle of conscription that he points to the lesson of his study. Rather, he criticizes the hesitant approach to universal service after Tilsit; he finds the objections caused not only by the poverty of the state and the fear of French reprisals but also by obvious reactionary and class interests; he has little sympathy with men such as Niebuhr and Altenstein (pp. 151, 156) who saw in general conscription a danger to culture, and he blames Scharnhorst for having planned a militia, strictly separated from the regular army. The author has acquired an unusual understanding of the task which Prussia faced in the Napoleonic era and of the democratic implications of universal service. But then it is somewhat hard to see what "profound lessons" he wants the reader to draw regarding the control of "Germany's military ambitions."

Fortunately enough the value of the book is not dependent on any farfetched actualization. It presents an excellent guide through the mass of records and never loses itself in the vast material as, for example, Jany does. The author shows with much detail that the *Krümper* came down from the furloughing practice of the *ancien régime* and was revived before the limit of 42,000 men was imposed upon Prussia in September, 1808. In fact there was little "subterfuge" in the *Krümper* setup. Nor did it lead to startling results. This, of course, has been known before, and not only among scholars. A book for the general reader such as Meinecke's *Zeitalter der Deutschen Erhebung* (1906) gave no higher total for the *Krümper* (35,000-36,000) than does Jany (1929), whom the author credits with being "one of the first historians to recognize the small scale of *Krümper* training" (p. 161, n.39). Mr. Shanahan himself presses the point almost too far,

But the basic increase of the Prussian army was undoubtedly due to the 120,000 *Landwehr* men, two thirds of whom had not received any training previous to 1813. All these questions are very aptly discussed and around the main line, which runs from the theory of universal service through the planning of the reformers to the emergency solution of 1813, interesting chapters are grouped regarding the changes in tactics and discipline, in organization and administration of the army.

Without entering upon matters of detail a rather general remark may be added to this appraisal. Military reform is, of course, one significant aspect of a whole; it is not only the expression of, and sometimes the stimulus to, a general reform of the state but also part of a basic change in social and spiritual climate. The author by no means neglects these implications altogether but often loses sight of them when discussing technical problems. Thus he arrives at a comparatively high estimate of the "reformers before the reform." He does not see that the Behrenhorsts, Bülow, and Knessebecks, while daring in some respects, were in others very much of the rationalistic and mechanistic school of thought. The interaction of the landlord-serf and the officer-conscript relationship hardly comes out, nor does the fundamental change which underlies the reform since 1807 in spite of slow motion. Something could be said about the struggle between English and French concepts (militia versus *levée en masse*). In fact the *Landwehr* was a battleground of ideas, as it continued to be through fifty more years. And Scharnhorst's reluctance to fuse the militia with the standing army is not only due to hesitancy and concessions, to the pressure of poverty and time (emphasis upon "*Landsturm*"); it also indicates a new spirit which he did not want to be spoiled by the traditions of the line. Likewise in the contrast between his plans and the important East Prussian draft much more is implied than some technical differences. When the Königsberg estates permitted substitutes they did so not mainly "in deference to the rights of the Mennonites" but rather to typical "bourgeois" demands. Also a good deal of the old traditions of a "provincial *Defensionswerk*" persisted. In these and other matters the interpretation could be considerably broadened. It would gain in depth by pointing ahead to Boyen's law on the one hand and the reforms of William I and Roon on the other, or to an alternative of either nationalizing the army or militarizing the nation. This seems to be a genuine and inherent "historical perspective" with which the higher "usefulness" of a specialized study is in fact bound up.

University of Chicago

HANS ROTHFELS

FEDERALISM AND REGIONALISM IN GERMANY: THE DIVISION OF PRUSSIA. By *Arnold Brecht*. [Institute of World Affairs Monograph Series.] (New York: Oxford University Press, 1945. Pp. xvi, 202. \$2.50.)

THE REGIONS OF GERMANY. By *Robert E. Dickinson*, Reader in Geography, University of London. [International Library of Sociology and Social Reconstruction.] (New York: Oxford University Press. 1945. Pp. ix, 175. \$3.50.)

STUDENTS of the German scene and authorities concerned with German problems will gain much from these two small volumes. Dickinson's book was put together somewhat hastily while its author was occupied with wartime government service. As an authority on problems of regionalism and on the German area in particular, however, he is thoroughly familiar with his material. His volume offers an admirable summary not only of the geographic but of the historical, social, and economic factors that have operated to develop "natural groupings" of German territories. He distinguishes eight of these, emphasizing both their unifying elements and their interdependence. His study is offered as a basis for decisions along either federalist or partitioning lines but does not appear to contemplate large amputations. The inference of his presentation, in fact, is that the latter would be more disrupting than a mere political division of the country.

Brecht, who was himself active in Republican days in the study and discussion of regional reform, considers the problem only in federalist terms. The arguments favoring partition are dismissed in a few short paragraphs sandwiched among concluding remarks. A German "atomization," he contends, would utterly defeat our primary purpose of fostering a democratic Germany, as democratic governments of separated German states would be placed in the dilemma of either espousing or opposing popular demands for reunion. They would thus be forced to choose between external and internal conflict.

Brecht dwells heavily on the democratic aspect of the German federal problem. In this connection he disposes very effectively of myths still current concerning the problem of Prussia in relation to German liberalism. He is not original in his emphasis on the postwar reversal of the roles of Prussia and Bavaria or on the fact that the curve of liberal sentiment falls in progressing from West to East rather than from South to North. But the persistence of opposite fancies underlines the continued need for such emphasis. The introductory chapters on Prussia and Bavaria and the regional differences in political opinion are a masterpiece as a summary of significant data. About a third of the book is devoted to a detailed survey of the proposals for federal reform and administrative decentralization under the Republic. His account adds dramatically to the list of "might have beens" associated with the period before Hitler's accession to power. It implies that if the accentuating crises could have been but slightly ameliorated in 1930 and 1933, positive steps toward federal reform might have contributed to stabilizing the situation. Bruening's mistake in dissolving the Reichstag on July 18, 1930, prevented the introduction of the constitutional amendment already drawn. The very day of Schleicher's fall in 1933 had been set for a consultation on a draft of the reform bill with a representative of Prussian Premier Braun.

The concluding chapter on the structure of postwar Germany advances a pro-

gram modeled closely on that of the Reform Committee. Brecht would divide Prussia into its constituent parts, restore the Federal Council with representation proportioned on population, and leave no states with less than two million inhabitants. On the side of procedure he favors Koch-Weser's proposal that the first National Assembly be composed of those non-Nazi members of the Reichstags from 1930 to 1932 who stayed out of the party and political office after 1933. The emphasis of his recommendations is thus to begin where the Republic left off and to utilize all the historic and material factors that can contribute to a German solution in line with the interests of the victor powers. It is not necessary, he implies, to *impose* reform or to break very sharply with the German past as the natural evolution was already in the right direction. What Brecht could of course not reckon with when he wrote was that many of his premises have been undermined since V-E Day, in particular by (1) the amputation of the eastern provinces, (2) the dumping of millions of embittered refugees from the most reactionary and nationalistic areas of Prussia (and the Sudetenland) into the liberal West, and (3) the erection of the four-power condominium of the occupying victor states. The problem of regional reform, like most German problems, will thus have to be re-examined on a new basis. For this, however, the works of Dickinson and Brecht should provide an admirable point of departure.

University of Minnesota

HAROLD C. DEUTSCH

HITLER'S PROFESSORS: THE PART OF SCHOLARSHIP IN GERMANY'S CRIMES AGAINST THE JEWISH PEOPLE. By *Max Weinreich*, Research Director, Yiddish Scientific Institute. (New York: Yiddish Scientific Institute. 1946. Pp. 291. Cloth \$3.50, paper \$3.00.)

THE purpose of this study is to present as extensive and conclusive a case for the war guilt of the professors and learned men of Germany as has been made out against the general staff and the Junkers. The author hopes to relate it to the Nuremberg trials and at least to indict German intellectual leaders of full complicity in the Nazi regime and in its worst crimes. Considering its purpose, its subject, and the fact that the author is a Jew, the book is objective and refrains from mere accusation and vituperation. The general conclusions are not new. It is hardly necessary today to prove terrorism and the intentional extermination of the Jews. Murder camps, mass murder, and mass executions have already been extensively described. The book does present much unpublished evidence of the campaign against the Jews, quotes liberally in the German and in translation from Nazi leaders and from lectures and books by professors hitherto not available here, and gives numerous facsimiles of orders and official documents which would be *prima facie* evidence before a court of law or international tribunal. All these refer to the intellectuals and professors.

The section of the book least known and therefore most useful to scholars is that describing the character and work of the varied and numerous institutes, such as the Reich institute for the history of the new Germany, the institute for the study of the Jewish question, the institute for the study of Jewish influence on German church life, the institute for German work in the East, the institute for research into the Jewish question. This last and its Frankfort conference in 1941 is described at some length. The International Anti-Jewish Congress held in 1944 is also given space. While the study is limited to the Jewish issue, proof appears indirectly of the successful Nazi infiltration of the universities as a whole and of extended complicity in the regime of German professors generally. Fewer of the names given are familiar than one might expect. Lenard and Starck, Nobel prize winners in physics, are the most famous. Wundt in philosophy, Erich Marcks and Srbik in history are also well known, but the majority are by no means famous names. The repute of most was primarily in Germany. The author seems at times to allege fame and influence for men whose guilt is particularly clear. Historians are less numerous than biologists and scientists. The chief university and professorial leaders as he gives them were Alfred Rosenberg, Eugen Fischer, Ernst Ruedin, Hans Frank, Carl Schmitt, Gerhard Kittel, Wilhelm Grau, Walter Grundmann. Haushofer and many others appear only incidentally. They were apparently little concerned with the Jewish issue. For this reason the book is not evidence that the older German professors generally joined the Nazi party. That the party housecleaned in the universities and appointed its own men to office has long been known. The universities were Nazi because others were removed.

Nevertheless, the book is an indictment of German scholarship difficult to overlook or deny. It is further proof that the re-education of Germany will be a long and arduous task. Unfortunately, the men who would be most reliable in the future in the universities are now elderly and about to retire. The younger generation and especially recent doctors of philosophy are products of the Nazi regime itself. One of the greatest tragedies is the overwhelming of scholarship in Germany by politics, racialism, and nationalism. The author rejects as improbable the idea, often advanced, that German scholars did lip service to Nazism because of fear for their lives and will now return with enthusiasm to true scholarship.

Washington University

ROLAND G. USHER

GERMANY TRIED DEMOCRACY: A POLITICAL HISTORY OF THE REICH FROM 1918 TO 1933. By *S. William Halperin*, Associate Professor of Modern History, University of Chicago. (New York: Thomas Y. Crowell Company. 1946. Pp. viii, 567. \$3.75.)

EXPERIMENT IN GERMANY: THE STORY OF AN AMERICAN INTELLIGENCE OFFICER. By *Saul K. Padover*. (New York: Duell, Sloan and Pearce. 1946. Pp. 400. \$3.75.)

WE have before us two books, both by American historians, dealing with German problems, each from a different point of view, each in a different way. They supplement each other, not in subject but in style and manner. Mr. Halperin's book is sound and solid, an objective appreciation of carefully analyzed events, rich in detail. Mr. Padover's volume is colorful and humane, a description of political and cultural life, but casual, superficial in presentation, a sketch of impressions rather than a coherent account. The scholarly work of Mr. Halperin deserves study; the lighter pages of Mr. Padover make easier reading. If Halperin had more of the fascination of Padover, his book would be considered a brilliant one which it is not. If Padover's account had been based on more reliable ground, it would have become a first-class source of contemporary history which it is not. However, let us try to examine the assets and liabilities of both studies in detail.

As is well known, an adequate history of the Weimar Republic has yet to be written. It would be a wonderful subject for a German Thucydides; defeat and reconstruction, hope and collapse, fear and menace, respectable work, illusions, and inevitable tragedy—these are some of the many factors which would make such a history a great chapter in modern historiography. Mr. Halperin lacks imagination and narrative gifts, but his judgment is so reasonable, his selection of material so fair that I should think a translation of the book for German consumption would be worth while. Actually, some very crucial problems of modern German history have received their best presentation from American scholars, as, for instance, the Schleswig-Holstein question or the contest between Francis Joseph and Bismarck. Mr. Halperin might well have taken his direction from them. The main requirement, of course, would be the correction of certain errors, for instance the inaccurate way in which the author deals with the "Evangelical Church" in Germany. There never was an evangelical church in Germany, dogmatically, administratively, or legally. Protestantism was split from the very beginning and never succeeded in establishing a complete union. The best known attempt in such a direction was the so-called Old Prussian Union, the fusion of the Lutherans and the German Reformed in the kingdom of Prussia as it existed in 1817 at the tercentenary of the Reformation. But in all other states of the former German confederation, the Lutherans and the German Reformed, in addition to many sectarians, continued their separate work. The French Reformed were not absorbed, not even in Prussia. Efforts during the Hitler period to coordinate the Protestant denominations are a problem apart and are not relevant to a discussion of the Weimar Republic. Furthermore, Protestantism did not embrace one half but roughly two thirds of the population of the German Reich of 1933; however, Protestantism lacked the integration of Roman Catholicism,

Many North German Protestants disliked the Anschluss idea because it would lead to an increase in the Roman Catholic population in Germany.

A subject of interest for many readers today is the question of co-operation between Socialists and Communists in the Weimar Republic. One would like to hear a little more than Mr. Halperin volunteers about the reasons for the complete collapse of this co-operation in Thuringia and Saxony and of its deeper causes. If it is true that the Social Democrats in Germany were "working class liberals," as the author puts it so nicely, more emphasis should be laid upon the disastrous tactics of the Communists which were responsible for the victory of Hindenburg over the left-wing candidate for the presidency, Wilhelm Marx. Very useful for a complete understanding of many German events is the author's mentioning of certain details of American policy. Only a few people in Germany knew of the enactment of the Hawley-Smoot Tariff in 1930, which instituted the highest rates in American history, increasing the duty on a number of commodities more than twenty per cent, a measure which the author appraises as constituting "a hard blow to the German export trade which already was in a bad slump."

One last, not quite negligible, mistake must be mentioned. Hitler never reached the rank of a corporal, only that of a lance-corporal. His superiors did not think him fit for the position of a noncommissioned officer because of his "hysteria." An officer's commission was completely out of the question; it was never even discussed, not only for personal but also for social reasons.

Both authors did work for the American Army during the late war. Mr. Halperin, as a sound pedagogue, organized and administered the historical program of the Biarritz American University for GI's. Mr. Padover, more inclined toward political work, was assigned to the OSS and led a psychological warfare team for seven months into Germany, from Aachen to Wiesbaden. His work brought him into contact with innumerable Germans, and his book is packed with descriptions of his experiences. We meet in it Germany's little men and women, some Communists and Catholics, a number of professional Nazi liars and swindlers, fellows who pretended they never were interested in politics, never heard of any atrocities, had done only their own jobs, and never had time to bother about anything the government did. Besides the general atmosphere of the times, the feelings, the reactions, the vocabulary, we find concrete and interesting details on examination procedures, on the wording of street posters, inscriptions, and doggerel. A man like this author, who observes so well and writes so vividly, almost involuntarily produces a valuable historical chronicle. Had the book been written less quickly, it might have achieved even more.

Remarkable highlights in the account are interviews with celebrities: the temporary mayor of Aachen, Oppershoff, who later on was murdered; the bishop of Aachen, who is reported to have said, "The Roman Church does not want to have martyrs" (how strange this must have sounded to a medievalist like the author!); a representative of the conspirator Goerdeler, "Mr. Mueller"; and the well-known

Nazi general Kurt Dittmar. All this is good, but it could be better. There are too many linguistic blunders in the book—if German quotations are used, they should be correct. For example, on page 197 the author quotes as a sixteenth century saying from the period of the Peasant Wars: “*Und setzet ihr nicht das Leben ein, Wie kann die Freiheit gewonnen sein!*” Not only is the second part of this quotation incorrect (it should read, “*Nie wird Euch die Freiheit gewonnen sein!*”) but also the song has nothing to do with the Peasant War or the sixteenth century; it is a line from the famous “Horse Guards’ Song” at the end of “Wallenstein’s Lager” by Friedrich von Schiller.

Both authors, each in his particular way, have made it their task to bring closer to our understanding two of the most involved and complicated periods in German history. To have achieved, even in part, an objective of such magnitude is worthy of admiration.

Library of Congress

VEIT VALENTIN

GERMANY: A SHORT HISTORY. By *George N. Shuster* and *Arnold Bergstraesser*. (New York: W. W. Norton and Company, 1944. Pp. 238. \$2.75.)

THIS book was written and published during the war. It is the combined work of an American-born and a German-born author. The intensity of their personal contacts and experiences and the breadth of their view made them particularly well qualified to put before the American public this sincere and scholarly interpretation of German history. As such it is a valuable antidote against cheap attempts to look upon the German past as a natural background for the National Socialists. The thesis of this book, on the contrary, is that “their philosophy and their actions were an affront to the values that had endured through all the tormented history of the German people. . . . It is the historical truth itself which speaks against them.”

Although united by the same purpose and dealing with their subject in the same measured language the two authors basically differ from each other in their manner of presentation. The second half of the book, dealing with the period since 1914 and essentially a plea for the soundness of the Weimar Republic, is primarily a narrative of events for which Shuster could draw on communications from some of the former leaders of the Republic. Well-balanced evaluations of such actions as the social legislation or of the general economic situation in the brief period of recovery are interspersed, but they do not dominate the story. Moreover, the detailed, almost year-by-year narrative, though occasionally offering some interesting new facts, makes it hard for the reader to come to a true understanding of the turning points in the history of the Republic. The first five chapters, on the contrary, and particularly those dealing with German history previous to the nineteenth century, abstain from any attempt at a narrative. They are particularly good

in the field of cultural and social history, the treatment of which is a masterpiece of condensed, clear, and meaningful presentation.

Compared with English or French or even Russian history the German development has been more dependent on extranational forces and on outside influences. Besides, it shows less unbroken continuity than the history of other nations. It is so varied, so full of catastrophe and of new beginnings that it seems to be hard to discover a central "theme," to discern its permanent features—unless they be those originating from unsteadiness and from the recurrent necessity to face the unfinished task of building up a lasting national form. Finally, in the last phase of German history the emergence and the technique of National Socialism are, as much as any other totalitarianism, an integral part of the problems of modern mass society with its breakup of traditional forces, its insecurity and standardization. Obviously, then, any attempt to treat German history as a separate process within the development of the Western world presents specific inherent difficulties.

In the present book some of these difficulties have been mastered remarkably well. Especially the universal character of the German medieval setup and the lasting influence of these universal ideas upon the German development are indicated with particular success. Similarly there is no undue overemphasis on Prussia in the analysis of the eighteenth and earlier nineteenth century, and the density of German cultural and social life previous to the national movement of the nineteenth century has found an unusually sympathetic and brilliant treatment.

On the other hand, the new forces of competitive power politics and of the modern individualistic society are not shown in their world-wide setting and with all their implications. The authors are fully aware of the fact that these forces broke upon Germany belatedly and abruptly as compared with the more harmonious evolution of state and society in the West. There is no lack of illuminating remarks, such as that German thought was not favorable to the growth of a "national intellectual society" or that Bismarck's Germany "had to deal in a few decades with problems that other nations had had centuries to solve." Yet one wishes that in the description and interpretation of the German development since the later nineteenth century incongruities and danger spots might have been pointed out more deliberately. This could have been done without in any way endangering a sound historical and basically positive approach to the whole of the German past. As it is, one notices in the later part of the book, particularly in the chapters dealing with the period after 1914, an inclination to overemphasize the moderate factors and the possibility of compromise solutions. Only limited attention is paid to the cracks in the political and social structure, to the forces of emotional extremism and to the relentless pressure of the international situation in economics and power politics. Even Shuster's obvious endeavors to do justice to the Weimar Republic could only have profited from working out more pointedly the counterforces and obstacles.

In the latest catastrophe that has befallen Germany and the world all the

forces have been challenged that built up the Western world—forces whose origin and *raison d'être* date back to very different periods, ecclesiastical and secular, conservative, liberal, and democratic forces. This careful and in some parts masterful survey is an excellent introduction to an understanding of all these forces as far as they have shaped the German past, particularly of the older traditions. It is less satisfactory in the way it deals with the dangers—both from within and from without—to which the growth and existence of these forces have been exposed, especially in the last hundred years.

Washington University

DIETRICH GERHARD

GESCHICHTE RUSSLANDS. By *Valentin Gittermann*. Band I und II. (Zurich: Büchergilde Gutenberg. 1944, 1945. Pp. 516, 539. Sfs. 18.00 per vol.)

FIVE or six years of separation from the European continent impose the heavy burden upon the American historian of acquainting himself with the accomplishments of European scholars of the period. Partly as "spoils of victory," great contributions to the sciences are now widely published and distributed in this country, but considerable research has also been carried on in the fields of the humanities. Much of it may not be practical or ready for printing now; yet, it is reasonable to expect that at least Switzerland and Sweden, the two nations least affected by the war, will not wait long with the publications of their scholars. In Switzerland several works of particular interest to the American scholar have recently appeared. Among them is Professor Gittermann's *Geschichte Russlands*.

Planned originally in two volumes, the work has been expanded to three to allow for "the peculiar attraction of the broadly flowing stream of Russian history." The first volume covers the period to the accession of Peter the Great; the second up to the Decabrist revolt; Volume III is in preparation and will appear this fall. The first two volumes contain appendixes with no less than 317 pages of carefully chosen and often rare source material, all of it translated into German. The text is accompanied by over a hundred illustrations and by nineteen maps. The excellent taste of both author and publisher is evident in the presentation of the material as well as in the choice of the reproduced woodcuts, etchings, and other illustrations, and in the outward appearance, the type and the cover.

Gittermann's historical outlook shows an enviable breadth and thoughtfulness, his style, typically Swiss, possesses clarity and simplicity. Presentation of military and diplomatic aspects, though not neglected, is subordinated to extensive treatment of economic and social problems. Yet, no line has been drawn to separate economic from national, social from military, cultural from diplomatic factors. As in life and history, while preserving their complexities they all are made to form part of an entity. In this sense, the dogmatic and political background of the Orthodox Church, the basis of the struggle of Moscow and Novgorod, the success and failure of Ivan the Terrible and Patriarch Nikon, the contradictions in the

struggle over the Ukraine during the seventeenth century, and other aspects or events gain meaning and a truthfulness which is seldom found in general histories. Scholarly, but dispensing with excessive "paraphernalia" of the trade; soberly evaluating, but not interpreting and reinterpreting in today's fashion, Gitermann may well serve as a model for many a historical writer.

Rejecting the idea of Russia's "backwardness," Gitermann, who has worked for more than twenty years on his history, insists that Russia is "not of the same kind, not of the same quality" as the rest of Europe. Exception may be taken to this point of view, although it derives from the study of the great Russian thinkers in the light of their own social surroundings, but it hardly contradicts the spirit of Russian development. The continuity of Russian history is clearly brought out, no sudden breaks occur, and no individual appears as a *deus ex machina*. At no time is the great Ranke's first demand upon the historian neglected ("Gentlemen, never lose sight of what is interesting"), and yet Russia's past is recounted without haste, superficiality, or pretense.

A history of an entire nation, be it an outline, a three, or for that matter twenty, volume work, will always be open to this and that criticism. However, within the possibilities of such an undertaking, Gitermann's work is an outstanding example of true scholarship, penetration, and of wisdom in the choice, scope, and manner of the material presented.

University of Delaware

WALTHER KIRCHNER

RUSSIA AND THE WESTERN WORLD: THE PLACE OF THE SOVIET UNION IN THE COMITY OF NATIONS. By *Max M. Laserson*. (New York: Macmillan Company. 1945. Pp. x, 275. \$2.50.)

THE RUSSIAN STORY: THE COMING OF AGE OF A GREAT PEOPLE. By *Nicholas Mikhailov*. (New York: Sheridan House. 1945. Pp. 191. \$2.75.)

THE purpose of Professor Laserson's book is to trace the internal evolution of Soviet Russia as well as the evolution of her foreign policy, both of which processes, in the opinion of the author, are bringing Russia closer to the democratic West. The book contains much interesting material and some enlightening comment but it suffers from two major defects: lack of proper organization and a tendency toward excessive optimism.

The reader will find in this volume a valuable discussion of various aspects of what Mr. Laserson terms the "Thermidorian trend" in recent Russian developments (the best chapters are those on the Soviet legal system and federal structure), but he is likely to remain skeptical in the face of some of the author's conclusions. Thus his assertion that in Soviet Russia law has been restored "as an independent regulator of human relations" is hard to reconcile with the statements of authoritative Soviet spokesmen which make it clear that the predominance of politics

over law has by no means been abandoned. Mr. Laserson goes even farther when he says that the Soviet government succeeded in breaking "the hold of legal nihilism on the Russian spirit" (the very existence of this historical phenomenon is highly debatable), and that "for the first time in Russian history, obedience to law became a virtue." In spite of the author's ingenuity, this statement remains an unconvincing paradox. Equally exaggerated seems his assertion that freedom of religion has been "fully restored" in today's Russia, and that the Orthodox Church has been "reinforced to a degree which exceeds anything recognized" in pre-Revolutionary Russia since the days of Peter the Great. Mr. Laserson seems to contradict himself when after having described the Soviet Union as a "federation imposed from the center" he then refers to it as a "commonwealth of nations which had previously decided to join the Union." Neither is it easy to reconcile his summing up of the decree of January 28, 1944, as extending to each federal state of the USSR "the right to pursue its own foreign policy" with his statement that the Soviet Union still retains "the establishment of the general character of the relations of the Union Republics with foreign states."

In the course of his discussion of Soviet foreign policy, which again contains valuable facts and pertinent observations, Mr. Laserson finds it possible to speak of "the full unreserved return of the Soviet Union into the comity of nations with unrestricted collaboration" and of the Soviet government's "high degree of ability to compromise." In the light of some recent experiences one is likely to take these pronouncements with more than a grain of salt. It seems that on occasions the author himself is not sufficiently convinced of the validity of his optimistic conclusions. Thus, he argues that "despite its own lack of democratic guarantees," the Soviet Union must be considered a "democratic factor" simply because it contributed to the victory over the Nazi Germany. Even more revealing is the somewhat unexpected argument that the absence of constitutional liberties in Soviet Russia is the best possible school for their appreciation: "liberty became a necessity to every one . . . because every one lacked it."

Mr. Mikhailov's little book should not be treated as a serious historical work. The author, a successful Soviet popularizer, has written a wartime patriotic tract, in which a sketchy outline of Russian history is built around those historical moments when the Russian people were called upon to repel a foreign invader. To this is added a cursory survey of Russian culture and a eulogistic account of the achievements of the Soviet regime. The whole is imbued with the spirit of Soviet nationalism. "Ours is a land of many superlatives," and so is Mr. Mikhailov's presentation.

Some interesting traits should be noted. Although the multinational character of the Soviet Union is duly stressed (of course, "Georgia voluntarily joined the USSR," and so did the three Baltic states in 1940), the Russians are singled out as the leaders: "they have built up the unity of this country from Ocean to Ocean," and they "have rallied the others to their cause." There is a curious echo of racial-

ism in the reference to "the steady process of Germanization in the ruling Romanov dynasty." Needless to say, in Mr. Mikhailov's version of history, Stalin appears as being "in direct charge of the uprising in Petrograd in October 1917," and as the main architect of victory during the Russian Civil War.

Harvard University

MICHAEL KARPOVICH

REPRESENTATIVE BUREAUCRACY: AN INTERPRETATION OF THE
BRITISH CIVIL SERVICE. By *J. Donald Kingsley*. (Yellow Springs, Ohio:
Antioch Press. 1944. Pp. 324. \$3.50.)

BRITAIN's civil service has earned wide respect while the relative recency and rapidity of its rise from shabby favoritism encourages lagging countries. The organic connection between the main divisions of the service and the educational system and the emphasis upon broadly cultural training in recruiting the candidates for ultimate promotion to high posts are of deep interest to the United States, for they fall in with the zest for administration as synthesis and the reaction against the piecemeal vocationalism that has characterized recruitment by examination under our merit system. At the same time the civil service of England, and especially the administrative class and the subordinate position of specialists, must answer the double challenge of suitability to the needs of an equalitarian public policy and the technological tasks of modern administration. Professor Kingsley contributes importantly to the background of these issues.

Representative Bureaucracy is essentially two books interlocked by a thesis. The first traces the "middle class and the evolution of bureaucracy." The second describes the machinery of the civil service on the eve of war for, despite the publication date, the facts were gathered and the book substantially written before 1939. Professor Kingsley's analysis of machinery was aided by his considerable technical knowledge; a decade ago he was co-author of what remains the leading text on public personnel methods in the United States. But the especial interest of the present volume is the bold portrayal of the setting of British administration in changing class relationships since the middle of the seventeenth century. The thesis is not novel, of course; to say that it was strictly new would imply that the author had strained as well as simplified an important point of view. Its reasonableness is hardly marred by traces of a magistral tone and touches of doctrine. Taken with due qualification, as the author intends, Professor Kingsley's argument is persuasive.

England's commercial elements, having bid for power prematurely under Cromwell, were the more reconciled to retreat because "the urban and rural proletariat were risky allies." A virtual alliance was struck with the aristocracy, which was conceded a nearly complete monopoly of the governmental machinery, including Parliament and the civil service, so long as their use respected middle class interests. The vast *modus vivendi* of balance and mutual dependence was helped

by the conditions which inclined the leaders of England's landed interests to give relatively sympathetic attention to the needs and policies of a trading and industrial nation. The civil service remained a perquisite of the aristocracy; it was a form of relief as well as a source of patronage for parliamentary manipulation. The state's administrative apparatus was consequently feeble but adequate under a policy of essential *laissez faire*. By the nineteenth century, however, rising discontents helped to make such a policy untenable. An efficient social service state became part of the price of order. From the conquest of the Commons and the municipal corporations, the middle class moved on the civil service. "It is against this general background," concludes Professor Kingsley, "that the reform of the Civil Service must be viewed."

The general reform hinted at in the consideration of the East India bill in 1833 was substantially realized in the period between the publication of the "Northcote-Trevelyan Report on the Organization of the Permanent Civil Service" in 1854 and the Order in Council of June 4, 1870. The establishment of open competition meant that "with the notable exceptions of the Foreign Office and the House of Lords, the last strongholds of aristocratic power gave way before the irresistible advance of the middle classes." But the reform was embodied in a relationship to education at its several levels, and to the social strata reflected at these levels, which assured, for a time at least, that the high administrative posts would prevailingly be held by persons drawn from the upper middle class.

Professor Kingsley is dubious about the survival of the system without drastic change. Its strength, he believes, has depended upon the fact that the top administrators—properly to be viewed as "permanent politicians"—have shared the social backgrounds and viewpoints of the ministers of either of the old parties. The author contends that "the essence of bureaucratic responsibility in the modern state is to be sought, not in the presumed and largely fictitious impartiality of the officials, but in the strength of their commitment to the purposes that the State is undertaking to serve." A bureaucracy will not act responsibly, or be responsive without corruption, unless it is "representative" in the sense of reflecting the currently dominant force in society. These points are well taken. Governmental action is seldom neutral; it takes sides even when it intervenes to create balance. The essence of administrative impartiality is loyalty to political decisions and their embodiment in law. Statutes are not to be conceived as dropping inertly from the legislative body; administrative mechanisms must propel and hold them on their course toward their indicated targets. There are limits, of course, to the extent to which an innovative party, even at evolutionary tempo, may expect or should expect that line administrators will furnish its main ideas. England's application of the career principle may have underestimated the need for fresh staff aides. In appraising the ability of the higher civil service to identify itself with the purposes of such a party as Labour, however, Professor Kingsley might well have given more atten-

tion to the stakes which career administrators, regardless of their family derivations, may find for themselves in the growth of the administrative state.

It is too early to pronounce on the correctness of Professor Kingsley's forecast that "if the working classes should emerge from the war as the dominant force in the State, the present Civil Service will be reformed from top to bottom." Begging the question of the several meanings of the terms "working classes" and "dominant," it is not too early to conclude that Labour in power shows no haste to change the pattern of the civil service or even fundamentally to criticize it as a scheme of recruitment. Since the Labour victory, the actual steps in this field have been confined mainly to the development of proposals and measures that date back to Coalition auspices. These matters have included the following items: the sensibly flexible but extremely modest proposals of the Committee on the Training of Civil Servants (Cmd. 6525, 1944), concerned with post-entry seasoning; the formula for the restoration of competition under fair conditions and the absorption of veterans, drawn mainly by the National Whitley Council Committee on the Staff of the Civil Service during the Reconstruction Period (Cmd. 6567, 1944); improvements in the status, pay, and opportunities of professional and other technical personnel, pursuant to the suggestions of the so-called Barlow Committee on Scientific Staff (Cmd. 6679, 1945); and, as yet very indirectly, the basic Education Act of 1944 (7 and 8 Geo. 6, c. 31). The last item touches the crux of the civil service problem, as Professor Kingsley correctly identifies it. Labour is likely to concern itself less with changes in the relation of education to the civil service than with changes in the relation of education to the distribution of wealth and the incidence of opportunity, including those subtly pervasive assets for which hard-won scholarships, even when available, hardly supply a full substitute.

It should be noted, however, that in the handling of technicians there are already hints of significant shifts in the conception of an immutable relation between pre-entry preparation and interests and advance to leadership. Professor Kingsley soundly rebukes the conventional understanding which thinks of public employment in Great Britain in terms only of the administrative, executive, clerical, and subclerical classes and overlooks as forgotten men the large numbers of professionally trained specialists in the civil service who are outside these classes, not to mention the bodies of admirable municipal employees whose spirit of expertise is relatively close to much of the public service in the United States. Professor Kingsley is glad to concede that the subordination of experts in England is more than an aristocratic defense; it implies confidence in the judgment of ordinary men. But in speculating briefly about the future needs of administrative command, he suggests that Britain is likely to require "managers, accountants, consumers' counsels, economists . . . men of decision and—practical men who know how to do a particular job, rather than political philosophers or Latin scholars—however valuable such men may continue to be in the formulation of overall policy." Thus the theme returns to the synthesis which must be the core of administration,

bringing subdivision of labor to fruition. But civil service systems must go farther than England's in the past in recognizing how large a proportion of able and ardent young men and women whose ultimate talent and interest may be broadly administrative are attracted early to the disciplines of science and its applications and enter the state's service on this basis.

Columbia University

ARTHUR W. MACMAHON

Far Eastern History

THE BEGINNINGS OF INDIAN HISTORIOGRAPHY AND OTHER ESSAYS. By *U. N. Ghoshal*, Fellow of the Royal Asiatic Society of Bengal, Editor, Journal of the Greater India Society, Formerly Professor of History, Presidency College, Calcutta. (Calcutta: Ramesh Ghoshal. 1944. Pp. xvi, 317. Rs. 8 or 16s.)

PROGRESS OF GREATER INDIAN RESEARCH (1917-42). By *U. N. Ghoshal*. (Calcutta: Greater India Society. 1943. Pp. viii, 114, viii. Rs. 4.)

The Beginnings of Indian Historiography and Other Essays is a collection of fourteen essays the final one of which is sufficiently nontechnical for general use. The author questions the adequacy of the terms "Hindu, Muhammadan, and British" in describing Indian history and contends that ancient (to *ca.* thirteenth century A.D.), medieval (thirteenth to nineteenth centuries), and modern (nineteenth to twentieth centuries) more accurately suggest the major changes in the stream of Indian life. Essay 1, on Indian historiography, discusses sources available to historians for reconstructing Indian history in Vedic times. These materials, which the reviewer considers less satisfactory as historical sources than the Homeric epics, contribute (contrary to Ghoshal) little to political history but still supply valuable information on Vedic intellectual, religious, economic, and cultural history.

Essay XIII on Vedic royal and imperial ceremonies is an example of a historical work derived from the source material described above. This essay chiefly concerns the *Rājasuya* or coronation ceremony, and in the closing pages the author draws conclusions concerning the nature of the Vedic state. Absolute monarchy, virtually devoid of any trace of a council of nobles or a popular assembly, was the general rule, according to Ghoshal, though he does see a check on kingly power in the Brahman priesthood. Ghoshal argues the question of royal power further in essays II, IV, V, and VI and rejects every suggestion that the early Indian king was ever responsible to the people. He cites copious evidence in the original languages to prove that kingship was absolute.

Essays III covering slavery, VI on administrative terms, and VIII on mineral wealth in ancient India contain material useful to social and economic historians. The ninth essay traces, from its inception in the sixth century to the year 1855, the

Śakṭa rite of offering one's own blood in sacrifice. Essay x argues that the eleventh century revolution of the Śūdra king, Divya, against the *Pālas* in Varendri in Bengal had popular support, while essays xi and xii concern religious archaeology in Cambodia and Indo-China.

Ghoshal's *Progress of Greater Indian Research* is chiefly a review of recently published books and articles dealing with the antiquities of Central and South-eastern Asia and Indonesia. By way of introduction, the author stresses India's importance as a distributor of civilization as well as a receiver of invading populations which she has equally Indianized. The book describes, in order, the archaeological work which has recently been done in Afghanistan, Central Asia, Tibet, Mongolia, Manchuria, Burma, Siam, Cambodia, Champa, Java, Bali, Borneo, Celebes, Sumatra, Malay, and Ceylon and indicates the extent of Indian influence in each region.

Perhaps wartime restrictions upon transportation prevented the author's use of American publications on Greater India since 1939. Dr. H. I. Poleman's bibliography on Greater India, published in the American Council of Learned Societies *Bulletin*, No. 28 (Washington, D. C., 1939), pp. 198-203, is a case in point which contains certain additional titles on Greater India. Despite these omissions and notwithstanding the inclusion of ten solid pages of errata, Ghoshal's book will be useful to students of Indic, Indonesian, and Far Eastern studies.

Northeastern University

ELMER H. CUTTS

A HISTORY OF HINDU PUBLIC LIFE. Part I [Period of the Vedic Samhitās, the Brāhmaṇas, and the Older Upaniṣads]. By *U. N. Ghoshal*, Fellow of the Royal Asiatic Society of Bengal, Editor, Journal of the Greater India Society, Formerly, Professor of History, Presidency College, Calcutta. (Calcutta: Ramesh Ghoshal. No date. Pp. xii, 175. Rs. 6.)

STIRRED to the task by Warren Hastings, Charles Wilkins published in 1785 a translation of that most important Hindu devotional book, the Bhagavad-Gīta, and soon thereafter a noted book of Hindu fables. Sir William Jones a little later produced the first printed edition of a Sanskrit text: Colebrooke, working scientifically, carried the studies much farther, and Friedrich Schlegel introduced the comparative method, thus leading up to Franz Bopp's comparative treatise on the conjugations in Sanskrit, Greek, Latin, Persian, and German. Sanskrit literature offers examples of all classes of writings, the greatest being the religious hymns of the Rig Veda, the philosophical dialogues and the fable literature: there are also epics, lyrics, dramas, fairy tales, and romances in abundance; and excellent works in grammar, mathematics, medicine, and law. History they neglected almost entirely, partly because of their pessimistic view of life and their belief in the transmigration of the soul, and partly because they never had to undergo struggles as did such states as Greece and Rome. So we do not know when those Aryan folk

came into northwestern India but it was prior to 1000 B.C. by a century or two at least; in that period, the Vedic, there began to emerge that system of social distinctions known as caste; the classes of society were at first four—Brāhmaṇas, Rājanyās, Vāiśyās, Śūdrās, who were respectively priests, warriors, peasants, servants. The book which is here reviewed shows how in the next period came the concept of the king's sovereignty over the whole people, and his high social status is clearly stated in the explanations of the Rājasūya ceremony, *i.e.*, the great sacrifice at the time of the coronation; the possibility of royal power pressing down on the people is not overlooked, and there are some statements to the effect that the king's power is derived from the people. But different sects have put forth varying views on this point; it seems that the people had some checks upon royal power but the statements about the civil rights of the people are not plentiful. The last chapter, ten pages in length, gives a clear summary of the views presented in the previous 160 pages of this part of the work.

The reviewer's work in Indian studies has been for the most part in text criticism, but a citizen of a great democracy who has lived in it for two generations ought to know something about the worth and workings of his own country's form of government; therefore he believes that this book ought to prove interesting and profitable to students of the science of government and to anyone who is concerned with the problems which continually arise in that sphere of activity.

Trinity College

LEROY C. BARRET

BLACK SHIPS OFF JAPAN: THE STORY OF COMMODORE PERRY'S EXPEDITION. By *Arthur Walworth*. Introduction by Sir George Sansom. (New York: Alfred A. Knopf. 1946. Pp. xviii, 278, viii. \$3.00.)

THE recent war in the Pacific has renewed interest in the exploits of the naval diplomat who, some ninety-two years ago, signed a treaty which pledged "a perfect, permanent, and universal peace, and a sincere and cordial amity, between the United States of America, on the one part, and the Empire of Japan on the other, and between their people, respectively, without exception of persons or places." And when the American might rolled on toward the beaches of Japan, the movements of Perry were recalled in the communiqués of MacArthur and Nimitz. It was easy to find comparable qualities in the American who opened Japan and his successor who conquered it.

Few diplomatic missions have been described in such detail as Perry's two visits to Japan. Beginning with the massive official version of 1856, supplemented by published and manuscript official correspondence and the private journals which escaped Perry's censorship, and checked by some material from Japanese sources, the ample records are growing (*cf. Am. Hist. Rev.*, LI [January, 1946], 262-76). Two full-length biographies of Perry have appeared, and several monographic studies of the Japan expedition have been made. The last compilation of the sources

was provided by Hunter Miller in *Treaties and Other International Acts of the United States of America*, VI (1942), 439-666. Now Mr. Walworth has re-examined the materials and in *Black Ships Off Japan* has retold the story admirably, stressing the accounts which were not available to earlier writers. He has handled his materials well, with a welcome objectivity. There is little hero worship in the telling, yet the commodore's real worth does not suffer. The text is well written, carefully proofed, with accurate documentation, an excellent bibliography, well-chosen illustrations, maps, appendixes, and a useful index.

As a survey of the American sources the study is to be commended. But the real achievement of Perry can only be appraised when fuller information of the forces at work in Japan is available. Mr. Walworth might have confined his narrative to the American reports, but when he dipped into the Japanese materials he should have used them more carefully. In fact the weakest chapter in the book is entitled "Behind the Screens" (pp. 122-38). An extract printed there is described as from a document "written by several of the henchmen of the Mikado" in 1853. It was, in fact, written in 1858 and was so described in the cited source. The Perry treaty and others negotiated in 1854-55 were approved by the emperor without question, but in 1858, when the quotation was written, the political situation was quite different. Again, the author takes the liberty of ascribing in the bibliography and citations the very useful anonymous "Diary of an Official of the *Bakufu*" to "Hayashi, D." It would be helpful if we could be sure that Hayashi Daigaku-no-Kami wrote this contemporary journal, but at present the ascription can only be a guess. Sir George Sansom contributes a thoughtful introduction.

Stanford University

PAYSON J. TREAT

MY TWENTY-FIVE YEARS IN CHINA. By *John B. Powell*. (New York: Macmillan Company. 1945. Pp. 436. \$3.50.)

ALTHOUGH *My Twenty-Five Years in China* is addressed to the general reading public, some of its pages are of interest to the historian of recent Far Eastern affairs. The author, a graduate of the University of Missouri School of Journalism, engaged actively in newspaper work with Shanghai as his headquarters from 1917 until December 20, 1941, when he was incarcerated by the Japanese in the notorious Bridge House Prison. Later, but only after what may well be termed indescribable suffering, he was repatriated on the refugee ship *Gripsholm*.

Mr. Powell's account of the growing tensions at Shanghai in the years immediately preceding Pearl Harbor, his description of Japanese methods in taking over the International Settlement, and his portrayal of prison conditions are of value as the record of an eyewitness. In the light of his own suffering and the sufferings of others which he witnessed, these pages describing prison days are commendable for their restraint.

The book as a whole is a record, chronological in arrangement, of those features

of the Far Eastern scene which claimed Mr. Powell's major interest as a journalist. This interest, resting, it would seem, on the "conviction, held long before Pearl Harbor, that America's stake in the Pacific is and will be a large one," has led the author to devote a rather large proportion of his space to journalistic accounts of political and diplomatic history during the years since 1917. In general it should be noted that the author's interpretations of such events as the Lansing-Ishii notes, the Shantung question, and the Washington Conference do not add to our knowledge as contained in the more definitive treatments of these subjects by such historians as La Fargue, Griswold, Bailey, and others.

Mr. Powell's sympathies relative to China's internal political struggles appear to be with the right-wing Kuomintang leadership. His interpretations are largely in terms of political factionalism and ideological conflict. Unfortunately, little light is thrown on social and economic conditions in China, where Mr. Powell's observations over a period of twenty-five years would be of great value. The Sian incident is presented inadequately as primarily a product of Russian influence. As to the position of Yen-an and its forces during the war against Japan, Mr. Powell's conclusion is that "The Chinese Communists were desirous of diverting Japanese pressure from their own front and hoped that Chiang Kai-shek could be forced to bear the weight of the Japanese onslaught" (p. 263). Readers will of course draw widely differing implications from this statement.

Mr. Powell is on more solid ground in discussing the foreign community of Shanghai to which he was introduced in 1917. There are some sidelights on American-Shanghai journalism and one of its leading figures in that day, Thomas F. Millard, whose philosophy was that his *Review of the Far East* could print "anything we damn please" (p. 11). There are references also to the outstanding work of the United States Court for China under Judge Charles S. Lobinger, who sought to prevent "loose and reckless incorporation" by Americans in their commercial activities in China. Finally there is a graphic and detailed account of the kidnapping affair of China's famous Blue Express in 1923. The record of wide contacts and unique experiences creates much of the interest which attaches to *My Twenty-Five Years in China*.

To the general reader who wishes to clarify his thinking with respect to eastern Asia, it is suggested that Mr. Powell's book should be read in conjunction with such works as L. K. Rosinger's *China's Wartime Politics* and Gunther Stein's *The Challenge of Red China*. To the historian there would be greater value had Mr. Powell emphasized that broad and neglected field, the relationship of the foreign language press to the whole complex of problems in modern China.

Duke University

PAUL H. CLYDE

SOVIET FAR EASTERN POLICY, 1931-1945. By *Harriet L. Moore*. [Issued under the auspices of International Secretariat, Institute of Pacific Relations]

Inquiry Series.] (Princeton: Princeton University Press. 1945. Pp. xv, 284. \$2.50.)

Miss Moore's volume is a very good and useful survey of the events and developments of Soviet Far Eastern policy after 1931. In some places the author develops a really vivid picture of inner links between the basic political phenomena of the East and West. Such, for instance, are the splendid pages dealing with the connection between the events and policies in the Far East prior to the second World War and the European political scene at that time. The author uses—but with a superb choice—abundant Russian-language materials including documents, journals, newspapers, and books. Therefore, instead of presenting her own interpretation too frequently, she is in a position to let the sources say, in an unmutilated way, what Soviet policy was aiming at.

It cannot be denied that the author has given us a most coherent presentation of a large amount of material in the small space of 150 pages, the remaining pages being taken up by appendixes. But the difficulties in writing this book consisted not only in obstacles of space but also in those of time. The story is limited—more or less arbitrarily—to a period of fifteen years. It begins at the time when Japan showed that she intended to destroy the Versailles peace and the League system, of which she was one of the builders and profiteers, particularly in the Pacific.

But there was a Soviet Far Eastern policy long before 1931. From the appendixes this can be clearly seen, because the documents quoted begin with the Treaty of Portsmouth, September, 1905. After the Soviet upheaval of 1917-1918 there was a feverish change of scene in the Far East. In some cases the Soviet Union was on the defensive, in others it showed very farsighted activity, particularly in the general region which is vaguely called China and which relates to that country's northernmost parts, embracing Mongolia, Manchuria, and other regions including even Korea. Soviet Far Eastern policy began in the early 1920's, after Japan's evacuation of Siberia, with agreements including the famous joint Sino-Soviet statement of 1923 in which Russia declared that she had no intention of encouraging the communization of China and finishing with the agreement of May 1, 1924, quoted in the appendixes to the book. Until 1924-1925 Japan expanded its concessions in Manchuria; it was stopped only by the support given to the new Chinese government by the United States.

To the years before 1931 belongs also the period of growing Japanese aggression which found its most classical expression in the Tanaka Memorial of 1927, later published in *China Critic* in 1931, which became the program of Japanese imperialism. The author, strangely enough, does not quote this source in the appendixes to her book and mentions this memorial only once superficially in two lines on page 22. In this paper the whole plan of the later Japanese expansion and military conquests in the second World War is exactly and meticulously set forth. It became the *vade mecum* of Japanese diplomacy.

Should it be repeated that every foreign policy is closely connected with the

internal policies of a country? This is true in the highest degree in relation to the foreign policy of renewed or revolutionary countries, such as the Soviet Union, young post-Manchu republican China, and rejuvenated, expanding Japan.

Therefore the author should have given at least some place to the internal backgrounds of the three latter countries. True, some names, personalities, and movements are slightly and nominally touched but not explained for the reader. These underlying backgrounds have been and have remained decisive in the whole interwar period including the more spectacular years of 1931-1945. This could have been done perhaps by shortening the chapters dealing in too detailed a manner with all the ramifications of disputes concerning fisheries, oil, and other concessions. Thus some short explanation might have been given of the internal powers of Soviet Russia, China, and Japan and their main parties and movements: the differences between the Stalinists and Trotskyites regarding the "desirable" aims of new China; the role of the Kuomintang and its relations to Chinese communism; the Japanese parties of the urban Kenseykay, the agrarian Seyoukay, and the industrialist Zaibatsu. All of them were factors which existed long before 1931 and continue to work even in the present postwar period after the defeat of Japan. Such an explanation would have helped also toward a clearer understanding of the attitude of the Soviet Union in the present situation in liberated China with her two militant basic movements of the Kuomintang and communism.

Even the most critical reviewer will not be able to find any factual mistakes or misquotations in the book. In one place (p. 37) the reader will not understand what the Russian word *Primorye* means; in another place, however, (p. 80) the correct translation of it, the "Maritime Province," is given.

Columbia University

MAX M. LASERSON

American History

THE ROOTS OF AMERICAN LOYALTY. By *Merle Curti*. (New York: Columbia University Press. 1946. Pp. x, 267. \$3.00.)

PROFESSOR Curti's book, the first systematic study of the development of American patriotism, is a valuable contribution to the still young but rapidly growing body of historical literature concerned with understanding the social patterns of ideas and emotions. The theme is a challenging one—the pride and love of country that evolved among a relatively new and heterogeneous people through aspirations both selfish and idealistic, directed toward prestige, security, and freedom. Avoiding the temptation to facile generalization, Mr. Curti has approached this theme with painstaking scholarship. Though placing principal emphasis upon the formative period—the first hundred years of American nationality—and presenting the more recent history in much less detail, he has utilized a vast body of primary sources, of which those chiefly used, the Fourth of July sermon, the

academic address, and the occasional sermon, have been hitherto neglected. The copiously cited materials have an intrinsic interest, dramatic, picturesque, and at times humorous. But the author's dominating purpose is interpretative, and the book is so organized as to bring successively under analysis, in the order of their emergence, the shifting factors which represent at the same time the principal meanings of American loyalty and the roots from which it grew.

These roots, as reflected in chapter headings, may be classified in four groups. First there are broad and persistent grounds of loyalty: devotion to the land itself, to its beauties and natural endowments; appreciation of the nation's temporal pattern, the glories of its past and the promise of its future; the concept of a unique people, the blending of many national and racial elements; and the economic advantages of national unity. Second, there are more esoteric and dated ideologies: the organic theory of the nation, elaborated in the post-Civil War period, with its tendencies toward exclusiveness and imperialism; and the critique to which this theory gave rise—a philosophy of patriotism re-emphasizing and elaborating the older individualism and humanitarianism. Third, there is the nurture of nationalism through symbols such as the flag and patriotic holidays and through indoctrination such as the patriotism of school texts. Finally, in several chapters Mr. Curti studies the development of loyalty in the wars of American history from the Revolution through World War II, during which the totalitarian menace evoked a rediscovery of the meaning and appeal of American values.

These are significant patterns, and Mr. Curti has woven into them a vast number of representative ideas, figures, and groups. His achievement in general is not too greatly diminished by some organizational deficiencies and certain omissions. The organization does not allow a sufficiently systematic analysis of such major factors as the valuation of America's federalism and democracy, the appreciation of its distinctive social institutions, and the stirring concept of a mission beyond its borders. Further, among noteworthy exponents of American patriotism John Quincy Adams, John L. O'Sullivan, Edward Everett, Blaine, Mahan, and Bryan receive no mention; nor is there reference to the Young America movement, Pan Americanism, or a number of other broad foreign policies which strengthened national pride through their translation of American ideals into principles of international action. The most regrettable omission is, undoubtedly, that of an adequate attempt at synthesis, in consequence of which the study appears somewhat fragmentary and inconclusive.

Certain general conclusions, however, are briefly indicated or may be inferred. The most obvious is that, despite the rather extraordinary divisive influences of state, sectional, group, and individual interests, American patriotism gradually grew in strength to the point where it was capable of withstanding all centrifugal tendencies, even if not the temptation to identify the national interest with self-interest. A second implication is that this growth was due not only to the more instinctive and nonrational factors which are present in the patriotism of every

people but also to the fact that American patriotism had deep and firm roots in a reasoned ideology. It is probably in the degree to which an essentially moral rationale figured as a motivating influence that American patriotism is most unique. Mr. Curti is right, to be sure, in pointing out that Americans have never attained a consensus as to the philosophy of patriotism or the precise nature of national welfare. But he has also emphasized that, though challenged at times by a more integral and chauvinistic nationalism, the major element in American patriotism has been its discrimination between loyalty to officials and loyalty to the general good—its orientation toward individualistic, libertarian, and humanitarian values. Such an ideology could enlist in the support of the nation the native impulses of American individualism and furnish common ground for unity and collaboration despite many disagreements and conflicts. Because of these roots American patriotism also seems capable of developing into that wider and more international loyalty which, as Mr. Curti indicates, is essential to the survival of the nation in the interdependent world of today.

*Historical Division,
War Department Special Staff*

ALBERT K. WEINBERG

THE ECONOMIC MIND IN AMERICAN CIVILIZATION, 1606-1865. By Joseph Dorfman. Two volumes. (New York: Viking Press. 1946. Pp. xii, 502, xxxi; vii, 503-987, lv. \$7.50.)

A MIGHTY fortress of important data is *The Economic Mind in American Civilization, 1606-1865*. Its long-run utility promises to be that of reference and suggestion—the work is extensive and inclusive, from an estimate of English social ideas during the period of colonial settlement to summaries of American economic writings through the second third of the nineteenth century. Unfortunately that utility may be slow to be recognized, for first appearances are different. The publisher's announcements, such as those that the book is "an antidote to Parrington and Beard" and that it tells the history of "a developing culture as mirrored in every sort of institution and ideal," may sell copies, but they place the book in a false light. Similarly, the title overstates. Dorfman has made no detailed effort to relate economic thought to the moving complex of civilization; he has neither compounded an antidote nor written a history of our national culture. He has done instead a tremendous labor of research, report, and comment on economic thinking. His knowledge of the field must be unique.

Dorfman begins by saying (p. ix) that the long span from 1606 to 1865 has a "marked individuality" which separates it from the industrial-mindedness and the domestic-mindedness of more recent times. The earlier epoch was "sharply characterized by the fertile force of commerce, the ideal of a stratified and hierarchical society, and the sophisticated culture of the then dominant groups. . . . The most potent determinant of economic action and thought was world commerce." So

oriented, Dorfman develops more amply than any other scholar the property-minded elements and the social conservatism of American thought. Where others, often with a more dialectical attack, have contributed to the history of ideas by stressing political action and reaction, Dorfman stresses the long continuities and the common factors which dwell in economic thought and presumption. In this vein the book becomes revisionist in certain high places. For example, Roger Williams and Rhode Island here (pp. 66-74) seem less different from the rest of New England than in other treatments, such as the recent one by Brockunier; commerce-mindedness is likewise made to bring Penn more than usual within the common lot (p. 92; for another revision of colonial Quakerism, see p. 79); and Jefferson's victory of 1800 is said to have placed a party in power, the distinction of which, from its rival, "appeared to turn on nothing more substantial than the question of how many Federalist officeholders were to be removed" (p. 314). Considered closely in terms of the strain of thought Dorfman is reporting, these amendments become illuminating and suggestive. In the broader terms of the history of civilization, they themselves would need amending.

The large share of the work is done in groups of biographical reports, with summaries of economic writings. In this form we have chapters the scope of which is represented by such examples as, "Molders of New England," "Monetary Reformers," "Social Philosophies of the Founding Fathers," "Followers of the American System," "The 'Labor' Literature," two chapters on the tradition of *laissez faire*, two on the protectionists, and three on the "contingents" of nineteenth century thinkers from South Carolina, Virginia, and the West. The remainder of the work is done in chapters on regions or special topics, such as "The Virginia Enterprise," "The Role of Paper Money," "The Higher Learning," and "The Civil War."

The performance is uneven. One's appreciation of new material, drawn indefatigably from the sources, is marred by the author's ungenerosity in acknowledging the relevant work of other investigators, for example, Brockunier on Williams, Nettels on colonial paper, and O'Connor on academic economics. This reviewer, as an old admirer of Dorfman's articles on Hamilton, Adams, and Jefferson, finds the present revision of these articles, in the chapter on "Social Philosophies of the Founding Fathers," to be the firm central core of the whole work. But how a writer of such power of synthesis and such urbanity could sustain the writing of a dozen and more chapters which are little other than one-plane digests of economic arguments and writings and which lack much analysis, comparison, or estimate of influence, is a question which recurs and recurs. In mid-passage, where at least one reader had to struggle to keep his sights straight on a "Federalist Ricardian," a "Republican Ricardian," and a "Ricardian Critic of Ricardo," is to be found (p. 551) the following passage from an 1828 review: "The rich mine of learning and satire is too deeply buried to be sought out by the indolent readers of the present time." One wonders about today.

A more urgent sense of movement, and of the relations of things, would have given greater power to this book. It is nevertheless a monument of research, it opens new veins of thought, and it promises long utility. Dorfman's coming volumes, to deal with economic thought in a less hierarchical society, and a society with which the author has a deeper sympathy, must be awaited with real anticipation.

Johns Hopkins University

CHARLES A. BARKER

GOVERNMENT AND LABOR IN EARLY AMERICA. By *Richard B. Morris*. (New York: Columbia University Press. 1946. Pp. xvi, 557. \$6.75.)

THE prodigious amount of research which has gone to the making of Professor Morris' *Government and Labor in Early America* and the wealth of information which it contains fairly overwhelm the reader. It seems impossible that future gleaning can bring to light any grain neglected in this harvesting. The author in his preface points out the topics which, given so all-embracing a title, one might expect to find but does not (price regulation, slave labor, court actions of various kinds), but the student is less likely to complain of omissions than of a surfeit. With a title as broad as the one chosen and research as extensive as is here represented, the mass of material is bound to be difficult to classify and to reduce to illuminating generalizations. We assume the subject to mean "the relation of government to labor." Under the term government Professor Morris explains that he includes the British imperial machinery, the Continental Congress, the colonial and the early state governments as well as those of county, town, and parish, along with courts of all kinds. What is meant by "labor" is nowhere specifically stated, but from the material it is evident that the author's definition is more inclusive than is that of the twentieth century. Masters and men alike appear as laborers.

Free labor is the subject of Part I; bound labor of Part II. The omission of slave labor is justified on the score of the extensive treatment which it has already received. In the three chapters of Part II the nature, the sources, and the legal status of bound labor are considered. Part I is more extended, illustrating copiously the regulation of wages, the terms of employment, and concerted action among workers. Two highly useful chapters bring together material relating to maritime labor and labor and the armed services. An introductory chapter deals with the mercantilist background and a concluding chapter presents "Persistent Problems of Labor Relations."

To the student of economic conditions the colonial period is a period of confusions: a confusion of mercantilist ideas with medieval doctrines of status and all that goes with it of privilege and protection; a confusion of functions which seem (perhaps mistakenly) to be clear-cut in earlier centuries but to be in flux by the late seventeenth and the early eighteenth centuries; a confusion of systems, with craft organizations, the putting-out system, and the workshop side by side. It is

because of the confusion of functions and of producing systems that rigorous definition of the term labor would have been useful. To the reviewer such definition would have made the author's final chapter of much greater value. A fourth confusion, by no means peculiar to the colonial period, is that between political action and economic action. Professor Morris has avoided trouble by including both. The colonial period was also one in which the distinction between regulation in order to relieve the poor and regulation of labor as such is elusive, and this volume fails to clarify it.

Because of the shifting functions and forms of organization it is difficult to separate wage-fixing and price-fixing though they are certainly not identical. In the treatment of wages in the Revolutionary period price-fixing pushes the regulation of wages into the background. When Sarson Belcher of Boston sells a beaver hat for £13 above the ceiling price, the attention of the reader is surely being diverted from wage regulation.

The range of treatment can best be illustrated by the chapter on the "Concerted Action among Workers." This includes material on (1) combinations by master workers to maintain a monopoly of business operations; (2) action by workers in licensed trades to secure better prices; (3) action by bound servants to secure redress of grievances (why not treated in Part II?); (4) combinations of free white workers to resist encroachment by Negro artisans; (5) political action by workmen and employers; (6) combinations of journeymen workers to secure better working conditions. The final fourteen pages of the chapter are devoted to the sixth of these categories, but in these pages are illustrations of employers' organizations to fix wages, associations of craftsmen for philanthropic purposes, employers' associations to control the labor market, to gain political aid for commerce or manufacturing, or to achieve educational ends (pp. 201-205).

Among the persistent problems of the final chapter appear problems of absenteeism, of labor monopoly, of employer liability. It seems clear that from the beginning of our history the government was more on the alert to curb combinations of workers than of employers and was zealous to protect the property rights of the employer. Nevertheless, the illustrations so thickly scattered through this volume show a surprising amount of mobility among skilled artisans as well as high rewards for their labor in spite of regulations intended to restrain their movements and limit their wages.

That this is an important work there can be no question, but the student must work out from the material it so abundantly supplies his own answers to the questions he brings to it. Not even in the final chapter does Professor Morris present the results of his research in summarized form in such a way as to show trends during two centuries or as to characterize different sections of the country or different industries. Perhaps he believes that this cannot be done, and he better than anyone else should know what questions his material will answer.

Wellesley College

ELIZABETH DONNAN

REMEMBRANCE OF AMHERST: AN UNDERGRADUATE'S DIARY, 1846-1848. By *William Gardiner Hammond*. Edited by *George F. Whicher*. (New York: Columbia University Press. 1946. Pp. viii, 307. \$3.00.)

This book depicts a period, a place, and a person. The time is the late 1840's; the place, a New England college; the person, a precocious youth whose development vividly reflects both the times and his immediate surroundings.

The writer of the journal, William Gardiner Hammond, scion of a long-established prosperous New England family, entered Amherst College as a seventeen-year-old sophomore one hundred years ago this fall, and at once set himself the task of recording the growth of a student's mind. In addition to his journal he kept a "chronicon"—a "registry of time spent." The passages from the daily journal here published cover the period from October, 1846, to April, 1848.

Amherst College had at the time five professors, two tutors, and 120 students. It was an idealistic country college, "a citadel of Congregational orthodoxy." Hammond describes the methods of teaching of the different professors as well as the subject matter of the courses of study—Greek, Latin, mathematics, and natural science, the latter exceptionally well presented by Professor Ebenezer S. Snell and by the eminent geologist-president, Edward Hitchcock.

But it is not so much the substance of the curriculum as the dedication of this youth to the life of the mind which his journal reveals. Hammond had a profound respect for learning and a determination to attain it. The amount of hard work he put into each course was exceeded only by the amount of time he spent in serious reading apart from his lessons. One engaging characteristic of the journal is his delight in the discovery of his own growing powers.

Next to high scholarship the faculty valued the ability to "speak persuasively" in public. To this end there were literary "exhibitions," declamations, and "incessant contests of forensic skill." The importance attached to effective debate was such that on the day when Daniel Webster and Rufus Choate were to argue a case at the courthouse in Northampton, classes in Amherst College were excused to enable the students to attend. Young Hammond's appraisal of the relative merits of the orators illustrates his independence of judgment: Choate's "plea was a more finished performance than Webster's, and in all respects better, but it was evidently his *best*, while Webster showed that he possessed a great deal more power than he employed." One finds here the unfolding of a literary, or rather, a linguistic mind, exploring the masterpieces of criticism and creative writing. Which leads to the one striking limitation of his intellectual grasp, namely, a conspicuous lack of interest in mathematics and the natural sciences. There are, I think, two reasons for this: first, the condescension of the classical student for natural science, characteristic of the period; and second, the prevalent use of science, to which Hammond conceded "many amusing and interesting facts," to point a moral, or to support religious beliefs. This common practice was repugnant

to a young man who remained unmoved by evangelical fervor even during the period immediately preceding the great revival of 1850.

Although his recreations were chiefly intellectual, Hammond enjoyed the out-of-doors. There were undergraduate games, of course, a hundred years ago, but no sports in the modern sense. Instead, he walked, with or without companions, immense distances; and there was sawing and bringing up wood for the open fireplace, the only means of heating college rooms even in zero weather.

For the Amherst antiquarian there are many sidelights on the village life with its lyceum lectures, its cattle shows, its hospitable homes and their gracious inhabitants. And to read Hammond's appreciation of the qualities of his classmate, Julius H. Seelye, warms the heart of one who remembers that great college president. He says: "Seelye is a man of no ordinary mold, uniting in greatest abundance the virtues and talents of the head and heart. Not a man in our class is as *strong* a character as he."

The editor's notes at the end of the volume, especially the detailed references to obscure books and articles to which Hammond alludes, are a source of particular interest to a student of the period. As a conclusion to this ably edited volume, there is an excellent index.

Washington, D. C.

MILLCENT TODD BINGHAM

SEARGENT S. PRENTISS: WHIG ORATOR OF THE OLD SOUTH. By Dallas C. Dickey. [Southern Biography Series.] (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press. 1945. Pp. ix, 422. \$4.00.)

THIS biography of Seargent S. Prentiss is a worthy addition to the "Southern Biography Series." The filial *A Memoir of S. S. Prentiss* (1855) by George L. Prentiss and the eulogistic *The Life and Times of Seargent Smith Prentiss* (1883) by Joseph D. Shields lack objectivity in treatment and do not present Prentiss in the perspective of his times. As Prentiss was famous primarily as an orator, it is fortunate that this biography should be written by a professor of speech. Mr. Dickey makes it clear why Prentiss' style of oratory was so popular one hundred years ago when there was such an exuberant, unbounded faith in the destiny of the American people.

The author has discovered no new major sources of private letters and papers, but he has found new materials on the life of Prentiss as a student at Bowdoin College, and his use of legal records in Vicksburg sheds light on Prentiss as one of the most distinguished lawyers of Mississippi. By all odds the most valuable additions to our understanding of Prentiss come from the effective use of the newspapers of Mississippi and Louisiana.

In this biography we see again the attractions of the West to an ambitious young man from New England, and how settlement in the Southwest led to his acceptance of the southern way of life and to the defense of its "peculiar in-

stitution." The famous disputed Mississippi Congressional election of 1837-1838 is discussed in detail, but does not appreciably improve upon previous treatments of it. The prominent part he took in support of the Whig candidates in the presidential campaigns of the 1840's and in the contest over the repudiation of Mississippi bonds is worth recalling, but it leaves one somewhat skeptical of the power of oratory to sway voters in contrast to the power of economic interests. The Democrats appealed more successfully to the larger population in the poorer sections of the state far removed from the wealthy Mississippi River counties.

Mr. Dickey presents a well-rounded, appreciative picture of the character and personality of this brilliant, cultivated Yankee who settled in Mississippi and ended his career in New Orleans. However, he does not gloss over the serious defects in his character which undoubtedly contributed to his untimely death. The style is clear and interesting, but not distinguished.

Hood College

JAMES BYRNE RANCK

GENERAL GEORGE CROOK: HIS AUTOBIOGRAPHY. Edited and annotated by *Martin F. Schmitt*. (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press. 1946. Pp. xviii, 326. \$3.00.)

"Nov. 4, 1886. Today 34 years ago I left New York for San Francisco to join my regiment. Went to see John L. Sullivan's exhibition of the noble art" (p. 267). In this casual fashion General George Crook referred in his diary to the beginning of a military career that was packed with adventure and hard campaigning to a degree that is probably not surpassed in all the annals of the United States Army.

Fresh from West Point, he went to the Pacific Coast in 1852. Thereafter followed eight years of fighting savage Indians, establishing military posts, marching in heat and in snow, and hunting big game. He loved to hunt, and at times it was his only means of food supply.

During the Civil War, as commander of a regiment of Ohio troops, he "burned out" an entire West Virginia county to rid it of bushwhackers. He fought at Second Bull Run, in Tennessee, in the Shenandoah Valley, and at Appomattox. He was brevetted brigadier general and major general of the United States Army. He is best known as an Indian fighter during the two decades after Appomattox. In the 1870's and again in the 1880's he subdued the Apaches in Arizona. In the interim he campaigned against the Sioux in the Yellowstone River country.

His autobiography ends with his defeat at the Battle of the Rosebud, in June, 1876—a defeat which the stubborn old trooper never did admit. Mr. Schmitt has completed the story of his life (to his death in 1890) from his diary and various other sources. The autobiography is well edited, and the account of the remainder of his life is written better than Crook wrote his autobiography.

The autobiography, unknown to historians until rediscovered by the editor in the library of the Army War College in Washington in 1942, adds relatively little

to the history of our Indian wars. It certainly does not add to the renown of the United States Army. Only infrequently is there praise of any man or any thing. Crook found fault with most frontier civilians, with his troops, with his fellow officers, and with his superiors. He did occasionally put in a kind word for the Indians and often worked fearlessly in their behalf. Indian agents he held in contempt and charged that they, together with Indian traders, provoked nearly all Indian wars.

The book contains four good maps and sixteen interesting illustrations.

Hardin-Simmons University

RUPERT N. RICHARDSON

THE CHICAGO TRIBUNE: ITS FIRST HUNDRED YEARS. Volume II, 1865-1880. By Philip Kinsley. (Chicago: Chicago Tribune, 1945. Pp. xviii, 349, viii. \$3.00.)

IN a second volume Philip Kinsley carries forward his history of the *Chicago Tribune* for the years 1865-1880, years crowded with geographic changes in the United States, with inflation, depression, and unemployment, with labor unrest and intellectual upsurges. The period is one of expansion and growing influence for the paper at a time when Chicago was extending her economic and spiritual powers beyond her own gates. Consistently the *Tribune* could boast a circulation as large as that of all the other English-language newspapers of the city. Circulation figures skyrocketed from an original 400 in 1847 to a daily average of 46,999 in May, 1865. By 1880 the Sunday issue alone approximated 50,000. This growth was, of course, just cause of pride, which the editor accepted as "a token of improving activity in all departments of trade and proof of the continued growth and prosperity of Chicago." "No first class journal," said he, "equals THE TRIBUNE in circulation, and it is doubtful if any two together have as large an advertising patronage" (p. 337). Throughout, its advertising appeal grew steadily, and even in the depression year of 1877 it attained a new high in the number of those using its columns. In 1877, too, it established its London bureau, and in the same year it gained new readers among women by initiating a household department. That it dared to engage in new undertakings in a year when panic stalked the country may explain, in part, why it forged ahead of its contemporaries.

Before the eighties a "gastronomical" column offered suggestions as to how to prepare foods and to build good menus. Woodcut illustrations and physiographic and meteorological maps illustrated the progressiveness of the *Tribune* promoters, and a political almanac heralded the day of the more recent newspaper yearbooks. Reviews of important books, comment on current scientific developments and upon musical and dramatic events reflected an interest in the refinements of life and in intellectual advance. During the period described by Mr. Kinsley the *Tribune* began its advocacy of spelling reform, which it has never abandoned.

In politics the *Tribune* was, on the whole, Republican of the regular brand.

although from 1865 to 1874 it was under the influence of Alfred Cowles and Horace White, free-trader and liberal. In 1865 Joseph Medill had resigned as editor in chief, after a ten-year connection with the paper, because he could not agree with White and Cowles. He returned in November, 1874, with a controlling interest in stock and until 1899 dominated its news and editorial columns. During the White-Cowles interregnum, the *Tribune* supported Horace Greeley for President and hit out boldly and fearlessly at Grant. At other times it came out for the remonetization of silver, a tariff, temperance reform, and the recognition of the legal rights of the Negro. An incipient isolationism was reflected in its proud boast during the Russo-Turkish war that the United States was indeed blessed to be separated geographically from such "disturbed and warlike nations between whom exist universal jealousy and universal hate" (p. 252).

In economic philosophy the paper on the whole mirrored the mind of "Big Business." Strikes were "communistically" inspired. The members of labor unions were held to be "communists," who were to be shunned as if smitten by the plague. The manner of presentation which Mr. Kinsley employs is nowhere more disappointing than in his chronicling of the labor controversies of the seventies. There is no tie-up of episodes leading to a great climax, and the interrelationship of events is ignored. This failure to cement the fragments of his important story is the chief defect in Mr. Kinsley's work. It is, perhaps, not so serious as in Volume I. A conclusion, or summary, would serve to leave the reader less suspended than he now is.

University of Chicago

BESSIE LOUISE PIERCE

LAND TITLE ORIGINS: A TALE OF FORCE AND FRAUD. By *Alfred N. Chandler*. (New York: Robert Schalkenbach Foundation. 1945. Pp. xvi, 550. \$3.00.)

As the title intimates, this volume is virtually an attack upon the general United States system of land titles. In justification Mr. Chandler claims that originally the majority of landholdings were secured fraudulently, and therefore they are now legally void. Evidently a follower of Henry George, he does not advocate governmental seizure of the land itself, but rather the absorption through taxation of the rents which have arisen as a result of general social progress. An estimate of the economic implications of Mr. Chandler's theory does not properly fall within the scope of this review, which will be restricted to the historical value of this volume as an account of the origin and development of land titles in the United States.

Even a cursory examination would show that Mr. Chandler has done a thorough piece of work. Not attempting the almost impossible task of going to the multitudinous sources, he has made use of all the more important secondary authorities, and the extensive bibliography shows with what discrimination he has

selected his references. In general, the facts he has culled from so wide a range are accurately set down. But in such an extensive list of facts erroneous statements, and especially mistaken inferences, inevitably creep in, and this is true of the present volume. For example, Mr. Chandler ascribes the ultimate origin of titles in the American colonies to the English crown, and this is correct. Further, he states that the crown held this land as a personal domain. Actually, in theory at least, the crown held the land as a trustee for the English people, although the Stuart kings appear to have regarded the American domain as their personal property. Still another instance of mistaken inferences is the author's conclusion that quit rents under Lord Baltimore were the origin of the present system of ground rents in Maryland. The facts are, that the quit rent was a feudal and perpetual charge due the proprietor, which the Maryland Assembly summarily abolished in 1780. Undoubtedly the quit rents gave a precedent for the ground rents which are so characteristic of the Maryland system of landholding, but the latter is merely a form of rent, limited to a definite period, and payable to a private person, just as any other charge upon the land.

Did space permit, other examples might be cited of erroneous statements which are the result of a necessarily cursory survey of the individual items in so extensive a field. Unfortunately it is impossible to determine whether the responsibility for such errors is to be assigned to the author or to the authorities from which he secured his material, inasmuch as there are no footnotes and obviously they would not be practical in view of the many facts cited. Another grave defect in a book of this type is the lack of adequate summaries and the failure to draw clear conclusions at the end of the several chapters. Nor is there an adequate concluding chapter. This omission is all the more regrettable in view of the imposing array of facts which the author has marshalled for the reader. Indeed, a really comprehensive conclusion would have been of far more value than the epilogue which includes a series of quotations, ranging from the Book of Leviticus to Dr. Sun Yat-sen, in support of the author's theories.

There is a comprehensive and usable index, and an excellent table of contents. Usually the arrangement of the chapters is logical, but why chapter xxvii on the "Public Domain" should follow chapter xxvi on the "Oregon Country" is not clear. Apparently the author does not grasp the significance of the original public domain in the Old Northwest, as a testing ground in which federal land policy was worked out before it was extended so successfully to the vast areas beyond the Mississippi. Altogether, from the historical point of view Mr. Chandler has given a careful and usually an accurate compilation of facts with regard to the origin of land titles. Such conclusions as are clearly stated, however, would be subject to much controversy and question.

University of Cincinnati

BEVERLEY W. BOND, JR.

THEODORE ROOSEVELT AND THE PROGRESSIVE MOVEMENT. By George E. Mowry, May Treat Morrison Professor of American History in Mills College. (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1946. Pp. viii, 405. \$4.00.)

To read Professor Mowry's book is almost to be persuaded that he had a personal part in that interesting episode in American history about which he writes. This is not to say that there may not be variations from what others may have experienced or observed in connection with the Progressive party movement which represented the sharp breaking up of the Republican party after President Taft's renomination in Chicago in 1912. However, Professor Mowry's book is well and clearly written. His style is smooth and pleasing.

The author treats adequately the close and personal ties that existed between Roosevelt and President Taft; the nomination of the latter in 1908 for the simple reason that he was Roosevelt's choice; Taft's ineptness with Roosevelt, particularly with reference to certain possible cabinet appointments; and the incipient coolness between the two men even before Roosevelt left Washington, which he did almost with precipitancy. I remember asking Colonel Roosevelt after the 1912 campaign why he had decided upon Taft as his successor. I was interested because Charles Evans Hughes had been my own choice and before election day in 1908 I had come to the conclusion that I could not vote for Taft although we were both Roosevelt men. Roosevelt's reply to my question, in substance, was "Why, I never proposed a forward-looking measure in cabinet that Taft did not want me to take a more advanced position. I never doubted that he would follow my policies. My only concern was that he might go too far."

Roosevelt could not be blamed if Taft proved to be too easygoing and too little experienced in politics to win a place in the regard of the people that Roosevelt, upon his return from hunting big game in equatorial Africa, could not challenge. Taft had a habit of saying the wrong thing at the wrong time and place. His Winona speech, and his position on Canadian reciprocity, turned against him the farmers who, in the North, have never really been happy except when they could vote the Republican ticket. And then there was the famous "Norton letter" written by his secretary to Senator Dolliver of Iowa, to the effect that there would be no White House patronage except for docile Republicans which spilled more beans than could be scraped up in many a day.

There also was the famous Pinchot-Ballinger row. There can be no doubt that whatever the merits of that controversy it profoundly affected the politics of the country. I doubt whether Roosevelt himself ever went into the record of this controversy. It was the general attitude of Roosevelt partisans throughout the country to believe implicitly, as I did myself, everything that Pinchot said or *Collier's Weekly* printed. However, I came later to question my convictions. The author, in a footnote on page 74, in effect says that this was due to the fact that Gifford

Pinchot had opposed a plan of mine when I was Secretary of the Interior to transfer the National Forest Service to the Department of the Interior. This is not accurate. Gifford Pinchot and I had for each other a close friendship for a number of years that was not broken because of our differences over the *locus in quo* of *Forestry*.

In reading Henry F. Pringle's biography of Taft I caught in a footnote a question as to the justness of the popular verdict against Ballinger. I assigned two very able lawyers to work on the complete files in both Interior and Agriculture. Neither of these men had ever heard of Ballinger. Neither had any preconceived notions about the controversy and I was careful not to express my views. After an exhaustive search of the original records, they presented to me facts from which no other conclusion could be drawn than that there was much more to the Pinchot-Ballinger controversy than appeared upon the surface. Professor Mowry refers to an article in the *Saturday Evening Post* written by me. It would appear that while he chides me for lack of documentation of this he has not read the much fuller official finding which I signed and which is now in the files of the Interior Department. He appears to think that his own facts and conclusions are "well documented" by the citing of contemporaneous newspaper references.

However, so far as the Pinchot-Ballinger episode is concerned, there can be no doubt that it had a profound effect upon Theodore Roosevelt's mind. It was perhaps a determining factor in his decision to run as the Progressive candidate for President. I believe that Professor Mowry quite justly assesses all of the considerations that influenced Theodore Roosevelt in making this momentous decision. I suspect that it would be difficult to pick the exact moment when, in his own mind, Theodore Roosevelt found that his toes no longer touched bottom and that he was in for a swim. So the greatest political split in American history was on.

After 1912, even before going to Brazil, it was becoming more and more clear—despite many public protestations that the Progressive party must continue—that Theodore Roosevelt was becoming tired of the whole enterprise. And the author justly says Roosevelt was not a man who cared to run for public office in order to be defeated. However, he was too much of a politician not to know that there might be some trading power that he could use if he could only keep some sort of a Progressive party alive. He was too young a man to become an elder statesman when he gave over to Taft in 1908. He was still too young for that role in 1912. It was while he was in Brazil and thereafter that the grip of George W. Perkins on the Progressive party machinery became tighter and tighter.

In effect Perkins became the receiver of the Progressive party, not an unaccustomed role for a member of the firm of J. P. Morgan and Company. It was Perkins' idea that the Progressive National Convention should be held in Chicago simultaneously with that of the Republican party. Undoubtedly Perkins wanted to be in Chicago so that, if possible he might work out a trade with the Republicans—a trade, without the knowledge or approval of other Progressive leaders, with the

possible exception of Roosevelt himself. (Cf. Harold L. Ickes, "Who Killed the Progressive Party," *Am. Hist. Rev.*, XLVI [January, 1941], 306-37.)

Perkins had wanted Walter F. Brown of Ohio to be permanent chairman of the Progressive Convention. He had frankly said at an earlier meeting of the Progressive National Executive Committee that "We might want an experienced man who knows how to use the gavel." But Raymond Robins, the eloquent temporary chairman, was made permanent chairman and out of this practically unnoted episode history was hatched. Roosevelt was nominated for President on the Progressive ticket by acclamation at the auditorium before the first nominating speech had been made at the Republican Convention at the coliseum. Thus Perkins had no tricks left up his sleeve, although when Roosevelt declined to run he was able to find a foxhole from which to operate during the campaign.

As I have said, this book of Professor Mowry's is interesting and, in general, accurate, but I regard his treatment of the 1916 convention and of the subsequent campaign quite inadequate. I note that the author says in his preface: "This volume is not a history of the Progressive Party, a book which the author hopes to write some day." I would like to encourage that book.

Perhaps when Professor Mowry writes his promised further book he will give a more thorough exposition of what happened to the Progressive party and why.

Washington, D. C.

HAROLD L. ICKES

WARTIME RELATIONS OF THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT AND THE PUBLIC SCHOOLS, 1917-1918. By *Lewis Paul Todd*. (Teachers College, Columbia University, Contributions to Education, No. 907.) (New York: Bureau of Publications, Teachers College. 1945. Pp. xi, 240. \$3.15.)

THIS volume begins by pointing to "the grave problems that confront statesmen and educators in the years that lie before us" in the hope perhaps that the American people should have learned from the "last war" some lessons for the educational issues that were likely to emerge from the recent one. Implied in the study seems to be the question whether the American people learned anything educationally from their military experiences of 1917-1918.

The purpose of the study was to try to find answers to such questions as: What educational activities did the federal government engage in during the first World War? What use did that government make of the public schools in which twenty million boys and girls were then enrolled? What did the government in Washington do "to prepare America's youth for the days of peace that lay ahead? Was our leadership in Washington primarily interested in the exigencies of the moment, or was it concerned primarily with the broader implications of its educational activities?" Another reason for examining into federal relations to public education in that military crisis, "education is an integral part of a nation's life.

and responds, as do all other institutions, to any alterations in the social, economic, and political structure." From that statement of obvious and generally recognized principle in social and educational history, however, the author does note another fact, also well known, that the powers of the federal government had to be enlarged and strengthened. And he predicts that many of the new powers assumed by the federal government "to carry on the Second World War" must be retained, if "the disorganization that will inevitably follow" is to be met successfully.

The book summarizes very well the federal efforts for unity during the years 1917-1918—indoctrination and propaganda through the Creel Committee, the feverish devices to stimulate "patriotism in the schools," the efforts "to stem hysteria," the use of the schools to promote military efforts, of the school garden army and of schoolboys as laborers on farms, to increase the production of food. Some attention is given to efforts at conservation, through drives for the Liberty and Victory loans, the Junior Red Cross, and the salvaging of "such scrap as metals, leather, paper, horse-hair, bags, tinfoil, and peach pits to the value of \$1,650,000,000."

But, there was another side to the picture in 1917-1918 as was the case in the recent war. The work of the schools and of the education of high-school children was disrupted, and prewar standards of school attendance and restrictions on child labor were relaxed.

Problems of health and of juvenile delinquency became acute in the first as was to be the case in the second World War, a fact which shows that we did not learn our history well. Moreover, then as now there was an alarming shortage of teachers. Then as now competition with industry for salaries became a serious threat to education and the integrity of its standards. And then, as may be the case in these postwar years unless we profit by the lessons from the first World War, teachers fell under heavy suspicion and often under humiliating restrictions.

Among Dr. Todd's conclusions in this well-written and stimulating book are the need now for "greater agreement as to the function of education in a democracy," a more effective national agency "to coordinate the federal educational activities," the use of reason instead of appeal to emotion in promoting patriotism and "the democratic way of life," and unusual opportunities for steady and enlightened educational leadership in periods of dislocation and stress.

The concluding sentence in this book furnishes its central theme: "Our concern must be that the mistakes of a generation past are not repeated in the schools today." It is hoped that the warning does not come too late. Certainly there is constant warning in the truth that those who ignore the past are doomed to repeat its mistakes.

University of North Carolina

EDGAR W. KNIGHT

STEELWAYS OF NEW ENGLAND. By *Alvin F. Harlow*. (New York: Creative Age Press. 1945. Pp. 461. \$3.50.)

Mr. Harlow's most recent study of the development of transportation in the United States will delight thousands of New Englanders, particularly those whose memories carry well back into the last century when the railroads dominated the field of overland transportation and exercised a hold on the popular imagination hard for the rising generation to appreciate. Many a New England boy forty, fifty, or more years ago spent happy hours watching the trains thunder past with their highly polished engines and brightly colored cars while the names of the great New England roads, as well as those of their famous trains, were household words. There is glamour and color aplenty in the story of the New England railroads, and Mr. Harlow does it full justice, not, however, at the expense of the more serious side of the story.

The beginnings of New England railroading were probably not very different from those of other early regional railroad developments in the United States. There was the first hesitant interest in the new mode of transportation, the acrimonious controversy over the relative merits of turnpikes, canals, and railroads, rural objections to granting a right of way, the difficulty of securing capital, and the technical problems of grading, track, and motive power. In discussing these problems the author brings out the growing interest of private capital, particularly Boston capital, in the railroads, the local and individual rivalries, the trials and tribulations of the early railroaders, and the vigorous efforts made to induce the several New England legislatures to grant charters and, more important, financial assistance. A deserved tribute is paid to the work of the engineers who surveyed and built the roads.

It was with the completion of the Boston and Lowell, Boston and Providence, and Boston and Worcester, all in 1835, that New England railroading really got under way. These roads turned at once to steam locomotion and proved so successful that the late thirties and forties witnessed a veritable railroad craze throughout the region. By the sixties the New England railroad network was pretty well delineated, a crowning achievement being the completion of the Hoosac Tunnel, the "Great Bore," in 1875. Mergers and consolidations, already underway, produced by the turn of the century some six well-defined systems, a number subsequently reduced by further consolidation, or by the domination of old New England systems by outside interests. Into the rather detailed history of these mergers with their sometimes rather dubious financial operations the author goes at considerable length. It is often a bit wearying to the reader but undoubtedly essential to an understanding of New England railroad history. Throughout the years there went on a steady improvement in rolling stock and equipment, in the comfort and elegance of railroad travel. Only in adopting the telegraph for train dispatching apparently were the New England roads notably backward. There it took the disaster at Revere, as late as 1871, to convince them.

Steelways of New England is primarily a history of the New England railroads with a concluding chapter devoted to the astonishing part New Englanders and New England capital have played in the building of the nation's railroads beyond the borders of New England. Only incidentally does it discuss the social, economic, and political consequences for the region of the coming of the railroads. For this the author can scarcely be blamed as it was not within the scope of his work. More serious from the standpoint of the reader is the complete absence of maps which would have helped even the native New Englander. On the other hand, the book is admirably illustrated. Although the study is lacking in footnotes, an extensive bibliography indicates thorough and painstaking research.

Dartmouth College

W. R. WATERMAN

HISTOIRE DU CANADA. By *François-Xavier Garneau*. Huitième édition entièrement revue et augmentée par son petit-fils, *Hector Garneau*. In nine volumes. (Montreal: Editions de l'Arbre. 1944-46. Pp. 284, 300, 303, 298, 316, 317, 230, 194, 295.)

THIS eighth edition of a century-old classic is disappointing for what it omits and for what it repeats. Gone is the magisterial preface by Gabriel Honataux in the fifth edition, which was reviewed in the *American Historical Review*, XIX (1914), 382; XXVI (1921), 556, and of which the sixth and seventh editions were little more than reissues. Gone is the fine *discours préliminaire* of François-Xavier Garneau, which first appeared in 1845. Gone is his grandson's enlightening introduction of 1913, apparently because its tone was tuned to many passages in the text that are also gone. What has happened to these passages is highly interesting because of their nature. They reflect the attitude of old Garneau toward the church, which was one of sturdy independence. They were in the first edition but were later suppressed. The editor prided himself on restoring them in the fifth edition, but now that he is himself grown old they are again carefully purged from the text. The record of the church in Canada is on the whole far too fine to stand in need of such subservience. As might be expected of an editor who thus reverses himself, a large number of his own additions to the text in this edition are avowedly inserted to give *une part plus étendue aux affaires religieuses*.

Age has withered the scholarship of Hector Garneau. In preparing the fifth edition he performed a feat of learning. Having kept abreast of the rapidly swelling literature on the subject and delved in the masses of manuscript material that had become available, he corrected the text where it seemed advisable, carefully indicating the changes by crochets, and he supplied an elaborate apparatus of footnotes and more than a hundred big pages of appendixes. But in preparing the eighth edition the editor has failed to incorporate the voluminous fruits of research that have been published subsequently. About the only significant revision is that of the roles of Montcalm and Vaudreuil, which could and should have been made

in 1913. The worst of what is still repeated is old Garneau's treatment of the period from the British conquest to the awakening of modern French Canadian nationalism, which occurred about the time that he was born. Growing up in an atmosphere charged with racial strife and writing when it was most intense, he carried the present back into the past and gave a most tortured account of the period just mentioned, his facts being as mistaken as his interpretation.

In the mechanical job of editor, the grandson has fallen from the high standard he upheld a generation ago. Now as then he has inserted crochets to indicate his own additions to the text, but a careful collation of the fifth and eighth editions reveals passages that were Hector's becoming his grandfather's and vice versa. To attract the popular reader the editor has abolished footnotes and appendixes by incorporating them into the text as smoothly as he could. In doing so, he has generally omitted the sources cited in the fifth edition, which is unpardonable when they are manuscripts. The bibliographies, of which there is one at the end of each chapter, are not up to date; and though some recent titles are included there is little or no evidence that the editor has used them. The outstanding advantage of this edition is that it is in nine convenient little volumes instead of two large cumbersome ones.

University of Minnesota

A. L. BURT

DIPLOMATIC CORRESPONDENCE OF THE UNITED STATES:
CANADIAN RELATIONS, 1784-1860. Volume III, 1836-1848: DOCUMENTS 1193-1853. Selected and arranged by *William R. Manning*. Volume IV, 1849-1860: DOCUMENTS 1854-2460. Selected and arranged by *William R. Manning*, assisted by *Mary A. Gillis*. (Washington: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace; distributed by International Documents Service, Columbia University Press, New York. 1943, 1945. Pp. xliv, 1189; xlv, 891. \$5.00 each.)

THESE weighty tomes mark the end of an important contribution to documentary historical publication. The last of four pertaining to Canada, they are worthy companions to the late Dr. Manning's previous selections on the independence of Latin America and subsequent inter-American affairs. The three series, now comprising nineteen volumes, compare favorably in editorial excellence with the best of Hunter Miller, Clarence E. Carter, and E. Wilder Spaulding. They go far to fill the gap in our published diplomatic correspondence that once stretched from 1828 to 1861.

Dr. Manning's basic plan has been described in this journal before (*Am. Hist. Rev.*, XLVII [April, 1942], 652). The volumes under review show no important change in policy. State Department records contribute most of the documents, although the editor has pushed beyond the familiar instructions, dispatches, and notes to and from the British legation to exploit the correspondence of consuls

and special agents. The transfer to Washington in 1939 of our London legation files brought to light some new papers and better versions of others already known. Material has been included from the Navy Department archives, from photostats of the British Foreign Office series, and from private letters in the Library of Congress. No personal manuscripts outside of Washington were utilized. Printed works, either congressional reports or writings of statesmen, were resorted to when the original copy could not be found. All items are reproduced in full except where they deal with non-Canadian topics or possess voluminous enclosures. In every case the nature of the omission is indicated. The documents are arranged chronologically under two headings: those initiated at the State Department and those received there. The second class occupies more than two thirds of the pages. The index and elaborate cross references are very useful.

Few new interpretations are likely to stem from these volumes. Some fresh material, to be sure, is presented; but most of the contents have been either printed before or used by authors in Professor Shotwell's admirable and recently completed "Relations of Canada and the United States" series. Nevertheless, this is a worth-while enterprise, intelligently conceived and splendidly executed. It makes readily available in one place with full explanatory notes the most important documents on every aspect of Canadian-American relations and on some issues which, like the Oregon boundary dispute, constitute major chapters in the history of our foreign policy.

At a time when similar documentary collections are urgently needed, it may seem ungracious, if not inconsistent, to say more. Yet a careful perusal of these volumes strengthened the conviction of this reviewer on the inherent limitations of diplomatic correspondence. Such data, even under the multiarchival approach, provide only a foundation. Ignorance, loyalty, fear of publication, and concealment of motives cause diplomats to leave much unsaid. Important names are sometimes omitted and pertinent papers destroyed. The relative part played by the President, Secretary of State, or Senate leaders cannot be demonstrated; and evidence of public opinion or private pressure must be sought elsewhere. These pages reveal correspondents abroad to be fuller and franker than their superiors at home but less able to gauge the mainsprings of policy. Then, too, negotiations are often conducted orally; and despite Dr. Manning's diligent search, the documents for the Webster-Ashburton and Marcy-Elgin conversations are still scanty. To a foundation of diplomatic correspondence we must add a fuller knowledge of congressional personalities and committees, a clearer appreciation of the interrelation of domestic and foreign problems, and a keener insight into those inherited or cultivated prejudices and sympathies that determine the actions of individuals and groups, if not the nation as a whole. Not until that is done will the historian of American diplomacy have come of age.

Harvard University

RICHARD W. LEOPOLD

AMERICAN EXPANSION IN HAWAII, 1842-1898. By *Sylvester K. Stevens*. (Harrisburg: Archives Publishing Company of Pennsylvania. 1945. Pp. viii, 320. \$4.50.)

THIS book does what it sets out to do: it tells the story of American expansion in Hawaii from 1842, when Daniel Webster, as Secretary of State, enunciated what Stevens calls the "Tyler Doctrine," through all the phases of a declining monarchy, growing sugar interests, acquisition of Pearl Harbor, and the aggressive leadership of a minority that knew what it wanted, and wanted either annexation to the United States or a republic. In this volume one may question the amount of emphasis given to certain sections; one cannot quarrel with the obvious sincerity, thoroughness, and competence of the author's work.

The "Tyler Doctrine" is the leitmotif of the book, a doctrine that involved two points: (1) though the United States possessed a very large share of the intercourse with the islands, it sought no "peculiar" advantages, no control over the Hawaiian government; (2) it would protest the action of any other nation that adopted a contrary policy. Whether or not this doctrine was strictly adhered to under the expansive programs of later secretaries like Marcy or Blaine, for instance, is a question not resolved by the author; however, he presents the evidence on which the reader may form an opinion.

Mr. Stevens is particularly good in summarizing Hawaii's place in the international scheme of things. There was certainly great danger to Hawaii in the flux of the forties and fifties from the activities of France and England. There was great activity in and around California; the whaling ships were in full sway; China had been opened up; Admiral Perry concluded a treaty with Japan; and it was not at all certain just which nation might take over the islands. The "Tyler Doctrine" was, therefore, extremely important for the Hawaiian Islands. Minister Everett, at London, after discussing the matter with Lord Aberdeen, secretary of state for foreign affairs, reported that Aberdeen had "signified to the French Ambassador that England could not agree to any encroachment on the Hawaiian Islands, and that England stood ready to guarantee Hawaiian independence." When Lord Paulet forced the Hawaiian monarchy to give over the government to a British commission in 1843, the doctrine met the test. Rear Admiral Thomas, in charge of the British Pacific squadron, "restored the flag of the King." From this time, there was a British-French agreement on Hawaii "never to take possession," a treaty which the United States refused to sign. But this treaty formed the basis for international objection to later activities.

Mr. Stevens treats the economic aspects of the relations between Hawaii and the United States in excellent fashion, and brings out the significance of the Reciprocity Treaty signed in 1875, with its famous Article IV. The Reciprocity Treaty proved to be so extremely profitable for Hawaii that the planters, in order to take advantage of it, began to import laborers. This, in a measure, was the real beginning of the so-called racial problem in Hawaii. Mr. Stevens' position is that with

this treaty and its renewal, which provided for exclusive rights to Pearl Harbor, and with the gradual weakening of the monarchy, together with some unfortunate acts on the part of Kalakaua and Liliuokalani, American control of the islands became inevitable.

The last three chapters are especially significant in view of the current movement for Hawaii's admission to the union as a state. These chapters are "Manifest Destiny and the 1893 Revolution," "The Annexation Fiasco," and "Annexing a Republic." This book shows clearly that "what happened in January, 1893, as the result of the conniving of a small group of determined men, was but the logic of Hawaiian history for some fifty years," and the author, while admitting the high idealism of the Cleveland-Gresham administration, analyzes the Blount Report as follows: "The facts in this indictment were unquestionably true and agree with independent analyses from other sources. The report and the administration erred, however, in failing to understand the fundamental and long developed causes of the Revolution of 1893. Viewed in proper historical perspective, the revolt was inevitable."

This story is an interesting and a complicated one. Mr. Stevens makes clear the fact that Hawaii became American territory, not because of a single factor but because of a whole concatenation of events.

University of Hawaii

GREGG M. SINCLAIR

LATIN-AMERICAN CIVILIZATION: COLONIAL PERIOD. By *Bailey W. Diffie*, with the assistance of Justine Whitfield Diffie. (Harrisburg; Stackpole Sons. 1945. Pp. 812. \$4.50.)

THIS book provides an extensive and detailed treatment of the whole period of Latin-American colonial history. Its general organization is clearly indicated by the headings of its three main divisions: Book One, "Foundation of Latin America" (pp. 1-312); Book Two, "Evolution of Colonial Latin America to 1810" (pp. 313-629); Book Three, "Colonial Brazil" (pp. 633-753). Since Latin-American civilization is the author's principal concern, the narrative and biographical phases of colonial history are reduced to the barest outline in order that justice may be done to the economic, social, and cultural aspects of the period.

In keeping with current historical practice, Diffie's book is utterly devoid of literary merit. Its chief virtue is that it brings together in one volume a mass of details from a large number of primary and secondary sources. Particularly noteworthy is the successful synthesis of material derived from recent monographs and articles dealing with the economic, social, religious, and intellectual life of the colonies.

It is probably inevitable that the various chapters of a book so large and comprehensive should be uneven in quality and value. In my opinion, the first five chapters of Book Two (chapters xvi-xx) represent a contribution to the economic

history of colonial Latin America. In comparison with the rest of the book, these chapters display a deeper research and a greater originality of interpretation. Chapters xvi and xvii are concerned with colonial agriculture; chapters xviii, xix, and xx (written in collaboration with Harry Bernstein) deal with mining, manufacturing and trade, and trade policy and reform to 1810. Second in importance to these opening chapters of Book Two are the 120 pages of Book Three, which provide a very full and satisfactory account of colonial Brazil.

Diffie's opinion of the American Indians is anything but favorable. He considers them bloodthirsty, immoral, and culturally deficient. He says (pp. 7-8), "For those who have looked on the Indians as plaster saints, some of the following pages will be a surprise. . . . The prevalence of drinking, incest, adultery, promiscuity, and homosexuality among the pre-Conquest Indians is emphasized here . . . only because too many writers have elaborated on the 'corruption' of the Indians by the Europeans." In fairness to the Indians, one is inclined to doubt the propriety of judging them by European standards. Furthermore, it is common knowledge that these same vices had a high incidence among the European conquerors.

As far as the culture of the American Indians is concerned, there is a middle ground between the extravagant claims of some anthropologists and the harsh judgment of Diffie when he says (p. 225), "The various potteries of America, as well as the work in metals, wood and stone, are not even comparable to the works produced in Europe." Even the highways of the Incas do not impress Mr. Diffie because they were suitable only for traffic on foot. He does not, however, dwell at great length on any important road building operations by the Spaniards.

Perhaps the underlying cause of Mr. Diffie's quarrel with the anthropologists is that he does not understand their point of view. For example, if he had been more familiar with cultural anthropology, he would not have been surprised that the Maya used the corbeled rather than the true arch (p. 222). Instead, he would recall that the corbeled arch is the natural architectural form employed by people who build with large blocks of stone (the Mycenaeans, to cite one case), whereas the true arch is a logical development in an architecture which employs bricks and small stones (Babylonians, Etruscans, Romans).

These minor criticisms are by no means intended to obscure the plain fact that Mr. Diffie has produced a book which will be a standard work in the Latin-American colonial field for many years to come. Although its use as a textbook may be restricted by the lack of a companion volume for the republican period, it will certainly be employed for reference reading in introductory courses and as a handbook for graduate students.

Washington, D. C.

TOM B. JONES

* * * *Other Recent Publications* * * *

General History

THE CLOCK OF HISTORY. By *Alvin Johnson*. (New York, W. W. Norton, 1946, pp. 253, \$3.00.) Mr. Alvin Johnson's unassuming collection of essays entitled *The Clock of History* is a readable and rewarding little book, full of knowledge and wit. Written as editorials for the *Bulletin* of the New School for Social Research, the brief component parts fit nicely together in larger units grouped under a score of headings. These range from "Our Constitution: Perfection?" to "The Political Circus" and "The Scholar's Function." The continuity and ease of treatment in these originally topical pieces show a well-balanced and admirably coherent mind, whose mastery of the art of simplification for lay audiences never works against the claims of subtlety or the true difficulties of a subject. It is especially pleasing to see how the author uses the whole sweep of history, from ancient times to the latest anthropological relations, in order to illustrate and enliven his generalities. Mr. Johnson's theses, needless to say, belong to the tradition of the free intellect and the conscious republican; but with him that tradition is practical and militant. Every word, be it concrete or abstract, reveals the man endowed with political sense as well as social conscience. Indeed, his utterances in this book simply broaden to the limits of the nation or the world the meaning behind his work as director of the New School for over a quarter century.

JACQUES BARZUN

SCOPE AND METHOD IN SOCIAL AND POLITICAL THEORY. An inaugural lecture delivered before the University of Oxford on 9 November 1945 by *G. D. H. Cole*, Chichele Professor of Social and Political Theory. (New York, Oxford University Press, 1945, pp. 16, 70 cents.)

TRANSACTIONS OF THE ROYAL HISTORICAL SOCIETY. [Fourth Series, Volume XXVIII.] (London, Royal Historical Society, 1946, pp. v, 174, 15s.) This latest volume of the *Transactions* of the Royal Historical Society is an exceptionally interesting group of papers. The range is wide, from the presidential address of Professor Stenton on early English history to Professor Bellot's on the writing of American history in the last seventy-five years. So that no one of the papers may be overlooked by American scholars in various fields the list follows: F. M. Stenton, "Early English History, 1895-1920" (presidential address); H. G. Richardson, "The Commons and Medieval Politics"; Miss K. L. Wood-Legh, "Some Aspects of the History of Chantries in the Later Middle Ages"; Mrs. Helen Suggett, "The Use of French in England in the Later Middle Ages" (Alexander Prize Essay); W. H. B. Court, "Industrial Organization and Economic Progress in the Eighteenth-Century Midlands"; W. P. Morrell, "The Transition to Christianity in the South Pacific"; H. Hale Bellot, "Some Aspects of the Recent History of American Historiography." The volume is prefaced by an admirable tribute by Charles Johnson to the late Hubert Hall.

BRITISH CONTRIBUTIONS TO TURKISH STUDIES. By *Harold Bowen*. (London, Longmans, Green, 1946? pp. 63, 1s.) "Mr. Bowen has devoted twenty years to the study of Orientalism. This essay is a study of the impact of Ottoman civilization on British culture from the sixteenth century, when to Europeans the Middle East was a remote and almost legendary world, to our own time."

THE PIONEER PERIOD OF EUROPEAN RAILROADS. A Tribute to Mr. Thomas W. Streeter. [Kress Library of Business and Economics, Publication No. 3.] (Boston, Baker Library, Harvard Graduate School of Business Administration, 1946, pp. vi, 71, 50 cents.) This brochure contains a brief sketch by Professor A. H. Cole of the pioneer period of railroads in England, France, and the United States. The rest, some fifty-five pages, is a bibliography of material in the Streeter gift. All items deal with early railroad history in Europe.

THE DEVELOPMENT OF PUBLIC SERVICES IN WESTERN EUROPE, 1660-1930. By *Ernest Barker*. (New York, Oxford University Press, 1944, pp. x, 93, \$1.50.) Students of administrative history will be delighted with this interesting and informative little book which the author describes as "a tentative and preliminary study, based on a comparative method, of the development of administration, and the public services generally, in the three main countries of Western Europe since 1660." It is a reprint of a portion of the fifth volume of *European Civilization*, edited by Edward Eyre and published by the Oxford University Press in 1935-39. Beginning with an account of the growth of administrative ideas and institutions in the central and local governments of France, Prussia, and England, the author proceeds to an examination of the methods by which the three countries have performed the four major public functions of conscription, taxation, the social services, and education. Points of similarity and difference are noted and explained in the light of the historical development of each country. While the author finds that historic tradition, geography, and social forces have differentiated the administrative system of one country from another, he concludes that "each has produced some institution, or some method of public service, which has served as an example to others; and each, in turn, has borrowed from each. There has been a rivalry of methods, but it has not been unfriendly: one country has studied, adopted, or tried to improve the methods of another; and all have combined, however unconsciously, to promote the growth of a common European standard of administration and public service." That this common standard has many applications to public administration in the United States will be apparent to American readers of Professor Barker's book, of whom there should be many. LLOYD M. SHORT

AN INTERNATIONAL CONVENTION AGAINST ANTISEMITISM. By *Mark Vishniak*. (New York, Research Institute of the Jewish Labor Committee, 1946, pp. viii, 135, \$2.50.) "The author presents the legislation against and in favor of Jews from Roman codes and papal bulls through emancipation to international protection of Jewish minorities. He discusses the legal possibilities of an international struggle against the dangers of antisemitic hate-propaganda and of racial hatred in general, and brings analogies and precedents of international struggle against various social evils."

THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE: SELECTED DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE DRAFTING OF THE STATUTE. [Department of State Publication 2491, Conference Series 84.] (Washington, Government Printing Office, 1946, pp. v, 167, \$1.00.)

GENERAL MARSHALL'S REPORT: THE WINNING OF THE WAR IN EUROPE AND THE PACIFIC. Biennial Report of the Chief of Staff of the United States Army, July 1, 1943, to June 30, 1945, to the Secretary of War. (New York, published for the War Department in cooperation with the Council on Books in Wartime by Simon and Schuster, 1945, pp. 123, paper \$1.00.)

REPORT BY THE SUPREME COMMANDER TO THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF ON THE OPERATIONS IN EUROPE OF THE ALLIED EXPEDITIONARY FORCE, 6 JUNE 1944 TO 8 MAY 1945. By *Dwight D. Eisenhower*. (Washington, Government Printing Office, 1946, pp. x, 123, \$1.00.)

ARTICLES

- RAYMOND J. SONTAG. On the Study of Diplomatic History. *Pacific Hist. Rev.*, June.
 REINHARD BENDIX. Max Weber's Interpretation of Conduct and History. *Am. Jour. Sociol.*, May.
 ARTHUR H. COLE. Business History and Economic History. *Jour. Ec. Hist.*, Supp. V, Dec.
 THOMAS C. COCHRAN. The Economics in a Business History. *Ibid.*
 S. C. GILFILLAN. Invention as a Factor in Economic History. *Ibid.*
 FRANK TANNENBAUM. A Note on the Economic Interpretation of History. *Pol. Sci. Quar.*, June.
 LEO WOLMAN. Labor Policy and Economic History. *Jour. Ec. Hist.*, Supp. V, Dec.
 SALO W. BARON. Levi Herzfeld, the First Jewish Economic Historian. *Louis Ginzberg Jubilee Volume* (New York, Am. Acad. for Jewish Research, 1945).
 HOWARD MUMFORD JONES. The Colonial Impulse: An Analysis of the "Promotion" Literature of Colonization. *Proc. Am. Philosophical Soc.*, XC, no. 2.
 DONALD F. BOND and J. M. CARRIÈRE. Anglo-French and Franco-American Studies: A Current Bibliography. *Romanic Rev.*, Oct., 1945.
 J. DE GHELLINCK. Progrès récents et tendances actuelles en histoire des bibliothèques. *Revue d'hist. ecclés.*, XXXVIII, nos. 1-2.
 ADELAIDE E. MINOGUE. Treatment of Fire and Water Damaged Records. *Am. Archivist*, Jan.
 SOLON J. BUCK. The National Archives and the Protection of Records in War Areas. *Ibid.*
 EDWARD E. YOUNGER. John Adam Kasson and the Beginnings of the Universal Postal Union, 1863, 1867. *An. Iowa*, July.
 PETER MASTEN DUNNE. The 1931 Revolution in Spain. *Hist. Bull.*, May.
 HUGH SETON-WATSON. The Danubian Satellites: A Survey of Main Social and Political Factors in the Present Situation. *Internat. Affairs*, Apr.
 ANTONIO GRAMSCI. Benedetto Croce and His Concept of Liberty. *Sci. and Soc.*, Summer.
 WOODBRIDGE BINGHAM. Historical Training and Military Intelligence. *Pacific Hist. Rev.*, June.
 WILLIAM C. BINKLEY. Two World Wars and American Historical Scholarship. *Miss. Valley Hist. Rev.*, June.
 EDWARD MEAD EARLE. The Influence of Air Power upon History. *Yale Rev.*, Summer.

Ancient History¹

T. R. S. Broughton

PAULI SENTENTIAE: A PALINGENESIA OF THE OPENING TITLES AS A SPECIMEN OF RESEARCH IN WEST ROMAN VULGAR LAW. By *Ernst Levy*, Professor of Law, History, and Political Science in the University of Washington. (Ithaca, Cornell University Press, 1945, pp. xii, 130, \$2.75.) This volume is a very technical study in the history of the development of Roman law, of interest probably to rather few of this journal's readers. Levy analyzes eighty-three *sententiae* of Paulus, sentence by sentence, treating briefly the topic under which the rule was classified in the classical law, the source in Paulus from which the author of the *Sententiae* (assumed not to have been Paulus himself) may have derived it, and an interpretation in paraphrase of the meaning. More fully he discusses with each sentence the origin, classical or postclassical, of the rule, and the author of its extant wording. The last question is complex: the author of the *Sententiae* shortly before

¹ Under this and the following headings unsigned notices are, in general, contributed by the persons whose names appear at the heads of the divisions and who are otherwise responsible only for the lists of articles and documents.

A.D. 300; the authors of changes made in the period 300-450, and those of alterations associated with the "unduly neglected" *Interpretatio* of the mid-fifth century; the compilers of the *Lex Romana Visigothorum*, A.D. 506; the authors of changes made in the East before Justinian; and finally the compilers of the *Digest*. The author reaches the conclusion that most of the *sententiae* reflect the situation under Diocletian, some the changes in the next 150 years, that Justinian's share is very small and Alaric's none. There are incidental discussions of interesting matters of detail, e.g., the difference between *consiliarius* and *adessor*, the developing significance of *municeps*, the corporation of grain-measurers at Ostia and Rome. An index of one page "limited to topics specifically discussed" and referring not to pages but to passages of the *Sententiae* is neither very convenient nor satisfactory. The Cornell University Press has made a very nice volume of the book; the only troublesome misprint the reviewer has noticed is *avant* on page 35, for which read *vacant*.

ROBERT SAMUEL ROGERS

GENERAL ARTICLES

- SAMUEL N. KRAMER. Heroes of Sumer. A New Heroic Age in World History and Literature. *Proc. Am. Philos. Soc.*, May 10.
- THORKILD JACOBSEN. Sumerian Mythology: A Review Article. *Jour. Near East. Stud.*, Apr.
- RAYMOND WEILL. Remplacement chronologique de la XXI^e dynastie égyptienne et conditions de la royauté pharaonique de son époque. *Acad. Inscr. et Belles-Lettres*, July, 1945.
- SIDNEY SMITH. The Threshing Floor at the City Gate. *Palestine Explor. Quar.*, Jan.
- G. ERNEST WRIGHT. The Literary and Historical Problem of Joshua 10 and Judges 1. *Jour. Near East. Stud.*, Apr.
- SOLOMON ZEITLIN. The Beginning of the Jewish Day during the Second Commonwealth. *Jewish Quar. Rev.*, Apr.
- P. J. HEAWOOD. The Beginning of the Jewish Day. *Ibid.*
- SAUL LIEBERMAN. Palestine in the Third and Fourth Centuries. *Ibid.*
- BOAZ COHEN. Civil Bondage in Jewish and Roman Law. *Louis Ginzberg Jubilee Volume* (New York, Am. Acad. for Jewish Research, 1945).
- J. JANNORAY. Le peuplement de la Phocide maritime aux hautes époques. *Rev. Archéol.*, 1945.
- GREGORY VLASTOS. Solonian Justice. *Class. Philol.*, Apr.
- S. PAPASPYRIDIS-KAROZOU. Anacréon à Athènes. *Bull. Corresp. Hell.*, LXVI-VII, 1942-43.
- E. WILL. Sur la nature du pneuma delphique. *Ibid.*
- GILBERT MURRAY. Reactions to the Peloponnesian War in Greek Thought and Practice. *Jour. Hell. Stud.*, LXIV, 1944.
- J. A. O. LARSEN. The *Acharnians* and the Pay of Taxiarchs. *Class. Philol.*, Apr.
- B. D. MERITT. Note on the Athenian Calendar. *Class. Quar.*, Jan.-Apr.
- E. T. SALMON. The Belated Spartan Occupation of Decelea: An Explanation. *Ibid.*
- B. D. MERITT. Borrowings in the Archidamian War. *Ibid.*
- F. JACOBY. *Patrios Nomos*: State Burial in Athens and the Public Cemetery in the Kerameikos. *Jour. Hell. Stud.*, LXIV, 1944.
- E. A. THOMPSON. The Last Delphic Oracle. *Class. Quar.*, Jan.-Apr.
- A. S. OSLEY. Greek Biography before Plutarch. *Greece and Rome*, Jan.
- F. W. WALBANK. The Causes of Greek Decline. *Jour. Hell. Stud.*, LXIV, 1944.
- PIERRE GRIMAL. Le colline de Janus. *Rev. Archéol.*, 1945.
- EUGÈNE CAVAIGNAC. Le problème de l'organisation centuriale après les recherches de M. Mattingly. *Revue historique*, Jan.
- ALFRED R. BELLINGER. Crassus and Cassius at Antioch. *Num. Chron.*, 1944.
- J. M. C. TOYNBEE. Roman Medallions: Their Scope and Purpose. *Ibid.*
- R. H. MALDEN. The Foundations of the Roman Empire. *Greece and Rome*, Jan.
- C. H. V. SUTHERLAND. The Gold and Silver Coinage of Spain under Augustus. *Num. Chron.*, 1945.
- JACQUELINE CHITTENDEN. Hermes-Mercury, Dynasts, and Emperors. *Ibid.*, 1944.
- CHARLES EDSON. A Note on the Macedonian *Merides*. *Class. Philol.*, Apr.

- LOUIS LESCHI. La carrière de Q. Marcius Turbo, préfet de prétoire d'Hadrien. *Acad. Inscr. et Belles-Lettres*, Jan.
- HERBERT C. YOUTIE. ΙΣΙΣ ΤΡΙΧΩΜΑΤΟΣ . *Harvard Theol. Rev.*, Apr.
- ANDRÉ PIGANIOL. Observations sur le tarif de Palmyre. *Revue historique*, Jan., 1945.
- H. I. BELL. A Greek Village in the Age of Justinian. *Jour. Hell. Stud.*, LXIV, 1944.
- ANTON-HERMANN CHROUST. Law and Justice in the Ancient World and the Middle Ages. *Jour. Hist. Ideas*, June.
- E. BIRLEY. Britain under the Flavians: Agricola and His Predecessors. *Durham Univ. Jour.*, June.

ARCHAEOLOGICAL ARTICLES

- R. DEMANGEL. Daleth. *Bull. Corresp. Hell.*, LXVI-VII, 1942-43.
- T. J. DUNBABIN. Archaeology in Greece, 1939-1945. *Jour. Hell. Stud.*, LXIV, 1944.
- R. DEMANGEL. Un incunable protodorique à Delphes. *Bull. Corresp. Hell.*, LXIV-V, 1940-41.
- J. BOUSQUET. Le trésor de Syracuse à Delphes. *Ibid.*
- A. D. URE. Red-figure Cups with Incised and Stamped Decoration. *Jour. Hell. Stud.*, LXIV, 1944.
- R. DEMANGEL. Sur une anse d'amphore thasienne. *Bull. Corresp. Hell.*, LXIV-V, 1940-41.
- GORHAM P. STEVENS. Architectural Studies concerning the Acropolis of Athens. *Hesperia*, Apr.
- PIERRE GRIMAL. Vitruve et la technique des aqueducs. *Rev. Philol.*, 1945.
- R. G. GOODCHILD. The Origins of the Romano-British Forum. *Antiquity*, June.
- R. DEMANGEL. Regula. *Bull. Corresp. Hell.*, LXVI-VII, 1942-43.
- Capt. C. T. NORRIS. New Reasoning concerning the Fortifications of Jerusalem in the First Century A.D. *Palestine Explor. Quar.*, Jan.

INSCRIPTIONAL AND NUMISMATICAL SOURCES

- D. WINTON THOMAS. The Lachish Ostraca. *Palestine Explor. Quar.*, Jan.
- MARCELLUS T. MITSOS. An Inscription from Mycenae. *Hesperia*, Apr.
- M. FEYEL. Sur quelques inscriptions attiques et ioniennes de la première moitié du iv^e siècle. *Rev. Philol.*, 1945.
- J. BOUSQUET. Delphes. Comptes du iv^e siècle. *Bull. Corresp. Hell.*, LXVI-VII, 1942-43.
- KENDRICK PRITCHETT. Greek Inscriptions. *Hesperia*, Apr.
- J. BOUSQUET. Inscriptions de Delphes. *Bull. Corresp. Hell.*, LXIV-V, 1940-41.
- P. AMANDRY. Dédicaces delphiques. *Ibid.*
- Id.* Actes d'affranchissement delphiques. *Bull. Corresp. Hell.*, LXVI-VII, 1942-43.
- G. DAUX. En marge des inscriptions de Delphes. *Ibid.*
- A. E. CONTOLÉON. Inscriptions de Delphes, de Locride et de Doride. *Ibid.*
- J. JANNORAY. Nouvelles inscriptions de Lébadée. *Bull. Corresp. Hell.*, LXIV-V, 1940-41.
- M. FEYEL. Nouvelles inscriptions d'Abdère et de Maronée. *Bull. Corresp. Hell.*, LXVI-VII, 1942-43.
- JACQUES ROGER. Inscriptions de la région du Strymon. *Rev. Archéol.*, 1945.
- R. DEMANGEL. Une lettre d'Hadrien retrouvée à Brousse. *Bull. Corresp. Hell.*, LXIV-V, 1940-41.
- STELLA BEN-DOR. Some New Seleucid Coins. *Palestine Explor. Quar.*, Jan.
- E. S. G. ROBINSON. Greek Coins Found in the Cyrenaica. *Num. Chron.*, 1944.
- E. WILL. Nouvelle dédicace thasienne. *Bull. Corresp. Hell.*, LXIV-V, 1940-41.
- P. ROUSSEL. Note sur deux inscriptions de Thasos. *Ibid.*
- R. MARTIN. Un nouveau règlement de culte thasien. *Ibid.*
- ALFRED R. BELLINGER. A Tetradrachm of Hyspaosines. *Num. Chron.*, 1944.
- Id.* Parthian Drachmae of Orodes II and Phraates IV. *Ibid.*
- CHARLES SELTMAN. *Argentum Oscense and Bigati*. *Ibid.*
- C. H. V. SUTHERLAND. The Evans Collection at Oxford: Roman Coins of the Early Empire. *Ibid.*
- T. O. MABBOTT. The Magistrate Thalastos at Mylasa in Caria. *Ibid.*
- J. W. E. PEARCE. Lugdunum: *Siliqua*-Coinage of Valentinian II and Eugenius. *Ibid.*

Medieval History

Bernard J. Holm

OBLIGATIONS OF SOCIETY IN THE XII AND XIII CENTURIES. By *Austin Lane Poole*, Fellow of St. John's College, Oxford. [The Ford Lectures delivered in the University of Oxford in Michaelmas Term 1944.] (New York, Oxford University Press, 1946, pp. 115, \$3.50.) This little book might be described as a study of certain phases of the transition from a status to a money economy in medieval England. Mr. Poole first points out the difficulty of imposing any logical and consistent pattern on English society in the twelfth century and then analyzes the forms of tenure and the obligations of peasants, knights and sergeants. In each group we see that service is becoming less important than money, that personal obligations are being transformed into cash payments. This process is most obvious in the case of the knights, and Mr. Poole shows clearly how subinfeudation, splitting of fees, and reluctance to serve overseas created a situation in which fines and scutages were substituted for military service on such a scale that by 1200 "the feudal levy had ceased to be an effective fighting force." Services provided by sergeants were also losing their usefulness, and while a new sergeantry was created in Oxfordshire as late as the 1230's the general tendency of the thirteenth century was to commute tenure by sergeantry into tenure for a money rent. Even the peasant tenures were affected by the need for ready cash, and one of the merits of this book is to show how early the process of taking money instead of labor services began in England. Mr. Poole warns us, however, that lords sometimes changed their minds and demanded labor instead of money, especially when better methods of estate management and rising prices made field work more valuable. The book is a useful and compact summary of recent work on English tenures and services, but it is more than a condensation of generally accepted results. Mr. Poole's thorough knowledge of the sources enables him to illustrate many topics with fresh material and to throw new light on doubtful questions. For example, his discussion of the difficult problem of the relation between fine and scutage, his explanation of the "constabularia," his interpretation of "reasonable relief" are worth careful study. At the other extreme he is willing to risk generalizations about the quality of justice and the efficiency of the exchequer. Add to these scholarly qualities a distinguished style, and you have a book which will be profitable to all students of medieval England.

JOSEPH R. STRAYER

THE LEGISLATORS OF MEDIEVAL ENGLAND. By *Helen Cam*. [The Raleigh Lecture on History, British Academy, 1945.] (London, British Academy; New York, Oxford University Press, 1946, pp. 24, \$1.00.) In this thoughtful paper Miss Cam has reviewed the work of recent writers on the early history of Parliament in an attempt to discover what groups and individuals were responsible for parliamentary enactments and, in so doing, to trace the relation between law and public opinion in medieval England. She points briefly to two sources of legislative activity—the desire for order on the part of the king and council and the concern of the judges for clarification of the law—but concerns herself chiefly with a third, namely, the public demand for improvement of the law and the redress of grievances. In analyzing that demand Miss Cam describes the pressures which helped to form public opinion (*e.g.*, administrative abuses, class antagonisms, local jealousies), the channels (chiefly petitions) through which public opinion made itself felt on the government, and, finally, the sources of public opinion in terms of the groups and interests which made it articulate. Miss Cam concludes that, although the king and council were undoubtedly the guiding

spirits throughout the Middle Ages, nearly every interest in medieval society left its trace on the enactments of Parliament and council. She describes the legislative activity of medieval England as a "joint stock enterprise" and comments pointedly on the importance of such combined endeavors on the part of many sorts and conditions of men in creating a consciousness of national welfare which was to find expression in the parliamentary activity of the modern period.

GEORGE L. HASKINS

THE HERBAL OF RUFINUS. Edited from the unique manuscript by *Lynn Thorndike*, assisted by Francis S. Benjamin, jr. (Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1945, pp. xliii, 476, \$5.00.) Edited by Lynn Thorndike and transcribed by his student Francis S. Benjamin, jr., the hitherto forgotten manuscript herbal by the hitherto unknown Italian physician and botanist Rufinus is now made available in an excellent printed version. This first printed edition is based upon the unique manuscript in the Laurentian Library in Florence, Italy. Known as MS 189 Ashburnham (after its former owner Lord Ashburnham) the codex is described as "a handsome illuminated folio of perhaps the early fourteenth century comprising 18 double-columned leaves." Although Rufinus composed his herbal shortly after 1287 A.D. this text is not his original but a copy thereof. The fact that this is the only known existing work by Rufinus made its reproduction imperative, and, as Professor Thorndike tells us in his introduction, it was only a few days before Italy entered World War II that a photostatic copy of this manuscript reached the Columbia University Library. The importance of this herbal is that it provides considerable new information on medieval botany and medicine. Rufinus is shown to be a remarkably keen and independent observer of nature and not a slavish copyist of Dioscorides as were so many of his predecessors and contemporaries. Thus, although his text is obviously a compilation, Rufinus himself has added about one fifth of the material from his own observations and experience. The editor further points out in his illuminating introduction that this version is a rich source of philological materials for students of medieval Italian and related vernaculars. The bulk of the book is of course devoted to the transcribed text together with editorial notes. As an aid and guide to the text five valuable indexes have been appended as follows: "Herbs and Other Simples and Some Compound Medicines"; "Diseases and Parts of the Body Affected"; "Measures, Instruments, and Utensils"; "Names of Persons and Titles of Anonymous Works"; "Names of Places." Professor Thorndike and his collaborator have performed a valuable service in making this unique text available. It is to be hoped that students of the history of science may soon give us interpretive studies of this work.

MORRIS C. LEIKIND

A PAGEANT OF OLD SCANDINAVIA. Edited by *Henry Goddard Leach*. (Princeton, Princeton University Press for the American-Scandinavian Foundation, New York, 1946, pp. xv, 350, \$3.50.) In this volume, the author, who has for many years been the director of the American Scandinavian Foundation, has brought together a wide variety of selections, 116 in all, from the earliest periods of Old Norse literature. These translations present a colorful panorama of life as lived by the old Vikings and skalds, in days when literature was passed from one generation to another by word of mouth. Some of the earlier pieces are from dateless antiquity and of unknown authorship. Most of them date from the twelfth, thirteenth, and fourteenth centuries, when the old myths, legends, and tales, recorded only in oral tradition, were being written down on sheepskin manuscripts for later generations to enjoy. Many of the selections are taken from the Icelandic Eddas and sagas, although sources from other Scandinavian countries are also drawn upon. There will be general agreement that the selections are well made. The author has used such translations as appeared to him to be

the most worthy. A brief but scholarly survey of the beginnings and early sources of Scandinavian literature precedes the selections. Typographically the volume leaves nothing to be desired. It is printed on choice white paper, in large type, easy and pleasant to read. Henry Goddard Leach, than whom the Scandinavian people have no more appreciative friend, has done a labor of love in presenting in attractive form these evidences of early Scandinavian culture. One may confidently express the hope that the volume may find a generous reception by the reading public.

HALDOR B. GISLASON

GENERAL, INSTITUTIONAL, AND POLITICAL

- LOREN C. MACKINNEY. Manuscript Photoreproductions in Classical, Medieval, and Renaissance Research. *Speculum*, Apr.
- CARL STEPHENSON. The Problem of the Common Man in Early Medieval Europe. *Am. Hist. Rev.*, Apr.
- J. C. RUSSELL. The Short Dark Folk of England. *Social Forces*, Mar.
- A. H. BURNE. The Battle of Badon: A Military Commentary. *History*, Sept., 1945.
- V. H. GALBRAITH. Good Kings and Bad Kings in Medieval English History. *Ibid.*
- F. M. STENTON. Early English History, 1895-1920. *Trans. Royal Hist. Soc.*, 4th series, XXVIII, 1946.
- H. G. RICHARDSON. The Commons and Medieval Politics. *Ibid.*
- K. L. WOOD-LEGH. Some Aspects of the History of Chantries in the Later Middle Ages. *Ibid.*
- Z. N. BROOKE and C. N. L. BROOKE. Henry II, Duke of Normandy and Aquitaine. *Eng. Hist. Rev.*, Jan.
- ALFRED ADLER. *Hervis de Mes* and the Matrilineal Nobility of Champagne. *Romanic Rev.*, Apr.
- HENRI GLAESNER. Godefroid de Bouillon, était-il un "médiocre"? *Revue d'hist. ecclés.*, XXXIX, nos. 3-4, 1943.
- KENNETH M. SETTON. A Note on Michael Choniates, Archbishop of Athens (1182-1204). *Speculum*, Apr.
- GIUSEPPE MARTINI. Regale sacerdotium. *Archivio di storia patria*, IV, fasc. 1-4, 1938.
- A. NATALE. La felice società dei balestrieri e dei pavesati a Roma e il governo dei banderesi dal 1358 al 1408. *Ibid.*, V, fasc. 1-4, 1939.
- C. CALISSE. Longobardi e monaci in territorio romano. *Ibid.*
- G. BOLLAND. Le testament d'Henri III, duc de Brabant. *Revue d'hist. ecclés.*, XXXVIII, nos. 1-2, 1942.
- G. I. BRĂȚIANU. Le conseil du roi Charles [crusade projected by Charles II of Sicily]: essai sur l'internationale chrétienne et les nationalités à la fin du moyen âge. *Bibliothèque historique du sud-est européen*, I, 1942.
- Id.* Le problème de la continuité daco-roumaine, (1) à propos de les nouvelles remarques de M. Ferdinand Lot, (2) l'histoire roumaine écrite par les historiens hongrois. *Ibid.*, II, 1944.
- CHARLES GILLIARD and HENRI MEYLAN. Histoire de la Suisse, publications des années 1936 à 1940 [includes medieval items]. *Revue historique*, Jan.
- J. DE GHELLINCK. Progrès récents et tendances actuelles en histoire des bibliothèques [includes Carolingian libraries]. *Revue d'hist. ecclés.*, XXXVIII, nos. 1-2, 1942.
- E. HEYSE DUMMER. Johann Christoph von Aretin, a Revaluation. *Lib. Quar.*, Apr.
- HARDIN CRAIG *et al.* Recent Literature of the Renaissance. *Stud. Philol.*, Apr.

LEGAL

- W. ULLMANN. Medieval Principles of Evidence. *Law Quar. Rev.*, Jan.
- ANTON-HERMANN CHROUST. The Function of Law and Justice in the Ancient World and the Middle Ages. *Jour. Hist. Ideas*, June.
- NORMA ADAMS. Nullius filius: A Study of the Exception of Bastardy in the Law Courts of Medieval England. *Univ. Toronto Law Jour.*, Lent Term, 1946.
- J. F. NOUBEL. Le réalisme de l'idée de Droit naturel chez St. Thomas d'Aquin. *Bull. de littérature ecclés.* (Toulouse), XLI, 1942.
- W. ULLMANN. Reflections on Mediaeval Clerical Taxation. *Dublin Rev.*, Apr.

GUIDO KISCH. Relations between Jewish and Christian Courts in the Middle Ages. *Louis Ginsberg Jubilee Volume* (New York, Am. Acad. for Jewish Research, 1945).

ECONOMIC

REGINALD LENNARD. The Destruction of Woodland in the Eastern Counties under William the Conqueror. *Ec. Hist. Rev.*, nos. 1-2, 1945.

ROBERT L. REYNOLDS. In Search of a Business Class in Thirteenth-Century Genoa. *Jour. Ec. Hist.*, Supp. V, Dec.

DOM AELRED WATKIN. Fragment of a Thirteenth-Century Receiver's Roll from Winchester Cathedral Priory. *Eng. Hist. Rev.*, Jan.

ALWYN A. RUDDOCK. Alien Merchants in Southampton in the Later Middle Ages. *Ibid.*

P. GORISSEN. De Karweien der Brabantsche Kloosterhoeven in de XIV^e eeuw. *Bull. Commission royale d'hist.*, CX, nos. 1-2, 1945.

F. FAVRESSE. Le premier règlement accordé au métier des tisserands de lin de Bruxelles par l'Amman et la "Loi de la Ville." *Ibid.*

ED. DE MOREAU. La législation des ducs de Bourgogne sur l'accroissement des biens ecclésiastiques, étudiée spécialement en Belgique. *Revue d'hist. ecclés.*, XLI, nos. 1-2.

M. ANTONELLI. Il patrimonio nei primi anni dello scisma. *Archivio di storia patria*, IV, fasc. 1-4, 1938.

ECCLESIASTICAL AND MONASTIC

AUBREY GWYNN. The Bollandists, Past and Present. *Studies, An Irish Quar. Rev.*, Mar.

P. LEON DIEU. La persécution au II^e siècle: Une loi fantôme. *Revue d'hist. ecclés.*, XXXVIII, nos. 1-2, 1942.

ALLEN A. GILMORE. Augustine and the Critical Method. *Harvard Theol. Rev.*, Apr.

JOHN J. GAVIGAN. St. Augustine's Friend Nebridius. *Cath. Hist. Rev.*, Apr.

M. ALAMO. Nouveaux éclaircissements sur le Maître et Saint Benoît. *Revue d'hist. ecclés.*, XXXVIII, nos. 3-4, 1942.

D. B. CAPELLE. Le Maître antérieur à S. Benoît? *Ibid.*, XLI, nos. 1-2.

MARCEL RICHARD. Proclus de Constantinople et le théopaschisme. *Ibid.*, XXXVIII, nos. 3-4, 1942.

E. HILDESHEIMER. Les clercs et l'exemption du service militaire à l'époque franque (VI^e-IX^e siècles). *Revue d'hist. de l'église de France*, XXIX, 1943.

CATHERINE E. BOYD. The Beginnings of the Ecclesiastical Tithe in Italy. *Speculum*, Apr.

MONSIGNOR IGNACE STAUB. La culture monastique en Suisse, et son importance pour l'Europe. *Formes et couleurs*, V, no. 5, 1945.

J. LECLERCQ. L'interdit et l'excommunication d'après les lettres de Fulbert de Chartres. *Revue hist. de droit français et étranger*, XXIII, no. 4, 1944.

E. DELARUELLE. Essai sur la formation de l'idée de Croisade. *Bull. de littérature ecclés.*, XLII (1941), 24-45, 86-103; XLV (1944), 13-46, 73-90.

LOUIS BREHIER. Le schisme byzantin, à propos d'un livre récent. *Revue historique*, Jan.

JOAQUIN XIRAN. La mística de Ramón Lull. *Revista de las Indias*, Sept., 1945.

SIMONE ROISIN. L'efflorescence cistercienne et le courant féminin de piété au XIII^e siècle. *Revue d'hist. ecclés.*, XXXIX, nos. 3-4, 1943.

JOSHUA STARR. The Mass Conversion of Jews in Southern Italy (1290-1293). *Speculum*, Apr.

HENRY G. J. BECK. William Hundleby's Account of the Anagni Outrage. *Cath. Hist. Rev.*, July.

J. LECLERCQ. Chuny et le Concile de Bâle. *Revue d'hist. de l'église de France*, XXVIII, 1942.

JEAN MEYHOFFER. Réformateurs Suisses et questions d'églises. *Formes et couleurs*, V, no. 5, 1945.

GORDON RUPP. Martin Luther, 1546-1946. *London Quar. and Holborn Rev.*, Apr.

HAROLD J. GRIMM. Luther and the Peasant Revolt. *Lutheran Church Quar.*, Apr.

MEDIEVAL AND RENAISSANCE LEARNING

RICHARD McKEON. Poetry and Philosophy in the Twelfth Century: The Renaissance of Rhetoric. *Mod. Philol.*, May.

L. RIGAUD. La Nation germanique de l'ancienne Université d'Orléans. *Revue d'hist. de l'église de France*, XXVII, 1941.

ERNEST F. JACOB. English University Clerks in the Later Middle Ages: The Problem of Maintenance. *Bull. John Rylands Lib.*, Feb.

- LYNN THORNDIKE. Robertus Anglicus and the Introduction of Demons and Magic into Commentaries upon the *Sphere* of Sacrobosco. *Speculum*, Apr.
- O. V. TRACHTENBERG. William of Occam and the Prehistory of English Materialism. *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research*, Dec., 1945.
- PEARL KIBRE. The Intellectual Interests Reflected in Libraries of the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Centuries. *Jour. Hist. Ideas*, June.
- P. CHAMPION. Henri III et les écrivains de son temps. *Bibliothèque d'humanisme et renaissance*, I, 1941.
- W. E. CAMPBELL. John Colet, Dean of St. Paul's. *Dublin Rev.*, Apr.
- SISTER MARY JEREMY. Caxton's *Golden Legend* and Varagine's *Legenda aurea*. *Speculum*, Apr.
- CARL J. BURCKHARDT. Guillebaud Pirckheimer. *Formes et couleurs*, V, no. 5, 1945.
- G. CARDASCIA. Machiavel et Jean Bodin. *Bibliothèque d'humanisme et renaissance*, III, 1943.
- P. VAN TIEGHEM. La littérature latine de la Renaissance. *Ibid.*, IV, 1944.
- J. HOYOUN. Les moyens d'existence d'Erasmus. *Ibid.*, V, 1944.

LANGUAGE AND LITERATURE

- HELEN SUGGETT. The Use of French in England in the Later Middle Ages. *Trans. Royal Hist. Soc.*, 4th series, XXVIII, 1946.
- HELEN ADOLF. The *Esplumoir Merlin*, A Study in Its Cabalistic Sources. *Speculum*, Apr.
- ARNO SCHIROKAUER. Die Wortgeschichte von *Herr*. *Germanic Rev.*, Feb.
- HALDEEN BRADY. Chaucer and Dame Alice Perrers. *Speculum*, Apr.
- MARSHALL W. STEARNS. A Note on Chaucer's Use of Aristotelian Psychology. *Stud. Philol.*, Jan.
- H. GAFFNEY. Our Lady's Medieval Plays. *Irish Eccles. Rec.*, May.
- W. A. MEFHAM. Mediaeval Plays in the Sixteenth Century at Heybridge and Braintree. *Essex Rev.*, Jan.

ART AND MUSIC

- ROBERT GRINNELL. The Theoretical Attitude towards Space in the Middle Ages. *Speculum*, Apr.
- S. SULBERGER. Die Rückkehr des Altarbildes des Mystischen Lammes. *Pro Arte*, Apr.
- M. J. FRIEDLÄNDER. Die Ausstellung altniederländischer Kunst im Haag. *Ibid.*
- OTTO BRENDL. The Interpretation of the Holkham *Venus*. *Art Bull.*, June.
- E. TIETZE-CONRAT. Titian's Workshop in His Later Years. *Ibid.*
- FRANCIS LEE UTLEY. The Choristers' Lament. *Speculum*, Apr.
- CURT F. BÜHLER. A New Manuscript of the Middle English Tract on Proportions (Sometimes Attributed to Chilston). *Ibid.*

Modern European History

BRITISH EMPIRE AND COMMONWEALTH OF NATIONS

Francis H. Herrick

ELIZABETH'S ARMY. By C. G. Cruickshank. (New York, Oxford University Press, 1946, pp. 156, \$2.75.) This book touches on almost all features of the English military establishment of its period and in most matters is reasonably adequate. The chapter on arms, however, ignores the longbow, a standard weapon until almost the end of Elizabeth's reign and not wholly obsolete until years later. Some discussion of Sir John Smythe's eloquent and almost convincing argument in its favor seems called for. Moreover, there is no mention of drill or tactics. Most persons barely know that they existed then and have only a vague picture of confused masses of men shooting and stabbing at each other. It is true that with poorly trained men any military evolution could degenerate into "hubbledeshuf"—an expressive word, apparently of Sir John's own coinage—but a clear theory existed and was well practiced by professionals. There is no bibliography, though the footnotes make some reference to sources. With this, the reviewer has said all that he can find in depreciation of the book. Its expositions of the

process of levying troops, transportation, supply, pay, discipline, are clear, always supported but never overwhelmed with illustrative detail. The inefficiency and corruption that permeated the service are exposed and to some extent explained. This condition is familiar to all readers of history, but we are here informed of some little-known things that show very different conceptions from those that are now held. It was the untrained men who were sent to the front, so that the supply of trained men might be conserved; the mentally, morally, and physically unfit were preferred instead of rejected in conscription; the soldier was charged with the cost of the powder he expended in practice and in battle, to encourage economy. The text shows every sign of careful research and its literary style allows it to be read with pleasure as well as profit.

THOMAS M. SPAULDING

THE VICTORIA HISTORY OF THE COUNTY OF WARWICK. By *L. F. Salzman*, General Editor, and *Philip Styles*, Local Editor. Volume III, BARLICHWAY HUNDRED. [The Victoria History of the Counties of England.] (London, published for the University of London, Institute of Historical Research by the Oxford University Press, 1945, pp. xv, 288.) This volume presents a picture of one of the four divisions of Warwickshire, the ancient hundred of Barlichway. It is a rural area containing only one borough, but it happens to be Stratford-upon-Avon. The Victoria County History is so large that few libraries will buy it all; however, many should buy some volumes, one of which may well be this book both because of the wide interest in Stratford and because it gives an excellent description, parish by parish, of phases of the English countryside as presented by the latest English scholarship. The evenness of editorial supervision appears in its adherence to a definite order of evidence: the wide knowledge of Mr. Salzman, the general editor, makes certain that not many types of even archival data escape the footnotes. For agricultural districts the contents cover topography, buildings, particularly manor houses and churches, descent of feudal and ecclesiastical holdings, and (very English) local charities. Of course, some parishes have exceptional characteristics and histories, and the market towns demand more economic attention. The treatment of Stratford is quite thorough. Coats of arms appear for nearly every family, and diagrams for the architecture of nearly every church. Many pictures enhance the value of the book, illustrating, for instance, the charm of Henley-in-Arden. Within the limits set by the editors the execution is excellent: the pattern is distinctly archaeological with the historical attention focused upon the lords of the manors. The lesser people are blurred in the picture so that we cannot see their physical types, dress, or furniture, the pattern of their agricultural holdings or life, or the social classes of the villages. Even the manor lords do little but pass on their manors, their advowsons, and their families: did they have no books, or local traditions, or intellectual interests?

JOSIAH COX RUSSELL

PUBLIC BATHS AND HEALTH IN ENGLAND, 16TH-18TH CENTURY. By *Charles F. Mullett*. [Supplements to the Bulletin of the History of Medicine, No. 5.] (Baltimore, Johns Hopkins Press, 1946, pp. 85, \$1.50.) Professor Mullett is to be congratulated on selecting a large subject, rich in sources and unexplored by historians, and for presenting a fine bibliographical essay for scholar and layman. He states his theme thus: "To date, relatively slight and limited surveys have supplied all our information, and their preoccupation with social history has failed to reveal, let alone to exhaust, the medical possibilities of the topic. After all, 'bathing' should concern the historian of medicine as much as the angle-worm, and no aspersion of the angle-worm is intended" (p. 1). As is to be expected, the most famous of the public baths was Bath in Somerset, where, after the Methuen Treaty in 1703 with Portugal, port drinkers with their gout and other ailments betook themselves and caused a well-plotted city

to arise. The development of this resort was most rapid from 1740 to 1760. Along with the hosts taking the waters, came swarms of camp followers: "Lodging-house keepers, quacks, light ladies, fortune hunters, pimps, and similar parasites thrived in such an environment" (p. 2). Dr. Mullett's essay is a valuable study of the state of medicine in the sixteenth, seventeenth, and eighteenth centuries. The bibliographical information will be new to most readers and an aid in other investigations. Two hundred and thirty-eight items are listed. An index of names or titles and an index of spas complete the work.

FRANK J. KLINGBERG

THE ENGLISH DICTIONARY FROM CAWDREY TO JOHNSON, 1604-1755. By *De Witt T. Starnes*, University of Texas, and *Gertrude E. Noyes*, Connecticut College. (Chapel Hill, University of North Carolina Press, 1946, pp. x, 299, \$3.50.) Professors Starnes and Noyes, having published some independent studies in the same area, have happily joined forces and produced the first comprehensive account of the development of English dictionaries from the beginning up to (but not including) Dr. Johnson's. Their thorough and concrete work supersedes previous general surveys and monographs. An introductory chapter on the medieval and Renaissance heritage stresses the foreign-language and especially Latin wordbooks which were models and sources for the earlier English dictionaries. Twenty-one chapters on individual dictionaries take us from Robert Cawdrey's *Table Alphabeticall* (1604) with its 2,500 hard words to the Scott-Bailey work of 1755 (a rival to Johnson's) with about 65,000 words. Two appendixes discuss medieval and Renaissance vocabularies and the growth of cant lexicography, and a third gives an elaborate bibliography and census of dictionaries in American libraries. The main part of the book traces the changing aims and methods of the lexicographers as they moved from elementary pedagogical tools and lists of hard words toward the modern ideal of completeness (with such added functions and problems as that of the reference book and classical dictionary). We are shown, with sometimes amusing illustrations, the degree to which they built upon and advanced beyond their predecessors in general scope, accuracy and minuteness of definition, and, however slowly and erratically, in etymology. A minor item on the debit—or must we say credit?—side is the fading away of the color and flavor of the compiler's personality into the pallid impersonality of mature lexicography, though the old freedom had a famous exemplar in Johnson—and has had a modern one in the author of the *Dictionary of Modern English Usage*. Professors Starnes and Noyes have written a substantial and authoritative book in an important but relatively unfamiliar field, a book which can be read as a whole with profit and dipped into with pleasure.

DOUGLAS BUSH

LIFE OF MILTON: NARRATED IN CONNECTION WITH THE POLITICAL, ECCLESIASTICAL, AND LITERARY HISTORY OF HIS TIME. By *David Masson*. In seven volumes. (Reprint ed.; New York, Peter Smith, 1946, pp. 4700, \$60.00.)

LE JOURNAL DE GIBBON A LAUSANNE, 17 AOÛT 1763—19 AVRIL 1764. Publié par *Georges Bonnard*. [Université de Lausanne, Publications de la Faculté des Lettres, VIII.] (Lausanne, Librairie de l'Université, 1945, pp. xxvi, 326.) Besides his memoirs, written in old age, Edward Gibbon kept a journal, with somewhat irregular entries, from August 24, 1761, to December 31, 1764. The first part, to January 28, 1763, was written in English and published by D. M. Low in 1929. Following a memorable visit to Paris, where Gibbon allowed the journal to lapse, he went to Lausanne, the scene of several years of his earlier life. Here he remained almost a year, preparing for a projected tour of Italy which followed in due course and which inspired the conception of his masterpiece, *The Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire*.

It is the part of his journal written in Lausanne that has just been published under the auspices of the University of Lausanne. It will supersede a much deleted edition, translated into English, which Gibbon's friend, Lord Sheffield, included in *Miscellaneous Works of Edward Gibbon, Esquire*, published in 1796. Unlike Lord Sheffield, M. Bonnard has been scrupulously faithful to Gibbon's text, written in his fluent but somewhat erratic French, and the edition is admirable scholarship, with meticulous preface and footnotes clarifying the text. The bulk of the journal, and its most valuable part, as Lord Sheffield realized, consists of young Gibbon's critical analysis and comparison of sources related to ancient Italian geography. The play of his mind, already erudite, upon divergent records, is chastening reading even today. But the twentieth century reader is amazed at the limitations of Gibbon's perspective, which seemed untouched by the stirring events of world significance in 1763-64, and one wonders whether the historians of Lausanne will profit much from his brief and rather malevolent comments on the local society by whom he was generously entertained.

ALEEN DUNHAM

LETTERS OF WILLIAM DAVIES, TORONTO, 1854-1861. Edited with Introduction and Notes by *William Sherwood Fox*. With a Preface by H. A. Innis. (Toronto, University of Toronto Press, 1945, pp. xiii, 144, \$2.00.) This little volume is of particular interest to students of Canadian business history, which has been too much neglected. The founder of William Davies and Company, the large firm that lost its identity nearly twenty years ago when merged in Canada Packers, arrived in Toronto at the age of twenty-three with a wife, a baby, and not much money. Having learned the provision trade in England, he thought he could make more out of it in Canada; and these letters, written to a brother he left in the old country, tell in considerable detail how he succeeded during his first years. By 1860 he was doing the best cheese trade in what is now Ontario and was a large dealer in butter and eggs. More and more his attention turned to the export business, and he pioneered in the manufacture of pork products for sale in England. Incidentally this record of his operations throws new light on how the Marcy-Elgin Reciprocity Treaty worked before the Civil War, for instead of selling to the United States Davies was buying from the United States, and heavily. These letters have also not a little to say about church matters, for Davies was a staunch Baptist. Here and there he touches on social conditions but only rarely does he mention politics. The editor, president of the University of Western Ontario and a grandson of the letter writer, has supplied a thirty-page biographical sketch; and Professor Innis of Toronto, the dean of Canadian economic historians, has written a suggestive preface.

A. L. BURT

ARTICLES

- ROBERT LIVINGSTON SCHUYLER. The Antiquaries and Sir Henry Spelman: An Essay in Historiography. *Proc. Am. Philosophical Soc.*, XC, no. 2.
- W. E. CAMPBELL. John Colet, Dean of St. Paul's. *Dublin Rev.*, Apr.
- J. E. NEALE. More Elizabethan Elections. *Eng. Hist. Rev.*, Jan.
- H. R. TREVOR-ROPER. Archbishop Laud. *History*, Sept., 1945.
- WILLIAM RALEIGH TRIMBLE. The Embassy Chapel Question, 1625-1660. *Jour. Mod. Hist.*, June.
- G. E. FUSSELL. The Traffic in Farm Produce in Seventeenth-Century England. *Agric. Hist.*, Apr.
- JOHN A. SCHUTZ. Christopher Codrington's Will: Launching the S. P. G. into the Barbadian Sugar Business. *Pacific Hist. Rev.*, June.
- R. C. JARVIS. The Death of Walpole: Henry Fielding and a Forgotten Cause Célèbre. *Mod. Lang. Rev.*, Apr.
- GEORGES BONNARD. L'importance du deuxième séjour de Gibbon à Lausanne dans la formation de l'historien. *Mélanges d'histoire et de littérature offerts à Monsieur Charles Gilliard*. Lausanne, 1944.

- ARCHIBALD CLOW and NAN L. CLOW. Vitriol in the Industrial Revolution. *Ec. Hist. Rev.*, nos. 1-2, 1945.
- T. S. ASHTON. The Bill of Exchange and Private Banks in Lancashire, 1790-1830. *Ibid.*
- PETER CAREW. A Back Bencher of the Navy [Sir John Hill, 1773-1855]. *Blackwood's Mag.*, July.
- DERYCK ABEL. The End of the Corn Laws. *Contemp. Rev.*, June.
- GODFREY DAVIES. The Continuity of British Foreign Policy. *Univ. Toronto Quar.*, Apr.
- FRANCIS H. HERRICK. Lord Randolph Churchill and the Popular Organization of the Conservative Party. *Pacific Hist. Rev.*, June.
- OUTRAM EVENNETT. The Cambridge Prelude to 1895. The Story of the Removal of the [Roman Catholic] Ban on the Universities Told from the Cambridge Angle. *Dublin Rev.*, Apr.
- W. O. HENDERSON. British Economic Activity in the German Colonies, 1884-1914. *Ec. Hist. Rev.*, nos. 1-2, 1945.
- F. A. H. [F. A. HAYEK]. The London School of Economics, 1895-1945. *Economica*, Feb.
- W. H. B. COURT. Problems of the British Coal Industry between the Wars. *Ec. Hist. Rev.*, nos. 1-2, 1945.
- SIR R. H. BRUCE-LOCKHART. Home Rule for Scotland. *For. Affairs*, July.
- F. W. HOLDEN. The Prospects of English Local Government. *Am. Pol. Sci. Rev.*, June.
- WILLIAM THOMAS MORGAN. Britain's Election: A Debate on Nationalization and Cartels. *Pol. Sci. Quar.*, June.
- Id.* The British General Election of 1945. *South Atlantic Quar.*, July.
- MILLICENT B. REX. The University Constituencies in the Recent British Election. *Jour. Politics*, May.
- HERBERT FEIS. The Future of British Imperial Preferences. *For. Affairs*, July.
- W. L. MORTON. Clio in Canada: The Interpretation of Canadian History. *Univ. Toronto Quar.*, Apr.
- ESTHER CLARK WRIGHT. Cumberland Township: A Focal Point of Early Settlement on the Bay of Fundy. *Can. Hist. Rev.*, Mar.
- W. L. MORTON. The Western Progressive Movement and Cabinet Domination. *Can. Jour. Ec. Pol. Sci.*, May.
- M. H. M. MACKINNON. The RCAF in Newfoundland. *Univ. Toronto Quar.*, Apr.
- L. B. PEARSON. Canada Looks "Down North." *For. Affairs*, July.
- ANDREW H. CLARK. The Historical Explanation of Land Use in New Zealand. *Jour. Ec. Hist.*, Nov., 1945.

DOCUMENTS

- FRED K. VIGMAN. A 1745 Plan for . . . a National Militia in Great Britain and America. *Military Affairs*, Winter.

FRANCE

FRANCE: A SHORT HISTORY. By *Albert Guérard*. (New York, W. W. Norton, 1946, pp. 274, \$3.00.) The collapse of France in June, 1940, brought a flood of books attempting to account for that disaster. After the initial shock, friends of France sought to restore confidence in her by showing that she had recovered from other serious blows and that her true greatness consisted in achievements not dependent on political or military power. Albert Guérard's contribution to this literature is a brief history of French political and cultural development from its origins to the liberation in 1945. This is not a new interpretation but a brief summary of the author's previous works on French history, emphasizing the evolution of a national culture that values liberty and the welfare of the common man. It is a testament and an expression of confidence that France will continue to play "a major part in the growth of human culture." Readers unfamiliar with French history or literature will find here only a suggestion of its meaning and an invitation to further reading; those with some fragmentary knowledge of the subject will see more clearly the continuous

development of the French nation and its heritage from the past. Specialists probably will disagree with the relative space given to some periods, especially the "origins," and with some of the interpretations. Napoleon I, in barely three and one half pages, receives something less than justice, while Napoleon III receives generous and sympathetic treatment in seven pages. On the whole the summary of the political evolution is suggestive, though necessarily oversimplified. The treatment of the transformation of social classes, the cultural life and influence, and the role of religion is good for the medieval and early modern periods but less adequate for the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. The chronological summaries of each period are useful for reference. The brief list of suggested references is most helpful for contemporary history but contains few English titles.

WILMA J. PUGH

THE DOCTOR IN THE FRENCH LITERATURE OF THE SIXTEENTH CENTURY. By *Nancy F. Osborne*. (New York, King's Crown Press, 1946, pp. xviii, 140, \$2.00.) This book is probably more useful for literary than for historical purposes, since it does not relate the references to the vast amount of source material of a historical nature available in published form. Such sources might explain the uniformly unfavorable impression produced by the literary references quoted, or they might prove them biased. A study of the documents of the Hôtel-Dieu of Paris would have given a more accurate picture of conditions in the hospital than was obtained by reference to very general secondary sources (*cf.* p. xiii). In these same documents, we would find that, if the Italians referred to syphilis as a French disease (p. xvi), the French in turn called it the "vérole de Naples," a fact more related to the subject of the book than the Italian poem quoted. The book is difficult to use. Of about 235 titles in the bibliography, only 71 are cited in the text and notes, while some fifteen important authors including Molière, mentioned in the text, are omitted from the bibliography. There is lack of uniformity in the bibliographical citations, for date, place of publication, and number of volumes are frequently omitted, and several forms of the same name are used. Brantôme is called "Pierre de Bourdeille, seigneur de Brantôme," on pages 18 and 112, while on page 77 he is "Pierre Brantôme, seigneur de Bourdeille." The *Memoires et correspondance* of Philippe du Plessis-Mornay are listed under "Plessis-Mornay," while the *Memoires* of Madame du Plessis-Mornay are given under "Mornay, Mme de, seigneuresse du Plessis." In the case of Agrippa von Nettesheim, both Latin and English forms of the name are used, and in some places the Latin genitive appears where a nominative is required. The same is true in the citation of Robert Gaguin. One author, DuBartas, seems to have been used and quoted in an old edition, which does not appear in the bibliography. The edition quoted in the bibliography does not correspond in number of volumes to the numbers given in the footnotes. All this is evidence of haste, as is the listing of a work by "le Docteur Incognu" under another, probably the correct, author, without apparent recognition of the word *Incognu* as a pseudonym; and the addition of notes without changing the numbering, as in the case of 9 and 9a on page xv, where only six notes would have required new numbers. It is unfortunate that the inconsistencies and other defects have made a satisfactory reading of interesting material almost impossible.

DOROTHY MACKAY QUINN

L'ORIENT ROMANESQUE EN FRANCE, 1704-1789: ETUDE D'HISTOIRE ET DE CRITIQUE LITTÉRAIRES. By *Marie-Louise Dufrenoy*. (Montreal, Éditions Beauchemin, 1946, pp. 380.) Several aspects of the Oriental influence in French literature have been treated by Hazard, Mornet, and others. Here we have a carefully prepared survey of the entire field of eighteenth century French narrative literature with an Oriental setting. The author's thesis is that this influence, beginning with the publica-

tion of the *Mille et une nuits* (1704-17), provided contemporary French writers with a model, offered a convenient and popular setting for the presentation of new ideas, and produced a steady stream of "Oriental" narratives for the rest of the century. A quantitative study of these writings reveals that this literary movement passed through three successive but overlapping phases: *la féerie*, *le conte galant*, and the Oriental satire. The first phase, *la féerie*, saw numerous and pedestrian imitations of the *Mille et une nuits* in which its style, characters and stock situations were closely copied. This was soon succeeded by the more sophisticated *conte galant*, best represented by *Le Sopha* of Crébillon fils. The *Lettres persanes* (1721) is both the best and the most familiar example of the third phase, the Oriental satire, combining as it does a careful documentation and criticism of institutions with the erotic appeal of the *conte galant*. Montesquieu had many imitators, and an Oriental setting was frequently used as a convenient and censor-proof vehicle for new and tentative ideas in a wide variety of fields. Voltaire is the best known of the group; the appendix lists forty-nine of his works in this category. This last phase soon passed, however, with the relaxation of the censorship after 1760. By the end of the century two new and quite different trends were apparent: the science of Oriental studies, and the purely imaginative literary tradition represented by Bernardin de Saint Pierre, and later by Chateaubriand and Pierre Loti. Both of these trends, as well as French literature in general, owes a debt to the Oriental influence of the eighteenth century. This book is a useful analysis of that influence.

GORDON H. McNEIL

ENSAYO SOBRE EL JACOBINISMO. By Roger P. Labrousse, Profesor en la facultad de filosofía y letras de Tucumán. [Cuadernos de Historia, 3.] (Tucuman, Universidad Nacional de Tucumán, Facultad de filosofía y letras, 1946, pp. 109, \$2.50.)

THE CAUSES OF THE FRENCH REVOLUTION: A COURSE OF READING. By Alfred Cobban. [General Series: G 2.] (London, P. S. King and Staples for the Historical Association, 1946, pp. 27, 1s.)

ARTICLES

L. CEYSSENS. L'ancienne université de Louvain et la Déclaration du Clergé de France (1682). *Revue d'hist. ecclés.*, XXXVI, nos. 3-4, 1940.

R. STRUMAN. La perpétuité de la foi dans la controverse Bossuet-Jurieu, 1686-1691. *Ibid.*, XXXVII, nos. 1-4, 1941.

BON P. VERHAEGEN. Révolutionnaires de 1792-1793. *Ibid.*, XXXVIII, nos. 3-4, 1942.

G. LENORMAND. Le mouvement républicain dans la Somme au début de la III^e République (1870-1877). *Revue historique*, Jan.

ELLEN HAMMER. Hindsight on Vichy. *Pol. Sci. Quar.*, June.

NORTHERN EUROPE

O. J. Falnes

DUTCH TRADE TO THE BALTIC ABOUT 1600: STUDIES IN THE SOUND TOLL REGISTER AND DUTCH SHIPPING RECORDS. By Aksel E. Christensen. (Copenhagen, Einar Munksgaard, 1941, pp. 490, 35 kr.) This volume presents a study of the late sixteenth and the seventeenth century Dutch trade with the Baltic, a trade marked by exchange of salt from French and Portuguese ports for Baltic grain, timber products, and flax and hemp. The author rests his study on a re-evaluation of three main categories of sources—the Danish Sound Toll Register, the charter-parties in the Dutch notaries registers, and the Dutch commerce archives. On certain major points

the conclusions of earlier investigators are questioned. Contrary to Schreiner, the author asserts that the competition of Norwegian timber did not reduce the Dutch demand for high quality Baltic woods. Brunner overestimated the reliability of the charter-parties and exaggerated the role of the shipmaster in the management of his ship in the Baltic trade. Sayous and van Dillen emphasized too little that Amsterdam was less the heir of Antwerp than formerly supposed. By the 1590's, says the author, Amsterdam already commanded the shipping market of the entire Zuider Zee area, and Antwerp's fall in 1585 only accelerated at Amsterdam developments which already were under way. The author holds that the records now available, extensive as they are in some respects, are yet insufficient to present an accurate picture of the balance of trade with the Baltic. Roughly it appears that the export balance in favor of the west was in the ratio of two to one. In part at least the balance was made good by precious metals from the west. Hence the Sound was one of the avenues along which large treasures of the Spanish silver fleets were scattered over Europe. A great deal of scholarly labor has gone into the preparation of this ponderous volume, and it is unfortunate that much of the discourse is expressed in heavy and often awkward English prose.

HANSEATENE OG BERGEN: FORHOLDET MELLEME DE KONTORSKE OG DET BERGENSKE BYSAMFUND. By *Christian Koren Wiberg*. (Bergen, Johan Grieg, 1941, pp. 264, 39.20 kr.)

CHRISTIAN MAGNUS FALSEN: LINJEN I HANS POLITIKK. By *Einar Østvedt*. (Oslo, Aschehoug, 1946, 23.52 kr.)

NORSK SEILSKIPSFART EROBRER VERDENSHAVENE. By *Nils P. Vigeland*. (Oslo, Brun, 1943, pp. 272, 15.25 kr.)

NORGE I 1905: AKTSTYKKER FRA UNIONSOPPGJØRET. By *Frik Hougen*. (Oslo, Aschehoug, 1945, pp. 64, 2.24 kr.)

ÅRET 1814. II. UNIONEN. By *Arne Bergsgård*. (Oslo, Aschehoug, 1945, pp. 355, 15.12 kr.)

ET REGIME FORAN UNDERGANGEN: FREDRIK STANG—OLE JACOB BROCH. By *Jens Arup Seip*. (Oslo, Tanum, 1945, pp. 248, 13.44 kr.)

STATTHOLDERSAK OG UNIONSSTRID 1856—1862. By *Fredrik Stang*. (Oslo, Aschehoug, 1943, pp. 464, 18.48 kr.)

NANSENS RØST: ARTIKLER OG TALER. By *Fridtjof Nansen*. Three volumes. (Oslo, Dybwad, 1945, pp. 751, 30 kr.)

NORGE UNDER HAAKON VII. By *Odd Hølaas*. (Oslo, Cappelen, 1945, pp. 510, 48 kr.)

PRELIMINARY STUDY OF CERTAIN FINANCIAL LAWS AND INSTITUTIONS: NORWAY. Edited by *R. D. Scott*. [United States Treasury Department.] (Washington, Government Printing Office, 1943, pp. 365.)

PRELIMINARY STUDY OF CERTAIN FINANCIAL LAWS AND INSTITUTIONS: DENMARK. Edited by *Nelson Lancione*. [United States Treasury Department.] (Washington, Government Printing Office, 1944, pp. 707.)

TIL NORGE: TALER OG ARTIKLER GJENNOM KRIGSÅRENE 1939—1945. By *Jacob S. Worm-Müller*. (Oslo, Aschehoug, 1946, 13.44 kr.)

BEITRÄGE ZUR GESCHICHTE DES DEUTSCHTUMS IN NORWEGEN: SCHRIFTENREIHE IM AUFTRAGE DES REICHSKOMMISSARS FÜR DIE BESETZTEN NORWEGISCHEN GEBIETE. Herausgegeben von Ministerialrat Dr. Alfred Huhnhäuser. Heft 1, DIE DEUTSCHE EINWANDERUNG IN KONGSBERG. (Oslo, Deutsche Zeitung in Norwegen, 1944, pp. 160, 5.04 kr.)

KRIGEN I NORGE. By Willy Brandt. Two volumes. (Oslo, Aschehoug, 1945, pp. 283, 312, 26.88 kr.)

FRA NORGES KAMP FOR RETTEN: 1940 I HØYESTERETT. By Ferdinand Schjelderup. (Oslo, Grøndahl, 1945, pp. 234, 8 kr.)

TYSKERNE, QUISLING OG VI ANDRE. By Victor Mogens. (Oslo, Utenriksforlaget, 1945, pp. 297, 14 kr.)

PRESSE- OG LITTERATURFRONTEN UNDER OKKUPASJONEN 1940-1945. By Arne Kildal. (Oslo, Aschehoug, 1945, pp. 256, 10.08 kr.)

NORSKE PRESSE UNDER HAKEKORSET. By Gunnleik Jensson. (Oslo, Tell, 1945, pp. 172, 25 kr.)

TO GANGER 9 APRIL: BRUDDSTYKKER AV ILLEGAL LITTERATUR OM 900-ÅRSKRIGEN FOR TUSENÅRSRIKET. By Christian Gierløff. (Kragerø, Naper, 1945, pp. 302, 10 kr.)

ET NORDISK GRENSELAND: SØNDERJYLLANDS KAMP FOR SIN FRIHET. By Finn Lie. (Oslo, Rosén, 1945, pp. 117, 6.50 kr.)

ARTICLES

RUDOLF FREUND. Squandering the Public Domain in Sweden: 1820-1870. *Jour. Land and Public Utility Ec.*, May.

AXEL LINVALD. Historie [analysis of two works of Heckscher and Huizinga]. *Nord. Tids.*, no. 7, 1945.

PAUL DIDERICHSEN. Runer og Runeforskning i nordisk belysning, i anledning af det nye danske runeværk [Lis Jacobsen og Erik Moltke]. *Ibid.*, no. 5, 1945.

SIGURÐUR NORDAL. Hvor bör de gamle islandske Håndskrifter opbevares? *Ibid.*, no. 1, 1946.

BRUNO LESCH. Rysk Medelhavspolitik på 1700-talet. *Sv. Tids.*, no. 1.

GEORG ANDRÉN. En tillbakablick. Tal för Lunds studenter vid Tegnérfesten 1945. *Ibid.*, no. 10, 1945.

KARL BRUHN. Runebergskulten och den Finländska ungdomen. *Nord. Tids.*, no. 2.

EINAR BOYSEN. Grundtvig, Hartvig Nissen og Skandinavismen. *Ibid.*

LOLO KRUSIUS-AHRENBERG. J. J. Nordström och hans två fädernesland. Glimtar ur brevvexlingen med vänner i Finland. *Sv. Tids.*, no. 2.

OLAF BROCH. Det norske Videnskaps-Akademi under Okkupasjonen. *Nord. Tids.*, no. 7, 1945.

KNUT GETZ WOLD. Svensk-Norsk debatt [World War II]. *Sv. Tids.*, no. 10, 1945.

G——t, Finland under Åren 1939-45. En kort politisk översikt. *Ibid.*, no. 8, 1945.

C. E. BLACK. Patterns of Democratic Renaissance [Finland]. *For. Pol. Rep.*, May.

N. G. EHNRÖOTH, Finland 1945. *Nord. Tids.*, no. 2.

GUNNER HECKSCHER and ERIK DAHMEN. Sverige 1945. *Ibid.*

K. PETERSEN. Economic Conditions in Norway: Losses through Occupation and War; Revival for Foreign Trade. *Oxford Inst. Stats. Bull.*, Apr.

CHR. A. R. CHRISTENSEN. Norge i 1945. *Nord. Tids.*, no. 1.

HARALD JØRGENSEN. Aktuelle danske grænseproblemer. *Ibid.*, no. 2.

GERMANY, AUSTRIA, AND SWITZERLAND

Ernst Posner

UMRISS EINER GESCHICHTE DER PREISE UND LÖHNE IN DEUTSCHLAND VOM AUSGEHENDEN MITTELALTER BIS ZUM BEGINN DES NEUNZEHNTEN JAHRHUNDERTS. By *M. J. Elsas*. Zweiter Band—Teil A. (Leiden, A. W. Sijthoff's Uitgeversmaatschappij N.V., 1940, pp. iv, 649, unbound 13.10 fl., bound 14.70 fl.) This stout volume is the second devoted by Dr. Elsas and his associates to the history of prices and wages in Germany. This installment of the *Umriss* is only Part A of Volume II. In general, but with no uniformity, the data run from the middle of the sixteenth century to the later years of the eighteenth. The volume opens with nearly fifty pages on coinage and weights and measures. The data on prices and wages focus on Frankfurt, Leipzig, and Speyer. They are drawn chiefly from the accounts of hospitals in those centers. The work is carried out in the best tradition of Beveridge, Gay, and Bagge. This work was finished in 1940 but could not be published until war pressures were eased. The introduction and similar interpretive matter will appear in Part B of this volume.

DIE ÄLTESTE CHRONIK DER HUTTERISCHEN BRÜDER: EIN SPRACHDENKMAL AUS FRÜHNEUHOCHDEUTSCHER ZEIT. Herausgegeben von *A. J. F. Zieglschmid*, Northwestern Universität. (Philadelphia, Carl Schurz Memorial Foundation, 1943, pp. lxix, 1037, plates, \$7.50.) This voluminous book makes accessible to scholars, in reliable printed form, the manuscript of the oldest chronicle of the Hutterian brethren and thus provides a dependable basis for the pursuit of linguistic, historical, cultural, and religious studies, for which purposes it offers abundant material. The chronicle, compiled between 1581 and 1665 and containing an account of the origin and early history of the Hutterians, was long believed irretrievably lost until Professor Zieglschmid recently discovered it in Tabor, South Dakota. The introduction of the book presents succinct information concerning the history of the Hutterians subsequent to that related in the chronicle and data concerning the chronicle. Following the text are a bibliography, indexes of names of persons and of places, a helpful glossary, a list of errata, and photostatic copies of several pages of the manuscript. Since the sole purpose of the book is to offer a reliable, accurate copy of the chronicle in printed form, it can be judged only by how well it does so. Having read the book carefully and compared the few photostatic pages in the back of it with the corresponding printed pages in the text, I regard it a masterly and highly commendable achievement. How painstaking the editor was to attain the highest degree of accuracy and reliability is shown by the fact that, although occasionally strips of paper written by a later hand and presumably giving the original reading were pasted over damaged portions of the manuscript, he did not accept the reading of these slips but by means of illumination determined the true reading of the original. In some instances discrepancies were found (*cf.* p. xxx). The few errata in the text are corrected on page 1033. However, one mutilated sentence on pages xx-xxi was overlooked. The volume is well documented with instructive footnotes.

GEORGE F. LUSKY

THE GERMAN PEOPLE: A SOCIAL PORTRAIT TO 1914. By *Robert H. Lowie*, Professor of Anthropology, University of California. (New York, Rinehart, 1945, pp. 143, \$1.75.) Professor Lowie's book forms the first part of a projected study of the German people that promises to be of interest to all students in this field. It is refreshing to see a professional anthropologist turn from so-called savages in Polynesia

to people in central Europe who have built philosophical schemes around barbarities which would rudely shock any respectable South Sea Islander. The author is mainly interested in social psychology, and his small volume has some very acute observations on the cultural attitudes and behavior norms of the various social and economic groups that make up the German nation. In particular, he stresses the ways in which these social groups in Germany differ from corresponding social strata in other countries, particularly western Europe and North America. If the total picture that emerges from his account does not contribute to excessive optimism about the basic problems of Germany's integration into civilized social and political institutions, the fault lies not with Professor Lowie but with the subject of his study. The book suffers from two defects: First, it is much too short. A scholar of Professor Lowie's rank could have given us, even for the limited period up to 1914, a much deeper and more incisive analysis of the German way of life if he had disposed of more space for his story. Second, he occasionally gets lost in trivial and insignificant data which contribute little or nothing to the value of the book. However, these criticisms do not detract from the basic soundness of the study, which is very readable and rich in literary and artistic materials. Also, the method of Professor Lowie's work seems to deviate, quite successfully, from orthodox historical writing; instead of carving up German history into time periods, the author divides his subject matter in terms of forces and institutions. Finally, Professor Lowie does not seem to suffer from the fear of dealing with real problems, difficult as they may be.

WILLIAM EBENSTEIN

THE PAN-GERMANIC WEB: REMAKING EUROPE. By *Vladimir Grossman*. (Toronto, Macmillan Company of Canada, 1944, pp. viii, 179, \$2.00.) This lengthy essay contrives to present "the historical background of Germany's urge for expansion at the expense of her neighbours, since this alone may explain the events in Europe during the last century." The March revolutions of 1848 marked and decided the downfall of Austria as the dominant German power and the beginning of Prussian aggrandizement. From this point a pattern of aggression is traced to Denmark, Poland, Czechoslovakia, France, and the Mediterranean without regard to historical sequence. In the final section is a plan—somewhat sketchy and poorly premised, whatever its real merits—for "remaking Europe." The main theme is this: "Germany, the traditional aggressor and oppressor of her weaker neighbours, is to be dissolved as an abnormal state body and delivered to those same nations for a long period of real education and real adjustment to the modern ideas of a new world." FRANK E. DUDDY, JR.

BLUEPRINT OF THE NAZI UNDERGROUND—PAST AND FUTURE SUBVERSIVE ACTIVITIES. By *Robert M. W. Kempner*. [Research Studies of the State College of Washington, Volume XIII, Number 2.] (Pullman, State College of Washington, 1945, pp. 51-158, \$1.00.) The reviewer of this book is reminded, perhaps a little unfairly, of an opening line of one of Lessing's book reviews: "*Das Buch enthält viel Wahres und viel Neues; das Wahre ist nicht neu und das Neue ist nicht wahr.*" In Dr. Kempner's study, the true that isn't new predominates. Three quarters of the little volume is devoted to a Prussian police report of 1930 revealing the treasonable character of the NSDAP. Dr. Kempner was the legal adviser to the Prussian secret police at the time and had a hand in the report. The report itself is of no interest: it rehearses all the known facts about the Nazis' aims and methods of organization, their declarations of intentions to overthrow the democratic system of government, and their utilization of the democratic system to produce its destruction. The report is based entirely on a careful collation of Nazi public statements. Though the Prussian secret police framed it, they seem to have got all their evidence from the public

library—a rather remarkable fact which draws no comment or explanation from the editor. Dr. Kempner became engaged in a semipublic battle with the attorney general of the Reich because the latter refused to prosecute the Nazis on the basis of the report. He published the legal basis for the prosecution in *Die Justiz*, whose editors asked the attorney general to explain publicly what steps he was taking. The attorney general brushed this question aside with the statement that the investigation was not complete. Kempner publishes this correspondence, and places the blame for inaction squarely on the shoulders of Karl August Werner, the incumbent. One of the documents indicates that the same question was put to the minister of justice and others, but their replies are neither reproduced nor summarized. The Prussian minister of the interior could also have done something. Dr. Kempner must know something about the reasons for his paralysis. In short, the study throws up many questions about the operation of the German and Prussian bureaucracy in the last days of Weimar. The author presumably knows a great deal about this subject, one of the most difficult for historians or political scientists to get hold of. But his present purpose is not to part with his knowledge in that field, but rather to give us again what we already know from the Nazis' own mouths.

CARL E. SCHORSKE

ARTICLES

- HAROLD J. GRIMM. Luther and the Peasant Revolt. *Lutheran Church Quar.*, Apr.
 HEINZ BLUHM. Die Lebensform des Lutherschen Menschen und ihr Schicksal. *Monatshefte*, Apr.
 E. F. ROGERS. Sir Thomas More's Letter to Bugenhagen. *Mod. Churchman*, Mar.
 JOACHIM WACH. Caspar Schwenkfeld, a Pupil and a Teacher in the School of Christ. *Jour. Religion*, Jan.
 HEINRICH MEYER. Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz. *Monatshefte*, May.
 LEROY E. LOEMKER. Leibniz's Doctrine of Ideas. *Philos. Rev.*, May.
 G. V. JOURDAN. "Les Matinées Royales," a Work Falsely Attributed to Frederick the Great, King of Prussia. *History*, Sept., 1945.
 ELIZABETH HORSCH BENDER. Jung-Stilling and the Mennonites. *Mennonite Quar. Rev.*, Apr.
 F. L. WELLS. Hölderlin: Greatest of "Schizophrenics." *Jour. Abnormal and Soc. Psych.*, Apr.
 HELMUT REHDER. Literary Criticism in Germany during the Romantic Period. *Monatshefte*, Apr.
 CLEMENT VOLLMER. Heine's Conservatism. *South Atlantic Quar.*, July.
 ROY PASCAL. The Frankfurt Parliament, 1848, and the *Drang nach Osten*. *Jour. Mod. Hist.*, June.
 FELIX E. HIRSCH. Hermann Oncken and the End of an Era. *Ibid.*
 FRITZ NEUMANN. Max Scheler, Thinker and Prophet. *Monatshefte*, Apr.
 FELIX A. VOIGT. Gerhart Hauptmann unter der Herrschaft des Nazismus. *Ibid.*, May.
 WALTER A. REIGHART. Gerhart Hauptmann since 1933. *Books Abroad*, Spring.
 GERHART RITTER. The German Professor in the Third Reich. *Rev. Politics*, Apr.
 FRIEDA WUNDERLICH. The National Socialist Agrarian Program. *Soc. Research*, Mar.
 KURT SCHUSCHNIGG. Die Begegnung von Berchtesgaden am 12. Februari 1938. *Neue Rundsch.*, Apr.
 THOMAS R. SMITH and LLOYD D. BLACK. German Geography: War Work and Present Status. *Geog. Rev.*, July.
 L. A. HOFFMAN. Germany: Zones of Occupation. *Dept. of State Bull.*, Apr. 14.
 FRANZ X. PETER. Die völkerrechtliche Stellung Deutschlands unter dem Besetzungsregime. *Schweizer Monatsh.*, Apr.
 EDWARD S. MASON. Has Our Policy in Germany Failed? *For. Affairs*, July.
 FERDINAND A. HERMENS. The Economics of Potsdam. *Rev. Politics*, July.
 WALTER SULZBACH. German Reparations. *South Atlantic Quar.*, July.
 WALTHER ZÖLLNER. Wo steht die deutsche Intelligenz? *Neue Schweizer Rundsch.*, Sept., 1945.
 WERNER RINGS. Das Unglück der deutschen Intelligenz. *Ibid.*, Dec.
 WILHELM RÖPKE. Um die deutsche Frage. *Ibid.*, Dec.
 ROBERT REDSLOB. Betrachtungen über den politischen Wiederaufbau Deutschlands. *Schweizer Monatsh.*, Feb.

- HANS KOHN. Germany and Russia: Old Dreams and New Realities. *Internat. Jour.*, Spring.
 CLARA MENCK. Germany Today. *Rev. Politics*, July.
 HENRY J. KELLERMANN. The Present Status of German Youth. *Dept. of State Bull.*, July 14, 21.
 LAWRENCE A. HOFFMAN. Austria: Zones of Occupation. *Ibid.*, Apr. 21.
 CHARLES GILLIARD et HENRI MEYLAN. Histoire de la Suisse (publications des années 1936 à 1940). *Revue historique*, Jan.
 O. FORST DE BATTAGLIA. La Suisse et la guerre. *Rev. Pol. et Parlem.*, Dec.

DOCUMENTS

- Excerpts from Basic Postulates and General Themes for German Propaganda Abroad. *Dept. of State Bull.*, Mar. 3, 10.
 Documents concerning Relations between the Spanish Government and the European Axis. *Ibid.*, Mar. 17.
 German Documents on Sumner Welles Mission, 1940. *Ibid.*, Mar. 24.
 German Documents on Invasion of Norway. *Ibid.*, Apr. 28.
 German Documents on Hitler's Plans for Norway and Denmark, 1942. *Ibid.*, June 2.
 German Documents on Hungary. *Ibid.*, June 9.
 German Documents on Relations with Japan. *Ibid.*, June 16.
 German Documents: Conferences with Axis Leaders. *Ibid.*, June 30, July 14.

ITALY

ESPERIENZE E SOLUZIONI: STATO LIBERALE, STATO FASCISTA, STATO REPUBBLICANO. By *Oliviero Zuccarini*. (3d ed.; Rome, Edizioni di "Critica Politica," 1945, pp. 248, 100 l.) This is another reprint of a book that originally appeared in Italy in 1926 while totalitarian fascism was on the march and when it was still possible to publish antifascist writings. The present reprint also contains a brief preface and a few reviews of the original edition. The author has long been one of the most penetrating republican publicists in Italy, and his commentaries on a variety of Italian political and social problems—that of federalism, for example—are decidedly worth reading.

AVELLINO E L'IRPINIA NELLA TRAGEDIA DEL 1943-44. By *Vincenzo Cannaviello*. (Avellino, Tipografia Pergola, 1945, pp. 208, 120 l.) This is one of the better chronicles among the many that are being published in Italy with regard to conditions in provincial centers eventually occupied by the Allies. Professor Cannaviello brings to this book on a southern Italian district a wealth of detail, much of it based on careful personal observation.

EDUCATION IN FASCIST ITALY, 1932-1940. By *L. Minio-Paluello*. (London, Royal Institute of International Affairs, Oxford University Press, 1946? pp. 256, 15s.)

IN THE WAKE OF THE GOOSE STEP. By *Filippo Bojano*. Translated from the Italian by Gerald Griffin. (Chicago, Ziff-Davis, 1945, pp. 272, \$2.50.) The author of this impressionistic and superficial book, which is largely concerned with the relations between Fascist Italy and Nazi Germany, was the Berlin correspondent of *Il Popolo d'Italia*, Mussolini's daily newspaper, from 1929 until 1941, and he also served as a correspondent of the equally fascist Stefani Agency in Moscow (during the period of the Hitler-Stalin Pact) and in Stockholm. He goes to great lengths to denounce Mussolini and Hitler, and he attempts to convey the impression that he was a fervent opponent of the Axis. All the while he assumes an excessive degree of ignorance or credulity on the part of the reader, failing to give a candid statement of his thorough-going fascist record (as evidenced by his many dispatches) and conveniently forgetting

to mention the fact that he was the co-author, with a Nazi German, of a book entitled *Wir haben's gewagt! Weg und Wollen der Führer in Deutschland und Italien* (1934). It is not surprising that it was only after Mussolini's "fall" in July, 1943, that Bojano felt the impulse to write the book under review and to exclaim, among other things, "If there had been no such thing as Fascism! If there had never been an Axis!" The following remark, on page 251, is applicable to himself, "The perfervid imagination of the Italian when he is in a tight corner is often unlimited." Nevertheless, his testimony may be of value to some readers, particularly with regard to Ciano. To him, the behavior of Ciano and the Cianists was "nauseating"; Ciano merely "played" at being anti-German.

GAUDENS MEGARO

ARTICLES

HOWARD R. MARRARO. Ambrose Baber at the Court of Sardinia (1841-1843). *Georgia Hist. Quar.*, June.

RENÉ ALBRECHT-CARRIÉ. Italian Colonial Policy, 1914-1918. *Jour. Mod. Hist.*, June.

RUSSIA AND SLAVIC EUROPE

Sergius Yakobson

OBSHCHESTVENNYI STROI IAKUTOV XVII-XVIII VEKOV [the social setup of the Yakut in the 17th and 18th centuries]. By S. A. Tokarev. (Iakutsk, Iakutskoe Gosudarstvennoe Izdatel'stvo, 1945, pp. 414, 15 r.) The investigation of the historical past of the peoples of the Soviet Union is enriched by this monograph, which, though well documented, is rather controversial in some of its findings.

CHESMENSKII BOI I PERVAIA RUSSKAIA EKSPEDITSIIA V ARKHIPELAG (1769-1774) [the battle of Chesma and the first Russian expedition to the Archipelago]. By E. V. Tarle. (Moscow, Izdatel'stvo Akademii Nauk SSSR, 1945, pp. 110, 6 r.) ADMIRAL NAKHIMOV (MATERIALY DLIIA ISTORII RUSSKOGO FLOTA. SERIIA: RUSSKIE FLOTOVODTSY) [Admiral Nakhimov. Source material for the history of the Russian navy. Series: The leaders of the Russian navy]. Edited by N. V. Novikov and P. G. Sofinov. With a foreword by E. V. Tarle. (Moscow, Voenno-Morskoe Izdatel'stvo NKVMF, 1945, pp. 251, 12.20 r.) These are two further contributions to the growing literature on the history of Russian naval exploits. The analysis of the struggle for the eastern Mediterranean in the second half of the 18th century—a chapter of his forthcoming monograph "The Foreign Policy of Catherine the Great"—leads Tarle to the conclusion that the Russian navy is bound to play a very great role in the future, not only on the world oceans but particularly in the Mediterranean, the largest of all inner seas. The second publication, a common enterprise of the Chief Archives Administration of the People's Commissariat for Internal Affairs of the USSR and the Institute for Historical Research of the Academy of Sciences of the USSR provides an interesting collection of source materials for the study of the life of Admiral Nakhimov, the famous defender of Sevastopol in the Crimean War, and of his place in the history of Russian sea warfare. Selection of the material was hampered, as the editors themselves admit, by the inaccessibility of some of the pertinent archive collections evacuated during the war.

PROISKHOZHDENIE BOL'SHEVIZMA [the origin of Bolshevism]. By F. I. Dan. (New York, Novaia Demokratia, 1946, pp. 494, \$5.00.) A survey of the main phases and elements in the development of Russian political and social thought, based on

primary sources and the personal recollections of the author, who himself was a prominent figure in the Russian social democratic movement.

RELIGION IN RUSSIA. By *Robert Pierce Casey*, Brown University. (New York, Harper and Brothers, 1946, pp. viii, 198, \$2.00.) The Lowell lectures of Professor Casey, given in 1945, appear now as a book. It is a well-written, sometimes even fascinating, book by a well-informed author. It gives the American reader many a new detail and revealing illustration concerning enigmatic Russia. It does not mean, of course, that this enigma is now solved. The best chapters in the book are those on "The Imperial Church" and "The Antireligious Theory in Russia." The chapter on "Russian Dissent" throws light only on recent Protestant sects in Russia which, according to Dr. Casey, are not characteristic of the Russian mind. One would expect, instead, a picture of the peculiar situation of the Russian church between the intelligentsia and the people in order to understand its breakdown at the present time. The core of the story, the church under the Soviets, is written exclusively on the basis of official documents. The chapter on "The Attack on Religious Institutions" is objective and instructive, so far as the official politics of the state is concerned. But one is astonished by a complete silence on the executions of the priests, deportations, concentration camps, and the general atmosphere of terror in which the church lived for about twenty-five years. Outside this picture, however, the causes for the establishment of the Living Church and the schism it produced make no sense, nor does the so much advertised reconciliation of 1941. The least satisfactory is the picture of "The Revival of Orthodoxy." Here the reader expects something more than official letters of the patriarchs and the bishops. The inner life of the church, the state of mind of the average Christian, his attitude toward the church leaders and their tactics remain unexplained, because of the lack of sources. In lieu of throwing light on these puzzling matters concerning the religious mind in Russia, the author presents many documents, short stories, and lyrical poems depicting German atrocities, Russian patriotism, even the cult of Lenin and Stalin. Mr. Casey is a warm partisan of the policies pursued by the patriarch and he therefore provides an optimistic background of Russian social and cultural life. The events of the last year did not cool his enthusiasm, as is evident in his "Epilogue." Incidentally, since the end of the war a new source has been made available for the study of the inner life in Soviet Russia. This is the testimonies, of course varied and contradictory, of thousands of Soviet citizens abroad—Red army soldiers, war prisoners, and refugees. Without such a corrective, the study of life in a totalitarian country is of little profit. So far the best introduction to the religious life of Soviet Russia is offered by Professor N. S. Timashev's *Religion in Soviet Russia, 1917-1942* (New York, 1942), the fullest documentary material by Paul Anderson's *People, Church, and State in Modern Russia* (London, 1944). Even with these books available, however, Professor Casey's study enriches our knowledge of church life under the Soviet regime. Factual mistakes are here less numerous than is common in books on Russia. The most disturbing ones are misprints in dates and contradictions in statistical figures (pp. 90-91 and 93).

G. FEDOTOV

CENTRAL-EASTERN EUROPE: CRUCIBLE OF WORLD WARS. By *Joseph S. Roucek* and Associates. (New York, Prentice-Hall, 1946, pp. xii, 679.) This book aims to reach as large a body of American readers as possible in order that the common misconceptions and general ignorance they harbor in regard to the vast expanse of central-eastern Europe may be replaced by a wealth of dependable knowledge. It represents a co-operative enterprise under a general editor and is exposed to the many only too familiar hazards of this kind of project. First, there is the sheer mass of the

material coupled with its extraordinary variety. From Finland on the Baltic Sea southward to Turkey on the Mediterranean there is a roster of sixteen states, which in accordance with the plan mapped out by the editor are to be presented not merely in their recent vicissitudes but in their total development. This means so extensive a coverage that a dry, encyclopedic treatment is imposed as a matter of course. It is overcome by only a single contributor, Dr. Hans Kohn, whose special gifts enable him to adorn the dead facts with that imaginative flourish by which they are again restored to life. A second hazard is the number of contributors, who are necessarily of uneven capacity and represent a wide and often unreconciled range of viewpoints. They come to a total of eleven specialists, and while a measure of scholarly competence may be claimed for all of them, their command of their respective fields and their constructive power exhibit a considerable and often disturbing fluctuation. A last hazard has to do with the process of selection among the heaped events at each author's disposal. Since eleven historians are certain not to do their selecting on a common principle, we are sometimes startled by omissions of definitely essential matter, sometimes by so tight a compression that the telescoped incidents are stripped of their most characteristic features. On the whole, the judgment may be ventured that, while the book will serve a useful purpose in reference libraries and editorial offices, it is unlikely to fulfill the editor's hope of winning a large body of readers prepared at long last to achieve a sympathetic understanding of this unknown, diverse, and cruelly tormented section of Europe.

FERDINAND SCHEVILL

ČEŠI A SLOVÁCI. By *Josef Rotnágľ*. (Prague, Josef R. Vilímek, 1945, pp. 276, 140 Kč.)

A series of systematized essays on the relationship of the Czechs and Slovaks from the historical beginnings to the present day.

NÁROD SE BRÁNIL. By *Albert Pražák*. (Prague, Sfinx Bohumil Janda, 1945, pp. 409, 250 Kč.) A historical analysis of the role played by the Czech language in the development of Czech nationalism.

KRONIKY MLUVÍ. By *Otařar Doražil*. (Prague, Josef R. Vilímek, 1946, pp. 367, 140 Kč.) An exhaustive study of Czech chronicles from ancient times to Hájek.

SEST LET EXILU. By *Edvard Beneš*. (Prague, Orbis, 1946, pp. 479, 130 Kč.) President Beneš' speeches and lectures together with the documents pertaining to his activities in exile.

ARTICLES

EMILY GRACE KAZAKÉVICH. The Study of Ancient History in the Soviet Union. *Am. Rev. on the Soviet Union*, Feb., 1945.

HENRY GRÉGOIRE. Vizantinovedenie v Sovetskoi Rossii [Byzantine studies in Soviet Russia]. *Novyi zhurnal*, XII.

E. A. KOSMINSKII. Agrarnaia istoriia Anglii i Russkaia istoricheskaiia shkola [Russian studies on English agrarian history]. *Izvestiia Akademii Nauk SSSR, Serii istorii i filosofii*, II, no. 3, 1945.

M. GUKOVSKII. Ital'ianskoe Vozrozhdenie v trudakh Russkikh uchenykh XIX veka [Russian 19th century scholars on the Italian Renaissance]. *Voprosy istorii*, 1945, nos. 5/6.

B. KAMENETSKY. Two Centuries of Russian Writing on America. *Am. Rev. on the Soviet Union*, May, 1945.

I. MINZ. Studies of the October Revolution and Civil War. *Ibid.*, Aug., 1945.

B. D. GREKOV. Istoricheskie publikatsii Akademii Nauk [the historical publications of the Academy of Sciences]. *Izvestiia Akademii Nauk SSSR, Serii istorii i filosofii*, II, no. 3, 1945.

ROGER PORTAL. L'activité des historiens russes et la guerre d'après le "Istoričeskij Žurnal." *Revue historique*, Jan.

- B. I. ELKIN. Paul Milyukov, 1859-1943. *Slavonic and East Eur. Rev.*, Jan., 1945.
- E. JOHN RUSSELL. Sir John Maynard and His Studies of the Russian Peasant. *Ibid.*
- MICHAEL KARPOVICH. Soviet Historical Novel. *Russian Rev.*, Spring.
- P. N. TRET'IAKOV. Vostochno—slavianskie plemena nakanune obrazovaniia Kievskogo gosudarstva [the eastern Slavic tribes prior to the rise of the Kievan state]. *Izvestiia Akademii Nauk SSSR, Serii istorii i filosofii*, II, no. 3, 1945.
- S. H. CROSS. Primitive Civilization of the Eastern Slavs. *Am. Slavic and East Eur. Rev.*, May.
- B. D. GREKOV. Obrazovanie Russkogo gosudarstva [the origin of the Russian state]. *Izvestiia Akademii Nauk SSSR, Serii istorii i filosofii*, II, no. 3, 1945.
- FRANK F. SEELEY. Russia and the Slave Trade. *Slavonic and East Eur. Rev.*, Jan., 1945.
- SIR RAYMOND BEAZLEY. Early Glimpses of Moscovite Russia. *Contemp. Rev.*, Nov., 1945.
- I. I. LIUBIMENKO. Prosveshchenie i nauka pri Petre I i osnovanie Akademii Nauk [the state of education and of science at the time of Peter the Great and the founding of the Academy of Sciences]. *Izvestiia Akademii Nauk SSSR, Serii istorii i filosofii*, II, no. 3, 1945.
- F. M. MOROZOV. Ekonomicheskie vzgliady N. S. Mordvinova (1754-1845) [Mordvinov's economic ideas]. *Izvestiia Akademii Nauk SSSR, Otdelenie ekonomiki i prava*, no. 2, 1945.
- CHARLES E. PASSAGE. The Influence of Schiller in Russia: 1800-1840. *Am. Slavic Rev.*, V, nos. 12-13.
- S. P. MEL'GUNOV. Rytsar' svobody (k stoletiiu so dnia smerti dekabrista Lunina) [Lunin, a knight of freedom]. *Novyi zhurnal*, XIII.
- B. P. KOZ'MIN. A. I. Gertsen v istorii Russkoi obshchestvennoi mysli [Alexander Herzen's place in the history of Russia's social thought]. *Izvestiia Akademii Nauk, Serii istorii i filosofii*, II, no. 2, 1945.
- ERIC VOEGELIN. Bakunin's Confession. *Jour. Politics*, Feb.
- ALBERT PERRY. Yankee Whalers in Siberia. *Russian Rev.*, Spring.
- DAVID HECHT. Two Classic Russian Publicists and the United States [Chernyshevsky and Herzen]. *Am. Slavic and East Eur. Rev.*, Aug., 1945.
- Id.* Lavrov, Chaikovski and the United States. *Ibid.*, May.
- Id.* Lavrov and Longfellow. *Russian Rev.*, Spring.
- MICHAEL KARPOVICH. Vladimir Soloviev on Nationalism. *Rev. Politics*, Apr.
- BERNARD PARES. Two Great Russian Liberals: Peter Struve and Sergius Bulgakov. *Slavonic and East Eur. Rev.*, Jan., 1945.
- L. IVANOV. Revoliutsiia 1905 goda na Ukraine [the 1905 revolution in the Ukraine]. *Voprosy istorii*, 1945, nos. 5-6.
- V. A. MAKLAkov. Pered vtoroi dumoi [on the eve of the second Duma]. *Novyi zhurnal*, XII.
- PAUL B. ANDERSON. Patriarch Sergei. *Slavonic and East Eur. Rev.*, Jan.
- G. FEDOTOV. Russia and Freedom. *Rev. Politics*, Jan.
- GREGORY MEIKSINS. Russia, Britain and the Straits. *Am. Rev. on the Soviet Union*, May.
- ROBERT J. KERNER. Russian Policy in the Far East. *Yale Rev.*, Fall.
- OWEN LATTIMORE. Yakutia and the Future of the North. *Am. Rev. on the Soviet Union*, Feb., 1945.
- CHARLES PRINCE. Current Views of the Soviet Union on the International Organization of Security, Economic Cooperation and International Law: A Summary of Current Trends and Thoughts. *Am. Jour. of Internat. Law*, July, 1945.
- WL. DWORZACZEK. Polish Archives' War Losses. *Slavonic and East Eur. Rev.*, Jan.
- ADAM ULAM. Andreas Fricius Modrevius—A Polish Political Theorist of the Sixteenth Century. *Am. Pol. Sci. Rev.*, June.
- W. J. ROSE. Wladyslaw Sikorski. *Slavonic and East Eur. Rev.*, Jan., 1945.
- HENNIE SMITH. The New Czechoslovakia. *Quar. Rev.*, Apr.

DOCUMENTS

- A. V. YEFIMOV. What a Russian Schoolboy Learns about American History. *Am. Slavic and East Eur. Rev.*, May.
- SERGIUS YAKOBSON. An Autobiography of Gennadii Vasil'evich Yudin. *Lib. of Congress Quar. Jour.*, Feb.
- WARREN B. WALSH. Some Breshkovskaya Letters. *Am. Slavic and East Eur. Rev.*, Dec., 1945.

Far Eastern History

E. H. Pritchard

TREATMENT OF ASIA IN AMERICAN TEXTBOOKS. Prepared Under the Direction of the Committee on Asiatic Studies, American Council on Education, and the American Council, Institute of Pacific Relations, Howard E. Wilson, Coordinator and Editor. (New York, American Council, Institute of Pacific Relations, 1946, pp. vii, 104, 40 cents.) The rising concept of "One World" gives this little booklet significance. It is a co-operative survey of the treatment of Asia in American elementary and secondary school textbooks by a committee of four teachers and a board of review specialists in Asiatic studies. In many respects it is comparable to the study of *Latin America in School and College Teaching Materials*, published by the American Council on Education in 1943. It fills a need, for many changes are necessary in the presentation of Asia—and other areas as well—in this atomic age when international understanding is the only hope of solving world problems. The reports that make up this survey treat the following subjects: geography, world history, American history, civics, and modern problems. Courses in these fields are widely offered in American schools and are the basis for programs in education for citizenship. The strict adherence to textbook teaching that still widely prevails in the public schools requires that textbooks measure up to a high standard. If a world outlook is to be attained, much thought and attention will have to be given to improving the subject matter of the social studies. The survey reveals that data on Asia in American textbooks are inadequate and badly presented. Materials are not wisely selected or evenly balanced. References to Asia are usually so slight and scattered that pupils cannot integrate them into any coherent pattern. Errors of fact and interpretation are common. Stereotypes result in misconceptions. Attitudes of superiority are created in the minds of pupils. Clear thinking about Asiatic peoples is impossible. Illustrations and maps—or the lack of them—also come in for criticism. The committee presents recommendations for improving textbooks in the several subjects. More attention should be given to Asia by eliminating less significant data. All materials should be more wisely selected and better balanced. Why not include the great personalities of Asia? It is pointed out that materials should be adjusted to the structure and pattern of the different fields. These and many other suggestions are presented in concrete form. Even if one does not agree with all of them, they are thought-provoking and worthy of consideration. The brief survey is a contribution to educational literature. It should aid in the reorientation of American education to meet the global problems of the present, and should be studied by curriculum-makers, textbook writers, and teachers.

ARTHUR C. BINING

ARTICLES

- K. H. BAILEY. Dependent Areas of the Pacific: An Australian View. *For. Affairs*, Apr.
 ARTHUR L. NEAL. Canada's Trade with Trans-Pacific Countries. *Pacific Affairs*, Mar.
 NATHANIEL PEPPER. Pearl Harbor Post-Mortem. *Far Eastern Survey*, Mar. 27.
 WILLIAM C. REPETTI. The Beginnings of Catholicity in the Marianas Islands. *Cath. Hist. Rev.*, Jan.
 JOHN USEEM. Social Reconstruction in Micronesia. *Far Eastern Survey*, Jan. 30.
 CHI-YUN CHANG. The Prospects for Chinese Democracy. *Pol. Sci. Quar.*, Sept., 1945.
 PAO-CHUAN CHAO. The Agricultural Economics Program of China. *Jour. Farm Economics*, Aug., 1945.
 THEO. HSI-EN CHEN. China's Foreign Relations. *World Affairs Interpreter*, Autumn, 1945.
 The Chinese-Russian Relations. *Contemp. China*, Mar. 18.

- KWANG-SHEE CHU. The Chinese Central Police College. *Jour. Criminal Law and Criminology*, Nov.-Dec., 1945.
- DOMINGO M. CORREA. Impresiones de un misionero en China. *Revista Geografica Americana*, Feb.
- J. W. DECKER. Christian Movement in China. *Far Eastern Survey*, Feb. 27.
- LANCELOT FORSTER. Stanley Military Internment Camp: Hong Kong. *Contemp. Rev.*, Jan.
- SIDNEY D. GAMBLE. Four Hundred Chinese Farms. *Far Eastern Quar.*, Aug., 1945.
- A. J. GRAJDANZEV. Manchuria as a Region of Colonization. *Pacific Affairs*, Mar.
- KAN HSU. Food Problems [of China]. *China*, June.
- YUNG-YING HSU. The Government of Yen-an: A Study of a Chinese Communist Area. *Sci. and Soc.*, Fall, 1945.
- HU SHIH. Chang Poling: A Biographical Tribute. *China*, June.
- GEORGE KERR. Some Chinese Problems in Taiwan. *Far Eastern Survey*, Oct. 10, 1945.
- PAUL C. T. KWEL. Christian Higher Education in China. *Internat. Rev. of Missions*, 1945.
- OWEN LATTIMORE. The Outer Mongolian Horizon. *For. Affairs*, July.
- LIN YUTANG. Invention of a Chinese Typewriter. *Asia*, Feb.
- Manchuria as a Demographic Frontier. *Population Index*, 1945.
- FRANZ H. MICHAEL. Chinese Military Tradition. *Far Eastern Survey*, Mar. 13, 27.
- RUTH E. PARDEE. First Aid for China. *Pacific Affairs*, Mar.
- MAURICE T. PRICE. Differentiating Myth, Legend and History in Ancient Chinese Culture. *Am. Anthropologist*, Jan.
- L. RABINOWITZ. Eldad ha-Dani and China. *Jewish Quar. Rev.*, Jan.
- PHILIP L. RALPH. The Outlook for Democracy in China. *South Atlantic Quar.*, July, 1945.
- A Report on China's Economic Administration. *Contemp. China*, Apr. 29.
- H. L. RICHARDSON. Szechwan during the War. *Geog. Jour.*, July-Aug., 1945.
- AGNES ROMAN. Public Finance in Post-War China. *Pacific Affairs*, Mar.
- CHIH TSANG. The Postwar Trade of China. *Contemp. China*, Dec. 24.
- C. LESTER WALKER. The China Legend. *Harper's*, Mar.
- HSIAO-LAI WANG. Commercial Rehabilitation in China. *Asiatic Rev.*, Jan.
- WEN-HAO WONG. Economic Affairs [in postwar China]. *China*, June.
- YUN CHEN. China's Post-war Industrialization. *Asiatic Rev.*, Jan.
- GERARD M. FRITERS. Russia's Position in the Far East. *Contemp. Rev.*, Oct., 1945.
- ESSON M. GALE. Manchu or Muscovite. *Michigan Alumnus Quar. Rev.*, Autumn, 1945.
- ANDREW J. GRAJDANZEV. Soviet Position in the Far East. *Far Eastern Survey*, Nov. 21.
- Id.* Korea Divided. *Ibid.*, Oct. 10, 1945.
- ROBERT J. KERNER. Russian Policy in the Far East. *Yale Rev.*, Sept., 1945.
- JULES MENKEN. The Russo-Chinese Agreements. *Nat'l Rev.*, Oct., 1945.
- WILLARD PRICE. Jap Rule in the Hermit Nation. *Nat'l Geographic*, Oct., 1945.
- MARTIN T. BENNETT. Japan's Capacity to Produce. *Far Eastern Survey*, May 8.
- ALLAN B. COLE. The Mount Vernon's Voyage from Batavia to Nagasaki in 1807. *Am. Neptune*, Oct., 1945.
- J. W. EATON. A Walking Tour in Japan. *Queen's Quar.*, Spring.
- ALVIN JOHNSON. The Japanese Mentality. *Am. Jour. Econ. and Sociol.*, Oct., 1945.
- KENNETH K. KURIHARA. Japan's New Diet. *Far Eastern Survey*, May 22.
- JOHN M. MAKI. Japan's New Cabinet. *Ibid.*, June 19.
- SHIKAMATSU MUKAI. The Structure of Japan's Post-War Economy. *Pacific Affairs*, Mar.
- MORRIS EDWARD OPLER. Japanese Folk Beliefs concerning the Snake. *Southwestern Jour. of Anthropology*, 1945.
- Id.* and ROBERT SEIDO HASHIMA. The Rice Goddess and the Fox in Japanese Religion and Folk Practice. *Am. Anthropologist*, Jan.
- FRANZ OPPENHEIMER. Japan and Western Europe, IV: A Comparative Presentation of Their Social Histories. *Am. Jour. Econ. and Sociol.*, Oct., 1945.
- WILLARD PRICE. Desperate Peasants. *Asia*, Jan.
- FRITZ STERNBERG. Japan's Economic Imperialism. *Soc. Research*, Sept., 1945.
- WALTER SULLIVAN. Enlightening the Japanese Mind. *Free World*, Apr.

- L. H. TIBESAR. Hirohito—Man, Emperor, "Divinity." *Rev. Politics*, Oct., 1945.
- ILZA VEITH. Englishman or Samurai: The Story of Will Adams. *Far Eastern Quar.*, Nov.
- HARRY EMERSON WILDES. Russia's Attempt to Open Japan. *Russian Rev.*, Autumn, 1945.
- Id.* Democracy—by Divine Decree. *Asia*, Jan.
- Are We Winning the Peace in Japan? *Amerasia*, Feb.
- J. RUSSELL ANDRUS. Burina—an Experiment in Self-Government. *For. Pol. Rep.*, Dec. 15.
- ADRIAAN J. BARNOUW. Cross Currents of Culture in Indonesia. *Far Eastern Quar.*, Feb.
- P. T. BAUER. Some Aspects of the Malayan Rubber Slump, 1929-1933. *Economica*, Nov., 1944.
- R. A. BLASDELL. Islam in Malaya. *Internat. Rev. of Missions*, 1945.
- JAN O. M. BROEK. Man and Resources in the Netherlands Indies. *Far Eastern Quar.*, Feb.
- MARTIN D. BURKENROOD. The Development of Marine Resources in Indonesia. *Ibid.*
- ABRAHAM CHAPMAN. American Policy in the Philippines. *Far Eastern Survey*, June 5.
- J. J. H. A. DE LA COURT. Some Proposals for Postwar Education in Indonesia. *Far Eastern Quar.*, Feb.
- RUPERT EMERSON. An Analysis of Nationalism in Southeast Asia. *Ibid.*
- IRA GOLLOBIN. Philippine Election Coalition. *Far Eastern Survey*, Apr. 24.
- ANDRÉ GUIBAUT and LOUIS LIOTARD. Notes de Géographie Humaine sur la Vallée Moyenne de la Salouen. *Annales de Géographie*, 1945.
- CECIL HOBBS. Reading List on Burma. *Far Eastern Quar.*, Nov.
- DON WENDELL HOLTER. Conquest, Reconquest, and the Aftermath in the Philippines. *Religion in Life*, Spring.
- RAYMOND KENNEDY. Dutch Plan for the Indies. *Far Eastern Survey*, Apr. 10.
- BRUNO LASKER. The Role of the Chinese in the Netherlands Indies. *Far Eastern Quar.*, Feb.
- W. E. LE GROS CLARK. Pleistocene Chronology in the Far East. *Antiquity*, Mar.
- SEWARD W. LIVERMORE. Early Commercial and Consular Relations with the East Indies. *Pacific Hist. Rev.*, Mar.
- KARL J. PELZER. Tanah Sabrang and Java's Population Problem. *Far Eastern Quar.*, Feb.
- C. PRABHA. Siam's Democratic King. *Asia*, Mar.
- VICTOR PURCELL. A Malayan Union: The Proposed New Constitution. *Pacific Affairs*, Mar.
- A. ARTHUR SCHILLER. Labor Law and Legislation in the Netherlands Indies. *Far Eastern Quar.*, Feb.
- H. SJAARDEMA. One View of the Position of the Eurasian in Indonesian Society. *Ibid.*
- HELEN L. SMITH. Geographical Nomenclature in Siam. *Geog. Rev.*, Apr.
- ROBERT F. SPENCER. The Annamese Kinship System. *Southwestern Jour. of Anthropology*, 1945.
- H. M. SPITZER. Siam's Political Problems. Siam's Economic Problems. *Far Eastern Survey*, Apr. 10, May 8.
- VIRGINIA THOMPSON. Japan's Blueprint for Indonesia. *Far Eastern Quar.*, Feb.
- Id.* Siam and the Great Powers. *For. Pol. Rep.*, Mar. 1.
- R. STANLEY THOMSON. The Establishment of the French Protectorate over Cambodia. *Far Eastern Quar.*, Aug., 1945.
- Id.* Siam and France 1863-1870. *Ibid.*, Nov.
- R. O. WINSTEDT. Old Malay Legal Digests and Malay Customary Law. *Jour. Royal Asiatic Soc.*, 1945.
- Id.* Kingship and Enthronement in Malaya. *Ibid.*

DOCUMENTS

- WARREN B. WALSH. Pacific Voyage, 1866. *Pacific Hist. Rev.*, Mar.
- Id.* A Visit to the Tsungli Yamen. *Ibid.*, Dec.

United States History

E. C. Burnett

GENERAL

IN SEARCH OF THE REGIONAL BALANCE OF AMERICA. Edited with a Foreword by *Howard W. Odum*, Kenan Professor of Sociology, and *Katharine Jocher*, Professor of Sociology and Assistant Director of the Institute for Research in Social Science. [The University of North Carolina Sesquicentennial Publications.] (Chapel Hill, University of North Carolina Press, 1945, pp. 162, \$3.00.) The first third of this volume consists of three contributions each by Howard W. Odum and Katharine Jocher. In these are summarized the work of the Institute for Research in Social Science of the University of North Carolina and of the publication *Social Forces* during twenty-five years. Miss Jocher presents a useful bibliography of the publications and manuscripts of both these agencies. Mr. Odum emphasizes that "there can be no enduring reality of the southern regions of the United States, except as they are component parts of the better balanced and integrated Nation." He holds that "the South's attitudes and behavior on most levels are wrong, judged from any general abstract principle of democracy or Americanism," but he holds also that the rest of the nation has a responsibility to work co-operatively with the South in a planned program for the future, if the situation is to be improved. The remaining two thirds of the book is composed of ten essays by various authors. Those by Rupert B. Vance, William F. Ogburn, Charles S. Johnson, Ruth Landes, and C. Hermann Pritchett support the general essays by Mr. Odum in their views on southern regionalism or regional planning, as the case may be. Those by Edith W. Williams, Edgar T. Thompson, T. J. Woofter, and T. Lynn Smith exemplify Miss Jocher's methodological survey on "The Regional Laboratory for Social Research and Planning." The last essay, "Regionally Planning the Far East" by Elizabeth Green and Craighill Handy, although it presents an interesting regional comparison of China and the United States, mars the unity of the book. It remains only to commend the editors and to wish them success in their efforts to point out the present regional imbalance and suggestions for correcting it.

HARVEY L. CARTER

MAJOR TRENDS IN AMERICAN CHURCH HISTORY. By *Francis X. Curran, S.J.*, Weston College, Weston, Mass. (New York, America Press, 1946, pp. xviii, 198, \$2.50.) This brief history of American religion, the first from the pen of a Catholic scholar, is a sound and stimulating work. Father Curran believes that the two most significant religious developments since the Civil War have been the growth of Catholicism and infidelity, both at the expense of Protestantism. By 1936, as he points out, the United States contained only 31,000,000 professed Protestants, as against 25,000,000 non-Protestants (20,000,000 of whom were Catholics) and 70,000,000 who had no church connection. These figures demonstrate, he maintains, that if historians "are to interpret American church history, and not merely Protestant church history, they cannot ignore either the Roman Catholic Church or the great mass of the 'un-churched.'" Father Curran's history of the nation's religious development is shaped to this pattern. In eleven short and highly interpretative chapters he traces the history of religion in America from colonial days to the present. His narrative, in keeping with his professed purpose, devotes more space than usual to Catholicism and to the record of Protestant stagnation, which he lays to the modernization of doctrine to the point where most sects have forsaken all creeds. "It would appear," he writes, "that Prot-

estantism, having abandoned its ancient faith, was being deserted by the faithful." Father Curran has made no great contribution—his material has been drawn almost exclusively from monographs and secondary works—but he has written a judicious and challenging history of American religion.

RAY ALLEN BILLINGTON

THE LOST AMERICANS. By *Frank C. Hibben*. (New York, Thomas Y. Crowell, 1946, pp. xi, 196, \$2.50.) This book is a summary of our present archaeological knowledge of early man in America. It differs from earlier summaries in that it is frankly directed to the reader who has little or no knowledge of the early human history of America. Technical terms are avoided as much as possible. Background chapters have been added. One of these deals with Paleolithic Man in the Old World. Another discusses the possible routes of migration of man to the New World, including the long rejected routes via mythical Mu and Atlantis, and eliminates all but the generally accepted Bering Sea route. A third describes the glaciations and fauna of the Pleistocene Epoch of North America. In the discussion of early Americans the emphasis is upon Folsom Man and Sandia Cave Man. The Folsom and Clovis sites in New Mexico and the Lindenmeier site in Colorado are described, and Folsom Man is followed northward to the Alaska peninsula. The discoveries in Sandia Cave, the author's principal contribution to our knowledge of early man, are graphically reported. Other cultures noted include the Yuma, Abilene, Lake Mohave, and Cochise. A short chapter is devoted to comments on skeletal remains for which high antiquity has been claimed. Mr. Hibben is eminently fitted to write this type of book because he visualizes the man and the group, who hunted the game, beyond the spear point, the ashes, and the charred animal bones. He clothes the archaeological sites with the local color of human life in the midst of abundant rains, lush vegetation, and the great Pleistocene beasts. A tinge of romance permits the reader to acquaint himself with the essential facts of the earliest American history in an entertaining manner.

LLOYD A. WILFORD

THE IROQUOIS: A STUDY IN CULTURAL EVOLUTION. By *Frank Gouldsmith Speck*. [Cranbrook Institute of Science, Bulletin No. 23.] (Bloomfield Hills, Mich., Cranbrook Institute of Science, 1945, pp. 94.)

THE EFFECT OF SMALLPOX ON THE DESTINY OF THE AMERINDIAN. By *E. Wagner Stearn* and *Allen E. Stearn*. (Boston, Bruce Humphries, 1945, pp. 153, \$2.50.) Two lay persons concerned about the problem of vaccinating or not vaccinating their children very sensibly went to the library to get the facts. Soon they were fascinated to see what a terrible scourge smallpox can be when it attacks a community or a people who have not been immunized in some way against it. They became so particularly interested in the awful ravages that smallpox worked among the aborigines of America that they spent a year in big libraries gathering the facts. With these in hand they have written a book which will be of great interest to the anthropologist, the ethnologist, and the epidemiologist. In this book they show that again and again during the 450 years that have elapsed since the arrival of Columbus, millions of the aborigines have been swept away by smallpox. Often thousands died within a few weeks after their contact with an infected white man, and commonly from thirty to ninety per cent of a tribe or "nation" would be wiped out. Often not enough were left to bury the dead. In desperation the Indians and perhaps the missionaries with them tried out all sorts of remedies, but only when vaccination could be resorted to was an epidemic stopped. In the face of such terrible evidence it is hard to understand how anyone today could advocate or fight for the neglect of universal vaccination. This can be done only by one who does not know what smallpox used

to do and could still do. Especially convincing to persons who are in doubt as to the wisdom of vaccinating their children should be the fact that the writers of this book are not doctors of medicine, they are not even propagandists; they just published the facts that they dug out from old records and diaries of frontiersmen, and let these facts speak for themselves.

WALTER ALVAREZ

WILLIAM BEAUMONT'S FORMATIVE YEARS: TWO EARLY NOTEBOOKS 1811-1821. With Annotations and an Introductory Essay by *Genevieve Miller*, Institute of the History of Medicine, The Johns Hopkins University. (New York, Henry Schuman, 1946, pp. xv, 87, \$6.00.)

FEES AND FEE BILLS: SOME ECONOMIC ASPECTS OF MEDICAL PRACTICE IN NINETEENTH CENTURY AMERICA. By *George Rosen*. [Supplements to the Bulletin of the History of Medicine, No. 6.] (Baltimore, Johns Hopkins Press, 1946, pp. 93, \$1.50.)

ON THE IMPROVEMENT AND SETTLEMENT OF LANDS IN THE UNITED STATES. An Essay by the late *James Wilson*, Justice of the Federal Supreme Court, presented by him to Dr. Benjamin Rush, by the heirs of Dr. Rush to The Library Company of Philadelphia and now by The Library Company to the public. [A Research Bulletin of the Free Library of Philadelphia.] (Philadelphia, the Library, 1946, pp. 31.) "This document in the handwriting of James Wilson is in Benjamin Rush's papers at The Library Company of Philadelphia. It consists of thirty-nine numbered pages, small folio (32 x 18 cm.). On the margin of page 34 Dr. Rush has written an endorsement: 'Judge Wilson with two Letters.' The two letters, unfortunately, are missing. Julian P. Boyd first called attention to the document in his article on James Wilson in the *Dictionary of American Biography* (XX, 330). Lyman H. Butterfield studied it in the course of his preparatory survey for an edition of Rush's letters. This document is a significant illustration of the thinking of eastern leaders about western lands in the closing years of the eighteenth century."

MEN AND MOVEMENTS IN THE AMERICAN EPISCOPAL CHURCH. By *E. Clowes Chorley*. (New York, Charles Scribner's Sons, 1946, pp. ix, 501, \$4.00.) The historiographer of the Episcopal church has developed the historical background of the several parties in that church by means of representative biographies of some of the leaders in each movement. Nine more or less distinct stages of development are represented in the Evangelical, the High Church, the early Catholic, the Broad Church, the Anglo-Catholic, the Ritualistic, the Low Church, the Liberal Evangelical, and the Liberal Catholic parties. Each group is developed separately in the order named, which is not exactly a historical order, yet the work points out that these are more like facets of the same diamond than serious fissures. The nine groups could have been revised to show that they represent the Left and the Right of a central mass such as can be found among any group in any age. *Men and Movements* is the result of the Hale Lectures, the purpose of which is to present the history of the church largely from the biographical standpoint; hence extended sketches are given of Devereux Jarratt, Alexander Viets Griswold, William Meade, Alfred Lee, and others to represent the Evangelicals. Seabury, Hobart, and Ravenscroft are among the leading High Churchmen; while Ives, Doane, and Whittingham are among the early Catholics. The biographies of the earlier leaders are rather full, but towards the end of the book the great number of names mentioned becomes rather tedious. *Men and Movements* is probably the best one-volume reference on the development of religious thought in the American branch of the Anglican communion available today, but there are some inaccuracies and some few points presented as facts about which local historians are

not agreed. It is to be regretted that comparative movements in other sections of American Christianity were not mentioned.

NELSON WAITE RIGHTMYER

THE SOCIAL THOUGHT OF AMERICAN CATHOLICS, 1634-1829. By *Celestine Joseph Nuesse*. [The Catholic University of America Studies in Sociology, Volume X.] (Westminster, Md., Newman Book Shop, 1945, pp. x, 315, \$3.00.) This competent study of Roman Catholic attitudes toward American social trends during the colonial period and the early republic is one of numerous doctors' dissertations in the social sciences sponsored by the Catholic University of America which have been appearing in a steady stream for the past several years. Defining social thought as "all thinking about human associations" the author concedes at the start that there were no "all-embracing Roman Catholic social attitudes in the period treated, nor are there today." The author however expresses the hope that the teaching of recent popes and the increasing awareness on the part of American Roman Catholics of the ancient traditions of the Roman church will eventually evolve distinctive Roman Catholic social attitudes. During the early period of our history the American Roman Catholics were principally concerned with getting on with their Protestant neighbors, then a great majority, and were most anxious to convince them that their social, economic, and political attitudes were no different from those of the typical American Protestant. The author characterizes this attitude as "conformist," calling attention to the fact that there were few significant controversies with Protestants during this period, and that "far from proclaiming uniqueness, they were anxious to convince their neighbors that they were not different from them except in creed" (p. 283). It may be relevant here to point out that this conformist attitude has disappeared and the American hierarchy, the teaching church, is now insisting on Roman Catholic differences, especially in the realm of education and social relations, and as a result Roman Catholics are more and more withdrawing within themselves and any rapprochement with American Protestantism is becoming increasingly difficult if not completely impossible. Then as now the Roman Catholics were sensitive to any implication that there was an inherent conflict between their religion and democratic institutions, pointing particularly to the Roman Catholic contribution to the cause of religious freedom made by Lord Baltimore's experiment in Maryland as proof of Roman Catholic compatibility with all our basic freedoms. The author, however, admits that the Maryland experiment was a demonstration of the practical aspects of toleration and was not the result of the recognition of the principle of full religious liberty which, of course, implies the complete equality, as a matter of right, of all religions under the law. This principle the Roman Catholics have always rejected on the ground that error ought not to have the same rights as truth. The first two chapters cover the colonial period and deal principally with those colonies where Catholics were the most numerous, Maryland and Pennsylvania. Two chapters are given to the Catholic part in the Revolution and Constitution-making. The achievement of religious liberty for Roman Catholics receives special attention, stressing particularly the frontier influence in its attainment, and the part played by the Irish Catholic immigrant. The charge that Roman Catholicism was a foreign religion and could never be acclimated to American soil was combatted strongly by the early Irish prelates. The author points out that the "native Catholics"—the descendants of the colonial Catholic families—were as suspicious of the Catholic foreigners streaming into the country after 1820 as were their Protestant contemporaries. I should like to commend the author on his restraint in the use of the words "bigot" and "bigotry"—obnoxious and useless terms which have been employed all too frequently in studies of this sort.

WILLIAM W. SWEET

LINCOLN AND THE SOUTH. By J. G. Randall, Professor of History, University of Illinois. [The Walter Lynwood Fleming Lectures in Southern History, Louisiana State University.] (Baton Rouge, Louisiana State University Press, 1946, pp. viii, 161, \$1.50.) The central theme of this book, as the title indicates, is Lincoln's relationship to the South. Lincoln's close connection with this region and his interest in it were fundamental in his thought and action on all great national problems with which he wrestled. Born in the South, of ancestry southern for several generations, he always felt that he knew the South firsthand, and this knowledge gave him a sentimental attachment, nowhere in his whole life better expressed than in his plan for knitting the nation together as the Civil War drew to a close. In directing the war, he never lost sight of the fact that though the South was the object of attack, its civilization and institutions must not be destroyed beyond the minimum necessity of preserving the Union. Hence his long delay in coming to the point of dealing with slavery—freeing the slaves by proclamation, which was not freeing them at all. Professor Randall devotes considerable attention to the Emancipation Proclamation, as indeed to the other points suggested in this resumé. With sound scholarship and clever craftsmanship, he lets Lincoln's record be the basis of his fame. This book is made up of four lectures given by Professor Randall at Louisiana State University as the Walter Lynwood Fleming Lectures in Southern History, entitled, "When Lincoln Looked South," "Lincoln and the Southern Border," "Design for Freedom," and "Design for Peace." Fuller discussion of some of the points in these lectures appears in Professor Randall's recent two-volume work, *Lincoln the President: Springfield to Gettysburg*.

E. MERTON COULTER

HENRY BARNARD'S AMERICAN JOURNAL OF EDUCATION. By Richard Emmons Thursfield. [The Johns Hopkins University Studies in Historical and Political Science, Series LXIII, Number 1.] (Baltimore, Johns Hopkins Press, 1945, pp. 359, xiv, cloth \$3.75, paper \$3.00.) Perhaps no person contributed more to the advancement of education in the United States in the last half of the nineteenth century than Henry Barnard. His influence was exerted in numerous ways but in none so extensively as through the publication of the *American Journal of Education*, a private enterprise upon which he spent some twenty-five years of labor and the most of his modest fortune. Its thirty-one volumes constitute an encyclopedic work comprising material relating to almost every phase of education, drawn from both American and foreign sources or contributed by competent writers. In undertaking a study and evaluation of it, Mr. Thursfield faced a formidable task which he has accomplished with notable success. The amount and diversity of the material with which he had to deal has not prevented him from achieving a clear and comparatively brief, but sufficiently detailed and documented, exposition. In addition to descriptive facts, it presents the service rendered by the *Journal* in preserving the annals of American education, in transmitting educational ideas and methods from Europe, in stimulating improvements in educational opportunities and facilities, and in effecting social change. The book is of value both as a guide to the contents of the *American Journal of Education* and also as a contribution to the history of American culture.

HARRIS E. STARR

THE HISTORY OF PHI BETA KAPPA. By Oscar M. Voorhces, Phi Beta Kappa Historian. (New York, Crown Publishers, 1946, pp. xi, 372, \$4.00.) This volume is the first full, authentic history of the Phi Beta Kappa Society. As Professor William T. Hastings observes in his preface, it is in the main "a constitutional history," necessarily concerned, in the earlier period, with procedures of electing members and

establishing new branches; in the period since 1883, with the functioning of the United Chapters. Less obviously perhaps, it is the history of a creative idea in American education (intellectual fellowship in the service of the commonwealth) which has been of quietly persistent influence for over 160 years. In general, the transformation which may be traced, through tedious details of chapter minutes and correspondence, is that from a band of congenial spirits, a cross between a present-day fraternity and a collegiate literary club, into a national "honor" society, with scholarly achievement as its basis of membership. Dr. Voorhees' research began in 1890 with a paper based on the *Original Records* of the parent society at Williamsburg, and has continued through his long term (1901-1931) as secretary and thereafter as historian of the United Chapters. It is regrettable that the official history of a scholarly society should be deficient in such essentials of good writing as firmly organized paragraphs and careful documentation. Of course, the source of most quotations from chapter records and archives is clear enough without footnotes, but there are numerous references to inadequately identified writings. Still, we must be grateful for the author's single-minded devotion and industry, in the face of recurrent disappointments and for long periods without sufficient secretarial assistance. No one but Dr. Voorhees could or would have written this book; no one else would have had the persistence to make a comprehensive collection of these often misplaced or neglected materials. The obvious defects and limitations of the work should not cause us to undervalue its very real contribution to an understanding of the intellectual history of the United States.

STANLEY P. CHASE

PUBLIC MEN IN AND OUT OF OFFICE. Edited by *J. T. Salter*. (Chapel Hill, University of North Carolina Press, 1946, pp. xx, 513, \$4.00.) A volume of brief biographical sketches covering twenty-seven present-day worthies and some unworthies. The writers are chiefly seasoned newspaper men or members of departments of journalism, political science, or history. The volume is better balanced than the material dished out by columnists and will certainly find interested readers.

PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGN FUNDS. By *Louise Overacker*, Professor of Political Science, Wellesley College. With an Introduction by Theodore Francis Green, U. S. Senator from Rhode Island. [The Gaspar G. Bacon Lectureship on the Constitution of the United States, Boston University Lectures, 1945.] (Boston, Boston University Press, 1946, pp. vii, 76, cloth \$1.50, paper \$1.00.) This little volume consists of three lectures by Miss Overacker at Boston University on the Bacon Foundation. The first chapter deals with campaign funds as "A Problem in Democratic Control," the second with "The Hatch Act: Limitations Which Do Not Limit," and the last chapter is on "Trade Union Contributions." Those who know Miss Overacker's previous studies will find in this slim volume the same scholarship and good sense. She does not think that a law about it does much good. Publicity and an aroused public opinion are better remedies.

ARSENAL OF DEMOCRACY: THE STORY OF AMERICAN WAR PRODUCTION. By *Donald M. Nelson*. (New York, Harcourt, Brace, 1946, pp. xviii, 439, \$4.00.) This is a well-told story of an almost incredible achievement in the production of war material for world-wide distribution. To Mr. Nelson, next to President Roosevelt, goes the credit for setting seemingly unachievable goals and then reaching or surpassing them.

THE NEW UNITED STATES. By *Edgar Eugene Robinson*, Margaret Byrne Professor of American History, Stanford University. (Stanford University, Stanford University Press, 1946, pp. viii, 141, \$2.50.)

CONTEMPORARY AMERICA: THE NATIONAL SCENE SINCE 1900. By *Harvey Wish*, Smith College. (New York, Harper and Brothers, 1945, pp. xvi, 657, \$4.00.) If this volume is judged on the degree of success of the author in achieving the purpose he set before himself, then it will merit high praise indeed. In scope, proportion, and emphasis, it is clearly tailored to plan; criticisms, if there be any, will come from those who want another type of book. Consciously, the author has prepared a text in the social history of the twentieth century. He has been aware of the difficulties, some of them inherent, in the task he has accepted, and has tried to minimize them. Social history is somewhat chaotic at best; space limitations and his own choice combine to force Mr. Wish to say a little bit about a great number of things. A superficial examination of the volume gives the first impression of disorder; reduced to daily assignments (this is the role of a textbook) the units regain proportion and coherence, though the problem of relationship remains. The volume devotes equal space to the four decades, with a final chapter including the election of 1944. Social, intellectual, and artistic materials often do not fit neatly into such time divisions; the effort to hold the time sense has made a little choppy the treatment of these larger trends and even introduces repetition, but the student will be profoundly grateful for the clarity in chronology. In the handling of the New Deal, where organization is especially difficult on any other basis, Mr. Wish has taken refuge in strict development by administrations. The tone is mildly "liberal," though the author makes too free use of that much-abused term. If there are weaknesses, they lie in the handling of institutional politics and institutional economics. A more profound foundation in these elements in our century would perhaps have given a basis for more positive judgment of men and measures, but after all, Mr. Wish is writing only one book this time. For its purpose, this is an excellent volume. It is above the average in intellectual maturity demanded of the student and contains an adequate body of fact to support the work of the instructor. The annotated bibliography is unusually comprehensive.

RAYMOND C. MILLER

ARTICLES

- LOUIS GOTTSCHALK. Carl Becker: Skeptic or Humanist? *Jour. Mod. Hist.*, June.
- GUY STANTON FORD. Carl Lotus Becker (1873-1945). *Year Book of Am. Philosophical Soc.*, 1945.
- FRANCE V. SCHOLES. Research Activities of Lansing B. Bloom in Foreign Archives. *New Mexico Hist. Rev.*, Apr.
- NEIL H. SWANSON. American History Has Failed Us. *Army Ordnance*, May.
- OSCAR WEGELIN. Early American Directories in the Library of the New-York Historical Society. *New-York Hist. Soc. Quar.*, Apr.
- JEAN DELANGLEZ. The "Recit des voyages et des decouvertes du Pere Jacques Marquette." *Mid-Am.*, July.
- MAXINE MATHEWS. Truth and Fiction about William Penn's Treaty with the Indians. *Social Stud.*, May.
- CARL BRIDENBAUGH. Baths and Watering Places of Colonial America. *William and Mary Quar.*, Apr.
- RAYMOND PHINEAS STEARNS. Colonial Fellows of the Royal Society of London, 1661-1788. *Ibid.*
- HOWARD R. MARRARO. Rome and the Catholic Church in Eighteenth-Century American Magazines. *Cath. Hist. Rev.*, July.
- HUBERTIS CUMMINGS. Robert Morris and the Episode of the Polacre "Victorious." *Pennsylvania Mag. Hist. and Biog.*, July.
- WILLIAM BUCKNER MCGROARTY. The Death of Washington. *Virginia Mag. Hist. and Biog.*, Apr.
- LEWIS LEARY. Leigh Hunt in Philadelphia—An American Literary Incident of 1803. *Pennsylvania Mag. Hist. and Biog.*, July.
- LYON G. TYLER. Highways and Milestones: Foreign Policy of the Administration of President John Adams. *Tyler's Quar. Hist. and Geneal. Mag.*, Apr.

- J.-M. CARRIÈRE. Mr. Jefferson Sponsors a New French Method. *French Rev.*, May.
- ELIZABETH G. MCPHERSON. The Southern States and the Reporting of Senate Debates, 1789-1802. *Jour. Southern Hist.*, May.
- RAYMOND WALTERS, JR. The Making of a Financier: Albert Gallatin in the Pennsylvania Assembly. *Pennsylvania Mag. Hist. and Biog.*, July.
- ROSS J. S. HOFFMAN. The American Republic and Western Christendom [Orestes Brownson]. *Cath. Hist. Soc., Hist. Recs. and Stud.*, XXXV.
- WILLIAM J. PETERSEN. Mormons on the March [1831-46]. *Palimpsest*, May.
- R. E. HARVEY. The Mormon Trek across Iowa Territory. *An. Iowa*, July.
- RUSSEL B. NYE. The Slave Power Conspiracy, 1830-1860. *Sci. and Soc.*, Summer.
- OSCAR SHERWIN. Sons of Otis and Hancock. *New Eng. Quar.*, June.
- HOWARD C. PERKINS. A Neglected Phase of the Movement for Southern Unity, 1847-1852. *Jour. Southern Hist.*, May.
- LOUIS S. FRIEDLAND. Richard Hildreth's Minor Works. *Papers Bibliog. Soc. of Am.*, XL, 2d quar.
- EDWIN C. MUSTARD. The Submarine in the Revolution and Civil War. *Social Stud.*, May.
- FRANK E. VANDIVER. Confederate Plans for Procuring Subsistence Stores. *Tyler's Quar. Hist. and Geneal. Mag.*, Apr.
- F. LAURISTON BULLARD. Abraham Lincoln and George Ashmun. *New Eng. Quar.*, June.
- ERNEST J. WESSEN. Debates of Lincoln and Douglas: A Bibliographical Discussion. *Papers Bibliog. Soc. of Am.*, XL, 2d quar.
- LYMAN BRYSON. Lincoln in Power. *Pol. Sci. Quar.*, June.
- EDGAR CURTIS TAYLOR. Lincoln the Internationalist. *Abraham Lincoln Quar.*, June.
- ROBERT BARTON. William E. Barton, Biographer. *Ibid.*
- LOUIS TAYLOR MERRILL. How Ben Butler Saved "Old Ironsides." *Maryland Hist. Mag.*, June.
- DOROTHY PENN. George Cable Bingham's "Order No. 11." *Missouri Hist. Rev.*, Apr.
- CHESTER McARTHUR DESTLER. The Standard Oil, Child of the Erie Ring, 1868-1872: Six Contracts and a Letter. *Miss. Valley Hist. Rev.*, June.
- DAVID MALDWYN ELLIS. The Forfeiture of Railroad Land Grants, 1867-1894. *Ibid.*
- HENRY J. BROWNE. The "Italian Problem" in the United States, 1880-1900. *Cath. Hist. Soc., Hist. Recs. and Stud.*, XXXV.
- BERLIN B. CHAPMAN. The Cherokee Commission, 1889-1893. *Indiana Mag. Hist.*, June.
- ARTHUR S. LINK. The Progressive Movement in the South, 1870-1914. *North Carolina Hist. Rev.*, Apr.
- JOHN D. HICKS. The Western Middle West, 1900-1914. *Agric. Hist.*, Apr.
- C. WRIGHT MILLS. The American Business Elite: A Collective Portrait. *Jour. Ec. Hist.*, Supp. V, Dec.
- N. S. B. GRAS, LINCOLN GORDON, CHARLES CORTEZ ABBOTT, C. O. RUGGLES. Shift from Government Regulation to Government Control of Business. *Bull. Business Hist. Soc.*, Apr.
- HERBERT E. KAHLER. Ten Years of Historical Conservation under the Historic Sites Act. *Planning and Civic Comment*, Jan.
- NORMAN FOERSTER. Iowa, North Carolina, and the Humanities. *North Carolina Hist. Rev.*, Apr.
- AUBREY L. BROOKS. America in a World Democracy. *Ibid.*

DOCUMENTS

- ELIZABETH MERRITT. The Lexington Alarm, April 19, 1775: Messages Sent to the Southward after the Battle. *Maryland Hist. Mag.*, June.
- EDITH ROSSITER BEVAN. Thomas Jefferson in Annapolis, November 25, 1783-May 11, 1784. *Ibid.*
- PHILIP MARSH. Madison's Defense of Freneau. *William and Mary Quar.*, Apr.
- JAY MONAGHAN. From England to Illinois in 1821: The Journal of William Hall. *Jour. Illinois State Hist. Soc.*, June.
- WILLIAM D. HOYT, JR. [Jerome Napoleon Bonaparte, Jr.'s] Journey to the Springs, 1846. *Virginia Mag. Hist. and Biog.*, Apr.
- T. HARRY WILLIAMS. General Ewell to the High Private in the Rear. *Ibid.*
- WILLIAM G. BEK. The Civil War Diary of John T. Buegel, Union Soldier [I]. *Missouri Hist. Rev.*, Apr.
- JAMES A. PADGETT. Alfred Mordecai's Notes on Mexico, 1866. *North Carolina Hist. Rev.*, Apr.

NEW ENGLAND AND MIDDLE COLONIES AND STATES

THE RISE OF THE JEWISH COMMUNITY OF NEW YORK, 1654-1860. By Hyman B. Grinstein. (Philadelphia, Jewish Publication Society of America, 1945, pp. xiii, 645, \$3.00.) This book is a contribution to an understanding of Jewish community growth in a city that by 1860 had become the foremost center of Jewish population and influence in the Western Hemisphere, if not in the world. With meticulous scholarship, Dr. Grinstein examines the structure and functioning of community institutions as they evolved during the first two hundred years of Jewish life in New York. After a brief but excellent preliminary survey of the forces at work over two centuries, the author treats topically such major aspects of community effort as were concerned with synagogue organization, religious practices, social welfare projects, cultural and educational interests, problems of religious dissent, and solicitude for co-religionists elsewhere in the nation and abroad. Though limited in scope, it is a work of decided merit, written with objectivity and clarity and based upon an exhaustive examination of numerous manuscript and printed sources. The coming to New York of Jewish groups of diverse national origins and cultural backgrounds affords Dr. Grinstein an opportunity to study the process of adjustment to a new urban environment in intimate detail. As a result, he has thrown interesting light on some specialized sociological aspects of the broader subject of immigration and settlement. Especially significant is the emphasis placed on the impact of New World ideas and ideals on Jewish religious and community activity. In this connection, one wonders whether the title of the book is precisely descriptive of its contents. For, as the author himself explains, from the very beginning "*the Jewish community*," in the technical, Old World sense, did not exist in New York City, and it never arose. On the contrary, Jewish community life in this period represented the barest remnants of institutional cohesiveness. In a democratic America the traditional Jewish community gave way to a pattern of social endeavor in religious, educational, philanthropic, fraternal, and related fields strikingly different from Old World ways. While some age-old practices were neglected, others were retained and strengthened in a civil and cultural climate congenial to a group profoundly imbued with the concepts of social justice and equality among men. Noteworthy in this transformation was the advent of American independence, which was markedly productive of many changes in Jewish institutional functioning. Influential especially was the New York state law of 1784 on the incorporation of religious societies, which greatly affected synagogue organization and policy. After the Revolution, as Dr. Grinstein shows, the spread of nonconformity among Christian denominations had its repercussions in the Jewish fold too. In fact, the Jews reacted like everyone else to the main political, economic, and social currents of the times. The author's restricted field of investigation leaves a good deal of the pre-Civil War story of the Jews of New York untold, particularly as it relates to their intercommunity contacts and other endeavors in the life of the city. Much, therefore, remains to be done to complete the picture of the part played by the Jews in the history of early New York. Dr. Grinstein, of course, has made a very notable beginning.

SIDNEY I. POMERANTZ

LETTERS OF A TICONDEROGA FARMER: SELECTIONS FROM THE CORRESPONDENCE OF WILLIAM H. COOK AND HIS WIFE WITH THEIR SON, JOSEPH COOK, 1851-1865. Edited by *Frederick G. Bascom*. (Ithaca, Cornell University Press, 1946, pp. xii, 134, \$2.00.) If this notice had been written for the first volume of the *Review*, it would hopefully have sought anchorage by saying that the Ticonderoga farmer who wrote the letters addressed them to his son, the well-known

Joseph Cook, whose Monday lectures for twenty years drew crowded audiences in Boston or wherever he appeared. Today there is no meaning to "the well-known Joseph Cook." He, who with Spurgeon, Beecher, and Talmadge was among the first syndicated writers with an audience more devoted than any columnist, is forgotten. That may be no great calamity. But the story told in these letters of a farmer and stock-raising father who invested everything in his one son till the latter was self-supporting at thirty-eight is well worth preserving. It is life with father, or on father, that reveals an appealing character whose faith in God, his son, hard work, and well-bred horses was justified to his own satisfaction before he died. It is not often you meet the combination of a simple faith and an honest horse trader in the middle of the nineteenth century on the eastern edge of David Harum country. Farming and finances and shrewd advice and some politics are the themes of these letters scattered from 1851 to 1884. So intimate is the reader's identification with "Cliff Seat" in Trout Brook Valley that the concluding note of the editor touches a nostalgic chord. "Before many years Cliff Seat fell into decay. Nothing but dilapidation remains to tell the story of simple life and country ways, of hopes and fears, ambition, perseverance and triumph that had been unfolded there." G.S.F.

A HISTORY OF THE DIOCESE OF ALBANY, 1704-1923. By *George E. De Mille*. Foreword by the Bishop of Albany. (Philadelphia, Church Historical Society, 1946, pp. 155, \$2.50.)

A TOWER ON THE HEIGHTS: THE STORY OF THE FIRST PRESBYTERIAN CHURCH OF BROOKLYN. By *Ralph Foster Weld*. (New York, Columbia University Press, 1946, pp. xiii, 169, \$2.50.) Not many readers will be concerned with the theme of this little book, the story of a village church that became suburban, then metropolitan, safe on its height amid wealth and brown stone fronts, then looked out over mansions become apartments, aristocracy replaced by bohemianism, stability undermined by social change. When local church history is written in these terms by a trained social historian like Dr. Weld, it is worth a word of hearty commendation.

ARTICLES

- T. D. SEYMOUR BASSETT. The 1870 Campaign for Woman Suffrage in Vermont. *Vermont Quar.*, Apr.
 MARY W. ELLIS. John Strong: A Pioneer of Addison, Vermont. *Ibid.*
 ARTHUR J. ALEXANDER. Exemptions from Military Service in New York State during the Revolutionary War. *New York Hist.*, Apr.
Id. Prelude to the Antirent War of 1845 in Delaware County, New York. *Agric. Hist.*, Apr.
 MAX BERGER. British Impressions of New York a Century Ago. *New York Hist.*, Apr.
 HOWARD R. MARRARO. Garibaldi in New York. *Ibid.*
 FRANK WEITENKAMPE. New York State in National Politics: Notes for a Cartoon Record. *New-York Hist. Soc. Quar.*, Apr.
 ROBERT R. COLES. The Story of the Musketa Cove Patent of 1677. *Nassau County Hist. Jour.*, Spring.
 ELMER T. HUTCHINSON. Union Hall Hotel, Elizabethtown, New Jersey. *Proc. New Jersey Hist. Soc.*, Apr.
 J. H. POWELL. John Dickinson, President of Delaware State, 1781-1782 [II]. *Delaware Hist.*, July.
 CHARLES L. REESE, JR. A Note on Capt. John Hamilton [1780-1828]. *Ibid.*

DOCUMENTS

- MARY E. CUNNINGHAM. Diary of Orrin Wood Robertson [II]. *New York State Hist.*, Apr.
 N. B. W. Captain Samuel Shaw's Revolutionary War Letters to Captain Winthrop Sargent. *Pennsylvania Mag. Hist. and Biog.*, July.

- John Hamilton (1780-1828). *Some Reminiscences of Wilm'tn and My Youthful Days*, etc. *Delaware Hist.*, July.
- LEON DE VALINGER, JR. Rodney Letters. *Ibid.*

SOUTHERN COLONIES AND STATES

THE HISTORY OF THE HOFFMAN PAPER MILLS IN MARYLAND. By *May A. Seitz*. (Towson, Md., author, 1946, pp. 63, \$2.00.) The man who built and operated the first paper mill in Maryland was a German immigrant, William Hoffman, who in 1775 settled north of Baltimore and became the progenitor of a long line of paper-makers. In the following generations the Hoffman mills developed rapidly until, towards the end of the nineteenth century, they lost ground as the young and forward pushing New England paper industry grew. Through many years Mrs. May A. Seitz has collected material on the history of the Hoffman enterprise. Based on land records, contemporary newspaper clippings, diaries, and other personal documents her findings have been compiled not as a family history or a genealogy for the Hoffman clan but as a contribution to the history of early American industry. It is a well-written and well-documented account of an interesting phase and an important sector of American industrial history. More studies like this would bring to light a host of material which now is buried in attics and family chests. Some illustrations and a bibliography add to the value of the little book.

DIETER CUNZ

CHARLES I, KING OF ENGLAND, 1600-1649: A PROCLAMATION FOR SETTLING THE PLANTATION OF VIRGINIA, 1625. With an Introduction by *Thomas Cary Johnson, jr.* (Charlottesville, Tracy W. McGregor Library, University of Virginia, 1946, pp. 40, out of print.) "A reproduction in facsimile of a proclamation famous in Americana, with a historical introduction and a bibliographical note on the printing variants in the dozen known copies. The proclamation was the first of the imperial constitutions for the royal provinces in America."

EXECUTIVE JOURNALS OF THE COUNCIL OF COLONIAL VIRGINIA. Volume V (November 1, 1739-May 7, 1754). Edited by *Wilmer L. Hall*. (Richmond, Virginia State Library, 1945, pp. xvi, 604.)

OUR GEORGIA-FLORIDA FRONTIER: THE OKEFINOKEE SWAMP, ITS HISTORY AND CARTOGRAPHY. Volume I. (Ithaca, A. H. Wright, 1945, pp. vi, 47.)

FLORIDA BECOMES A STATE. Foreword: SOCIAL LIFE IN FLORIDA IN 1845, by *W. T. Cash*, State Librarian. Introduction and Edited Documents, by *Dorothy Dodd*, Archivist, Florida State Library. (Tallahassee, Florida Centennial Commission, 1945, pp. xi, 481, \$3.50.) Issued in commemoration of the first centennial of Florida's statehood, this volume consists mainly of selected documents relating to the admission of Florida to the Union. Its general value lies in the fact that the documents included constitute a casebook in the formation of a state, and as such it possesses wide usefulness to students of the science of government. Those interested specifically in the history of Florida will find in this publication an abundance of valuable material, virtually all of which is here printed for the first time. Reproduction of the *Journal* of the St. Joseph Convention, long a collector's item, makes available the proceedings of the 1838 convention which drafted the first constitution. In a 27-page foreword W. T. Cash, state librarian, discusses social life in the 1840's. Among the fourteen illustrations are a map, in color, of Florida in 1845, the year of admission, and the title page of the *Journal* of the St. Joseph Convention. The skillful selection and editing of the docu-

ments, which were drawn primarily from the Florida State Library and government depositories in Washington, is the work of the archivist of the Florida State Library, Dorothy Dodd. In her introduction, Dr. Dodd presents a scholarly interpretation of the documents. *Florida Becomes a State* is the first publication of the Florida State Library and is a highly creditable contribution by members of the Florida State Library Board under whose supervision the volume was prepared. It was published from funds provided by the Florida Centennial Commission.

A. J. HANNA

TEXAS: AN INFORMAL BIOGRAPHY. By *Owen P. White*. (New York, G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1945, pp. ix, 268, \$3.50.) It would seem fair in judging a book to consider the purpose for which it was written. Avowedly, *Texas* was not intended primarily to please an audience composed of members of the American Historical Association. Mr. White asserts that this volume is no history—its pages not being “cold, humorless, and conventional.” Rather, he has set out to write “an informal biography,” the story of men who have made their state great. In his choice of them, he is unorthodox, eschewing some whose importance has been inflated by recorders and including many whose vices, even more than their virtues, appeal to the nostalgic affection of a writer living far from his native state. Because this author carries with him so much of its essence, he continues to avoid the adulation of either an expatriate or of the professional Texan. Instead he writes with lively and picturesque criticism of the state’s “cussedness,” affection for its virtues, and that genial exaggeration of both which is to be expected. He was bred in an area prolific of tellers of tall tales. For all this, and though the statement may perturb him, let it be set down that Mr. White somewhat affiliates himself with the historians by a recurrent wish to present the truth, and, though scorning to saddle himself with references to page and chapter, by citing divers authorities, both old and new. In his choice of characters, he gives considerable space to “fancy women” and to men who “liquor up,” gamble, and generally rejoice in the illicit. This may not be so much from predilection as from a knowledge that, from the first to the eighth book written by this self-acclaimed “durable sinner,” he has found such characters profitable material. Mr. White is a man who supports himself by his pen. For the rest, he writes with discriminating praise of Moses Austin and of Stephen, his even greater son; and with infectious pleasure of Captain Jack Hays, Milton Favor, Anson Mills, Governor James Hogg, and of the pirate, Jean Lafitte. He pays due tribute to the men who in the last war served both Texas and the United States, its “ally.” His vocabulary continues racy and he still enlivens his pages with mildly shocking phrases, but, since there is monotony in purveying tales of evil, one records with pleasure that Mr. White elects now, as climax of his story, to write of the passing of the “gas-wasting and hot oil days when states’ rights was a smoke screen” behind which powerful Texans blackmailed the corporations, and bluffed New Dealers. If what is right, and not what is wrong, in state traditions can be maintained by daring and individualism, Texans can cheer on the struggle and hope that it may be with, not against, the federal government. Owen White makes a good cheerleader.

DORA NEILL RAYMOND

ARTICLES

CHARLES BRANCH CLARK. Politics in Maryland during the Civil War [concl.]. *Maryland Hist. Mag.*, June.

ARTHUR PIERCE MIDDLETON. The Chesapeake Convoy System, 1662-1763. *William and Mary Quar.*, Apr.

MARION TINLING. Cawson's, Virginia, in 1795-1796. *Ibid.*

GEORGE CARRINGTON MASON. The Colonial Churches of Northumberland and Lancaster Counties, Virginia. *Virginia Mag. Hist. and Biog.*, Apr.

- E. G. SWEM. Views of Yorktown and Gloucester Town, 1755. *Ibid.*
- EDWIN M. BETTS. Groundplans and Prints of the University of Virginia, 1822-1826. *Proc. Am. Philosophical Soc.*, XC, no. 2.
- MRS. VIRGINIA ARMISTEAD NELSON. Secretary William Claiborne of Virginia. *Tyler's Quar. Hist. and Geneal. Mag.*, Apr.
- GEORGE MASON GRAHAM. Political Occurrences on the Island of Galveston in 1818. *Ibid.*
- MYRA GLADYS GRAY. A. W. Campbell—Party Builder. *West Virginia Hist.*, Apr.
- MARJORIE HOLMES DERR. Removal of the Capitol of West Virginia from Charleston to Wheeling—1875. *Ibid.*, July.
- JAMES HENRY JACOBS. The West Virginia Gubernatorial Election Contest, 1888-1890. *Ibid.*, Apr., July.
- WILLIAM A. NESBITT and ANTHONY NETBOY. The History of Settlement and Land Use in the Bent Creek Forest [near Asheville, N. C.]. *Agric. Hist.*, Apr.
- C. B. ALEXANDER. Richard Caswell: Versatile Leader of the Revolution. *North Carolina Hist. Rev.*, Apr.
- ALONZO THOMAS DILL, JR. Eighteenth Century Newbern: A History of the Town and Cracren County, 1700-1800. Part VI: Newbern as Colonial Capital. *Ibid.*
- CLEMENT EATON. Edwin A. Alderman: Liberal of the New South. *Ibid.*
- EDMUND CODY BURNETT. Hog Raising and Hog Driving in the Region of the French Broad River. *Agric. Hist.*, Apr.
- JOSEPHINE BONE FLOYD. Rebecca Latimer Felton, Champion of Women's Rights. *Georgia Hist. Quar.*, June.
- STANLEY FAYE. The Contest for Pensacola Bay and Other Gulf Ports, 1698-1722 [II]. *Florida Hist. Quar.*, Apr.
- WEBSTER MERRITT. Physicians and Medicine in Early Jacksonville. *Ibid.*
- WILBUR H. SIEBERT. The Port of St. Augustine during the British Régime. *Ibid.*
- T. FREDERICK DAVIS. Pioneer Florida: Destruction of Port Leon, 1843; The First Militia Organization [1826]; The Wild Tallahassee of 1827. *Ibid.*
- JOHN WALLACE GRIFFIN. Historic Artifacts and the "Buzzard Cult" in Florida. *Ibid.*
- E. W. COLE. La Salle in Texas. *Southwestern Hist. Quar.*, Apr.
- S. G. REED. Land Grants and Other Aids to Texas Railroads. *Ibid.*
- ANDREW FOREST MUIR. Patents and Copyrights in the Republic of Texas. *Jour. Southern Hist.*, May.

DOCUMENTS

- EVERARD KIDDER MEADE. The Papers of Richard Evelyn Byrd, I, of Frederick County, Virginia. *Virginia Mag. Hist. and Biog.*, Apr.
- ROSS B. JOHNSTON. West Virginians in the American Revolution [Stone to Tucker]. *West Virginia Hist.*, Apr., July.
- ALBERT B. SAYE. Commission and Instructions of Governor John Reynolds, August 6, 1754. *Georgia Hist. Quar.*, June.

WESTERN TERRITORIES AND STATES

PIONEER SKETCHES OF THE UPPER WHITEWATER VALLEY: QUAKER STRONGHOLD OF THE WEST. By *Bernhard Knollenberg*. [Indiana Historical Society Publications, Volume 15, Number 1.] (Indianapolis, Indiana Historical Society, 1945, pp. 171, 75 cents.) The Whitewater Valley of southeastern Indiana and southwestern Ohio has served as the basis for a unique American community. Into it came a group of English settlers along with a group from the Philadelphia area. With them came groups from Virginia and North Carolina, some of whom had spent a time in Kentucky, and in addition to these were a group of settlers from the New England states, while later there came a large migration of Germans. Thus, a foundation was made for a representative American community. The two outstanding communities in this territory were Brookville in the southern part of the valley and Richmond in the

northern part. One needs only to read the history of Brookville to recognize the importance of this community to the state and nation. Three of Indiana's early governors came from Brookville. Former governor of Kansas, John P. St. John was born here, as was General Lew Wallace, once governor of New Mexico and the author of *Ben Hur*. Stephen S. Harding, once governor of Utah, was a Brookville man. Four United States senators and three foreign ministers were from Brookville. The north end of the valley produced Oliver P. Morton, the first native-born governor of Indiana; George W. Julian, the statesman; Robert Underwood Johnson, the author; and a number of others worthy of mention. The valley furnished the setting for a number of artists of more than local reputation, and it was the scene of much political activity and controversy. So the Whitewater Valley deserves a recognition never achieved until Mr. Knollenberg wrote his *Sketches*. No more capable person could have been found to make this study and make available its results. He is a descendant of that rich German contribution to the valley. He grew up in this environment, he graduated from Earlham College, located in Richmond, and then established himself in law in New York City. With a gift for research and writing, he attracted the attention of Yale University, and while there as the university librarian, he prepared this book. He has been able to view the pioneers of the valley with objectivity: by using contemporary manuscripts, memoirs, journals, letters, and by personally exploring the whole region, he has produced a narrative of the beginnings of the settlement of the upper Whitewater and has also described the social and cultural contributions of the pioneers. Set limits on the length of this review make it impossible to say many things which are deserved. The thing to do is to read the *Sketches* in its entirety. The author has included a very full bibliography of sources, including manuscripts, newspapers, books, and periodicals.

HARLOW LINDLEY

THE CATHOLIC CHURCH IN THE DIOCESE OF VINCENNES, 1847-1877. By *Sister Mary Carol Schroeder*, Oldenburg, Indiana. [The Catholic University of America Studies in American Church History, Volume XXXV.] (Washington, Catholic University of America Press, 1946, pp. ix, 227.)

RECOLLECTIONS OF LIFE AND DOINGS IN CHICAGO FROM THE HAY-MARKET RIOT TO THE END OF WORLD WAR I, BY AN OLD TIMER [Charles H. Hermann]. (Chicago, Blessing Book Stores, 1945, pp. 274, \$3.00.)

THE POLISH IMMIGRANT IN DETROIT TO 1914. By *Sister Mary Remigia Napoliska*, Felician, O.S.F. [Annals of the Polish Roman Catholic Union, Archives and Museum, Vol. X, 1945-46.] (Chicago, Polish Roman Catholic Union of America, 1946, pp. 110, \$1.25.)

HISTORY OF THE SOCIAL-DEMOCRATIC PARTY OF MILWAUKEE, 1897-1910. By *Marvin Wachman*. [Illinois Studies in the Social Sciences, Vol. XXVIII, No. 1.] (Urbana, University of Illinois Press, 1945, pp. 90, cloth \$2.00, paper \$1.50.) The Milwaukee Social Democratic party was constructed out of a trace of German "forty-eightism," the prestige of Eugene V. Debs, strong union support, a touch of Henry George, the tradition of Populism, and a flavor of scientific Marxism. These elements were combined by a remarkable leader who was also a skillful politician and an earnest worker in the public interest, Victor L. Berger. He wrote platforms to win elections, not to fit Marxian theory. Local issues were so heavily emphasized that the party was dominated by Milwaukee and largely isolated from state and national affairs. Willingness to compromise caused criticism and conflict with socialists elsewhere, who in turn were condemned for "narrowness" by the Milwaukee party—which never-

theless extended an invitation to its most "fanatical" opponent, Daniel DeLeon, to edit a proposed Milwaukee Socialist daily. Berger formed an organization which "would be the envy of any political machine today." Its "bundle brigade" distributed Socialist literature "in seven different languages" to "every house in the city." Lack of a distinctive Socialist program and emphasis on local issues made it possible for the Socialists to take advantage of a notoriously corrupt condition in the city government and to elect a mayor, an important minority of the city council, and several members of the state legislature in 1904. The author ends his story with the ensuing administration. It would have been interesting for him to have told of the many years of efficient administration by the Socialist mayor, Daniel Hoan, and the collapse of the Socialist movement following the death of Victor Berger, with an analysis of the reasons for this collapse.

A. M. SIMONS

ARTICLES

- ELIZABETH WARREN. Benjamin Sebastian and the Spanish Conspiracy in Kentucky. *Filson Club Hist. Quar.*, Apr.
- Mrs. MARY WAGNER HIGHSAW. A History of Zion Community in Maury County, 1806-1860 [cont.]. *Tennessee Hist. Quar.*, June.
- ROBERT LESLIE JONES. The Horse and Mule Industry in Ohio to 1865. *Miss. Valley Hist. Rev.*, June.
- HARVEY L. CARTER. Rural Indiana in Transition, 1850-1860. *Agric. Hist.*, Apr.
- WILLIAM G. CARLETON. The Money Question in Indiana Politics, 1865-1890. *Indiana Mag. Hist.*, June.
- ELFRIEDA LANG. German Influence in the Churches and Schools of Dubois County, Indiana. *Ibid.*
- HAROLD E. BRIGGS and ERNESTINE B. BRIGGS. The Early Theatre in Chicago. *Jour. Illinois State Hist. Soc.*, June.
- O. FRITIOF ANDER. What about Teaching the History of Illinois in Our Public Schools? *Ibid.*
- CHARLES VAN RAVENSWAAY. St. Louis and the Exploration of the West. *Bull. Missouri Hist. Soc.*, Apr.
- WILLIAM J. PETERSEN. A Day by Day Calendar of Historical Events in Iowa (January-June) [Jan. 1, 1839-June 30, 1834]. *Iowa Jour. Hist. and Pol.*, Apr.
- JOHN ELY BRIGGS. Ripe for Statehood [Iowa, 1846]. *Palimpsest*, May.
- JACOB A. SWISHER. Iowa Adopts a Constitution. *Ibid.*, July.
- Id.* A Century of School Legislation in Iowa. *Iowa Jour. Hist. and Pol.*, Apr.
- EARL D. ROSS. Green Pastures and Tall Corn [Herder vs. Tiller]. *Palimpsest*, June.
- OSCAR HALLAM. A Midwest Farm Boy of the 1870's: Bloomfield and Number Five. *Minnesota Hist.*, June.
- SISTER GRACE McDONALD. A Finishing School of the 1880's: St. Benedict's Academy. *Ibid.*
- MERRILL E. JARCHOW. The Beginnings of Minnesota Dairying. *Ibid.*
- ROBERT TAFT. The Pictorial Record of the Old West: II, W. J. Hays. *Kansas Hist. Quar.*, May.
- JAMES C. MALIN. Dust Storms: Part I, 1850-1860. *Ibid.*
- ANNIE L. MILLER. The Social Life of Pioneer Lincoln. *Nebraska Hist.*, June.
- WILLIAM STOLLEY. History of the First Settlement of Hall County, Nebraska. *Ibid.*, special issue, 1946.
- N. C. ABBOTT. Silas A. Holcomb (Part II). *Ibid.*, Jan.
- SISTER M. INEZ HILGER. The Narrative of Oscar One Bull. *Mid-Am.*, July.
- FRANKLIN C. SMITH. Pioneer Beginnings at Emmanuel, Shawnee. *Chron. Oklahoma*, Spring.
- HAROLD KEITH. Memories of George W. Mayes [1848-1940]. *Ibid.*
- LANSING B. BLOOM. Ledgers of a Santa Fe Trader. *New Mexico Hist. Rev.*, Apr.
- Id.* Beginnings of Representative Government in New Mexico. *Ibid.*
- MARJORIE F. TICHY. New Mexico's First Capital. *Ibid.*

DOCUMENTS

- Mrs. JOHN TROTWOOD MOORE. Records of Commissions of Officers in the Tennessee Militia, 1811 [Dickson to Jackson Counties]. *Tennessee Hist. Quar.*, June.

- ENOCH L. MITCHELL. Letters of a Confederate Surgeon in the Army of Tennessee to His Wife [cont.]. *Ibid.*
- DOROTHY PENN. The Missouri Reader: The French in the Valley [III]. *Missouri Hist. Rev.*, Apr.
- MARY HILL. A Story of the Scotch Settlement, Jefferson County, Indiana. *Indiana Mag. Hist.*, June.
- POWELL MOORE. A Hoosier in Kansas: The Diary of Hiram H. Young, 1886-1895 [1]. *Kansas Hist. Quar.*, May.
- RUTH K. NUERMBERGER. Letters from Pioneer Nebraska by Edward Randolph Harden, Territorial Judge, 1854-1856. *Nebraska Hist.*, June.

Latin-American History

John J. Johnson

GENERAL

GREATER AMERICA: ESSAYS IN HONOR OF HERBERT EUGENE BOLTON. (Berkeley, University of California Press, 1945, pp. ix, 723, \$6.00.) This stout volume of twenty-seven articles in honor of Herbert Eugene Bolton constitutes an impressive achievement, whether judged by bulk or any other standard. The authors obtained advanced degrees under his direction at the University of California since 1932 and have presented a much more diversified and interesting *homenaje* than their predecessors, who edited the two-volume *New Spain and the Anglo-American West* on the occasion of Bolton's election to the presidency of the American Historical Association. A copious bibliography of Bolton's writings and of all his advanced students complete this meticulously edited book of over seven hundred pages. No footnote citations are given, but each chapter closes with a thoughtful essay on sources, and the maps liberally scattered throughout the volume reflect Bolton's own insistence on precise and meaningful cartographical knowledge as an essential tool of the historian. The topics treated range from the Treaty of Tordesillas to the California Gold Rush days; they need not be described here as they have been listed separately elsewhere in the *Review* (April, 1946), but certain generalizations may be made. Some of the essays are condensations of substantial doctoral dissertations, others are portions of masters' theses, and a few appear to be no more than seminar term papers. It is encouraging to see that this younger crop of Boltonites has ranged far beyond the rim of Christendom to write of Potosí, Patagonia, and Negro slavery in New Granada. Brazil continues to be relatively underdeveloped, for no article appears on the history of that vast and variegated world. The six contributions by religious scholars testify to the deep influence this North American professor has exerted on the writing of the story of the Catholic church in Spanish America. Many of the essays are based on manuscripts and other source material in the Bancroft Library, which illustrates once more the indispensable connection between historical scholarship and the availability of historical sources. One possibly significant omission may be pointed out. The introduction states, "A major purpose of this volume is to present in the bibliographical section concrete evidence of Bolton's influence in creating a school of Western Hemisphere historians." Yet not one of the essays undertakes to expound, analyze or evaluate the concept of "Western Hemisphere history." Perhaps the next crop of historians to be influenced by Bolton during the period of his so-called "retirement" will tackle this problem. Meanwhile the *conquistador* himself continues to discover and stake out virgin territory, for the last item in his bibliography is "In preparation—*The New Land*, a work on the expedition of Francisco Vázquez Coronado."

LEWIS HANKE

HISTORIA DE LA NACION ARGENTINA (DESDE LOS ORIGENES HASTA LA ORGANIZACION DEFINITIVA EN 1862). *Ricardo Levene*, Director general. Vol. VIII, LA CONFEDERACION Y BUENOS AIRES HASTA LA ORGANIZACION DEFINITIVA DE LA NACION EN 1862. Por *Ramón Cárcano et al.* (Buenos Aires, Academia Nacional de la Historia, 1946, pp. xix, 875.) Twelve of the fourteen chapters of this large volume deal with a stormy period in Argentine history, the ten years between 1852 and 1862. The last two chapters, which survey Argentine literature and music, begin earlier, the one on literature in 1537 and the one on music in 1810. The tome is a part of a ten-volume work on the history of the country from the beginning until the formation of the nation in 1862. Volumes IX and X, dealing with the fourteen provinces, have already been published. The seventh volume, covering the period of the Rosas dictatorship (1829-1852), has not been completed. The volume under review has outstanding merits. The style and format are excellent and the writers have fully utilized the sources of information, both printed and manuscript, as revealed by content, citations, and bibliography. No other Latin-American country has produced better historians than Argentina, and the historians of no other Latin-American country have written so voluminously. A few defects may be noted. The volume contains no survey of the economic and technical development of the country, in spite of the fact that its authors generally admit that the central theme of their story is the struggle, fundamentally economic, between the province of Buenos Aires and the rest of Argentina. In dealing with political and military leaders the tone is too laudatory; Brazil's policy in respect to the Río de la Plata states is interpreted too severely; the work is rather nationalistic; and there are no photographs of the principal actors.

J. FRED RIPPY

CORRESPONDENCIA DIPLOMATICA DE LA DELEGACION CUBANA EN NUEVA YORK DURANTE LA GUERRA DE INDEPENDENCIA DE 1895 A 1898. Volume IV. [Publicaciones del Archivo Nacional de Cuba, IX.] (La Habana, Talleres del Archivo Nacional, 1946, pp. vii, 199.)

COLECCION DE CEDULAS REALES DIRIGIDAS A LA AUDIENCIA DE QUITO, 1601-1660. [Publicaciones del Archivo Municipal, XXI.] (Quito, Talleres Tipográficos Municipales, 1946, pp. 726.)

BIBLIOGRAFIA DE VARNHAGEN. Armando Ortega Fontes. [Comissão de Estudo dos Textos da História do Brasil.] (Rio de Janeiro, Ministério das Relações Exteriores, 1945, pp. 42.)

New periodicals of interest to Latin-American historians: *Afroamérica* (México, D. F.), Vol. I, Nos. 1-2, Jan.-July, 1945; *Boletín del Departamento de Estudios Etnográficos y Coloniales* (Santa Fe, Argentina), Año I, No. 1, Dec., 1945; *Revista de la Universidad de Costa Rica* (San José), Año I, No. 1, Sept., 1945; *Revista do Instituto Histórico e Geográfico de Minas Gerais* (Belo Horizonte), Vol. I (1943-44), 1945; *Universidad de San Carlos* (Guatemala City), No. 1, Oct., 1945.

ARTICLES

B. BONNET REVERÓN. Las expediciones a las Canarias en el siglo XIV [concl.]. *Rev. Indias* (Madrid), July, 1945.

MANUEL GIMÉNEZ FERNÁNDEZ. Algo mas sobre las bulas alejandrinas de 1493 referentes a las Indias. *Anales Univ. Hispalense* (Sevilla), VIII, no. 3, 1945.

ERWIN W. PALMS. Excavations of La Isabela, White Man's First Town in the Americas. *Acta Americana*, Oct., 1945.

- ANGEL VALTIERRA. Hispanoamérica en el Concilio de Trento. *Rev. Arch. Nac. Costa Rica* (San José), Jan.
- F. MATEOS. Ecos de América en Trento. *Rev. Indias* (Madrid), Oct., 1945.
- PÍO BALLESTEROS. Los indios y sus litigios, según la recopilación de 1680. *Ibid.*
- JOSÉ ANTONIO CALDERÓN QUIJANO. El ingeniero Simón Desnaux y su proyecto de academias militares en América. *Ibid.*
- JOSÉ A. MARTÍNEZ-FORTÚN Y FOYO. Alcaldes de San Juan de los Remedios [1615-1944]. *Rev. Bimestre Cubana* (La Habana), July, 1945.
- VIRGILIO SAMPOGNARO. El tratado de Madrid de 1750. *Rev. Estud. Pol.* (Madrid), no. 25-26, 1946.
- MANUEL MOREYRA PAZ-SOLDÁN. La técnica de la moneda colonial. Unidades, medidas y relaciones. *Rev. Hist. Am.* (Tacubaya), Dec.
- OSWALDO MORALES PATIÑO. La rebeldía de los indocubanos, rectificaciones de hechos históricos. *Rev. Bimestre Cubana*, Sept., 1945.
- E. ALANIS PATIÑO. El concepto del latifundismo. *Bol. Soc. Mex. Geog. Estadística* (México, D. F.), May.
- RAFAEL PANIAGUA RIVAS. Interpretación de las luchas políticas de Hispano-América. *Rev. Estud. Pol.*, no. 25-26, 1946.
- Managua: de villa a capital. *Rev. Acad. Geog. Hist. Nicaragua* (Managua), Nov.
- RÓMULO BETANCOURT. Evolución histórica de Venezuela. *Educación* (Caracas), Dec.
- LILLY DE JONGH OSBORNE. Arterias comerciales. *Anales Soc. Geog. Hist.* (Guatemala City), Dec.
- OSWALDO MORALES PATIÑO Y ROBERTO PÉREZ DE ACEVEDO. El período de transculturación indohispánico. *Rev. Arq. Etnol.* (La Habana), Jan.
- W. ERNEST ATKEN. La familia Palomino del Huila. *Bol. Hist. Antig.* (Bogotá), Sept., 1945.
- OLIVEIRA VIANNA. El orgullo ecuestre entre los gauchos riograndenses. *Rev. Mex. Soc.* (México, D. F.), Jan.
- IFIGENIA MARTÍNEZ HERNÁNDEZ. El desarrollo demográfico en la Baja California. *Rev. Econ.* (México, D. F.), May.
- LUIS RESTREPO OSORIO. Democracia y dictadura en Simón Bolívar. *Univ. Católica Bolivariana* (Medellín), Oct., 1945.
- ENRIQUE D. TOVAR Y R. Los Iturbide de México y los Iturbide del Perú. *Anales Soc. Geog. Hist.*, Dec.
- GEORGE P. ISBELL. Cunninghame Graham in Texas. *Southwestern Hist. Quar.*, Apr.
- J. FRED RIPPY. Notes on the Early Telephone Companies of Latin America. *Hispanic Am. Hist. Rev.*, Feb.
- JAMES B. CHILDS. Cecil Knight Jones, 1872-1945. *Ibid.*
- PAUL A. F. WALTER. Lansing Bartlett Bloom. *New Mexico Hist. Rev.*, Apr.
- FRANK TANNENBAUM. The Destiny of the Negro in the Western Hemisphere. *Pol. Sci. Quar.*, Mar.

DOCUMENTS

- LÁZARO LAMADRID. Report on the Missions by the Franciscan Commissary General of the Indies (1612). *Americas*, Apr.
- Archivos de la cofradía del señor de Veracruz de la iglesia de la villa de Nindirí [1802-16]. *Rev. Acad. Geog. Hist. Nicaragua* (Managua), Nov.
- JULIA KATHRYN GARRET. Dr. John Sibley and the Louisiana-Texas Frontier, 1803-1814 [concl.]. *Southwestern Hist. Quar.*, Apr.

INDEXES, BIBLIOGRAPHY, AND ARCHIVE GUIDES

- MARÍA CASTELO DE ZAVALA. El Archivo Nacional del Perú. *Rev. Hist. Am.* (Tacubaya), Dec.
- Índice del ramo universidad 1553-1601. *Bol. Arch. Gen. Nac.* (México, D. F.), Jan.
- Guía del ramo "desagüe" [concl.]. *Ibid.*, Jan., Apr.
- Índice del ramo de tierras, volúmenes 1552 a 1595 cont. *Ibid.*
- Índice del ramo inquisición. *Ibid.*, Apr.
- Índice del ramo criminal. *Ibid.*
- Índice del ramo Provincias Internas [1778-1817]. *Ibid.*, Jan.
- Encomiendas [1600-63]. *Bol. Arch. Hist. Prov. Mérida*, Nov.

- Mudanza del pueblo de San Antonio de Mucuño para otro sitio más apropiado en tierras de la encomienda del capitán Alonso del Toro Holguín, en el valle de Acequias [1672-92]. *Ibid.*
- CHARLES J. G. MAXIMIN PIETTE. The *Diarios* of Early California, 1769-1784. *Americas*, Apr.
- LAURA L. PORTEOUS. Index to the Spanish Judicial Records of Louisiana, LXXXII, May, 1785. *Louisiana Hist. Quar.*, Jan.
- Índice de documentos del período federal independiente existente en los Archivos Nacionales de Costa Rica, ya catalogados [1824-28]. *Rev. Arch. Nac. Costa Rica* (San José), Jan.
- Bibliography [of the works of Lansing Bartlett Bloom]. *New Mexico Hist. Rev.*, Apr.
- Boletín Bibliográfico Argentino* (Buenos Aires), 1945.
- Bibliografia de história do Brasil* (Rio de Janeiro), 1. semes., 1945.
- Anuario Bibliográfico Cubano* (La Habana), 1945.
- Boletín Bibliografía Dominicana* (Ciudad Trujillo), Sept., 1945.
- MARGARITA OBREGÓN LORIA. Publicaciones nacionales, 1944. *Rev. Arch. Nac. Costa Rica*, Jan.
- Bibliografía de historia de América (1943-1945). *Rev. Hist. Am.* (Tacubaya), Dec.

COLONIAL PERIOD

NORTH AND CENTRAL AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN

ARTICLES

- CLARENCE FINLAYSON. Los Mayas. *Univ. Antioquia* (Medellín), Jan.
- PEDRO ZAMORA CASTELLANOS. Itinerarios de la conquista de Guatemala y El Salvador. *Anales Soc. Geog. Hist.* (Guatemala City), Dec.
- ROBERT S. CHAMBERLAIN. The Founding of the City of Gracias a Dios, First Seat of the Audiencia de los Confines. *Hispanic Am. Hist. Rev.*, Feb.
- ANGEL MA. GARIBAY K. Elogio fúnebre de los arzobispos de México. *Ábside* (México, D. F.), Apr.
- HARVEY L. JOHNSON. El primer siglo del teatro en Puebla de los Angeles y la oposición del obispo don Juan de Palafox y Mendoza. *Rev. Iberoamericana* (México, D. F.), Mar.
- MARJORIE F. TICHY. New Mexico's First Capital. *New Mexico Hist. Rev.*, Apr.
- JEAN DELANGLEZ. The Joliet Lost Map of the Mississippi. *Mid-Am.*, Apr.
- E. W. COLE. La Salle in Texas. *Southwestern Hist. Quar.*, Apr.
- OTAKAR ODLOŽILÍK. Czech Missionaries in New Spain. *Hispanic Am. Hist. Rev.*, Nov.
- STANLEY FAYE. The Contest for Pensacola Bay and Other Gulf Ports 1698-1722. Part II. *Florida Hist. Quar.*, Apr.
- JOSÉ HERNÁNDEZ FAJARDO. El doctor Giovanni Francesco Mayoli ("El Judío"). *Yikál Maya Than* (Mérida), Mar.
- J. JOAQUÍN PARDO. Efemérides para escribir la historia de la muy noble y muy leal ciudad de Santiago de los Caballeros de Guatemala [cont.]. *Anales Soc. Geog. Hist.*, Dec.
- FIDEL DE LEJARZA. Las misiones del Colegio de San Fernando de Méjico en 1746. *Arch. Ibero-Americano* (Madrid), Jan.
- MIGUEL HERRERO. Un trabajo impreso de fray Junípero Serra. *Rev. Indias* (Madrid), July, 1945.
- WILBUR H. SIEBERT. The Port of St. Augustine during the British Régime. *Florida Hist. Quar.*, Apr.
- HIPÓLITO SÁNCHEZ RANGEL. Visita pastoral del obispo Espada en 1804. *Rev. Bimestre Cubana* (La Habana), Sept., Nov., 1945.
- FERMÍN PERAZA SARAUSA. Papel periódico de la Havana [cont.]. *Ibid.*, July, Sept., 1945, Nov., Jan.

DOCUMENTS

- ROBERT S. CHAMBERLAIN. Documents: Four Letters of Pedro de la Gasca, 1546-1548, from the Archivo General del Gobierno, Guatemala City. *Hispanic Am. Hist. Rev.*, Nov.
- MARÍA DEL ROSARIO MOLINA COTO. La embajada de la provincia de Costa Rica ante la corte del rey don Felipe II en 1565. *Rev. Arch. Nac. Costa Rica* (San José), Jan.

- Reyerta entre el gobernador de Yucatán don Francisco Velázquez de Gijón y el obispo fray Diego de Landa.-Año de 1574. *Bol. Arch. Gen. Nac.* (México, D. F.), Apr.
- Nuevos datos sobre el Dr. Diego García de Palacio, 1589. *Ibid.*, Jan.
- El proceso de una pseudo iluminada, 1649. *Ibid.*
- EDMUNDO O'GORMAN. Enseñanza del castellano como factor político-colonial [1691]. *Ibid.*, Apr.
- Nombramiento de gobernador de Honduras extendido a favor del Sr. don Pedro Truco [1750]. *Rev. Arch. Bib. Nac.* (Tegucigalpa), Mar.
- ROBERT S. SMITH. Retail Stock of a Guatemalan Store, 1780. *Hispanic Am. Hist. Rev.*, Feb.
- G. DEBIEN. Papiers de la cafetière la Merveillère [1764-92]. *Revue Soc. Hist. Geog. Haiti* (Port-au-Prince), Apr.
- ROBERT G. CLELAND and HAYDÉE NOYA. The Gabriel Moraga Expedition of 1806: The Diary of Fray Pedro Muñoz. *Huntington Lib. Quar.*, May.
- Honores a un retrato de Fernando VII en Mérida de Yucatán, año de 1809. *Bol. Arch. Gen. Nac.* (México, D. F.), Apr.

SPANISH SOUTH AMERICA

ARTICLES

- GEORGE KUBLER. The Behavior of Atahualpa. *Hispanic Am. Hist. Rev.*, Nov.
- RUBÉN VARGAS UGARTE. El monasterio de la Concepción de la Ciudad de los Reyes. *Rev. Indias* (Madrid), July, 1945.
- CÉSAR ARRÓSPIDE DE LA FLOR. La expresión americana en el arte virreinal del Perú. *Mercurio peruano* (Lima), Apr.
- RAÚL PORRAS BARRENECHEA. El cronista indio Felipe Huamán Poma de Ayala (1534-1615?). *Ibid.*, Feb.
- SILVIO ZAVALA. Apuntes históricos sobre la moneda del Paraguay. *Trim. Econ.* (México, D. F.), Apr.
- MARION A. HABIG. The Franciscan Provinces of South America (Argentine, Paraguay, and Uruguay). *Americas*, Apr.
- EDMUNDO WERNICKE. El P. Floriano Paucke S.J. misionero en Santa Fe en la época colonial y su manuscrito. *Bol. Depart. Estud. Etnog. Col.* (Santa Fe), Dec.
- P. CONSTANTINO EGUÍA. España en América: lenguas y lingüistas en el antiguo Paraguay español. *Rev. Indias* (Madrid), July, 1945.
- D. DE LA VÁLGOMA Y DÍAZ-VARELA. El primer gobernador de Montevideo, don José Joaquín de Viana, y su linaje de varonía. *Ibid.*, Oct.
- AUGUSTO ARIAS. El primer periódico de América. *Veritas* (Buenos Aires), Mar.
- CARLOS GERKE URDINEA. Mariano Moreno y la Universidad de Charcas. *Ibid.*
- Montevideo colonial: muros de la batería de San Sebastián. *Bol. Mun.* (Montevideo), Jan.

DOCUMENTS

- Un bando de D. Juan de Garay [1580]. *Bol. Depart. Estud. Etnog. Col.* (Santa Fe), Dec.
- Archivo de Indias. Indiferente General. Sevilla. 1585. Peticiones y memoriales al consejo. 1586. Licencias para el Nuevo Reino. *Bol. Hist. Antig.* (Bogotá), Sept., 1945.
- Un acta de remate del tiempo de la colonia [1742]. *Bol. Depart. Estud. Etnog. Col.*, Dec.
- Nomina de los vecinos principales del real de minas de Tegucigalpa en 1762. *Rev. Arch. Bib. Nac.* (Tegucigalpa), Jan.
- Archivo del virrey Mendieta [1802]. *Bol. Hist. Antig.*, Sept., 1945.
- Actuación pública de Feliciano Antonio Chiclana [1804-22]. *Rev. Biblio. Nac.* (Buenos Aires), 3 trimes., 1945.

BRAZIL

ARTICLES

- MANUEL DIÉGUES JÚNIOR. O açúcar no povoamento de Alagoas [cont.]. *Brasil Açucareiro* (Rio de Janeiro), Apr.
- BÁSILIO DE MAGALHÃES. O açúcar nos primórdios do Brasil colonial [cont.]. *Ibid.*

- SALOMÃO DE VASCONCELLOS. Os Vasconcellos de S. Paulo e de Minas-Gerais. *Rev. Arq. Mun.* (São Paulo), Apr., 1945.
- JOÃO VAMPRÉ. O príncipe dos bandeirantes. *Rev. Acad. Paulista Letras* (São Paulo), Mar.
- SERGIO ELÍAS ORTIZ. Los indios yurumanguies. *Bol. Hist. Antig.* (Bogotá), Sept., 1945.
- ERNESTO ENNES, Teresa Margarida da Silva e Orta, a Brazilian Collaborator in the Anti-Jesuit Propaganda of Pombal. *Americas*, Apr.

DOCUMENTS

- Cartas régias, 1667-1681 [indexed]. *Doc. Hist.* (Rio de Janeiro), LXVII, 1945.
- Ordens régias (1740). *Rev. Arq. Mun.* (São Paulo), Apr., June, 1945.
- Ofício do governador Sebastião Xavier da Veiga Cabral da câmara ao vice-rei do Brasil, D. Luiz de Vasconcelos [1780]. *Bol. Mun.* (Pôrto Alegre), Oct., 1945.

NATIONAL PERIOD

MEXICO AND CENTRAL AMERICA

ARTICLES

- Discurso de un diputado sobre la introducción de efectos extranjeros, 1823. *Trim. Econ.* (México, D. F.), July, 1945.
- CARLOS BOSCH GARCÍA. Las primeras negociaciones comerciales entre México y Francia. *Ibid.*, Jan.
- ALFONSO JUNCO. Símbolo de la tragedia. *Rev. Estud. Pol.* (Madrid), no. 25-26.
- CARLOS BOSCH GARCÍA. Contactos diplomáticos de México con Francia, 1822-1836. *Rev. Hist. Am.* (Tacubaya), Dec.
- LOIS FOSTER BLOUNT. The Old Red House at Nacogdoches. *Southwestern Hist. Quar.*, Apr.
- HÉCTOR MEDINA PLANAS. Morazán como militar [cont.]. *Rev. Arch. Bib. Nac.* (Tegucigalpa), Mar.
- GUSTAVO A. CASTAÑEDA S. El combate de el Obrajuelo [cont.]. *Ibid.*, Jan.
- BRASSEUR DE BOURBOURG. De Guatemala a Rabinal; episodio de un viaje en la América del Centro en los años de 1855 y 1856 [cont.]. *Anales Soc. Geog. Hist.* (Guatemala City), Dec.
- MANUEL AGUILAR URANGA. El Ferrocarril Mexicano del Sur y la presa del Valsequillo. *Rev. Econ.* (México, D. F.), May.

DOCUMENTS

- La diputación provincial de Nicaragua y Costa Rica pide á la regencia del reino la erección de una audiencia y capitanía general en estas dos provincias, con independencia de Guatemala.—Año de [1814]. *Rev. Acad. Geog. Hist. Nicaragua* (Managua), Nov.
- El jefe político de Nicaragua y Costa Rica apoya la proyectada erección de una audiencia y capitanía general en las provincias de su mando.—Año de 1814. *Ibid.*
- La población de Tegucigalpa en 1821. Censo formado de orden del noble ayuntamiento de esta villa de Tegucigalpa . . . que . . . se comenzo en 1. de enero de 1821 [cont.]. *Rev. Arch. Bib. Nac.* (Tegucigalpa), Jan., Mar.
- Anales parlamentarios: asamblea ordinaria del estado de Honduras, año de 1831. *Ibid.*, Jan.
- RAFAEL HELIODORO VALLE. Documentos escritos de enero a junio de 1823, tomo IV [cont.]. *Ibid.*, Mar.
- Anales parlamentarios, asamblea ordinaria del estado de Honduras, año de 1831 [cont.]. *Ibid.*
- GUSTAVO A. CASTAÑEDA S. El combate de el Obrajuelo [1845, cont.]. *Ibid.*
- De gallo a gallo: Felipe Jáuregui y Francisco Ferrera; Acusacn. del Licdo. Jáuregui contra el general Ferrera año 1848. *Ibid.*
- El príncipe don Andrés Pignatelli Cerchiara en México, 1823-1833. *Bol. Arch. Gen. Nac.* (México, D. F.), Jan.
- La controversia que decidió [1846]. *Rev. Acad. Geog. Hist. Nicaragua* (Managua), Nov.
- Documentos sobre la guerra del 56. Comunicación del general Mora al Sr. Ministro de la Guerra. *Rev. Arch. Nac. Costa Rica* (San José), Jan.
- Informe del estado de la educación primaria en la provincia de Cartago [1871]. *Ibid.*

- Segundo mensaje del presidente de Honduras, de 9 de marzo de 1879 [cont.]. *Rev. Arch. Bib. Nac.* (Tegucigalpa), Jan., Mar.
 Manifiesto del partido liberal [1891]. *Rev. Acad. Geog. Hist. Nicaragua*, Nov.
 Documentos aclaratorios. Para el pueblo [1904]. *Ibid.*

CUBA, THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC, AND HAITI

ARTICLES

- N. MONDESTIN JEAN. Essai de clinique historique: Ju-Jacques Dessalines. *Revue Soc. Hist. Géog. Haiti* (Port-au-Prince), Apr.
 JOSÉ MARÍA MORILLAS. Doctor don José Núñez de Cáceres. *Clio* (Ciudad Trujillo), Jan., 1945.
 COSME DE LA TORRIENTE. El general Loynaz. *Rev. La Habana*, Mar.

DOCUMENTS

- MODESTO A. TIRADO. Apuntes de un corresponsal [cont.]. *Rev. Bimestre Cubana* (La Habana), July, Sept., 1945, Nov., Jan.
 RAFAEL MAYOS DÍAZ. Documentos para la historia diplomática. Algunos documentos referentes a la misión diplomática de don Pablo Pujol en los Estados Unidos de América [1864]. *Bol. Sec. Estado Relaciones Ext.* (Ciudad Trujillo), Oct., 1945.

SPANISH SOUTH AMERICA

ARTICLES

- BARTOLOMÉ DESCALZO. General D. José de San Martín, el libertador [cont.]. *Rev. Mil.* (Buenos Aires), Jan., Feb., Mar., Apr.
 Coronel D. Manuel Isidoro Suárez. *Ibid.*, Feb.
 La provincia de La Rioja en la compañía de los Andes; expedición auxiliar a Copiapó; juicio crítico a la monografía del coronel D. Roque Lanús. *Ibid.*, Apr.
 SANTOS B. CASTILLO. El delta entrerriano; sus primeros habitantes blancos; los muebles de madera que usaron. *Bol. Depart. Estud. Enog. Col.* (Santa Fe), Dec.
 ENRIQUE NARANJO MARTÍNEZ. Alexander Macaulay; héroe desconocido—su familia y antecedentes. *Bol. Hist. Antig.* (Bogotá), Sept., 1945.
 LUIS BRUZUAL BERMÚDEZ. Retirada del general Urdaneta desde la villa de San Carlos hasta la Nueva Granada. *Bol. Acad. Nac. Hist.* (Caracas), July, 1945.
 VICENTE LECUNA. La guerra a muerte. *Ibid.*
 Relación desnuda que hace el general Luis Urdaneta a la nación colombiana sobre el horrendo asesinato del gran mariscal de Ayacucho. *Ibid.*
 WILLIAM H. GRAY. Steamboat Transportation on the Orinoco. *Hispanic Am. Hist. Rev.*, Nov.
 VICTOR L. JOHNSON. Edward A. Hopkins and the Development of Argentine Transportation and Communication. *Ibid.*, Feb.
 WATT STEWART. Notes on an Early Attempt to Establish Cable Communication between North and South America. *Ibid.*
 S. FANNY SIMON. Anarchism and Anarcho-Syndicalism in South America. *Ibid.*
 J. FRED RIPPY. The Dawn of Manufacturing in Peru. *Pacific Hist. Rev.*, June.
 AGUSTÍN BIANCHI BARROS. El tratado de 1904 y síntesis de la historia diplomática entre Chile y Bolivia. *Rev. Univ.* (Santiago de Chile), XXX, no. 4.

DOCUMENTS

- "Memorias curiosas" o "diario" de Juan Manuel Beruti [1829, 1843-50; cont.]. *Rev. Biblio. Nac.* (Buenos Aires), 3 trimes., 1945.
 El procurador general solicita en 1810 ante la Superior Junta de Mérida, se regulen los precios de los artículos de primera necesidad, en vista del excesivo valor de ellos. *Bol. Arch. Hist. Prov. Mérida*, Nov.

- Actos oficiales sobre el crimen de Berruecos [1830]. *Bol. Acad. Nac. Hist.* (Caracas), July, 1945.
 VICENTE LECUNA. Liberación de Guayana. Relación de Carlos Castelli [1817]. *Ibid.*, Oct., 1945.
 Documentos inéditos del general Rafael Urdaneta [1818-44]. *Ibid.*, July, 1945.
 VICENTE LECUNA. Papeles de Manuela Sáenz. *Ibid.*, Oct., 1945.
 Gobierno de Urdaneta en Colombia. *Ibid.*, July, 1945.
 Carta inédita del libertador al general Urdaneta sobre la revolución del istmo [1830]. *Ibid.*
 Testamento del general Páez. *Ibid.*, Oct., 1945.

BRAZIL

ARTICLES

- F. DE PAULA CIDADE. A intelectualidade entre os mercenários alemães de Pedro I. *Rev. Mil. Brasileira* (Rio de Janeiro), Jan., 1945.
 LUCAS BOITEUX. A marinha brasileira. *Rev. Inst. Hist. Geog. Brasileiro* (Rio de Janeiro), July, 1945.
 ALCINDO SODRÉ. Dom Pedro II na pacificação do Rio Grande do Sul. *Ibid.*
 HÉLIO LÔBO. Rio-Branco e o Território de Palmas. *Ibid.*
 LEVI CARNEIRO. Rio-Branco e seu espírito de tradição. *Ibid.*
 WALTER SPALDING. Colonização açoriana. *Bol. Mun.* (Pôrto Alegre), Oct., 1945.
 HERBERT BALDUS. Os Tapirapé [cont.]. *Rev. Arq. Mun.* (São Paulo), Apr., June, 1945.

DOCUMENTS

- Papeis avulsos (1822). *Rev. Arq. Mun.* (São Paulo), Apr., June, 1945.
 Atas da câmara de Santo Amaro (1908). *Ibid.*

* * * * *Historical News* * * * *

American Historical Association

THE sixty-first annual meeting of the American Historical Association will be held in New York City on December 27, 28, and 30. Headquarters will be at the Pennsylvania Hotel, and members who wish reservations are asked to write directly to the hotel. Professors Thomas C. Cochran, of New York University, and Dwight C. Miner, of Columbia University, are chairmen of the Local Arrangements Committee and the Program Committee respectively. Further details concerning the meeting will be given in the program, to be mailed to members of the Association in November. Professor Cochran suggests that any member desiring reservations for theater tickets in New York would be wise to make them at least two months in advance. There is every prospect for a full and successful meeting. Members attending the meeting are admonished to bring their programs with them. A charge of twenty-five cents will be made for copies supplied at the registration desk.

The section in the *Review* on Russian and Polish articles and notices of books, hitherto for some years under the editorship of Avrahm Yarmolinsky, has been retitled "Russia and Slavic Europe" and will be in charge of Sergius Yakobson of the Library of Congress. The Board of Editors takes this occasion to acknowledge with gratitude the services of Dr. Yarmolinsky.

Other Historical Activities

Among the recent accessions to the Division of Manuscripts in the Library of Congress the following, arranged in chronological order of materials, may be noted: one volume of poems of Gregorio de Mattos, 1711; seventeen documents pertaining to land holdings near Charleston, South Carolina, 1716 to 1863; twelve additional papers of, or relating to, George Washington, 1751 to 1839; letter from Robert Dinwiddie, June 2, 1757; microfilm of papers of William Bond of Massachusetts, 1768 to 1833; microfilm of papers of Benjamin Tallmadge and the Tallmadge family, 1773 to 1846; photostats of lists of Thomas Jefferson's land holdings, and slaves, also an index to his account book, 1776 to 1778 (original account book in the Massachusetts Historical Society's Collection; originals of lists and index privately owned); photostat of letter from Robert Morris to Jonathan Hudson, November 30, 1770; one box of papers of Brutus J. Clay, 1782 to 1871; letter from Adam Shapley to D. Ellsworth and J. Shannavard, April 9, 1778; additional papers of John Rodgers, 1785 to 1842; microfilm of nine papers of William Rhodes, trader at Fort Jackson, Pennsylvania, 1785 to 1794, and later; photostats of letter from

Robert Burns to John Richmond, February 17, 1786, and his poem "My Nanie's Awa," 1795; photostat of letter from Pierre Charles L'Enfant to his parents, February 13, 1787; eighteen packages of papers of Edmund C. Burnett, pertaining to his study of the Continental Congress; four Civil War diaries, and other papers, of Samuel D. Barnes, 1791 to 1867; photostat of family Bible records of Samuel F. B. Morse, 1791 to 1880; two letters from Charles Lee to the President, May 8 and 9, 1796, pertaining to the transfer of the western posts to the United States; microfilm of the diary of Richard Clough Anderson, jr., July 4, 1803, to July 12, 1826; original diary of Thomas Worthington, September 28, 1805, to June 18, 1807, and photocopy of another diary, May 8, 1820, to January 1, 1821; photostat of letter from John Langdon to the Secretary of the Navy, January 22, 1809; one box of papers of Charles A. Wickliffe and John M. Wyse and related families, 1810 to 1894; autograph manuscript of "An Oration on the Revival of Learning" by John Martin Vanharlingen, 1817; five additional papers of Peter Force, 1823 to 1856; photostats of seven letters and two documents of Andrew Jackson [1828] to 1845 (originals in the possession of Mr. Charles C. Hart); two volumes of transcripts, records of marriages and deaths, Millbury and Springfield, Massachusetts, 1837 to 1895; letter from S. G. Simmons to I. M. Bowman, May 8, 1839; letters from John and Josiah Gregg, "To The Commanding Officer of the Escort of Dragoons for the Santa Fé Caravan . . ." May 12, 1839; additional papers of the Breckinridge family, 1853 to 1943; microfilm of the diary of Charles Ross Parke, American physician in Russia, 1855 to 1856; one volume of "Press Notices of William L. Marcy"; papers of John Hancock Douglas, 1861 to 1885, including notes from Ulysses S. Grant, written during Grant's last illness; microfilm of letters from Henry Clay Weaver to Cornelia Wiley, 1861 to 1865; thirty-six letters from George Haven Putnam to Mary Hillard, January 24, 1863, to June 12, 1865; one box of papers of Charles S. Sperry, *ca.* 1863 to 1885; photostats of twenty-eight letters and documents, chiefly of American statesmen and authors, 1863 to 1892 (originals in the possession of Mr. John Knight, Secretary, The Players); photostat of letter from Abraham Lincoln to Stephen A. Hurlbut, November 14, 1864; additional papers of William T. Sherman, 1864 to 1883; letter from Ulysses S. Grant to Samuel H. Roberts, March 12, 1865; one volume of reminiscences of Mrs. Philip Phillips during the Civil War; one large box of papers of Daniel O. Drennan, largely relating to the Civil War; papers of and collected by George H. Stuart, chiefly of the Civil War period; letter from Edwin Booth to Ulysses S. Grant, September 11, 1867; autograph copy of "Professional Base Ball Record for 1871" compiled by Henry Chadwick; photostat of letter from Edward Bulwer-Lytton [to his tobacconist]; letter from J. Doležal to Samuel Smiles, November 1, 1876; microfilm of scrapbook of Cassius M. Clay, jr., 1877 to 1912; letter from V. E. Mourek to Samuel Smiles, February 21, 1877; memorandum of William Boyd, Superintendent of Sculpture Work in the building of the Library of Congress, April 2 [1891] to July 12, 1893; diary of Sarah J. Churchill, March 28 to November

29, 1900; five boxes of papers of Albert Jay Nock, *ca.* 1911 to 1931; additional papers of Vinnie Ream; typescript copies of records relating to World War I, by Wendell Endicott; nine boxes of papers of James H. Wilson; autograph manuscripts of "Strange Affair at a Hotel" and "Books and Persons" by Arnold Bennett; autograph comments by Lewis Werner on Galsworthy's plays with corrections in Galsworthy's hand; letter from Paul-Marie Masson, February 28, [19]31; nine file drawers and six chests of papers of Mark L. Bristol (restricted); sixteen boxes of genealogical notes on the kinsmen of John Law and Roger Barton, collected by Adolph Law Voge; three boxes of the papers of Clarence Darrow (restricted); seven military pass books and two diaries of German soldiers, 1942 to 1944; two boxes of papers relating to the Service Men's Art Center and Contact Bureau, San Francisco, California, *ca.* 1942 to 1945; additional editorial correspondence of *Harper's Magazine*, 1943; photostats of letter from Cyril Clemens to Harlan F. Stone, August 16, 1945, and of Chief Justice Stone's reply, August 24, 1945; six additional boxes of papers of the Writers' War Board (restricted); two letters from Elizabeth P. Chevalier to Lavinia L. Dock, January 18, and March 21, 1946; papers used by Edith R. Curtis in the preparation of her volume on Lady Sarah Lennox; additional papers of the Riggs family (restricted); eight large boxes of papers of, or relating to, William Harrison Polk, including genealogical notes; and four hundred and forty-six packages of papers of William Allen White (restricted). The Library has now acquired full ownership of certain collections hitherto on deposit, particularly the William C. Rives Collection of Rives Family Papers, the Robert Ogden Collection, and a Melchite Office-Book of the thirteenth or fourteenth century.

The National Archives continues to receive substantial quantities of records of World War II. Among those recently received are the records of the United States Ballot Commission; the records of the Fair Employment Practices Committee, except a few papers being used in liquidating the agency; the Fort Ontario Emergency Refugee Shelter files and other field records of the War Relocation Authority; additional records of the Foreign Broadcast Intelligence Service, consisting chiefly of 11,000 recordings of enemy broadcasts; recordings of Office of War Information broadcasts to Japan, including those made by Navy Captain E. M. Zacharias; records of the New Delhi and Stockholm offices of the Office of Strategic Services; and enemy motion pictures captured in Europe and the Pacific. Of note among other accessions are records of United States delegations at various international conferences, 1923-38, and scattered pardon records, 1800-1850, which have been missing from the State Department's pardon files and which were found in the custody of another agency. The National Archives of Cuba, through its director, Captain Joaquín Llaverías, has presented the National Archives with sixty-five handsomely bound volumes of photostatic copies of documents in its custody relating to the United States. The documents reproduced (145) were

selected chiefly from two series, "Asuntos Politicos" and "Floridas," and were accompanied by an inventory in Spanish. This gift makes available to scholars in the United States a valuable collection of unpublished documents. Recent publications of the National Archives include an essay on *The Appraisal of Current and Recent Records*, by G. Philip Bauer, a revised edition of *How To Dispose of Records*, and a brief guide to the holdings of the National Archives, entitled *Your Government's Records in the National Archives*. Copies may be obtained from the assistant administrative secretary of the National Archives.

Dr. E. Ashworth Underwood, director of the Wellcome Historical Medical Museum, 183/193 Euston Road, London, N.W.1, announces that a catalogue of the extensive library of the museum is being prepared, but that it will be some time before this work will be published. Meanwhile, if any person who is preparing a bibliography of the works of any writer in the field of medicine or the allied sciences, desires to include the location of known copies of the different works, Dr. Underwood will be pleased to send him on request a list of the various works and separate editions of that writer which are in the library of the Wellcome Historical Medical Museum. Applications should be made to him in writing.

Russel B. Nye of the department of English in Michigan State College, East Lansing, is embarking on a study of Robert M. La Follette and the progressive movement. He would welcome any materials, such as periodicals or manuscript records, that might bear on the topic, particularly on the earlier or Wisconsin phase.

Arthur J. Marder, who is working on a history of British naval policy, 1904-1919, has had access to the correspondence of Lord Fisher, which he plans to publish in three volumes. He would be gratified for the loan of any letters in this country—the originals, if possible—which were not loaned to Admiral Fisher's literary executors at any time. Communications may be addressed to Dr. Marder at the University of Hawaii, Honolulu, T. H.

At the Illinois State Historical Library in Springfield, Hubert Schmidt, author of *Rural Hunterdon: An Agricultural History*, is editing for publication the library's Black Hawk War papers, and M. L. Flaningam, a research editor at the library, is cataloguing for publication source material on the state's civilian contribution to the war effort.

Guggenheim fellowships have been awarded to the following historians: *Post-service fellowships*. Stephen Addison Larrabee, Waterville, Maine, recently captain, Army, a critical and historical study of Hellenism in American literature from the foundation of the Republic to 1860; Franz Rosenthal, research analyst,

State Department, recently technical sergeant, Army, studies of Muslim historiography. *Latin-American fellowships.* Julio J. L. Le Riverend Brusone, fellow from Cuba at the Center for Historical Studies, College of Mexico, a study of the development of the sugar industry in Cuba from its beginning until 1860; Pedro Armillas, archaeologist, National Institute of Anthropology, and professor, National School of Anthropology, Mexico, D. F., comparative studies of the pre-Columbian cultures of the southeastern United States and of Mexico and Central America; Carlos Bosch-García, research scholar, College of Mexico, studies in the field of Mexican diplomatic history.

The Rockefeller Foundation has awarded postwar fellowships in the humanities to the following historians: Knight Biggerstaff (Department of State), Cornell University, Chinese history; Eugene P. Boardman (major, USMCR), Fort Atkinson, Wisconsin, Chinese history; Charles G. Crampton (War Department), Berkeley, California, Latin-American history; John K. Fairbank (OWI), Harvard University, Chinese history; McGregor Gray (lieutenant, AUS), Bard College, ancient and classical history; John Whitney Hall (lieutenant, USNR), Cincinnati, Ohio, Far Eastern history; Jack T. Johnson (ensign, USNR), University of Iowa, American history and Russian studies; Tom B. Jones (lieutenant, USNR), University of Minnesota, ancient history; Ulysses G. Lee, jr. (captain, AUS), Washington, D. C., American Negro history; Rodney C. Loehr (lieutenant, AUS), University of Minnesota, American history; Alfred Simpson Martin (lieutenant colonel, AUS), Ambler, Pennsylvania, American history; Saul K. Padover (lieutenant colonel, OSS), New York, European history; Earl Hampton Pritchard (War Department), Wayne University, Far Eastern history; Edward Hetzel Schafer, jr. (lieutenant, USNR), Cincinnati, Ohio, Chinese culture and history; Carl Emil Schorske (lieutenant, j.g., USNR), Scarsdale, New York, Central European history and international relations; George Edward Taylor (OWI), University of Washington, Far Eastern history; Bell Irvin Wiley (major, AUS), University of Mississippi, American history; Robert Lee Wolff (OSS), Fairfax, Virginia, modern eastern European history. This listing is not complete, but all funds for the awards have been expended.

The Department of State, upon the recommendation of its advisory committee on the exchange of students, has awarded grants for study in the other American republics to the following United States graduate students: Robert Jackson Alexander, a study of collective bargaining and labor relations in Chile; Robert C. Beyer, the history of the coffee industry in Colombia; Thomas Ewing Cotner, jr., the political career of José J. Herrera of Mexico; Milton Jon Klevens, a survey of the conservation practices relating to forests and watershed areas in Colombia; Allison Williams Bunkley, a study of the political philosophy and artistic accomplishments of Domingo Faustino Sarmiento of Argentina; Ellen Irene Diggs, a

study entitled "The Negro in Uruguay, Past and Present"; Theresa M. Picciano, a study of comparative literature; Robert Jones Shafer, a dissertation entitled "The *Sociedad Economica de Amigos del Pais* in Guatemala"; Sonja Petra Karsen, a study of the life and works of Guillermo Valencia of Colombia.

At a meeting of the committee on grants-in-aid of research of the Institute of Early American History and Culture held in Williamsburg May 9, 1946, awards were made to the following: Douglass Graybil Adair, assistant professor of history, College of William and Mary, for the completion of a book on "The Intellectual Backgrounds of Jeffersonian Democracy"; Lewis Leary, assistant professor of English, Duke University, for the completion of a study of "The Life of St. George Tucker and an Edition of His Writings"; and William Guire North of the Dublin School, Dublin, New Hampshire, for the completion of a manuscript on the "Political and Social Backgrounds of the Dartmouth College Case."

Those who wish to compete for the Alexander Prize, awarded annually by the Royal Historical Society, must send their essays on or before February 28, 1947. For the requirements of the award, see *American Historical Review*, October, 1945, p. 191.

Through the American Council of Learned Societies, the London Institute of Archaeology invited twenty-five American students to participate in archaeological excavations which were made in the summer of 1946 in the "blitzed" areas of Great Britain, including London, Canterbury, and Exeter. The early reports indicate some interesting finds especially in the London area.

In October, 1943, General Arnold of the Army Air Forces asked a committee of historians to make a study of Germany's war potential, or, more specifically, of the probable impact of the air bombardment of Germany. For this purpose they were permitted access to any relevant information the War Department had been able to gather. Their report, classified as secret, was made in January, 1944. An Army Air Force release says "It was a remarkably accurate forecast of the things that ultimately came to pass." Major (later Lieutenant Colonel) Frank Monaghan, who was in charge of the impromptu seminar, was personally commended and decorated, and certificates of appreciation were given to the members of the committee—the late Professor Carl Becker, of Cornell University; Professor Arthur C. Cole, then of Western Reserve University, now of Brooklyn College; Professor Henry Steele Commager, of Columbia University; Professor Louis Gottschalk, of the University of Chicago; Dr. Elias A. Lowe, of the Institute for Advanced Study; Dr. Dumas Malone, now of Columbia University; Professor Bernadotte E. Schmitt, then of the University of Chicago, now of the Department of State; and Professor J. Duane Squires, of Colby Junior College.

The *United Nations Weekly Bulletin* began publication on August 3, 1946. French and English texts and later other language editions will be available. The annual subscription is \$6.00 and individual numbers are priced at fifteen cents. Orders and subscriptions may be sent to International Documents Service, Columbia University Press, 2960 Broadway, New York 27, New York.

The Social Science Research Council, aided by a grant from the Rockefeller Foundation, has undertaken to place gift sets of American social science books and monographs published since 1939 in forty university libraries in European countries occupied by Germany during the war. The value of the collection sent to each library will exceed \$1,000. The first shipments left New York early in July. The project is under the direction of Dr. Thorsten Sellin, professor of sociology and chairman of the department in the University of Pennsylvania.

The creation of a medieval institute at the University of Notre Dame has been announced, the director to be the Very Reverend Gerald B. Phelan, who since 1937 has been president of the Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, Toronto, Canada. The Mediaeval Institute will be a distinct and independent academic unit within the university, and only holders of the bachelor's degree with special preparation will be admitted. "It will be primarily a research institution, devoted to an intensive study of the life and thought of the Middle Ages, the critical editions of unpublished materials, the publication of scholarly studies and critical analyses of available sources, the tracing of currents of thought and movements of civilization and, in general, whatever may advance the knowledge and understanding of Catholic mediaeval culture."

The Institute of Asiatic Affairs of the University of Colorado was formed last year for the purpose of advancing the study of Asiatic history and of the Asiatic countries. Earl Swisher, associate professor of history in the university, is director.

At a meeting at the Lee House in Richmond on July 8 the members of the Virginia Historical Society voted approval of the proposed merger with the Confederate Memorial Society. The purposes of both societies will be retained, including the maintenance of Battle Abbey.

Personal

Henry Eldridge Bourne, a member of the department of history of Western Reserve University from 1892 to 1930, died in his home in Cleveland Heights on June 19. His death occurred only a few weeks after that of his life-long friend and colleague, Dean Elbert Jay Benton. For over a third of a century these two men

dominated the department of history at Western Reserve University: Dean Benton in Adelbert College and Professor Bourne in Mather College. Professor Bourne enjoyed great success as a teacher, scholar, administrator, and editor. From 1893 to 1901 he was registrar at the College for Women, now Mather College; from 1892 to 1930 professor of history; from 1926 to 1936 a member of the board of editors, and from 1929 to 1936 editor of the *American Historical Review*; and since 1930 professor emeritus of history. In addition to numerous articles and book reviews, some of his publications are: *The Teaching of History and Civics* (1902); *Medieval and Modern History* (1905); *Revolutionary Period in Europe* (1914); and *The First Hundred Years: A History of the Church of the Covenant in Cleveland* (1946). Also he was joint author of *Introductory American History* (1912); *History of the United States* (1913); and *Story of America and Great Americans* (1923). But an enumeration of his degrees, positions, and publications would not do justice to Professor Bourne. His greatest contribution was his influence on his students and colleagues. Every college and university in the United States has the tradition of a great personality, but certainly none can claim one who made a more lasting impression than he made on generations of Mather students. His history majors organized the Alumnae Historical Association of Flora Stone Mather College, and only Professor Bourne's extreme modesty prevented them from naming it the Henry Eldridge Bourne Association. Once a year this association meets, and so great is the tradition that on more than one occasion every class between that of 1893 and 1929 has been represented by at least one member. The annual meeting in 1946 drew large numbers from these classes. In addition the alumnae of Mather have endowed the Henry Eldridge Bourne Lectureship to bring to the Mather campus once a year an outstanding historian. Bourne's students and colleagues appreciated the part he played in the public life of Cleveland and they rejoiced in his success as a scholar and as editor of the *American Historical Review*, but these triumphs seemed small to them in comparison with the influence he had on individuals. Many historians belong to the entire country or to a section of the country, but Professor Bourne, fundamentally, belonged to Mather College of Western Reserve University.

Louis Pelzer, professor of history at the State University of Iowa and, since 1941, managing editor of the *Mississippi Valley Historical Review*, died suddenly on June 28, 1946, at the age of sixty-seven. He was a true son of Iowa. Here he was born, here educated, here he won his bachelor's degree and the doctorate of philosophy, and here he had a long and successful career as a teacher—for a few years in the public schools and then, for thirty-five years, on the history faculty of the State University. His teaching and research in the field of the history of the West established a tradition. Under his guiding hand at least a score of young scholars received the doctorate, and many more the master's degree. And his influence widened as his students carried on in various schools, colleges, and uni-

versities. Moreover, in addition to his work in Iowa, Dr. Pelzer accepted calls to teach in the summer sessions of the universities of Cornell, Missouri, Nebraska, and Wyoming. In 1936 he was honored with the presidency of the Mississippi Valley Historical Association, and in 1946 was elected first vice-president of the American Association of University Professors. In spite of his teaching and editorial duties, Dr. Pelzer found time to be a creative scholar as well. From his pen came such books as *Augustus Caesar Dodge* (1907), *Henry Dodge* (1911), and *The Cattleman's Frontier* (1936). Numerous articles in his special field appear in various learned journals, among them the *Mississippi Valley Historical Review*, the *Iowa Journal of History and Politics*, and the *Harvard Journal of Economic and Business History*.

William Thomas Morgan, professor of European history, died of coronary occlusion at his home in Bloomington on June 9, 1946, at the age of sixty-three. Professor Morgan, descended of Welsh ancestors who had settled in eastern Ohio, received his first encouragement toward historical scholarship during his undergraduate days at Ohio University from Professors Martzoff and Elson. At Harvard and Yale, where he did his graduate work, he wrote his thesis under the direction of Professor W. C. Abbott on *English Political Parties and Leaders in the Reign of Queen Anne*. This was awarded the Herbert Baxter Adams Prize of the American Historical Association in 1919 and published by the Yale University Press. Mr. Morgan's regular teaching was in the public schools of Ohio, at Iowa State Teachers College, 1913-14, at Columbia University, 1916-19, and at Indiana University, 1919-46. He taught during summer sessions at Ohio University, University of Iowa, Boston University, University of Michigan, and Duke University. Professor Morgan was an effective teacher on both the undergraduate and graduate levels. He was seriously concerned with the progress of his students in his classes and after leaving the university. With his teaching he found time for an unusual amount of research in his special field, the history of England during the reign of Queen Anne. During summers and on leave of absence he worked in all the important libraries and archives in the United States and western Europe. Besides the work referred to above, he published a *Bibliography of British History, 1700-1715*, a number of syllabuses and guides, and more than fifty articles in scholarly magazines and periodicals. He left unpublished the manuscripts for two volumes, "Early Eighteenth Century British Elections, 1700-1733" and "A Comprehensive History of British Political Parties."

Henri Hauser, whose death at the age of 79 occurred recently, occupied an important place among French historians for the past half century. Until his retirement shortly before the outbreak of the second World War he was professor of economic history at the Sorbonne. His reputation was world wide; he had many friends in this country, where he served for a time as exchange professor at Har-

vard. His contributions to economic history took the form of a very large number of articles, many of which were collected in three books: *Ouvriers du temps passé* (1899), *Travailleurs et marchands dans l'ancienne France* (1920), *Les débuts du Capitalisme* (1927). While not all of equal body, some of these articles were contributions of much importance to our knowledge of sixteenth and seventeenth century history. Professor Hauser was more responsible than anyone else for showing that in France the organization of workers in guilds reached its height not in the Middle Ages but in the seventeenth century. This thesis, which he first announced in 1899, is a most fruitful one and has not yet been fully exploited. Like his lectures on economic history at the Sorbonne, Professor Hauser's articles are full of suggestive and valuable ideas that can be followed up to great advantage. His work in economic history deserves more study than it has received. Hauser wisely saw economic history always in its relation to general history, and the larger part of his output had the object of facilitating more general studies. He contributed four volumes dealing with the sixteenth century to the standard French bibliography, *Les sources de l'histoire de France*. He was co-author with Monsieur Renaudet of one volume on the Renaissance and Reformation in the series "Peuples et Civilisations" and wrote the entire subsequent volume himself. It appeared in 1933 under the title *La prépondérance espagnole, 1559-1660*. While at work on these and other studies and while in charge for France of the investigation undertaken by an International Committee into the history of prices, M. Hauser managed to maintain a lively interest in the great educational and political issues of his time. As long ago as 1903 he published an inquiry into the teaching of the social sciences in various countries. *Germany's Commercial Grip on the World*, which appeared during the first World War, was the work of a French patriot as well as of a learned observer of imperialism. His writings, combined with his race, put his life in jeopardy when the Nazis conquered France. He had returned from retirement at the beginning of the war to teach in the University of Rennes. In the summer of 1940 he escaped to the south and hid from the invader, but his fine library was confiscated and probably destroyed. It is a testimony to the vitality of French scholarship that he managed to keep up his scholarly work during the occupation, in old age, with failing eyesight, and under the most unfavorable material conditions. He completed a book on the economic thought of Richelieu, a subject that had intrigued him for at least two decades.

Gaston Gérard Dept, professor of history in the University of Ghent, died suddenly early in May, 1946. He had been selected by the Belgian-American Foundation as one of the scholars invited to come to America during the coming year, but his medical advisers informed him some months ago that he should not accept such an appointment. It was with deep regret and great reluctance that he finally resigned the appointment which would have permitted him to visit again in the United States. Dept was born at Ostend on June 5, 1900. In 1935 he married

Mlle. Yvonne Van Beckhoven, who survives him, as does a young son. He was one of that fine group of Belgian scholars trained by Henri Pirenne at Ghent and he later spent a year studying at Harvard under Haskins. His chief interests were history and geography, both of which he taught at Ghent. He contributed many articles and reviews to Belgian and French journals. His most extensive contribution was *Les influences anglaise et française dans le Comté de Flandre au début du XIII^e siècle*, published by the University of Ghent in 1928.

Wolfgang Michael, for over forty years a professor of history in Freiburg, died in Switzerland on February 22, 1945, in his eighty-third year. In 1937 the Nazis withdrew his *venia docendi* but did not otherwise persecute him. His main work was the five-volume *Englische Geschichte im achtzehnten Jahrhundert*. The first volume appeared in 1896 and the fifth in 1945.

William Miller, one of the first authorities in the world on medieval Greek history and the Balkans, died in Durban, South Africa, on October 23, 1945, in his eightieth year. When Dr. Miller escaped from Greece in 1941, his fine library was stolen or destroyed by the Germans. In 1903 he became *Morning Post* (London) correspondent in Rome and remained there for twenty years, but finding the Fascist regime irksome to his liberalism, he retired in 1923 to Athens, which became his home until 1941. Dr. Miller was made an honorary LL.D. of Athens University; he was also an honorary student of the British School in Athens, where he spent much time editing the journals and papers of Finlay, Hastings, and Jarvis. In his own Greek studies he followed in the footsteps of Finlay and Hopf, with special attention to the romantic age of the dukes of Athens and the Archipelago, and of the princes of Achaia. From these studies sprang his principal work, *The Latins in the Levant: 1204-1556* (London, 1908), which was translated into Greek by Lambros. In his later years Dr. Miller devoted much study to English philhellenes and early English residents in Greece, and the history and development of modern Athens. Among Dr. Miller's other books mention must be made of *Essays on the Latin Orient* (Cambridge, England, 1921), *The Ottoman Empire and Its Successors: 1801-1936* (Cambridge, 1927-36), *A History of the Greek People: 1821-1921* (London, 1922), *Trebizond, the Last Greek Empire* (1926), *The Balkans* (Birmingham, 1896), *The Latin Orient* (1920), *The English in Athens before 1821*, *The Early Years of Modern Athens*, *The Turkish Restoration in Greece: 1718-1797* (1921), *Greek Life in Town and Country* (1905), *Greece*, 1928 (1928). He also contributed chapters on medieval Greece and the Balkans to the *Cambridge Medieval History* and was a frequent reviewer in this journal.

Early L. Fox, Vaughan professor of history and political science in Randolph Macon College, Ashland, Virginia, was killed July 24 when a bus in which he was

a passenger collided with a truck. Professor Fox was born in Brownston, Virginia, February 9, 1890. He was graduated from Randolph Macon in 1909 and received his doctor's degree from the Johns Hopkins University in 1917. He was the author of a monograph on *The American Colonization Society, 1817 to 1840* (1919).

Arthur S. Turberville, who had held the chair of modern European history in the University of Leeds since 1929, died on May 9 at the age of fifty-seven.

Sir Charles Oman, fellow of All Souls since 1883 and Chichele professor of modern history in Oxford since 1905, died June 23 in his eighty-seventh year. In his long and distinguished career he covered in his publications many lands and many ages. He made military history his chief concern and in this field he was truly pre-eminent. For over thirty years there appeared the successive volumes of his monumental *History of the Peninsular War*. His volumes on the *Art of War in the Middle Ages* and on the *Art of War in the Sixteenth Century* show that he could focus his scholarship with illumination in something less than serial volumes.

Ray Stannard Baker, the distinguished publicist and authorized biographer of Woodrow Wilson, died on July 12 at the age of seventy-six. With the late William E. Dodd, later ambassador to Germany, he edited *The Public Papers of Woodrow Wilson*, which was published in six volumes in 1925-26. In 1927 the first two volumes, *Youth* and *Princeton*, of the eight-volume biography, *Woodrow Wilson, Life and Letters*, were published. For the last two volumes, *War Leader* and *The Armistice*, he received the Pulitzer Prize for biography in 1940.

Victor Hugo Paltsits has been named by the New Brunswick Museum of Saint John, N. B., Canada, as its first honorary member, and its highest award, given in recognition of his contributions to Canadian history and bibliography during half a century.

Edward Mead Earle, of the Institute for Advanced Study at Princeton, has been awarded the Medal for Merit, the highest decoration available to a civilian for war service.

The Royal Society of Canada has awarded the Tyrrell medal to Professor A. L. Burt of the University of Minnesota for his outstanding contribution to Canadian history.

Christiana McFayden, assistant professor in the department of history in the Woman's College of the University of North Carolina, has been awarded the Wolf fellowship in history at the University of Chicago.

Arthur E. Bestor, jr., associate professor of history in Stanford University, has been granted a Newberry fellowship for research in American intellectual and social history at the Newberry Library from August through December, 1946.

Philip K. Hitti, head of the department of Oriental languages at Princeton University, is in the Near East for a four months lecture and research tour under the sponsorship of the Lebanese government and the cultural co-operation program of the Department of State.

Bernadotte E. Schmitt, at his own request, has been made professor emeritus of the University of Chicago and has resigned as editor of the *Journal of Modern History*, effective September 30, 1946. He is now serving as special adviser to the Division of Policy Research in the Department of State.

In order that he may devote himself to the work ahead of him in completing his *British Empire before the American Revolution*, Lehigh University has made Lawrence H. Gipson research professor of history, freeing him after July 1 from any but optional teaching and attaching him to the Lehigh Institute of Research.

Leo Gershoy, formerly of Sarah Lawrence College, has been appointed professor of history in New York University. In the same institution André Alden Beaumont has been promoted to professor and Harold Hulme to associate professor of history.

George P. Hammond, formerly dean of the graduate school of the University of New Mexico, has been appointed director of the Bancroft Library and professor of history in the University of California, Berkeley.

B. B. Kendrick, who retired last year as professor and head of the department of history and political science in the Woman's College of the University of North Carolina, is still seriously ill in a rest home at Gardiner, Maine.

Clarence Crane Brinton has been elected McLean professor of ancient and modern history, and Frederick Merk has been elected Gurney professor of history and political science in Harvard University.

Northwestern University announces the appointment of Gray C. Boyce, formerly of Princeton University, as professor of medieval history and L. S. Stavrianos, formerly of Smith College, as associate professor of Russian and Near Eastern history.

Jarvis M. Morse, who left the staff of Brown University in 1941 for govern-

ment service, has been appointed director of the Education Section, U. S. Savings Bonds Division of the Treasury Department.

Harlow Lindley, secretary, editor, and librarian of the Ohio State Archaeological and Historical Society, retired June 30. John O. Marsh, curator of history, has been appointed acting librarian for the remainder of the year. Dr. Lindley has gone to Earlham College as director of historical research and library consultant.

Nelson Vance Russell, formerly professor of history in Carleton College, has accepted the presidency of Carroll College, Waukesha, Wisconsin.

Clement Eaton, formerly of Lafayette College, has accepted an appointment as professor of history in the University of Kentucky. He succeeds Wendell Stephenson, who has gone to Tulane University.

David Edward Owen has been promoted to professor of history in Harvard University. He is the present chairman of the department.

Shepard Clough has been promoted to a full professorship in Columbia University.

At the College of Wooster (Ohio) Aileen Dunham succeeds William J. Hail (retiring) as head of the department of history. Clayton S. Ellsworth has been promoted to a full professorship, and Robert Walcott, jr., formerly of Black Mountain College, has been appointed assistant professor of history.

The department of history of Princeton University announces the promotion of Robert R. Palmer to professor of history and the appointment of Theodor E. Mommsen as assistant professor.

Bernard Mayo of the University of Virginia is a visiting lecturer on history in Harvard University for the academic year 1946-47.

Clarence Perkins, professor of history and head of the combined departments of American and European history in the University of North Dakota, served as visiting professor of history at the University of Texas during July and August, a position which he also held the previous summer.

Peter Charanis has been promoted to associate professor of history in Rutgers University.

Chalmers G. Davidson, director of the library and associate professor of history of Davidson College, has been promoted to be director of the library and professor

of history. In the same institution, Edward O. Guerrant, formerly of the California Institute of Technology and lately of the Department of State in Washington, has accepted an appointment as associate professor of history and international relations.

W. Turrentine Jackson has been promoted to associate professor of American history at Iowa State College.

Francis L. Berkeley, jr., succeeds Lester J. Cappon as curator of manuscripts in the Alderman Library of the University of Virginia. William Harris Gaines, jr., will be associated with him as senior assistant in charge of manuscripts.

Henry Howard Eddy, formerly acting state archivist of the state of New York, has been appointed head of the Division of Archives and Manuscripts of the North Carolina State Department of Archives and History.

Arthur Meier Schlesinger, jr., has been appointed associate professor of history in Harvard University. He will go into residence in 1947.

Millard K. Bushong has accepted a position as associate professor of history at the University of Richmond.

At Bard College Felix E. Hirsch has been promoted to the rank of professor of European history and Anthony Garvan appointed instructor in history.

Cloyd W. Paskins has been appointed associate professor of history in Elon College, North Carolina.

Amos A. Ettinger, formerly of Lehigh University, and Amy Gilbert, formerly of Rhode Island State College, have been appointed visiting professors of history in Temple University for the year 1946-47. J. Richard Jones, formerly of Rhode Island State College, has been appointed assistant professor and Frances Manges has been appointed instructor in history at the same institution.

Woodbridge Bingham has been promoted to associate professor and Walton E. Bean to assistant professor of history in the University of California, Berkeley.

Charles van Ravensway has been appointed director of the Missouri Historical Society.

Alfred Larson of the University of Wyoming has been promoted to associate professor of history and is serving as acting head of the department for the academic year 1946-47.

The State University of Iowa announces that Chester W. Clark, associate professor of history, has resigned, George L. Mosse has been promoted to an assistant professorship in European history, Robert Stuart Hoyt has been appointed assistant professor of medieval history, and Ernest E. Ramsaur, jr., has been appointed instructor in modern European history.

Richard Hofstadter has been appointed assistant professor of history in Columbia University.

Theodore Saloutos has been promoted to assistant professor of history in the University of California at Los Angeles.

C. H. Peake has resigned as assistant professor of Chinese in Columbia University to remain in government service.

John J. Johnson of the University of California, Berkeley, has accepted an appointment as acting assistant professor in history at Stanford University for 1946-47.

Kenneth M. Stampp has accepted an appointment as assistant professor of history in the University of California, Berkeley.

Sidney G. Morse, formerly of Massachusetts Institute of Technology, is now assistant professor of history in Norwich University, Northfield, Vermont.

Ossip K. Flechtheim has been appointed assistant professor of history and government at Colby College for 1946-47.

Robert J. Campbell, formerly part-time instructor at George Washington University, has been appointed assistant professor of American history in Clark University.

Milton V. Anastos has been promoted to assistant professor of Byzantine theology in Harvard University. He divides his time between teaching in Cambridge and research at the Dumbarton Oaks Research Library and Collection in Washington, D. C.

Nelson Waite Rightmyer has been promoted from lecturer to assistant professor of ecclesiastical history in the Divinity School of the Episcopal Church in Philadelphia.

John W. Long, jr., has been appointed assistant professor of history in Western College, Oxford, Ohio.

Frank Freidel has accepted an appointment as assistant professor of history in Pennsylvania State College.

LeRoy H. Fischer has been appointed assistant professor of history in Oklahoma Agricultural and Mechanical College.

Carl Vincent Confer has been appointed assistant professor of history in Syracuse University.

Douglas S. Brown has resigned his position at Temple University to accept appointment as assistant professor of economics at the Pennsylvania State College.

Samuel C. McCulloch has gone to the University of Michigan as visiting assistant professor of history.

Carey V. Stabler, formerly assistant professor of history in Alabama College, has been appointed assistant to the president in that institution.

Arthur W. Silver has been appointed assistant professor of history at Temple University.

Delmer M. Brown, George V. Lantzeff, and George M. McCune have been appointed lecturers with special reference to Far Eastern history in the University of California, Berkeley.

Albin T. Anderson and David L. Dowd have been appointed instructors in history in the University of Nebraska.

Richard M. Leighton has been appointed instructor in history in the University of Cincinnati.

Seymour J. Pomrenze, who has been in charge of the Offenbach Archival Collecting Depot in the American Zone of Military Government, is now librarian of the National Archives.

Alfred Low, formerly of Wells College, has been appointed assistant professor of history and political science in Marietta College.

Raymond H. Fisher of Humboldt State College, California, has been appointed assistant professor of history in the University of California at Los Angeles.

Charles T. Leavitt has been appointed assistant professor of history in Iowa State Teachers College.

Alban W. Hoopes has been appointed assistant professor of history at Hartwick College, Oneonta, New York.